Territorial Integrity Treaties and Armed Conflict over Territory

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Abstract: Recent research suggests that a norm of territorial integrity spread rapidly across the globe during the twentieth century, leading to a dramatic reduction in the forcible acquisition of territory. This article offers a new conceptualization and measurement of this norm, and pushes the analysis of the norm's effects in new directions. Conceptually, we distinguish between a norm guaranteeing territorial integrity in a general sense and one that only proscribes the acquisition of territory by force, and we measure the changing strength of the norm based on states' acceptance of treaties with explicit provisions of each type. We also argue that the successful acquisition of territory by force is not the best way to test the impact of this norm, and that even unsuccessful attempts to acquire territory constitute violations of the norm. Over the past two centuries, the general territorial integrity norm appears to have reduced territorial conflict, but treaties proscribing only violent territorial gains appear to have been associated with increased conflict over territory. The norm's strongest effects appear to stem from pressure by other states that have accepted it rather than from a direct impact of the treaties on interactions between signatories. Finally, most territorial integrity treaties have come into effect following a reduction in territorial tension and few appear to have had a significant effect on territorial conflict while in effect, suggesting that there may be important selection effects to consider in further research on this topic.

In a recent article, Zacher (2001) discusses a territorial integrity norm that spread across the globe in the twentieth century. He describes this norm, encapsulated first in the League of Nations Covenant and more recently in the United Nations Charter and numerous regional treaties, as rejecting attempts to change the territorial status quo through the threat or use of force. Zacher's evidence suggests that once the norm became widespread, there were relatively few cases of successful territorial aggrandizement in the first three decades since World War II, and none since the mid-1970s.

Although Zacher's evidence initially seems persuasive, the underlying norm appears to involve more than just the avoidance of successful challenges to the territorial status quo; any attempt to acquire territory forcibly would seem to violate the norm. While there have been relatively few cases of successful territorial aggrandizement since World War II, Zacher notes forty such attempts during this peaceful period. Furthermore, many of the international treaties
that include territorial integrity provisions offer blanket guarantees of signatories' territorial integrity, not just condemnation of the forcible acquisition of territory. We thus reconceptualize the territorial integrity norm to distinguish between general guarantees of territorial integrity and the rejection of force for acquiring territory.

We measure the evolving strength of the territorial integrity norm (in both the general and violent manifestations) over two centuries of history through treaty commitments, and then examine the impact of this norm on several forms of territorial conflict. Our results suggest that the norm has had a mixed impact, with general territorial integrity obligations reducing territorial conflict but violent obligations actually associated with increased conflict. There appears to be a stronger effect associated with global acceptance of territorial integrity obligations than with potential adversaries' shared obligations from specific treaties, and few individual territorial integrity treaties have had a significant effect on territorial conflict between signatories. We conclude by discussing possible directions for future research in this area.

**Studying Territorial Integrity Norms**

Our conceptualization of international norms follows Krasner’s (1982: 186) definition as “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations.” Like Florini (1996: 364-365) and Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), we also emphasize "the sense of 'ought'" and the notion of legitimate behavior, which distinguish norms from observable behavioral regularities. A systematic analysis of a given norm must thus indicate which general class of behavior is addressed by the norm, which specific behaviors within this general class are considered legitimate, and why these behaviors are considered legitimate (rather than simply being observed empirically).
It is also important to be able to measure the strength of the norm over time, in order to examine its impact on states' behavior. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 895-905) describe the strength of norms as evolving through a "life cycle" of three stages. In the norm emergence stage, norm entrepreneurs (typically private citizens, often with organizational platforms to help spread their message) attempt to convince state leaders to follow their desired norm. In the norm cascade stage, the "norm leaders" -- states that have accepted the norm -- attempt to socialize other states to accept the norm and become "norm followers." Some budding norms may fail in either the emergence or cascade stages, if the entrepreneurs or norm leaders are unable to convince enough states to follow them. Norms that pass through the first two stages reach the norm internalization stage, by the end of which "norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate." (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895) This notion of a life cycle encourages scholars to think in terms of the evolving strength of a norm over time, allowing systematic analysis of the impact of the norm on international behavior.

Working from insights such as these, a great deal of normative scholarship has emerged in the past two decades, offering systematic examination of norms pertaining to decolonization (Goertz and Diehl 1992), alliance commitments (Kegley and Raymond 1990), and pacific dispute settlement (e.g., Dixon 1993; Mitchell 2002). Zacher (2001) has extended this list by suggesting that the past two centuries have seen the development of an important international norm against territorial changes. We now examine Zacher's characterization of this norm, before offering our own refinement of what the territorial integrity norm includes and how to measure it.

**Zacher’s Territorial Integrity Norm**
According to Zacher (2001: 215), the territorial integrity norm refers to "the growing respect for the proscription that force should not be used to alter interstate boundaries." Zacher (2001: 216-221) describes this norm as developing out of the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century. Before that time, territories frequently changed hands with the expansion or contraction of states and empires, as rulers sought to acquire more land for the purposes of increasing their own security and/or wealth; the inhabitants of the territories were not considered during the process. As nationalism developed, though, a norm began to take shape that opposed transferring one state's people to rule by another state.\(^1\) He later describes the spread of the norm as being driven by Western democracies and reflecting such factors as the association of territorial revisionism with major wars (most notably in the two world wars), liberalism's emphasis on national self-determination, and for nondemocratic states the changing costs and benefits of territorial aggrandizement (2001: 238-244).

Zacher (2001: 236) writes that the emergence phase of the territorial integrity norm began with the end of World War I, and lasted through the end of World War II. The norm began to take concrete form in the debate over the post-World War I peace settlement, and it was featured in one of Woodrow Wilson's famous Fourteen Points: "specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." The norm was first encapsulated in Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant: "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the

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\(^1\) Ironically, this norm may have sown the seeds for irredentist claims. While the norm opposes transferring control of one's own kinsmen to a foreign power, it could also be manipulated to justify a territorial claim to territory populated by one's kinsmen under a foreign ruler. Zacher recognizes this, noting (2001: 244) that states' concerns for protecting their nationals abroad "cannot be squelched, but it is much more difficult now for states to embark on attempts to protect and absorb fellow nationals in foreign states when their civil rights are respected."
territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." After World War I, Zacher (2001: 220-221) notes, the norm was applied unevenly; there were numerous transfers of territory from the defeated Central Powers, and the norm's supporters did little to oppose German, Italian, and Japanese conquests before the 1939 German invasion of Poland. By the end of World War II, though, the major democratic powers followed the norm much more closely, generally rejecting territorial gains at the expense of the defeated Axis; of the main Allied powers, only Russia took large pieces of Axis territory.

Zacher (2001: 236-237) describes the acceptance stage of the norm (or the cascade stage in Finnemore and Sikkink's terminology) as beginning with the adoption of the United Nations Charter and lasting until the mid-1970s: "It was not until the 1960s and early 1970s that broad and strong backing for the norm became palpable." Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter explicitly prohibited the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state, and similar principles soon began to be included in the charters of regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and Organization of African Unity (OAU) as well as in other multilateral agreements such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe's (CSCE's) Helsinki Final Act (Zacher 2001: 221-223, 237). Finally, Zacher (2001: 237) describes the institutionalization or strengthening stage of the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink's internalization stage) as running from 1976 to the present, when third parties have become involved in territorial conflicts to ensure that force does not lead to the successful acquisition of territory.^^

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2 For example, following the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait in 1991, the United Nations authorized a coalition of states from the international community to intervene and prevent a successful Iraqi acquisition of territory.
In order to determine the impact of the norm, Zacher (2001: 223-224) examines a list of major military conflicts between 1648-2000. This list includes 93 wars between 1648-1945 that involved territorial issues, and 40 between 1946-2000. Of these territorial wars, approximately 80 percent before 1945 led to the redistribution of territory, as compared to only 30 percent between 1946-2000. The number of territorial redistributions per year has also dropped substantially; the rate of redistribution since World War II is less than half that of the nineteenth century, and one-fifth that of the first half of the twentieth century. Importantly, Zacher (2001: 237) also reports that during the institutionalization stage of the norm's development (since 1975) there has not been a single major case of successful territorial aggrandizement.

