

# THE EVOLUTION OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN RIVALRY

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## **The Evolution of the Franco-German Rivalry**

Recent research on interstate conflict has suggested that the concept of interstate rivalry can be extremely useful in accounting for the outbreak or escalation of conflict. Scholars have found that so-called "rival" adversaries account for a large proportion of all interstate conflict, including interstate wars, militarized interstate disputes, and violent territorial exchanges. Furthermore, confrontations that occur in the context of rivalry tend to be more severe, escalatory, or war-prone than confrontations between non-rival adversaries, and this severity seems to increase somewhat as a rivalry relationship evolves (see, e.g., Brecher and James 1988; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Hensel 1994b, 1995; Leng 1983).

These existing studies of rivalry have helped to show the value of the concept of rivalry in studying interstate conflict. Yet they have also been accused of using somewhat arbitrary definitions and quantitative measures of conflict behavior, and of obscuring the value of the concept of rivalry. Thompson (1995a), for example, points out some dyadic relationships that he considers to be wrongly identified as "enduring rivalries" by typical quantitative measures of rivalry, as well as some that he considers important cases of rivalry that were not identified as such by the existing definitions. As Thompson rightly points out, we need a more detailed examination of individual cases of rivalry, in order to reach a better understanding of this concept and its implications.

In this paper I examine the rivalry between France and Germany, in order to extend our knowledge on rivalries from the existing quantitative large-N analyses. The Franco-German relationship showed many characteristics that are commonly associated with "enduring rivalry," and few scholars would quibble with its identification as a rivalry. The conflictual relationship lasted for an extended period of time, featured frequent confrontations between the adversaries, and saw many of these confrontations escalate to dangerous levels -- including three full-scale interstate wars and a series of prominent crises. By examining this particular rivalry in some detail, I hope to illustrate the real-world meaning of the rivalry concept, as well as to gain a better understanding of how relationships between these two rivals changed as their rivalry evolved.

This paper's analyses begin with a brief examination of the concept of rivalry, and of what it means to study the evolution of rivalry. I then present a brief outline of the history of the Franco-German rivalry, and use this historical case to address some theoretical issues regarding interstate rivalry. Finally, I use the results and conclusions from this analysis to suggest possible lines of future research.

### **The Meaning of Interstate Rivalry**

The term "rivalry" is conventionally used to describe a set of two or more actors "having the same pretensions and claims" or "striving to reach or obtain something that only one can possess" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary). Rivals are thus distinguished from non-rival actors by their competition, and a rivalry might involve any number of possible types of actors or forms of competition. Examples of situations that academics have described as "rivalry" include so-called rival political candidates who are competing for the same office, rival economic firms that are competing for the same economic market or for their production of the same good, and rival nation-states that are competing for ownership of the same piece of territory or for political influence in the same area.

Applications of the notion of rivalry to international relations have typically focused on a more specific form of rivalry, which might be described as "enduring, militarized, interstate rivalry." Such a relationship occurs between two or more nation-

states, features a prominent militarized component in its competition, and endures for a protracted period of time. Rivalry also seems to include more than simple competition between actors. As Kuenne (1989: 555) suggested, rivalry is distinguished from non-rival competition by the non-anonymity of the actors -- or the expectation that one actor's actions will affect its rival non-negligibly, the rival will be able to identify the first actor as the source of this effect, and the rival will react to protect its own interests. McGinnis and Williams (1993: 1) describe two states as rivals if the most influential policy-makers in each state believe that the other poses the primary threat to national security. Similarly, Thompson (1995a) argues that rivalry involves the mutual recognition of actors as rivals, which means that we need a better understanding of decision-makers' perceptions in order to distinguish between rival and non-rival adversaries.

The notion of enduring rivalry has certainly added to our knowledge about interstate conflict. As noted above, scholars have identified significant differences in conflict behavior between enduring rivals and non-rival adversaries. Hensel (1994b, 1995) and Thompson (1995b), though, have advocated a somewhat different approach to the study of rivalry, focusing on the possibility of changing opportunities, constraints, and preferences in a long-term relationship. This evolutionary approach treats rivalry as a continuous, dynamic concept, rather than the static "enduring rival" versus "non-rival" distinction used in much of the existing literature. That is, rather than studying the differences between adversaries that do and do not qualify as enduring rivals, this evolutionary approach focuses on new issues: how do some states reach the stage of full-fledged enduring rivalry, while other adversaries stop somewhere short of enduring rivalry? How do relationships between adversaries change over time, either as they approach rivalry or after they have reached a stage where they can be classified as rivals?

The present paper adopts such an evolutionary approach for the purposes of studying the Franco-German rivalry. Rather than assuming that the relations between two adversaries are roughly constant and do not change -- which is implicit in studies that only distinguish between enduring rivals and non-rival adversaries -- I assume that relations between them might be expected to change over time. And rather than assuming that some pre-existing factor or some structural condition predestined France and Germany to become enduring rivals, I study how the relations between these adversaries changed over time, and what happened in their relations *before* they could be classified as full-fledged rivals. I begin by discussing the aspects of this rivalry that will be studied.

### **Goals of the Case Study**

Three general topics will be examined, beginning with the time frame of the rivalry, or the point in time at which rivalry could be said to have begun and to have ended. A second topic involves the evolution of rivalry, or the question of whether or not the adversaries' conflict behavior and rivalry relationship can be said to have evolved over time. Finally, the third topic involves an effort to account for this evolution.

### **Time Frame of Rivalry**

This paper's analyses will begin by identifying the time frame of the rivalry, or the points at which rivalry between France and Germany (or Prussia) can meaningfully be said to have begun or ended. It should be noted that I focus on the German state of Prussia for the years before German unification in the mid-nineteenth century. There were a number of other German states besides Prussia, but I feel that the history of the Franco-German rivalry can be traced most directly to Prussia instead of the other states. Prussia was the state that would eventually unite the numerous smaller German states into a single Germany, and the state that was most active diplomatically vis-a-vis France in the years before German unification.

Case studies allow us to study when -- if ever -- a pair of adversaries came to view each other as primary adversaries or rivals, rather than assuming that a given operational definition is valid and that two adversaries that have engaged in a certain number of militarized disputes can automatically be classified as "rivals." Similarly, case studies allow us to study when -- if ever -- these identifications of the other as a rival faded and the rivalry can be considered to have ended, rather than assuming that two adversaries' period of rivalry ends after a certain length of time has passed without any militarized conflict.