Zacher's evidence appears persuasive initially, although his observation (2001: 224) that "the criteria for the inclusion of wars differs for the pre- and post-1945 years, and there is no claim of statistical significance" raises doubts. Further research seems warranted to assess the impact of this norm more systematically, employing more rigorous coding rules and standards of significance. In addition, we have several additional concerns with Zacher's approach that must be addressed before we can be confident in the impact of this norm. We are concerned with the identification of a single norm, when analysis of the relevant treaties and documents suggests two distinct norms related to territorial integrity -- one preserving the territorial integrity of all states, and one rejecting the threat or use of force against territorial integrity but permitting peaceful territorial change. We also suggest that closer attention needs to be paid to the behavior that is studied to evaluate the impact of the norm(s) in question. While successful territorial aggrandizement should indeed count as evidence against a territorial integrity norm, we believe
that the outbreak of armed conflict over territory (even if unsuccessful) should count as a violation of such a norm.³

**Reconceptualizing Territorial Integrity Norms**

We submit that instead of a single territorial integrity norm as described by Zacher, two distinct territorial integrity norms have been featured in multilateral treaties and institutions. Some treaties have specifically proscribed the acquisition of territory through the threat or use of military force; this was Zacher's primary focus. Others encapsulate the notion of territorial integrity more generally, without any explicit limitation to the rejection of forcible changes in territory. Because these latter treaties do not explicitly limit the territorial integrity obligation to rejection of violent transfers of territory, they appear to be a broader and more comprehensive norm against territorial change, and they may be expected to have different consequences for international behavior.

The first multilateral treaty to contain an explicit territorial integrity obligation, the League of Nations Covenant, proscribed the violent acquisition of territory in Article 10: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." Most other early efforts to encapsulate territorial integrity provisions in multilateral treaties followed

³ For example, Zacher notes that force has been much less successful at acquiring territory since 1945, with no successful territorial aggrandizement since 1976. Yet his data set indicates that forty territorial conflicts began between 1945-2000, thirteen of them between 1976-2000. During this same period, Huth and Allee (2002) and the ICOW project (Hensel 2001) also identify well over 100 explicit claims to territory. The fact that so many states seek territorial revisions, and that Zacher's own data set includes forty major uses of force, would seem to count as evidence against the effectiveness of a norm of territorial integrity.
similar approaches; details of each treaty are provided in this paper's Internet Appendix.\(^4\) Such treaties include the Saavedra Lamas Pact and Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States in 1930s Latin America, the United Nations Charter and the OAS Charter after World War II, and the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression and SADC Protocol on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation in contemporary Africa. In each case, the emphasis was on preventing war over territory, while still allowing peaceful transfers of territory by mutual agreement.

More recently, though, there has been a trend toward more general respect for territorial integrity provisions, with no explicit limitation to the proscription of violent acquisition of territory. The first such effort was the Locarno Pact (Pact of Mutual Guarantee) in interwar Europe, which sought to prevent Germany from challenging its western borders with France and Belgium. In Article 1 of this pact, the signatory states guaranteed "the maintenance of the territorial status quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919." German demands for territory through the threat or use of force were clearly banned by this document, but so were peaceful demands

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4 This list is based on the Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement data set, which is limited to treaties and institutions that contain at least five member states. Zacher (2001) lists several other treaties or documents as examples of territorial integrity norms that we do not include, because we do not believe that they qualify. For example, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and Pact of the League of Arab States both renounce war and call for the peaceful settlement of disputes, but neither document specifically mentions territorial integrity -- and the Arab League document explicitly rejects applying the League's obligatory peaceful settlement mechanism to territorial questions between members. Zacher (2001: 221) also describes decolonization as an example of this norm, listing 1960 and 1970 UN documents on decolonization because they called for the independence of entire colonies rather than the self-determination of each individual ethnic or tribal group. Yet this is not fully consistent with the territorial integrity norm that he describes throughout his paper, which concerns the rejection of territorial acquisition by force.
for territorial revision; the pact was intended to prevent any challenge to the Versailles settlement in Western Europe.\(^5\)

The Locarno Pact was the only such general territorial integrity obligation for more than three decades, until the decolonization of Africa in the 1960s. The borders between European colonies in Africa were often unnatural, cutting across traditional ethnic or linguistic groups and producing ill-fitting multiethnic colonial entities (Herbst 1989). As a result, leaders in the region chose to avoid uncertainty and conflict by preserving their existing colonial boundaries; it was feared that allowing challenges to any African borders on the grounds of illegitimacy could lead to the emergence of challenges against virtually every African border for the same reason.

(Malanczuk 1997: 162; Ratner 1996: 595-596; Zacher 2001: 221-223)\(^6\) The OAU Charter thus contained explicit support for territorial integrity in this general sense, rather than simply preventing the violent transfer of territory. Article 2 listed one of the purposes of the organization as "To defend [the African states'] sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and independence," while Article 3 elaborated by declaring adherence to the principle of "Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent

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\(^5\) Bell (1997: 36-37) notes that the Locarno Pact had great symbolic value in "confirming the territorial settlement in western Europe on a freely negotiated basis," and Gilbert (1984: 221-222) notes that in the eyes of the participants "the frontiers between Germany, France, and Belgium -- and the permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland -- were now recognized as final." The importance of this pact's general rejection of territorial change becomes clear when it is compared ro several other pacts that were signed at Locarno; unlike the western borders, Germany refused to accept its post-Versailles eastern borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and would only agree that those borders could not be challenged militarily.

\(^6\) A number of African leaders argued in favor of this territorial integrity provision at the OAU's 1964 Cairo summit. For example, President Tsiranana of Madagascar declared that "It is no longer possible, nor desirable, to modify the boundaries of Nations, on the pretext of racial, religious, or linguistic criteria." Despite objections from Somalia and Morocco, the resolution passed easily after just forty minutes of discussion, and the OAU adhered rigidly to the principle of the territorial status quo in subsequent years. (Chime 1969: 67; Touval 1972: 86-90)
existence." Similar provisions subsequently appeared in the Organization of the Islamic
Conference's Charter and ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia during
the 1970s; SAARC Charter and Andean Community's Declaration of Galápagos in the 1980s; the
charters of the CIS and the CICA in the 1990s; and charters or treaties associated with the
GUAM, SEECP, SCO, CSTO, and ECCAS in the 2000s. Excerpts from the relevant sections of
each treaty are provided in this paper's Internet Appendix.

This distinction between violent and general territorial integrity obligations appears to be
an important one. Most early efforts accepted the possibility of peaceful territorial change while
opposing the acquisition of territory through violent or coercive means. However, in cases such
as Locarno and the OAU even peaceful change was seen as a serious threat, and the existing
borders (whether created through Versailles or through colonization) were not to be challenged
through either peaceful or military means. If the explicit content of a norm is to be taken as a
guide to the norm's intended effects, it appears reasonable to offer the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** Militarized challenges to territory should be less likely around the world when
there is a stronger global territorial integrity norm (including either violent or general territorial
integrity provisions).