The use of case studies to examine when rivalry begins and ends is especially useful for cases in which one or both of the adversaries is involved in several conflictual relationships at the same time, as was the case for France and Germany. Case studies allow us to look at when, if ever, decision-makers on each side viewed the other as a primary rival. When one side has several possible rival adversaries, the use of case studies also allows us to see which of the adversaries are viewed as primary rivals at any given point in time, as well as to trace changes in this perception over time.

### *The Beginning of Rivalry*

A number of possible points may be identified as the beginning date for a period of militarized rivalry. One possible beginning point is the beginning of the underlying conflicts of interest between the adversaries, or the first time at which the two have divergent views on a contentious issue. Because this study -- like most current research on interstate rivalry (see Hensel 1995) -- focuses on militarized rivalry, though, that point is not very useful for the present purposes; many dyads that hold divergent views on contentious issues never back up their views with militarized force. Such a beginning point is helpful for studying the initial outbreak of militarized conflict between two states, but is not in itself appropriate as a definition of the beginning of rivalry.

A second possible beginning point for a period of rivalry would be the first resort to militarized means by one or both adversaries against the other. Such a point marks the beginning of the adversaries' militarized conflictual relationship, and is more closely related to the focus of the remainder of this study. The initial outbreak of militarized conflict, then, can be seen as marking the outbreak of what my evolutionary framework calls the "early phase" of a rivalry. Because of Thompson's (1995a) criticism as noted earlier, though, this type of definition of the beginning of rivalry seems potentially misleading because it fails to include a dimension of whether or not the adversaries actually perceive each other as rivals.

A third possible beginning point for a period of rivalry, and perhaps the best way to study the origins of a true "rivalry" relationship as suggested by Thompson, would be the point at which each adversary considers the other to be a primary rival. As noted above, Kuenne (1989), McGinnis and Williams (1993), and Thompson (1995a) all portrayed rivalry as requiring that each adversary identify the other as a rival or as a primary security threat. The beginning of rivalry from this perspective is likely to occur well into a period of rivalry as conventionally operationalized, rather than early in the relationship or at the point of the initial use of militarized means by the adversaries. Indeed, the description of the evolution of rivalry presented by Hensel (1995) would suggest that both states are not likely to view each other as primary security threats or rivals until they have engaged in a series of confrontations with each other. When two adversaries begin contending over some stake or stakes militarily, they are not likely to see each other as primary security threats or, essentially, as enduring rivals. Instead, this perception builds up over time as the adversaries engage in more conflict and in more bitter day-to-day interactions, most likely reaching the point of mutual identification as

rivals after a number of confrontations. This third approach to the beginning of rivalry, or more correctly to the beginning of enduring rivalry, will form the basis for the identification of rivalry beginnings in this paper.

### *The End of Rivalry*

As with the beginning of rivalry, a number of possible points may be identified as the end of a period of rivalry. A rivalry could be said to end with the conclusion of the last overt militarized incident between the rivals, if we are thinking of rivalry in the militarized sense. In effect, this is the approach used by many existing definitions of rivalry (e.g., Goertz and Diehl 1995).

A more long-term perspective would allow the rivalry some time to cool down, thus requiring that a period of time must elapse without the recurrence of militarized conflict before a rivalry can be considered to have ended. This resembles the approach used by the quantitative analyses of Hensel (1995), who considered rivalry to continue for fifteen years after the end of the last confrontation between the rivals. In a less quantitative sense, more suitable for case studies than for large-*N* analyses, this approach to the end of rivalry would focus on the adversaries' evaluations of each other as primary security threats or rivals, as described earlier in considering the beginning of rivalry. This is the approach that will be used in this paper.

A final alternative to identifying the end of rivalry involves an issue-based perspective, which is based on the status of the rivals' contentious issues. Such an approach would only classify a rivalry as ended if the contentious issues between the rivals have been resolved to each side's satisfaction, or if the rivals have been let the issues fade away; this approach is represented by the work of Bennett (1993). This approach is useful, and is closely related to the previous approach, but the present study adopts the previous approach instead of this one because mutual identification of the adversaries as rivals suits my present purposes better than a focus on contentious issues. Even if the two adversaries continue to be divided by important contentious issues, their rivalry can meaningfully be said to have ended if they have been able to stop resorting to militarized means to pursue these issues and they have been able to downgrade the perception of each other as primary security threats or rivals, although their contentious issues may remain unresolved.

### **Evolution of Rivalry**

The present paper examines the Franco-German rivalry from an evolutionary perspective, as mentioned earlier. Studying the evolution of this rivalry will involve comparing the adversaries' conflict behavior early in the rivalry with their behavior later, once the rivalry has become established and both sides have come to recognize this. Under an evolutionary approach, we would expect that the relationship between the adversaries would change over time as they accumulate more confrontations, with their relationship expected to become more conflictual over time. For example, I will examine the frequency of conflict between the adversaries at various phases of their rivalry, expecting conflict to become more frequent later as the rivalry becomes entrenched and both sides accumulate greater hostility and grievances toward each other. I will also examine the severity level of conflicts between adversaries at different phases of their rivalry, expecting conflicts between them to become more severe as they accumulate greater hostility from past confrontations. Finally, I will examine more routine, sub-militarized interactions between the adversaries, in order to see whether behavior below the militarized level also shows any type of evolution over time. I expect to find that interactions between two adversaries are likely to become more conflictual over time, and that adversaries are less likely to cooperate with each other in later phases of their rivalry relationships.

Sub-militarized relations can be studied by examining diplomatic interaction between two adversaries, such as attempts to resolve their contentious issues peacefully. Other actors below the level of the official state government might also be relevant to a rivalry relationship, so this aspect of rivalry will be studied by examining the statements and actions of actors within government (such as the legislature or the opposition parties), the general public, and the news media. Even if such actors do not make or implement policy directly, they may be seen as having important influences on government policy toward a rival state, as might be the case if public opinion and the popular media are demanding aggressive action and the government fears the backlash of a conciliatory move toward the adversary. Each of these dimensions of conflict and interaction mentioned above can offer us some insight into the relations between rivals, and into how these relations can change over time.