7 The CSCE's Helsinki Final Act includes several explicit provisions for territorial integrity and
the inviolability of frontiers, in line with Soviet desires for the binding territorial recognition of
the territorial changes that followed World War II (which would have qualified as a general
territorial integrity obligation). The document opens with a declaration that frontiers could be
changed peacefully with the agreement of the parties, though, which reflected West Germany's
interest in a peaceful reunification of Germany and general Western unwillingness to recognize
the East European borders as irrevocable; this qualifies the document as a violent rather than
general territorial integrity obligation. (Russell 1976: 249-253; Bowker and Williams 1985)
**Hypothesis 1a:** Violent transfers of territory should be less likely around the world when there is a stronger global territorial integrity norm (including either violent or general territorial integrity provisions).

**Hypothesis 1b:** Peaceful transfers of territory should be less likely around the world when there is a stronger global general territorial integrity norm; violent territorial integrity provisions should have little systematic impact on peaceful transfers.

While the first set of hypotheses will allow a more rigorous empirical analysis of the territorial integrity norm than has been conducted so far, aggregated analyses of global patterns may miss important effects of the norm. One reason is the standard aggregation problem; such analyses are unable to determine whether the states that have accepted territorial integrity obligations at any given point in time are the ones that engage in any observed territorial conflict. It would also be desirable to control for the impact of additional variables that are widely believed to influence conflict propensity. If most states that have accepted territorial integrity obligations would not be expected to fight each other even in the absence of such obligations, then it would be misleading to attribute their avoidance of armed conflict to the territorial integrity norm or any specific obligations embodying this norm -- that is, there may be a serious selection effect with respect to which states choose to accept territorial integrity obligations.

This discussion suggests that the impact of territorial integrity norms can be tested most appropriately using the dyadic rather than global level of analysis, examining the treaty obligations of specific pairs of potential adversaries while controlling for the impact of other factors that appear likely to affect their conflict behavior. Any meaningful effect of the territorial integrity norm should be observed best with such analyses, insofar as the treaty obligations
should be the main avenue for the norm's effects; most observers would expect the effects of the norm to be strongest for the states that have accepted its obligations in treaty form. This leads to the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2:** Militarized challenges to territory should be less likely, ceteris paribus, between states that share more territorial integrity treaty obligations (including either violent or general territorial integrity provisions).

While Hypothesis 2 examines what might be considered a direct effect of treaty obligations on the states that have signed and ratified the treaty, it is also possible that the territorial integrity norm has a more indirect effect on non-signatory states. If most states in the international system accept the norm, then their combined pressure may be sufficient to influence the behavior of non-signatory states with respect to the content of the norm. A state that does not formally accept any territorial integrity obligations could still refrain from challenging the territorial status quo because of the diplomatic or other pressure of other states that have accepted such obligations -- much like Mitchell (2002) has argued that democratic norms can influence the behavior of non-democratic states when enough of the interstate system is democratic. We introduce a further hypothesis to address this possibility:

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8 This is consistent with Zacher (2001), who considers the 1991 Gulf War to be a successful example of the territorial integrity norm. Even if Iraq apparently violated the norm by invading and annexing a neighboring state, the international effort to liberate Kuwait is considered to demonstrate the impact of an international system where the norm had been widely accepted.
**Hypothesis 3:** Militarized challenges to territory should be less likely, ceteris paribus, when there is a stronger global territorial integrity norm (including either violent or general territorial integrity provisions). -- even for states that have not accepted the norm in the form of explicit treaty obligations.

**Research Design**

These hypotheses will be tested using two approaches. First, we will undertake an analysis of global patterns of territorial conflict since 1816. This approach, similar to Zacher’s (2001) preliminary evaluation of the territorial integrity norm, will allow us to determine how much impact both violent and general territorial integrity obligations appear to have had on conflict over territory. We will supplement this with a more detailed analysis using data on specific pairs of potential adversaries, which will allow us to examine the impact of territorial integrity norms while controlling for other factors that seem likely to be relevant.

**Global Impact of Territorial Integrity Norms**

Our global analyses involve an examination of territorial conflict in the modern era, covering global history from 1816-2001 (the time span covered by the necessary data sets). The purpose is to determine whether the increasing strength of the territorial integrity norm(s) over time has been associated with a reduction in territorial conflict. This approach is similar to that used by Zacher (2001: 223-224), who examined various historical periods to compare the number of territorial conflicts that occurred and the proportion of these conflicts that led to the redistribution of territory.
We seek to improve on Zacher's analyses in several ways. First, we offer multiple measures of the changing strength of territorial integrity norms over time, which we believe will allow a more accurate assessment of the norms' impact. We also examine this impact using multiple indicators of territorial conflict, ranging from low-level armed conflict over territory to the violent transfer of territory between nation-states. Finally, whereas Zacher (2001: 224) explicitly noted that he was making no claim about the statistical significance of his results, we seek to use statistical techniques to gain a more detailed understanding of the norm's impact.9

Measuring Territorial Integrity Norms

Zacher measured the strength of the global territorial integrity norm by identifying historical eras that appear to correspond to Finnemore and Sikkink's stages of norm development, primarily by reference to international treaties and documents that seemed to embody this norm. We believe that a more accurate measurement can be made with reference to the actual treaties themselves. That is, rather than identifying historical periods that seem to fit various stages of norm development, we measure the average number of territorial integrity obligations that each state has accepted in a given year. When the average state in the system has signed and ratified more treaties with formal territorial integrity obligations, we believe that the territorial integrity norm is stronger, as states have been willing to accept and be bound by more territorial integrity provisions.

This approach identifies variation in the norm's strength within each of the various stages of norm development that Zacher identified, and appears to offer a more accurate measure of the

9 As discussed earlier, Zacher (2001: 224) also noted that the criteria for inclusion of wars changed for the post-1945 period, which is the time when he found the greatest apparent impact of the norm. Our analyses use a consistent measure of conflict across the entire period of study.
strength of the norm at any given point in time. For example, Zacher identifies the emergence phase of the norm as beginning with the League of Nations Charter, and running through the end of World War II. Yet the norm likely changed in strength over this time, as some states took on additional territorial integrity obligations, others abandoned previous obligations, and other states became independent without taking on any such obligations. Measuring the strength of the norm by specific treaty obligations allows us to determine how strong the norm was at any given point in time, based on the average obligations that each state in the international system had been willing to accept at that time.

We have already described the differences between violent and general territorial integrity obligations, and presented a list of multilateral treaties encapsulating each type of obligation. Table 1 presents the average number of territorial integrity obligations for each state in the international system, both overall and for each historical era in the territorial integrity norm as described by Zacher. There were no qualifying territorial integrity treaties of either type before 1919. During what Zacher describes as the norm’s emergence stage (1919-1945), each state has an average of 1.0 violent territorial integrity obligations per year, reflecting membership in the League of Nations for most states as well as signature of several regional treaties within South America; there is also an average of 0.03 general territorial integrity obligations, reflecting the few states in the Locarno Pact. In the norm cascade stage (1946-1975), these figures rise to 1.47 violent obligations and 0.36 general obligations, and the total commitments rises from 1.03 to 1.83 per year. Finally, in the norm internalization stage (1976-2001), violent obligations increase slightly to 1.71 and general obligations increase substantially to 1.32, for a total of 3.04 territorial integrity obligations per year. These obligations are thus consistent with Zacher’s
characterization of the various phases of the norm, with the added benefit of capturing variation in the strength of the norm within each phase in the norm's development as new states join existing treaties or new treaties are signed.

While treaty commitments or institutional memberships offer a better way to measure the strength of territorial integrity norms than categorizing several decades of history as corresponding to a specific stage of the norm, this approach does have several limitations. First, signing a treaty that includes a territorial integrity obligation implies some level of support for the territorial integrity norm, or at least some willingness to behave consistently with the norm, but there are also other reasons that a state might sign such a treaty. Particularly for large multipurpose treaties like the charters of the League of Nations, United Nations, or Organization of American States, a state may see a number of benefits to signing the treaty and joining the associated organization while not accepting every single element of the treaty or charter.