### **Accounting for Evolution**

After studying whether or not conflict behavior and interactions seem to evolve or change over the course of a rivalry, I seek to account for this evolution. In this section I focus on two particular factors that I expect to have important influences on rivalry evolution: the effects of past conflict outcomes and of contentious issues. Both of these factors have been shown to be important in large-*N* quantitative studies of interstate conflict (Hensel 1994a, 1995), so the present case study will allow us to assess whether the quantitative findings are also useful for helping to explain a single case of rivalry in more detail.

#### *Past Conflict Outcomes*

Existing research has suggested that the outcomes of previous confrontations between two adversaries help to shape future relations between the same adversaries. Decisive outcomes and compromises have been argued to decrease the likelihood of future conflict relative to the effects of stalemates, and -- if the adversaries did engage in renewed conflict -- to postpone the recurrence of militarized conflict (Maoz 1984; Hensel 1994a, 1995). Decisive outcomes, in which one side achieves a decisive victory over its opponent, are said to decrease the likelihood of conflict and to postpone future conflict by leaving one side more satisfied with the post-conflict status quo than it had been with the status quo ante. Even if the defeated side wishes to regain its losses, the fact that it was recently defeated by the adversary is expected to postpone the initiation of another confrontation. Compromises are said to decrease the likelihood of future conflict and to postpone future conflict by helping to resolve the disputed issues between the two states through a mutually accepted compromise settlement. Stalemates, though, involve neither a mutually acceptable agreement nor a decisive victory for either side, leaving little obstacle to the rapid recurrence of militarized conflict.

Examining the effects of conflict outcomes using case studies involves a number of elements. First, I will study the effects of past conflict outcomes on the two sides' interactions below the military level, including their effects on actors within government and on the public and the media. Second, I will study the effect of past outcomes on the adversaries' subsequent militarized relations, including both the likelihood and timing of future conflict. Additionally, for each of these elements I will examine the differences between different types of conflict outcomes -- i.e., are the effects different after decisive, compromise, and stalemate outcomes? Alternatively, do all three outcome types produce similar results, as we might expect if the effect of previous confrontations depends largely on the hostility and grievances that might result from the simple occurrence of a confrontation?

#### *Contentious Issues*

Existing research has also suggested that the type of issues under contention in a given confrontation can have an important effect on subsequent relations between the adversaries. When the issues under contention are more salient to one or both adversaries, the adversaries are expected to be more likely to use force to achieve their goals or to reverse past losses. Territory is seen as a particularly salient issue because of the material importance of territory for military security and economic well-being, as well as for its tendency to inspire strong emotions among adversaries and to have a psychological importance that is described as out of proportion to its objective value (Vasquez 1993; Hensel 1994a, 1995). Future conflict is expected to be more likely to occur and to tend to occur sooner when territorial issues are at stake, relative to situations in which only non-territorial issues are involved.

Studying the effects of contentious issues with case studies allows us to look at the specific stakes in a given conflict in much more detail than the simple territorial versus non-territorial distinction used in the existing quantitative research (Hensel 1994a, 1995). My examination of contentious issues will thus begin by identifying the nature of the stakes under contention in each rivalry, in terms of both the general type of stakes (e.g., territory or economic policy) and the more specific stakes involved (which piece of territory, which type of policy, and so on). I will then study how the nature of the stakes changes over time during the course of the rivalry; examples of changes might include contention over new issues in the middle of a rivalry, or changes in the scope or salience of the older issues. Finally, I will examine the effects of the different issues on relations between the adversaries, expecting more salient issues such as territory to lead to more conflictual relations.

## **The Franco-German Rivalry**

### *Historical Antecedents*

In searching for the early origins of the conflicts of interest between France and Germany, we could go back as far as Roman times. Some scholars, for example, start with the Celtic and Germanic tribes in modern-day France and Germany at the time of the Roman Empire (Lauret 1964; Putnam 1971; Phillipson 1918) -- although Lauret (1964: 2-3) is quick to point out that these were only scattered tribes, rather than any type of state or nation. The history of modern-day "France" and "Germany" can be traced more meaningfully to the partition of Charlemagne's empire among his heirs after his death. The 843 Treaty of Verdun divided the inheritance among Charlemagne's three heirs. The middle kingdom contained (inter alia) present-day Lorraine, Holland, and Belgium, and the other two kingdoms roughly approximate today's France and Germany. Later in the ninth century, when the empire was divided between Charles the Bald and Louis the German, Alsace and Lorraine would become part of the German empire (Barraclough 1963; Fulbrook 1992; Langer, 1948; Putnam 1971; Phillipson 1918).

The border along the Rhine remained largely peaceful for centuries after the partition, primarily because the French were oriented toward the West and toward England, and the Germans were oriented toward Italy and the Slavic lands to the east. In the fourteenth century France began to annex some territories belonging to the Holy Roman Empire and to intervene in the affairs of the German states, primarily as a means of attempting to weaken the Hapsburg Empire. In the sixteenth century France annexed a considerable portion of Lorraine, although an attempt to take Strassburg and Alsace failed in 1552; France then established close ties with the residents of Lorraine. Alsace would remain a part of Germany until the seventeenth century (Langer 1948; Lauret 1964; Phillipson 1918).

Following the Thirty Years War, the Peace of Westphalia divided Germany into 234 sovereign territorial units, each too weak to oppose French aims alone, and typically

beset by too many internal divisions to unite against a common enemy. The only two significant German states to come out of the Thirty Years War were Austria and Prussia, and these two had such conflicting goals that they tended to cancel out each other's influence. The Treaty of Westphalia also awarded (or recognized) French sovereignty over the Landgravate of Upper and Lower Alsace and ten imperial cities in Alsace, although -- in a confusing and partly contradictory clause of the treaty -- these entities retained their rights of membership in the Holy Roman Empire (Fulbrook 1992; Langer 1948; Phillipson 1918). Fulbrook (1992: 60) argued that this disposition of Alsace "ensured future conflicts between France and Germany."