Second, it is possible to accept the norm without signing any treaties that embody it; indeed, if the norm were widely accepted throughout the world it would not need to be encapsulated in formal treaties. Furthermore, a state's commitment to the norm may strengthen over time after signing a given treaty, as the state's leaders and citizens internalize the norm or as other states or institutions push for the norm more vigorously. Conversely, a state's commitment to the norm may weaken over time after signing a treaty, as the state's leaders find that the norm conflicts with what they consider vital interests or as they observe other states violating the norm (although this weakening would be picked up by our measure if the weakening commitment led to the state's withdrawal from the treaty or institution in question).

With these caveats in mind, though, we submit that treaty commitments offer a reasonable measure of states' commitments to the territorial integrity norm, and that this measure
is more accurate than delimiting historical periods when the norm was believed to have been stronger. We believe that (ceteris paribus) when states accept treaties that include explicit territorial integrity obligations, they typically do so because they have some level of support for the norm, and furthermore states that have signed and ratified more such treaties generally have more support for the norm than states that have less. Following Zacher, we also believe that such treaties do a reasonable job of capturing the development of the norm over time; Zacher dates the first explicit phase of the norm's development from the signing of the League of Nations Charter, and his discussion of the strengthening of the norm over time is based heavily on the signing of subsequent treaties. While there may have been states that accepted this norm without signing any relevant treaties, and other states that signed such treaties without accepting the norm, we believe that treaty obligations offer a better measure of the strength of the norm than any alternative (and by not measuring the strength of the norm by the presence or absence of the proscribed behavior, this measure allows systematic empirical analysis of the norm's impact). In any case, to ensure the fairest possible test of this norm's impact, our analyses will begin by using Zacher's historical periods (1816-1918, 1919-1945, 1946-1975, and 1976-2001) as an alternative measure of the strength of the norm before measuring it by territorial integrity obligations.

*Dependent Variables*

In testing the impact of the territorial integrity norm, it is important to specify exactly which types of behavior would constitute a violation of the norm. Zacher focused on successful territorial aggrandizement by force, which he measured by major territorial aggressions that led
to the redistribution of territory. We focus on multiple forms of conflict over territory, recognizing that different treaty obligations specify different behaviors that are proscribed.

First, we are interested in the outbreak of armed conflict over territory. Unlike Zacher, we consider the threat or use of military force to be in opposition to the territorial integrity norm, because it represents the type of behavior that the norm seeks to prevent; we believe that a successful norm will prevent attempts to conquer or otherwise acquire territory by force, as well as preventing the success of such attempts when they are made. We measure this using version 3.02 of the Correlates of War (COW) militarized interstate dispute data set (Ghosn et al. 2004), using the status quo revision variables to determine whether at least one of the participants in a given dispute was attempting to modify the territorial status quo; we exclude all disputes where no disputant was attempting to do so. One potential objection to using this data set is that many militarized disputes only include isolated threats or border buildups that never escalate to more dangerous levels, and thus would not qualify as what Zacher (2001) called "territorial wars" or "major military conflicts." Our main analyses thus focus only on militarized disputes over territorial issues that led to at least one battlefield fatality, although we supplement these analyses with robustness checks using all disputes over territory as well as only those that produced at least 100 fatalities.

Following Zacher, we also recognize that the success of efforts to acquire territory is important. We thus include additional analyses examining the transfer of territory, as measured by the COW territorial change data set (Goertz and Diehl 1992). We also distinguish between territorial changes that occur through peaceful means and those that occur through organized violence. Both violent and general territorial integrity obligations seek to prevent the violent
transfer of territory, but violent obligations appear to allow the peaceful transfer of territory, making this an important distinction for analysis.

**Dyadic Impact of Territorial Integrity Norms**

The global analyses discussed so far have several important limitations. First, they are unable to determine whether the states that have accepted territorial integrity obligations at any given point in time are the ones that engage in any observed territorial conflict at that time. Second, they are unable to control for the specific characteristics of states, which might promote or reduce the likelihood of territorial conflict at any given point in time. We thus supplement the analysis of global patterns with an analysis that considers all possible dyadic adversaries, or the different pairs of states that might become involved in territorial conflict.

These dyadic analyses require a population of cases that might reasonably be expected to become involved in territorial conflict. Rather than include hundreds of dyads such as Bolivia and Bangladesh that have no real prospect of conflict over any issue, much less over territory, we focus on two types of dyads: those composed of two states located in the same geographic region, and those composed of one major power and one other state in the international system. Our data set includes a dyad-year-level observation for each year that both members of either type of dyad were independent nation-states, as identified by the COW interstate system membership list.  

Our dyad-year-level analyses focus on only one of the dependent variables from the global analysis, fatal militarized conflict over territorial issues. The primary independent

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10 We also ran the analyses with the subset of contiguous dyads. None of the results for our key independent variables changed, increasing our confidence that the results are not being driven by including non-contiguous dyads in each region or dyads including distant major powers.
variables of interest are largely the same as in the global analyses: the historical development of
the territorial integrity norm as described by Zacher, and the global average of both general and
violent territorial integrity obligations in a given year. These are supplemented by measures of
the number of territorial integrity obligations shared by the two states in the dyad, in order to
determine whether or not the dyad's specific treaty commitments have a statistically discernible
impact on conflict behavior.

Control Variables

In order to avoid exaggerating the impact of the territorial integrity norm, these analyses
will control for the impact of other factors that might make affect the likelihood of armed
conflict. In particular, we control for joint democracy and the adversaries' relative capabilities.
A variety of research suggests that armed conflict is less likely between two political
democracies; joint democracy is measured with the Polity 4 data set, and indicates whether or not
both claimants received scores of six or greater on the Polity index of institutionalized
democracy. Our second control variable accounts for relative capabilities; if one state is
substantially stronger than its opponent, then we might expect militarized conflict to be much
less likely than would be the case between two relatively even adversaries, drawing from a
variety of research indicating that relative parity is much more conflictual than preponderance by
one side. Relative capabilities are measured using the Composite Index of National Capabilities
(CINC) score from version 3.01 of the COW National Material Capabilities data set (Singer
1988), taking the challenger’s CINC score as a percentage of the dyadic total. We also control
for conflict history, using both the number of "peace years" since the most recent fatal territorial
Empirical Analyses

Global Impact of Territorial Integrity Norms

Our first analyses address the global impact of territorial integrity norms. Table 2 presents the results of a number of negative binomial regression analyses, using a variety of measures of territorial integrity norms to predict a variety of measures of armed conflict over territory.\textsuperscript{11} In each analysis, the alpha parameter is positive and (in all but one case) statistically significant, indicating that a negative binomial model is more appropriate than a Poisson regression, which assumes that the value of alpha is zero. Each model controls for the number of states in the interstate system, which seems likely to increase the amount of conflict as the system has grown. Not surprisingly, this control variable has a positive effect (increasing conflict) in many of the models, although this effect is not always statistically significant.

[Table 2 about here]

Table 2 analyzes three different forms of challenges to the territorial status quo: fatal militarized disputes over territorial issues, violent territorial changes, and peaceful territorial changes. For each, the strength of the territorial integrity norm is measured by three different approaches: (1) a series of dummy variables indicating the three main phases in the development of the norm as described by Zacher, (2) the average number of total territorial integrity obligations (of all types) in the international system for each year of observation, and (3) the average number of both violent and general territorial integrity obligations for each year. The

\textsuperscript{11} The number of fatal militarized disputes over territorial issues ranges from zero to seven per year; the total number of disputes over territory (fatal or otherwise) ranges from zero to sixteen. The number of peaceful territorial changes ranges from zero to twenty per year, and violent territorial changes range from zero to fourteen.
results vary substantially across several of these analyses, indicating that the way the norm is conceptualized and measured can have a major impact on the results that are obtained.