In the seventeenth century, Louis XIV of France took advantage of the relative weakness of the German states to advance France's territory and to secure French predominance in Europe. Louis set himself up as protector of the states of south and southwest Germany through the creation of the Rhenish League in 1679. He then captured and annexed Strassburg in 1681, and consolidated French control of the left bank of the Rhine; France also occupied Lorraine in 1683. France ceded back Lorraine in the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick, although retaining Alsace and Strassburg. France occupied Lorraine again in 1733 during the War of the Polish Succession and was given Lorraine in exchange for Tuscany in the 1735 Treaty of Vienna; Lorraine was finally annexed to France in 1766. France's possession of Alsace and of Strassburg left western Germany exposed to the continual threat of French domination and conquest, and France endeavored to keep Germany weak and disunited so as not to pose a serious threat (Barraclough 1963; Fulbrook 1992; Langer 1948; Phillipson 1918).

Prussia's rise to prominence in the mid-eighteenth century sowed the seeds for the eventual Franco-German rivalry. France sided with Prussia against Austria in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), but then sided unsuccessfully with Austria against Prussia in the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). With the Treaty of Hubertusburg, signed on Feb. 15, 1763, Prussia emerged as a major power on the European scene and a rival with Austria for leadership of the German states. This Austro-Prussian rivalry tended to neutralize both states, and left the German territories beyond Prussian and Austrian borders as prey to foreign intervention and intrigue (Barraclough 1963; Langer 1948).

Austria and Prussia allied against France in February 1792, following the French Revolution. The War of the First Coalition began as France invaded German territory in April 1792, and captured all of Germany west of the Rhine. Prussia, financially exhausted and at odds with Austria, made peace with France in the 1795 treaty of Basel. In this treaty Prussia agreed to allow France to retain the left bank of the Rhine until peace was concluded with the empire, and France agreed to evacuate the right bank. In secret articles accompanying the treaty, Prussia agreed to the absolute cession of the left bank to France, in exchange for compensation through secularization of ecclesiastical territory on the right bank. Austria then agreed to the cession of the left bank in the 1797 treaty of Campo Formio, which also left navigation of the Rhine open to both Germany and France, and provided indemnification for German princes who lost through this cession. This treaty was confirmed by the 1801 Treaty of Lunéville (Barraclough 1963; Langer, 1948).

Prussia remained neutral from 1795 to 1806. Some of the smaller German states that had benefited from Napoleonic reforms chose to secede from the Holy Roman Empire and put themselves under French protection. Napoleon created the Confederation of the Rhine (*Rheinbund*) in 1806 from these German states, and the Holy Roman Empire was formally abolished on Aug. 6, 1806. After France's 1806 defeat of Prussia and the 1807 Peace of Tilsit, all the German states except for Austria and Prussia had joined the Confederation (Barraclough 1963; Fulbrook, 1992).



Prussia re-entered the war in September 1806. The Prussian army was badly defeated in October 1806 at the Battle of Jena, and in the 1807 Peace of Tilsit and the 1808 Convention of Paris Prussia lost all territories west of the Elbe and some eastern territories to France, as well as having to pay indemnities and contribute men and money to Napoleon's further campaigns. This defeat spurred wide-ranging reform of the Prussian military. After Napoleon's 1812 defeat in Russia, Prussia allied with the Russians in 1813 and re-joined the war. A coalition of Prussia, Austria, and Russia finally defeated Napoleon at Leipzig in 1813, after which the Confederation of the Rhine and the Napoleonic states in northern Germany were dissolved and the south German states signed treaties with Austria (Fulbrook 1992; Langer 1948).

Much of the Napoleonic reorganization of Germany remained in place or was extended with the 1814-1815 Congress of Vienna following Napoleon's ultimate defeat in April 1814. A German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*) was established in place of the Holy Roman Empire, consisting of thirty-eight states (thirty-four monarchies and four free cities) and occupying essentially the same boundaries as the old Empire. Prussia benefited from this reorganization by absorbing the Rhineland and Westphalia, while losing some of its territorial gains to the east; these changes were intended to turn Prussia into a strong power between France and Russia. The changes doubled Prussia's population and added more advanced commercial and industrial areas and more mineral riches to its previously backward agricultural economy. Prussia's shift to the west also gave it an advantage over Austria as being more representative of German interests and more important as a protector of Germany in central Europe (Barraclough 1963; Fulbrook 1992; Langer 1948).

The French Revolution and Napoleon's domination of Germany helped to set the stage for the rebirth of German nationalism. France's military successes exposed the existing German system as being inadequate, and Napoleon's obvious machinations regarding the German states and the Confederation of the Rhine exposed his revolutionary ideals as simply a new way to package previous French policies. The humiliation of Prussia's defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1806 and France's political domination of Germany until 1814 began to give rise to popular sentiments of German nationalism. These feelings of nationalism, lost since the Thirty Years War or earlier, were rooted in the consciousness of a great German past and in the idea of a new Germany that would be representative of the German people (Barraclough 1963).

#### *The Militarized Rivalry Begins*

After the close of the Napoleonic Wars, France and Prussia coexisted more or less peacefully, with little tangible evidence of militarized rivalry. They did become involved in several crises on opposite sides in the decades following Napoleon, but these were typically multilateral crises involving most of the major European powers on one side or the other. Examples include the crises over Belgium from 1830-1832 (Albrecht-Carrié 1973: 33-36; Schroeder 1994: 670-691; Bridge and Bullen 1980: 52-53) and over Syria in 1839-1841 (Albrecht-Carrié 1973: 52-55; Schroeder 1994: 736-756; Bridge and Bullen 1980: 61-64). These crises did not lead directly to future Franco-German conflict in the same sense that some of the later crises and wars would, although they did little to help relations between the two states.

Prussia after the Napoleonic Wars sought primarily to gain control over the German states, so much of Prussia's diplomatic effort went toward its political rivalry with Austria for leadership of Germany. France continued to monitor events to the east, seeking to ensure that there was no threat to the European international system, but for several decades France did not become involved directly on most questions involving

Prussia. Prussia had sought to achieve leadership of the German states in 1849-1850 by proposing the reconstruction of the German Confederation under Prussia. Austria proposed a grand empire including all of the non-German Habsburg possessions and in which Prussia would play a minor role. Prussia proposed a German state that would be dominated by Prussia, and the smaller German states sought a reformed confederation free from Prussian domination. Prussia formed the Erfurt Union as an alternative to the Confederation and convened a congress of German princes at Berlin in May 1850. Austria thwarted this congress by temporarily abandoning their plans for a reconstructed Germany; the smaller German states took Austria's side because they saw the institutionalized rivalry between Prussia and Austria in the Confederation as the best guarantee of their independence. Russia, too, supported Austria's plan as the best way to reconcile Austria and Prussia in a coalition against France and the revolutions sweeping Europe. When serious disturbances broke out in the state of Hesse, Austria and Russia demanded that Confederation forces be used to suppress the disturbances instead of Erfurt Union forces. Prussia eventually chose to back down, desiring reconciliation with Russia and fearing France more than Austria. Furthermore, the Prussian leadership realized that they would have to make unacceptable concessions to France, probably including territory on the Rhine, in order to ensure French neutrality in the case of war. Prussia then "surrendered" at Olmütz rather than go to war, leading to the dissolution of the Union and restoration of the Confederation (Bridge and Bullen 1980: 74-75; Langer 1948; Albrecht-Carrié 1973; Schroeder 1994).

The next confrontation to involve France and Germany involved the War of Italian Unification in 1859. Piedmont sought to expel the Austrian forces from northern Italy, expanding Piedmont to include Lombardy and Venetia, and agreed to cede Nice and Savoy to France in exchange for France's assistance. Piedmont tried provoking a war with Austria by mobilizing, but the British called a congress to deal with the problem. Before the congress could begin, though, Austria demanded that Piedmont demobilize, and when this ultimatum was not followed Austrian forces invaded Piedmont on April 29. France entered the war on May 12, and the French and Italians conquered most of Lombardy. The war stopped quickly, though, when Prussia mobilized its army along the Rhine on June 24 and spoke of armed mediation in the Italian conflict. France feared possible defeat and humiliation if Prussia intervened, and Austria feared the price that Prussia might demand for its assistance in the war. As a result, the war was short-lived, with Austria giving up Lombardy (which was then united with Piedmont) but retaining Venetia. Piedmont achieved one of its goals by acquiring Lombardy, but France lost heavily in the war. France lost military prestige by failing to defeat the Austrian forces, the retreat against the prospect of a two-front war against the German powers was a humiliation, and the failure to keep Austria isolated (as had been specified in the 1858 Plombières agreement) left France without Savoy and Nice (Bridge and Bullen 1980; Albrecht-Carrié 1973).

Since the humiliation at Olmütz in 1850, Prussia maintained her pretensions for leadership of Germany, and continued to work toward reversing the 1850 submission and attaining Austrian acceptance of Prussian dominance in northern Germany. Prussia had established and dominated an economic customs union (*Zollverein*) that excluded Austria, and now desired a corresponding political union as well. Both Austria and a majority of the other German princes in the Confederation opposed any further Prussian political or territorial expansion within Germany, but Bismarck was able to overcome this opposition through the 1864 Schleswig-Holstein war and the 1866 Seven Weeks' War (Bridge and Bullen 1980).

In 1863 Denmark annexed the Duchy of Schleswig in violation of the 1852 London Protocol, which had guaranteed the inseparability of the duchies of Schleswig

and Holstein (a member of the German Confederation). Bismarck saw this as an opportunity to make political gains by leading the fight against a non-German enemy, and Prussia and Austria invaded and defeated Denmark in early 1864. Neither France nor the other major European states intervened to prevent or manage this conflict, remaining limited to an ineffectual conference in London from April to June, 1864. Hostilities resumed after the failure of that conference, and this time resulted in total Danish defeat and surrender. The October, 1864 Treaty of Vienna awarded joint administration of the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenberg to Austria and Prussia (Albrecht-Carrié 1973; Langer 1948; Bridge and Bullen 1980)

*The Rivalry Heats Up: German Unification and the Franco-Prussian War*

Frictions over the joint Austrian-Prussian administration of the duchies would provide the pretext for the Seven Weeks' War between Prussia and Austria, with Bismarck seeking to incorporate the duchies into Prussia. Albrecht-Carrié (1973: 131) notes, though, that Prussia's real goal was the dissolution of the German Confederation and the expansion of Prussia's role as leader of the German states. Bridge and Bullen (1980: 104) argue that both Austria and Prussia knew from May 1866 onwards that war between them was inevitable, because of their contending views on the future of the German states; the Austrians did not know how to avoid war, they argue, and the Prussians did not want to avoid it. The expected war began in June, 1866, after Prussia introduced a proposal to reform the Confederation and Austria, feeling that war was inevitable, began mobilizing (Albrecht-Carrié 1973)

The war culminated in a decisive Prussian victory at Königgrätz (Sadowa) in July 1866 that effectively ended the war before the south German states that had allied with Austria could enter the fighting. Austria did not lose any territory to Prussia, nor were there any heavy indemnities to be paid. The main result of the war was Austria's acceptance of the dissolution of the Germanic Confederation, renunciation of all rights to the duchies (which had been the original pretext for the conflict), and agreement to accept any Prussian enlargement within the confines of the north German states. These agreements were implemented with the 1867 formation of the North German Confederation, in which Prussia -- having annexed Hanover, Nassau, Hesse-Kassel, Frankfurt, and Schleswig-Holstein -- held a dominant position and Austria was largely excluded from any further leadership role in German affairs. This new confederation was a federal state instead of a loose federation of states, allowing internal jurisdiction by the local rulers while the King of Prussia -- as head of the Confederation -- controlled foreign affairs and military matters. Prussia would later incorporate the south German states by means of the Franco-Prussian War (Albrecht-Carrié 1973; Fulbrook 1992; Langer 1948; Bridge and Bullen 1980).

Bismarck had contemplated war with Austria in 1865, although he refrained because of uncertainty over the likely French or Italian responses in the event of war. Bismarck had hinted to Napoleon III in 1865 that Prussia would compensate France in the Rhineland in exchange for neutrality in the coming war, which France had expected Austria to win anyway. Austria had also signed a secret treaty with France in June, 1866 in which she offered to cede Venetia in exchange for French neutrality, agreed not to oppose the erection of a neutral buffer state along the Rhine, and was given the right to make her desired changes in Germany after the war. When the war did come, France remained neutral, expecting that French mediation would be needed to end a long war, and that France would then receive compensation at the end. The rapid Prussian victory ended these expectations, at which point France considered the possibility of mobilization along the Rhine and the threat of armed intervention, as Prussia had done to prevent France from achieving its goals in 1859. The idea of armed intervention was rejected, though, and France instead demanded compensation for its neutrality in the form of

territory along the left bank of the Rhine, the 1814 frontier, Luxembourg, or Belgium. Bismarck refused to consider any compensation that would involve German territory, stalled on the other claims, and warned that war would be inevitable if France pressed her claims. France regarded Prussia's rapid victory as a national humiliation, but the French army was not considered ready for war with Prussia, so France acquiesced to the formation of the North German Confederation (Albrecht-Carrié 1973; Langer 1948; Bridge and Bullen 1980; Taylor 1954).