We begin by discussing militarized disputes over territorial issues. Each of the stages in Zacher's characterization of the development of the territorial integrity norm has a positive and statistically significant effect in Model I, indicating that more territorial conflict occurred during each of these eras (controlling for the number of states in the international system) than occurred in the 1816-1918 period before the norm was first encapsulated in written form. The largest substantive effect was for the 1946-1975 period and the smallest was for the 1976-2001 period, which suggests that territorial conflict has been somewhat less likely during the norm internalization phase than during the cascade stage, but fatal territorial conflict is still much more likely in each of these eras than it was before Zacher believes the norm began to develop.

We obtain similar results when measuring the strength of the territorial integrity norm by explicit treaty obligations in each year rather than by broad historical eras. The total treaty obligations measure in Model II has a significant and positive effect (p < .01), indicating that more fatal territorial conflict occurred in years when there were more territorial integrity treaty obligations in the international system (controlling for the size of the system). It is only in Model III, which distinguishes between violent and general territorial integrity treaty obligations, that we see the first reduction in territorial conflict that can be associated with the territorial integrity norm. In that model, higher average levels of violent territorial integrity obligations -- those that explicitly prohibit the acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force, but make allowance for the peaceful transfer of territory -- are still associated with greater levels of fatal territorial conflict (p < .05). However, higher levels of general territorial integrity obligations -- those that seek to maintain the territorial status quo in its entirety -- are associated with
significantly less fatal conflict \((p < .01)\). This suggests that the specific type of territorial
integrity obligation plays a very important role, and that general obligations to maintain the
territorial status quo are much more effective at avoiding serious territorial conflict than are
obligations to avoid the forceful acquisition of territory (which leave open the ability to seek
revision through other means).\(^\text{12}\)

Turning to the exchange of territory through either violent or peaceful means in the
remaining portions of Table 2, the strength of the territorial integrity norm appears to have had
much less of an impact. None of the historical phases in the development of the norm has seen
significant increases or decreases in the frequency with which territory changes hands
(controlling for system size). The total number of territorial integrity obligations in the system
has had no systematic impact on violent territorial changes \((p < .84)\), although greater levels of
such obligations have been associated with fewer peaceful territorial changes \((p < .06)\). Violent
territorial integrity obligations have had little impact on violent changes \((p < .25)\), although
significantly reducing peaceful changes \((p < .001)\). Finally, general territorial integrity
obligations have been associated with significantly less of both violent \((p < .03)\) and peaceful \((p
< .001)\) territorial changes.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{12}\) Similar results are produced with alternative measures of territorial disputes. If all militarized
disputes over territory are included rather than limiting the analysis to fatal disputes, the only
differences are the lack of statistical significance for the 1976-2001 era \((p < .30)\) and for violent
territorial integrity obligations \((p < .67)\). If only disputes with over 100 fatalities are included,
neither the 1946-1975 \((p < .38)\) nor 1976-2001 periods \((p < .87)\) have a statistically significant
effect on territorial conflict, nor do total \((p < .50)\) or violent \((p < .82)\) territorial integrity treaty
obligations. In each case, though, the territorial integrity norm has not had the expected effect of
reducing armed conflict over territory. The best that can be said in these cases, except for the
effect of general obligations in Table 2 as well as in each of these alternative analyses -- is that
the strength of the norm has made no systematic difference in the amount of territorial conflict.

\(^{13}\) If violent and peaceful territorial changes are combined, the only significant effects in any part
of this table involve a reduction in territorial changes when there are higher levels of either
violent \((p < .001)\) or general \((p < .001)\) territorial integrity obligations.
Together, these results suggest that the territorial integrity norm has had a surprisingly small effect on territorial conflict. The three phases in the development of the territorial integrity norm have all seen more armed conflict over territory than the period before the norm, and none has seen any reduction in the frequency of territorial changes. Measuring the strength of the norm based on explicit treaty obligations produces similar results, with higher levels of treaty obligations being associated with more armed conflict over territory but less peaceful territorial changes. Finally, violent territorial integrity obligations have been associated with more armed conflict but less peaceful changes, while only general territorial integrity obligations have been associated with less armed conflict, violent changes, and peaceful changes.

Of course, it is possible that these results can be explained by aggregation problems. Just because the average state has higher levels of explicit treaty obligations and the overall international system has higher levels of territorial conflict does not automatically imply that the states with the treaty obligations are those involved in the conflict, or that the treaty obligations are in any way causally associated with the conflict. We thus turn to a dyadic analysis of territorial conflict, in order to investigate whether pairs of states with higher levels of territorial integrity obligations have tended to experience less territorial conflict (as well as to control for the impact of other factors that are widely believed to be associated with armed conflict).

[Table 3 about here]

**Dyadic Impact of Territorial Integrity Norms**

Table 3 presents an analysis of the impact of territorial integrity norms on the territorial conflict behavior of individual dyads, rather than aggregating the conflict behavior of the entire international system into a single data point per year. Logistic regression is used, with the goal
of modeling the likelihood that a fatal militarized dispute over territorial issues will begin during a particular dyad-year observation. Five models are presented, the first three of which correspond to the three models from Table 2A except for the addition of dyadic control variables -- one with the three historical phases in the development of the territorial integrity norm as described by Zacher, and two with the average global territorial integrity treaty obligations. This table also adds two further models, though, replacing the global average treaty obligations with the number of shared territorial integrity obligations between the members of the dyad during each year of observation.

The results of the first three models in Table 3 are consistent with the global analyses presented in Table 2A. Fatal territorial conflict is significantly more likely in each of the three phases of the norm's development than in the referent category of all years before 1919, when there are more territorial integrity obligations for the average state in the international system, and when there are more violent territorial integrity obligations; conflict is also significantly less likely when the average state has more general territorial integrity obligations. In short, considering dyadic-level control variables does not change the original results.

The final two models in this table suggest an important caveat. While the average level of territorial integrity obligations in the international system appears to have a systematic impact on conflict behavior (even if not always in the expected direction), states' interactions do not appear to be influenced in any systematic sense by their shared treaty commitments. Neither the total territorial integrity obligations shared by the two members of the dyad (p < .81) nor their disaggregated violent (p < .12) and general obligations (p < .24) has a systematic effect on the likelihood of fatal territorial conflict in the dyad.\textsuperscript{14} The effect of the territorial integrity norm on

\textsuperscript{14}Generally similar results emerge when using alternative measures of territorial conflict. If all
a given state's interaction with a potential adversary, then, appears to depend more on pressure by outside states than on shared treaty commitments between the two potential adversaries themselves. This is largely consistent with parts of Zacher's argument, because of his emphasis on the global normative context rather than on individual states' treaty obligations.

This is not the end of the story, though; it is important to consider several possible limitations of the analyses that have been presented so far. One such limitation involves the possibility that different treaties have had different effects, and the impact of shared treaty obligations on conflict behavior in Models IV and V of Table 3 has been weakened by including treaties that had systematically different effects. Another is the possibility that territorial integrity treaties reflect the international context in which the treaties are signed, rather than having any separate influence on states' behavior. The remaining analyses address these possibilities.

**Context and Territorial Integrity Obligations**

A potentially important challenge to the idea of a territorial integrity norm involves the context in which territorial integrity treaties are signed. If the norm is to have an independent effect, it must be able to influence states' behavior, leading them to do something that they otherwise would not have done or to avoid doing something that they otherwise would have done. A norm of territorial integrity would thus only have an independent effect on states' behavior if it led them to avoid territorial conflict that they otherwise would have undertaken. If militarized disputes over territorial issues are used rather than only fatal disputes, the only difference is that the effect of total global obligations is not significant (p < .26). If only disputes with over 100 fatalities are considered, neither the 1976-2001 period (p < .13) nor total global obligations (p < .85) has a significant effect, while shared violent obligations (p < .001) and shared total obligations (p < .10) significantly decrease conflict and shared general obligations significantly increase it (p < .04).
states that otherwise would have had no interest in territorial conflict sign a territorial integrity treaty and subsequently do no engage in territorial conflict, it would be misleading to characterize the norm as successfully influencing states' actions.

It may be that states are only willing to accept territorial integrity obligations, whether of a general or violent nature, in situations of territorial stability. In such cases, the apparent obligation only reinforces what already exists, rather than adding important restrictions on states' abilities to pursue their interests. The treaty obligations would appear to be associated with peace, but only because the states that are willing to accept such obligations are unlikely to become involved in territorial conflict with or without the treaty. Alternatively, it may be that territorial integrity treaties represent a desperate measure that is only attempted in the most dangerous situations, where states attempt to create institutions to manage grave threats to regional stability. In such cases, the apparent territorial integrity obligations might appear to have a positive relationship with conflict, which might be interpreted as showing that signing territorial integrity treaties actually "causes" an increase in territorial conflict, when the territorial threat itself actually spawned both the treaties and the subsequent conflicts.

[Tables 4 and 5 about here]

We consider this possibility -- as well as the possibility, mentioned earlier, that there may be multiple types of effects of treaties, which may cancel each other out in aggregated analyses -- with an additional series of analyses in Tables 4 and 5. A separate analysis is run for each treaty, using the set of all possible dyads composed of two states that eventually accepted the treaty at the same time. Each dyad is included from the first year that both states in the dyad were members of the COW international system to the end of the period of study (2001) or the last year in which both states accepted the treaty; we do not have any systematic expectation for the
aftermath of a treaty's termination or the aftermath of one state's withdrawal from a treaty. The key independent variables of interest in these analyses are a dummy variable indicating the last decade of relations before the treaty took effect for the dyad, which will be used to investigate the effect of changing relations before the treaty, and a dummy variable indicating all years when the treaty was in effect for the dyad. The referent category for these two variables is the set of all years more than a decade before the treaty took effect.

Table 4 presents the results for two of the 22 treaties for which analyses were run; the results for all 22 treaties are summarized in Table 5. The control variables in each model generally produced the same effects as in the aggregated analyses presented in Table 3. For the League of Nations, a violent territorial integrity obligation, fatal territorial conflict was significantly more likely in the last decade before the treaty took effect for each dyad (p < .01), as well as in the years when the treaty was in effect for each dyad (p < .001). For the Non-Aligned Movement, a general territorial integrity obligation, fatal territorial conflict was significantly less likely in the decade before the treaty took effect (p < .02), but there has been no systematic effect on territorial conflict while the treaty was in effect (p < .44).

Considering the summary of results presented in Table 5, several findings become apparent. First, most of these territorial integrity obligations began -- or took effect -- in times when territorial conflict was already being reduced or ended. Four of the 22 treaties followed decades where fatal territorial conflict was already significantly less likely than it had been in earlier years, and another ten followed decades where no such conflict occurred between any eventual members. Only two -- the League of Nations and the Andean Community -- came into force following decades where territorial conflict among the members was significantly more likely than it had been in earlier years. The remaining six treaties followed decades where at
least one fatal territorial dispute occurred, but the likelihood of such conflict was not systematically different from earlier years. Fourteen of 22 treaties thus followed decades with either no territorial conflict or a significantly reduced likelihood of such conflict, and only two came out of contexts where conflict was more likely than it had been in earlier years. This suggests that there may be some sort of selection effect in the choice to begin territorial integrity obligations, and that they generally are not attempted in contexts with substantial conflict. Addressing the origins of these obligations lies beyond the scope of the present paper, but it appears to be an important topic for future research.

The other important result from Table 5 is the general lack of systematic effects of the various treaties included in this study. Only two of the 22 treaties have had a statistically significant impact on conflict behavior while they were in force: fatal territorial conflict was more likely while the League of Nations was in effect (p < .001), and less likely while SAARC has been in effect (p < .001). Six other treaties have not witnessed a single fatal territorial conflict while in effect, but only three of these (the Montevideo Convention, ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States) were in effect for at least a decade before the end of the period of study; the other three took effect during the last two years of the study, leaving too little time for us to be confident in their effects. Rather than the results in Table 3 being weakened by several opposite effects canceling each other out, it appears that the reason for the lack of effect of shared treaty obligations is the general lack of effect of the treaties in question.

Discussion
Taken together, this study’s analyses suggest a clearer picture of the impact of the territorial integrity norm. First, there have been two distinct territorial integrity norms in recent history, one that proscribes the acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force and one that seeks to preserve territorial integrity more generally. Both norms are becoming increasingly widespread across the globe, but their effects on territorial conflict appear to be mixed. Violent territorial integrity obligations -- which have been far more common than general obligations, at least until the last few decades of the twentieth century -- have had little systematic impact, and indeed seem to be associated with greater territorial conflict in some of our analyses. In contrast, general territorial integrity obligations have been associated with a significant decrease in numerous measures of territorial conflict.

Further investigation suggests that the greatest impact of the norm stems from pressure by other states in the international system that have accepted the norm, rather than from any direct effect of the norm on interactions between states that share obligations under the same treaty. Shared territorial integrity treaty obligations -- whether involving violent, general, or total obligations -- have not had a systematic impact on territorial conflict, and few individual treaties have had a significant effect on territorial conflict between members while the treaties have been in force. Most of the treaties were created in periods of reduced or no territorial conflict among the eventual signatories, though, suggesting a strong likelihood of a selection effect for individual treaties.

One important contribution of this study has been the systematic evaluation of an important international norm. While the increasing frequency of treaties incorporating explicit territorial integrity provisions has been interpreted as indicating a global spread of acceptance of a territorial integrity norm, the impact of this apparent norm has never been subjected to rigorous
empirical analysis. This study’s analyses reveal that territorial integrity norms do not seem to have been nearly as effective at avoiding challenges to the territorial status quo or reducing armed conflict as some have argued. While general territorial integrity obligations appear to have been associated with a reduction in territorial conflict, violent territorial integrity obligations -- which have historically been much more frequent than general obligations -- have had the opposite effect.

This is not the final word on the impact of these norms, though. While this study has examined the norm's effect on armed armed conflict over territory, which was also the focus of Zacher's (2001) earlier study on this norm, it may also reasonably affect other dimensions of territorial issues. For example, one of the goals of general territorial integrity obligations such as the Locarno Pact or OAU Charter was to prevent the emergence of any challenges to the territorial status quo (militarized or otherwise), so such obligations might be expected to prevent the initial outbreak of new territorial claims; violent territorial integrity obligations might not necessarily be expected to have a similar effect. By promoting support for the territorial status quo, both types of territorial integrity obligation might also be expected to increase the peaceful management or ending of territorial claims that were already underway. Future research should investigate these and other possible effects of the territorial integrity norm besides the initial emphasis on armed conflict in the present study and Zacher's earlier work.15