Napoleon attempted in the winter of 1866-1867 to acquire the Duchy of Luxembourg from the Netherlands. Luxembourg had been a member of the old German Confederation and was garrisoned by Prussian troops, but was not included in the new North German Confederation. Bismarck promised not to oppose this deal, provided that it were handled in such a way that German national feeling not be aroused. The deal was mismanaged, though, and word leaked out. In the resulting uproar the king of the Netherlands withdrew from the arrangements, and an international conference was called in May to deal with the crisis. The conference produced the Treaty of London, in which Luxembourg ceased to be a member of the German Confederation, and its independence and neutrality were guaranteed by the great powers. Napoleon took this settlement as a profound humiliation, and according to Langer (1948: 687), he "henceforth looked upon a final reckoning with Prussia as inevitable, reorganized his army and initiated negotiations for an alliance with Austria and Italy." (Langer 1948; Bridge and Bullen 1980)

Bismarck brought the four south German states into the Zollverein with the north German states in July 1867, and established a customs parliament (*Zollparlament*) including both southern and northern states. Convinced that France would not peaceably permit the inclusion of the south German states in the Confederation, and that war with France would drive these states into the Confederation, Bismarck too considered war with France to be inevitable. France was alarmed by the sudden appearance of this greatly strengthened neighbor, which led to demands for revenge for the humiliation of the Seven Weeks War and led to a series of attempted offensive or defensive alliances to prepare for the expected war with Prussia (Langer 1948: 687; Albrecht-Carrié 1973: 134-135).

The immediate crisis that led to the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 dealt with the question of succession to the Spanish throne. Spanish leaders chose a Hohenzollern prince, and France objected vigorously. The nomination was later withdrawn, but "it suited both France and Bismarck to exacerbate the issue into a crisis" (Fulbrook: 129). The result was a brief war in which the German army rapidly defeated the French. At the conclusion of the war in 1871 Germany annexed portions of the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, demanded indemnity payments of five billion francs, and stationed an occupation army in France until the payment of the reparations. The annexed portions include most of Alsace and about one-fifth of Lorraine, consisting of the so-called German Lorraine and the district around Metz (Fulbrook 1992; Langer 1948; Phillipson 1918; Putnam 1971).

The south German states had been persuaded to join the North German Confederation in the nationalistic fervor accompanying the war with France, and after the war they realized that they had little choice but to become more permanently bound to Prussia. A ceremony at Versailles on Jan. 18, 1871 proclaimed the establishment of a German Empire, and the rulers of the German states offered King William I of Prussia the hereditary crown of a united Germany. Alsace-Lorraine was initially designated a Reichsland and considered the common property of all the German states, until being organized as a state and given a legislature and considerable autonomy in May 1911 (Fulbrook 1992; Langer 1948).

A number of crises occurred in the few decades following the Franco-Prussian War, each threatening to lead to war over seemingly minor issues; examples include the "war scare" of April 1875, the Schnaebelé affair of April 1887, and the Zabern affair of December 1913. Further tension in the post-1870 period came from the rise of General George Boulanger to prominence in France in 1886. The loose Franco-German entente over African colonies led to nationalist and revanchist agitation in France. Boulanger was appointed minister of war in January 1886, and he quickly became the symbol of revenge against Germany. Bismarck responded with a speech in January 1887 reviewing the international situation. In this speech he warned the nations against war, redefined Germany's attitude toward France, and advocated a large increase in the German army. The French cabinet in which Boulanger was a minister then fell in May 1887, and he was not included in the new cabinet.

Bismarck's foreign policy after the Franco-Prussian War was aimed primarily at securing Germany's European position without entering into another war. He pursued this through a number of complex alliances, including the "Three Emperors' Alliance" of Germany, Austria, and Russia (1881-1887), an attempt to cultivate friendship with Britain, the Dual Alliance of Germany and Austria in 1879, and the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy in 1882. Austrian and Russian differences over eastern Europe and the Balkans created difficulties in maintaining that relationship, and German economic policies led to increased conflict with Britain. By the later 1880s, the renewed threat of potential war with France suggested the need to avert an alliance between France and Russia, and in 1887 Bismarck secured the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. Bismarck's successor as chancellor neglected to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia and proceeded to pursue a more aggressive, expansionist, and imperialistic foreign policy, which would eventually culminate in the First World War.

The scramble by Europe's major powers for colonies led to competition and conflict in Africa in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Germany had experienced internal agitation in favor of acquiring colonies as early as 1875, and in 1883 Germany officially began its period of colonialism by establishing a post at Angra Pequena in Southwest Africa. Germany's colonialism initially created great antagonism with England, but Germany obliged the British to accept Germany as a colonial power by establishing a loose entente with France in 1884. Two Franco-German crises over Morocco, in 1905 and 1911, both ended in the isolation of Germany and Austria by the remaining great powers.

The Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy had been signed in 1879 and 1882; the opposing Triple Entente of France, Russia, and Britain developed gradually over the next two decades. France and Russia developed an understanding between 1891 and 1894. Britain then began to align with this by an agreement with France in 1904, following the settlement of British-French differences in Egypt, Morocco, and the Far East. Russia's increasingly apparent weakness after its defeat by Japan in 1904-1905 and the 1905 revolution also led Britain to closer ties with Russia, culminating in a 1907 agreement. These alliances were not fixed, but the Triple Entente helped to provoke in Germany a fear of encirclement by hostile forces, which helped to increase the importance for Germany of its special relationship with Austria. (Albrecht-Carrié 1973; Fulbrook 1992; Langer 1948)

### *Two World Wars*

Trouble in the Balkans eventually culminated in the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, by a Serbian nationalist. A series of threats and mobilizations then led to a confrontation of Austria and Germany against Serbia and Russia. Anticipating war with Russia and seeking to avoid a two-front war, Germany's

general staff implemented their Schlieffen Plan, which called for a rapid strike to knock out France before fighting Russia. The result, of course, was World War I, which ended with Germany's defeat. The postwar settlement in the Treaty of Versailles led to France's recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, and to heavy reparations levied against Germany.