15 Such analyses could be undertaken with the ICOW territorial claim data (Hensel 2001) or Huth and Allee's (2002) territorial dispute data, although there are currently important limitations on using either of these data sources. Huth and Allee's data set currently begins in 1919, which was the year of the first explicit territorial integrity treaty, so analyses using that data set are unable to compare the years when the norm has been developing with earlier years before the norm existed. The ICOW data set currently extends to 1816, but only for selected regions of the world; data collection on the rest of the world is currently underway. Both data sets could offer important insight into this topic, although a definitive analysis must wait until the completion of further data collection.
It would also be desirable for future work to examine the impact of the territorial integrity norm in several specific regions with territorial problems. For example, after independence from Spain, the Latin American states are widely believed to have avoided territorial conflict through the legal principle of *uti possidetis*, which proclaimed the acceptance of colonial borders as the borders between independent states in order to minimize fratricidal conflicts over territory. While *uti possidetis* is typically associated with the Latin American experience, it has also been applied elsewhere, most notably in the OAU’s 1963 charter and 1964 Cairo Declaration. While the present study has focused on global patterns of territorial conflict over the past two centuries, future research should investigate the Latin American and African experiences in more detail. Scholars such as Kacowicz (2005), Zacher (2001), and Castellino and Allen (2003) suggest that *uti possidetis* and related doctrines and institutions helped to stabilize what otherwise would have been much deadlier relations between the newly independent states of these regions. Yet Hill (1945), Prescott (1987), and Lalonde (2002) suggest that *uti possidetis* was unable to solve many of the most difficult territorial problems in these regions and in fact may have created more. Further research should help to determine which of these varied characterizations is most accurate, which would greatly increase our understanding of the sources and management of territorial conflict in the modern era.
References


Table 1: Territorial Integrity Treaty Obligations

Note:
- This table depicts the average annual number of territorial integrity treaty obligations of each type per state in the COW interstate system.
Table 2: Aggregated Analysis of Territorial Integrity Obligations and Territorial Conflict

A. Fatal Militarized Disputes over Territorial Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th>Model III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919-1945</td>
<td>1.49 (0.30)**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1975</td>
<td>2.21 (0.38)**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-2001</td>
<td>1.42 (0.60)**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total TI Obligations</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.24 (0.33)***</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent TI Obligations</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.62 (0.31)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General TI Obligations</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-2.61 (0.67)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States in system</td>
<td>0.01 (0.004)</td>
<td>- 0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.01)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>- 1.72 (0.26)***</td>
<td>- 0.61 (0.26)***</td>
<td>- 2.57 (0.40)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 186  LL: -204.73  X² = 122.02***  α: 0.08
N: 186  LL: -228.97  X² = 73.54***  α: 0.49***
N: 186  LL: -208.61  X² = 114.27***  α: 0.18**

B. Violent Territorial Changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th>Model III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919-1945</td>
<td>0.42 (0.36)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1975</td>
<td>0.27 (0.60)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-2000</td>
<td>- 0.72 (1.18)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total TI Obligations</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>- 0.07 (0.36)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent TI Obligations</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.47 (0.41)</td>
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<td>General TI Obligations</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-2.53 (1.17)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States in system</td>
<td>- 0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>- 0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.50 (0.34)</td>
<td>0.67 (0.33)**</td>
<td>- 0.40 (0.58)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 185  LL: -273.63  X² = 9.38***  α: 1.50***
N: 185  LL: -271.15  X² = 14.33***  α: 1.42***
C. Peaceful Territorial Changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th>Model III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919-1945</td>
<td>-0.12 (0.22)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1975</td>
<td>0.11 (0.37)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-2000</td>
<td>-0.95 (0.66)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total TI Obligations</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.47 (0.24)*</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent TI Obligations</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.90 (0.24)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General TI Obligations</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-3.00 (0.54)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States in system</td>
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<td>0.01 (0.01)**</td>
<td>0.04 (0.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.72 (0.26)**</td>
<td>0.69 (0.21)**</td>
<td>-0.44 (0.29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 185  N: 185  N: 185
LL: -412.53  LL: -417.05  LL: -403.89
\(X^2 = 15.28***\)  \(X^2 = 6.23**\)  \(X^2 = 32.56***\)
\(\alpha: 0.43***\)  \(\alpha: 0.47***\)  \(\alpha: 0.35***\)

* \(p \leq .10\), ** \(p \leq .05\), *** \(p \leq .01\)

Negative binomial analysis; standard errors clustered by dyad.
Table 3: Dyadic Analysis of Territorial Integrity Obligations and Fatal Territorial Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
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<tr>
<td>1919-1945</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1975</td>
<td>1.25 (0.26)***</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-2001</td>
<td>0.84 (0.23)***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Obligations-Total</td>
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<td>0.12 (0.05)**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Obligations-Violent</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>1.19 (0.15)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguous by land</td>
<td>3.71 (0.29)***</td>
<td>3.75 (0.29)***</td>
<td>3.68 (0.29)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major power in dyad</td>
<td>1.30 (0.28)***</td>
<td>1.18 (0.29)***</td>
<td>1.30 (0.29)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint democracy</td>
<td>-0.80 (0.34)**</td>
<td>-0.72 (0.33)**</td>
<td>-0.78 (0.34)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability imbalance</td>
<td>-2.52 (0.58)***</td>
<td>-2.39 (0.55)***</td>
<td>-2.53 (0.59)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years</td>
<td>-0.31 (0.04)***</td>
<td>-0.30 (0.04)***</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.04)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 1</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)***</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)***</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 2</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)***</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)***</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)***</td>
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<td>Spline 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-5.25 (0.49)***</td>
<td>-5.94 (0.49)***</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Model V</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shared Obligations-Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shared Obligations-Violent</td>
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<td>-0.24 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Obligations-General</td>
<td>0.18 (0.15)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contiguous by land</td>
<td>3.68 (0.29)***</td>
<td>3.63 (0.31)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major power in dyad</td>
<td>1.05 (0.29)***</td>
<td>1.03 (0.29)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint democracy</td>
<td>-0.66 (0.33)**</td>
<td>-0.57 (0.31)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability imbalance</td>
<td>-2.35 (0.56)***</td>
<td>-2.30 (0.57)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years</td>
<td>-0.30 (0.04)***</td>
<td>-0.31 (0.04)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 1</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)***</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.00)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 2</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)***</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 3</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)***</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.00 (0.49)***</td>
<td>-4.92 (0.49)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 675,081  N: 675,081  N: 675,081
LL: -2185.23 LL: -2231.00 LL: -2175.25
X²: 1901.65*** X²: 1682.03*** X²: 1792.34***

* p ≤ .10, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01
Logistic regression analysis; standard errors clustered by dyad.
Table 4: Fatal Territorial Conflict before and after Selected Territorial Integrity Treaties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>League of Nations</th>
<th>Non-Aligned Movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Last decade before treaty</td>
<td>1.21 (0.39)***</td>
<td>- 0.94 (0.40)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty in effect</td>
<td>1.78 (0.35)***</td>
<td>- 0.27 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguous by land</td>
<td>2.14 (0.35)***</td>
<td>4.95 (0.39)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major power in dyad</td>
<td>1.99 (0.48)***</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint democracy</td>
<td>- 1.75 (0.57)***</td>
<td>0.26 (0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability imbalance</td>
<td>- 2.25 (0.90)**</td>
<td>- 0.21 (0.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years</td>
<td>- 0.33 (0.06)***</td>
<td>- 0.28 (0.08)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 1</td>
<td>- 0.00 (0.00)***</td>
<td>- 0.00 (0.00)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 2</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)***</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline 3</td>
<td>- 0.00 (0.00)***</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>- 5.77 (0.78)***</td>
<td>- 7.20 (0.68)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 86,483                      N: 241,125
LL: -624.90                    LL: -629.64
X²: 494.14**                   X²: 435.39***