Inflation and economic crisis inside Germany left it apparently unable to make its reparations payments to the Allies. Meanwhile, France was pursuing revisionist policies of its own, aiming to gain control of the left bank of the Rhine. France used a shortfall in German wood and coal deliveries as a pretext for "supervising" production in the Ruhr area, backed up by "protective" French and Belgian military forces who marched into the Ruhr in January 1923 and who eventually numbered 100,000 troops.

The Weimar Republic managed to achieve a measure of stability in late 1923 and 1924. Germany Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann was able to regularize German relations with her western neighbors, signing the 1925 Locarno Treaty with its guarantees that Germany, France, and Belgium would not alter their existing boundaries by force. Germany then regained a place in the international system, and joined the League of Nations in September 1926.

Germany's reparations problems were also eased by the 1924 Dawes Plan and the 1929 Young Plan, which set more manageable levels of payments and extended international financial assistance. French troops began to leave the Ruhr in July 1925, and the first area of the Rhineland was cleared. The inter-allied military commission that had overseen Germany's disarmament was withdrawn in January 1927, and France and Germany achieved economic rapprochement. The French forces finished their withdrawal from the Rhineland in June 1930, five years earlier than established in the Versailles Treaty (Albrecht-Carrié 1973; Fulbrook 1992; Langer 1948).

After Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933, his government attempted to achieve as many of its revisionist goals as possible through diplomatic means, while pursuing policies of rapid rearmament. Germany broke off participation in the Geneva Disarmament Conference and withdrew from the League of Nations in October 1934, and in March 1935 announced to the world the existence of a German air force and of general rearmament. The League of Nations and the "Stresa front" of Britain, France, and Italy protested German rearmament, but did not take any action to prevent or reverse it.

The Saarland returned to Germany after a plebiscite in March 1935. Seeing Allied preoccupation with Italy's invasion of Abyssinia, German troops remilitarized the Rhineland in March, 1936. Despite the relatively limited numbers of German troops involved, the remilitarization was achieved successfully, to popular acclaim at home and little serious criticism abroad. Germany then accomplished the Anschluss with Austria in March 1938, and -- despite its prohibition at Versailles -- the rest of Europe saw little reason to protest. Next, German agents and sympathizers fomented unrest in the border areas of Czechoslovakia with large ethnic German populations, and a crisis developed along the German-Czech border in the summer of 1938. The situation was defused after a period of mounting tensions and military mobilizations, and the Munich peace conference of September 1938 produced the cession of certain strategic Czechoslovak border areas to Germany as part of Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy. With Czechoslovakia's main defenses in German hands, there was little effective resistance once Hitler decided to invade what remained of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, and once again the western powers allowed Hitler to achieve his goals with little opposition.

The western powers toughened their stance once Germany turned its attention to Poland. Britain and France declared war on Germany two days after German forces

invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. After some rapid military victories in Poland and Scandinavia, Germany invaded France in May 1940, rapidly defeating the French forces and occupying France for four years. After Germany's eventual unconditional surrender in May, 1945, the four victorious Allied powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France) divided Germany into zones of occupation (Albrecht-Carrié 1973; Fulbrook 1992; Langer 1948).

### *The Militarized Rivalry Ends*

As World War II drew to a close, the Allies had considered a number of options for dealing with post-war Germany. The Western Allies eventually shifted from their earlier consideration of draconian, punitive policies or even the deindustrialization of Germany (as in the Morgenthau Plan) to a policy of reconstruction. In January 1947 the British and American zones were merged to form a "Bizonia" that developed its own quasi-government. The French had been pursuing a very independent line over a number of issues, but eventually came to cooperate with the British and Americans.

The creation of a single entity from the three western occupation zones and, particularly, the June 1948 currency reform in western Germany that produced the Deutschmark exacerbated relations with the Soviets and their occupation zone in eastern Germany, essentially producing the postwar division of Germany. Soviet pressure led to an attempt to cut off the western Allies from access to Berlin, producing the 1948-1949 Berlin airlift as the Western powers kept the city supplied and reinforced through the air. This airlift was especially important because, as Fulbrook (1992: 210) describes it, "the former bastion of Prussian nationalism and Nazi militarism had become a symbol of western freedom and democracy, to be protected at all costs... western Germany, no longer a defeated nation of despicable Nazis, was to become a democratic ally in the fight against 'totalitarianism' and communism in the developing Cold War." The Federal Republic of Germany was founded in May 1949. This new German state was granted only partial sovereignty, having only limited authority over domestic and foreign policy while most important decisions were controlled by the Allied High Commission.

The fourteen-year duration of West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer would see the integration of the Federal Republic into the West. Adenauer's goal of political recovery meant reacquiring Germany's right to pursue its own foreign policy, and the return of a democratic Germany to the society of Western states. He aimed to include Germany as an equal and respected partner in the West European community, and he sought to tie Germany securely to the cultural, religious, and political traditions of Western Europe in order to forestall the recurrence of authoritarian rule. These aims would require a fundamental and lasting rapprochement with France, the remainder of Western Europe, and the United States.

Adenauer's goals were in line with American policies for the post-war economic, political, and military integration of western Europe as a bulwark against communism. The Western powers desired German rearmament to provide military support in the Cold War. Furthermore, they sought German economic recovery to provide the economic and social basis for Germany's political and military integration into the Western alliance and the Western system of values, so as to provide domestic stability and to forestall movement toward communism or renewed dictatorship.

France remained somewhat distrustful of Germany throughout much of the postwar period. As Hanrieder and Auton (1980: 97-103) noted, the French historical experience played an important part in defining France's national interests and foreign policy after World War II. The traditional hostility between France and Germany -- particularly in light of the French experience of three wars since 1870, the rapid German

defeat of France in 1940, and the recently-ended German occupation of France -- had left "a deep residue of bitterness" and a conviction that future French interests required a weak Germany.