Logistic regression analysis; standard errors clustered by dyad.
Table 5: Coefficients for Impact of Individual Territorial Integrity Obligations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty/Institution (years in effect)</th>
<th>Last decade before treaty:</th>
<th>Treaty in effect:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Last decade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Obligations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Nations (1920-46):</td>
<td>1.21 (0.39)***</td>
<td>1.78 (0.35)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saavedra Lamas Pact (1933+):</td>
<td>0.63 (0.50)</td>
<td>0.24 (1.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montevideo Convention (1934+):</td>
<td>1.12 (1.33)</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations (1945+):</td>
<td>-0.65 (0.33)**</td>
<td>-0.25 (0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS (1951+):</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
<td>-0.14 (0.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsinki Final Act (1975+):</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS (1978+):</td>
<td>-0.39 (1.46)</td>
<td>-1.42 (1.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC (2004+):</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Obligations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locarno Pact (1925-36):</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM (1961+):</td>
<td>-0.94 (0.40)**</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU/AU (1963+):</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
<td>0.75 (1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC (1973+):</td>
<td>-0.31 (0.54)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN (1976+):</td>
<td>-0.46 (1.17)</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAARC (1985+):</td>
<td>-1.24 (0.34)**</td>
<td>-1.81 (0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN (1989+):</td>
<td>1.70 (0.50)***</td>
<td>0.50 (0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS (1991+):</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICA (1999+):</td>
<td>-2.08 (0.45)**</td>
<td>-0.70 (1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEECP (2000+):</td>
<td>-0.34 (0.68)</td>
<td>-0.60 (0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS (2000+):</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUUAM/GUAM (2001+):</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCO (2001+):</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTO (2003+):</td>
<td>Perfect†</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ .10, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01
† The variable perfectly predicts peace -- no fatal territorial conflict began during this time.
Logistic regression analysis; standard errors clustered by dyad.
Internet Appendix: Territorial Integrity Provisions in Multilateral Treaties

**Violent Territorial Integrity Obligations (Rejection of Violent Territorial Challenges)**

**League of Nations (1920-1946)**
- Article 10 of League Covenant: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League."

**Saavedra Lamas Pact / Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (1933-present; partially replaced by 1948 Pact of Bogotá)**
- Article 2: "They declare that as between the High Contracting Parties, territorial questions must not be settled by violence, and that they will not recognize any territorial arrangement which is not obtained by pacific means, nor the validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories that may be brought about by force of arms."

**Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1934-present)**
- Article 11: "The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily."

**United Nations (1945-present)**
- Article 2 (4) of UN Charter: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

**Organization of American States (1951-present)**
- Article 21 of OAS Charter: "The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, or military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized."

**ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978-present, although this will eventually be superseded by the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security when that comes into effect)**
- Article 1 of 1978 protocol: "Member States shall, in their relations with one another, refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression or from employing any other means inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity against the territorial integrity or political independence of other Member States."
- Article 2 of 1978 protocol: "Each Member State shall refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other Member States."
- Article 2 of the 1999 protocol: "Member States reaffirm their commitment to the principles..."
contained in the Charters of the United Nations Organization (UNO) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, particularly the following fundamental principles... territorial integrity and political independence of Member States."

- Article 11: "a) In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, State Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, other than for the legitimate purpose of individual or collective self-defense against an armed attack."

**General Territorial Integrity Obligations (Rejection of All Territorial Challenges)**

**Locarno Pact / Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (1925-1936)**
- Article 1: "The High Contracting Parties collectively and severally guarantee, in the manner provided in the following Articles, the maintenance of the territorial status quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919."

**Non-Aligned Movement (1961-present)**
- 1955 Principles of Bandung: "2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations."

**Organization of African Unity / African Union (1963-present)**
- Article 2 of OAU Charter: "1. The Organization shall have the following purposes... (c) To defend [the African States'] sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and independence"
- Article 3 of OAU Charter: "The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article 2, solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles... 3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence."
- Article 3 of AU Constitutive Act: "The objectives of the Union shall be to... (b) defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States"
- Article 4 of AU Constitutive Act: "The Union shall function in accordance with the following principles: (b) respect of borders existing on achievement of independence"

**Organization of the Islamic Conference (1973-present)**
- Charter of the Islamic Conference, Article II: "The member States decide and undertake that, in order to realize the objectives mentioned in the previous paragraph, they shall be inspired and guided by the following principles:
  3. Respect of the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each member State"

**Helsinki Final Act (1975-present)**
- Point III - Inviolability of frontiers: "The participating states regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain from
any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State."

• Point IV - Territorial integrity of states: "The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States. Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force. The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal."

• But also note Point I - Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty: "[all the participating States] consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement."

**Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976-present)**

• Article 2: "In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental principles... a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations"

• Article 10: "Each High Contracting Party shall not in any manner or form participate in any activity which shall constitute a treat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of another High Contracting Party."

**South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (1985-present)**

• Article II: "1. Cooperation within the framework of the Association shall be based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and mutual benefit."

**Andean Community (1989-present)**

• Article 12 of Declaration of Galápagos: "The Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela... Agree in the following declaration to...

2. Reaffirm their commitment to secure peace and cooperation in the Subregion and observe in their relations the principles on the prohibition of the use or threat of force, on the pacific settlement of conflicts, respect for national sovereignty, and compliance with the obligations arising from international legal instruments, as well as to abstain from actions against the territorial integrity, political independence, or unity of any of the states."

**Commonwealth of Independent States (1991-present)**

• Article 3 of CIS Charter: "For the achievement of the Commonwealth's objectives, the Member States shall, proceeding from the universally recognized norms of international law and the Helsinki Final Act, organize their relationships in accordance with the following interconnected principles of equal value: (...)

--inviolability of state borders, recognition of existing borders, and rejection of unlawful territorial acquisitions;
--territorial integrity of states and rejection of any actions aimed at dismembering another state's
Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (1999-present)
• Article III of Declaration of the Principles Guiding Relations among the CICA Member States: "The Member States shall respect the territorial integrity of each other. They recognize the inviolability of state boundaries and therefore they shall refrain at present and in the future from any attempt to violate these boundaries. The Member States shall likewise refrain from making each other's territory the subject of military occupation or other direct or indirect use of force in contravention of international law, or an object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of their implementation. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legitimate."

GUUAM/GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (2001-present)
• "Principles of GUUAM Cooperation" in Yalta GUUAM Charter: "Cooperation within the GUUAM is based on the universally recognized principles and norms of international law, in particular, on the respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs of the Member States."

South-East European Cooperation Process (2000-present)
• "Scope and Principles of the Regional Cooperation" in Bucharest Charter: "The cooperation among our countries shall be founded on the UN Charter, on the principle of full observance of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the states in our region, on the principles of the OSCE and the relevant documents of the Council of Europe..."
• "Objectives and Mechanisms of Cooperation" in Bucharest Charter: "Our political and security cooperation serving this purpose shall be focused on:
  --Creating peaceful and good-neighborly relations in the region through reconciliation, recognition of the inviolability of the existing international borders and the peaceful resolution of disputes, on the basis of international law..."

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2001-present)
• Article 5 of the Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO: “The States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization firmly adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, equal rights and mutual advantage, resolution of all issues through joint consultations, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use or threat of use of military force, and renunciation of unilateral military advantage in contiguous areas.”

Collective Security Treaty Organization (2003-present)
• Preamble of CSTO Charter: "Seeking to establish favorable and stable conditions for the full development of the States Parties to the Treaty and to ensure their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity..."
• Article 3 of CSTO Charter: "The purposes of the Organization are to strengthen peace and international and regional security and stability and to ensure the collective defense of the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member States..."

ECCAS Protocol Relating to the Establishment of a Mutual Security Pact in Central Africa
COPAX Protocol (2000-present)

• Article 3: "The member states reaffirm their attachment to the principles of the UN Charter, OAU Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and ECCAS Treaty, notably:
  (d) respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of states;
  (f) inviolability of the borders inherited from colonization"

Notes

• Dates for each treaty reflect the years when the treaty or institution was in legal effect.