France's postwar diplomacy thus meant to ensure that mechanisms in the new regime would control German sovereignty and lessen the risk of German resurgence. Such arrangements would help to control German resurgence, and would also help to improve France's position vis-a-vis Britain and the United States by adding Germany's political and economic potential to that of France. These goals were reflected in the 1950 Schuman Plan for a European common market for coal and steel, which represented the recognition that Germany recovery and rearmament was inevitable, the desire to create an international body to help supervise and regulate German remilitarization, and the desire to preclude exclusive German control over the industry of the Ruhr basin (Fulbrook 1992; Hanrieder 1967; Hanrieder and Auton 1980; Tint 1972; Willis 1968).

Germany joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in October 1949 and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in April 1951, and became a full member of the Council of Europe in May 1951. As German rearmament became increasingly important to the West for Cold War purposes, agreement was reached in the Bonn Conventions of 1951 that in return for remilitarization West Germany would become fully sovereign. These conventions did not go into effect directly because the French National Assembly voted them down along with the treaty establishing the European Defense Community (EDC) in August 1954. Nonetheless, the Allies continued to act in accordance with most provisions of the conventions, and offered an alternative framework for the restoration of German sovereignty in the Paris Agreements of October 23, 1954. These agreements included the protocol for terminating the Allies occupation, an official invitation for Germany to join NATO and the Brussels Pact, the Saar Agreement between Germany and France, and the Status of Force Convention.

The Allied occupation ended and West Germany regained full sovereignty when the Paris Agreements went into effect on May 5, 1955. As these agreements went into effect, Germany became a full member of NATO and the Brussels Pact. Constitutional amendments were introduced in 1956 to permit the Federal Republic to have an army and conscription for military service, and with the 1957 Treaty of Rome West Germany became a founding member of the European Economic Community (EEC). By the end of this period, then, Germany could reasonably be considered to be a full member of the western political and economic system, and -- despite some inevitable lingering fear and distrust by the French -- the Franco-German rivalry can reasonably be considered to have ended.

German Chancellor Adenauer and French President De Gaulle established a strong rapport with Germany's reintegration into the West. They shared common interests in European integration and in close economic and political ties between their countries. They went so far as to sign a Franco-German Friendship Treaty in January 1963, which provided for regular meetings between French and German officials and seemed to be an important step in the two countries' reconciliation. Nonetheless, tensions remained between France and Germany long after Germany's reintegration, leading to periodic political and economic confrontations -- albeit without resort to the military and without serious consideration of militarized means.

De Gaulle opposed a number of German foreign policy interests in the mid-1960s, and Erhard was much less sympathetic to French interests than Adenauer had been. The resulting disagreements became especially clear when de Gaulle announced in early 1966



that France would withdraw from NATO's command structure, and that French troops -- including those stationed in Germany -- would no longer remain under NATO control. This decision posed a potential threat to German security, and raised the difficult question of how French troops could remain in Germany once they were withdrawn from NATO and returned to French national control; Germany eventually consented to the continuing presence of French troops in their country on French terms. Tensions also appeared between France and Germany over the future of the Common Market and the EEC's eventual goal of political integration, as well as over more specific policies such as tariff policies, agricultural subsidies, and monetary coordination (Fulbrook 1992; Hanrieder 1967; Hanrieder and Auton 1980; Tint 1972; Willis 1968).

### **Conceptual Issues in the Franco-German Rivalry**

Having presented a brief history of the Franco-German relationship, I now turn to consider several conceptual issues in the study of rivalry. I begin with the timing of the rivalry, or the times at which it could be considered to have begun and ended. I then turn to the question of whether or not conflict behavior between the rivals seemed to evolve over time. Finally, I consider the dynamics of evolution within the rivalry, using conflict outcomes and contentious issues in an attempt to understand why relations between these rivals fluctuated or changed as they did.

#### **Time Frame of Rivalry**

##### *The Beginning of Rivalry*

The earliest origins of conflict across the Rhine predate Charlemagne, as noted above, but the origins of the modern conflicts of interest that would bedevil French and German decision-makers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are much more recent. These origins can be traced to France's intervention in the German states' affairs and annexation of disputed territories, which occurred periodically after the partition of Charlemagne's empire. This history of intervention and annexation laid the historical groundwork for competing claims to the banks of the Rhine, as well as for competition for position and influence in Europe.

The origins of the interstate conflict can be traced to the emergence of the modern French and German nation-states. France emerged as a state from the French Revolution, while the modern form of Germany came about with the emergence of Prussia and the unification of the smaller German states under Prussia. Prussia and France engaged in a series of militarized disputes or crises in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, but the Franco-German relationship can not be said to have become a full-fledged rivalry until the aftermath of the 1866 Seven Weeks' War and the resulting unification of the German states.

Before 1866 France did not consider Prussia to be a serious actual threat, although it had recognized Prussia's potential power -- especially if the German states were to be unified into a single state -- and was beginning to monitor Prussia's rapid growth. French diplomat Baron Bourgoing, according to Schroeder (1994: 789), constantly warned of the danger that "Teutonism" posed to France, the other German states, and the rest of Europe. Bourgoing also portrayed the existing German Confederation as more desirable for France than a unified Germany, which would prove to be too powerful, restless, and dynamic to play the same stabilizing role in Central Europe that was presently being played by the Confederation.

The minor crises over the decades before the Seven Weeks' War began to warn France that Prussia was becoming more assertive, especially once Prussia became involved in the 1859 war in Italy and the 1848 and 1864 Schleswig-Holstein Wars with Denmark. If we intend to study rivalry systematically, we must follow the definitions

discussed earlier. By this time France and Prussia were certainly competing over regional influence and position, so the competition element is met; the militarized relationship has also gone on for some decades and involves two nation-states. Finally, I consider the Seven Weeks' War to have been the catalyst for France to reevaluate its image of the German states. After this war ended with Prussia's shockingly rapid and decisive victory, there could be little doubt as to the already-mobilizable capabilities that Prussia possessed or the threat that she posed to France, and thus to the identification of Prussia as a rival of France. Furthermore, once Germany backed out of giving France any compensation (immediately or in the 1867 Luxembourg crisis) after the 1866 war, France had little doubt about German intentions. Taylor (1954: 183) argued that until May 1867, "Napoleon III had hoped that Germany would be united without France being humiliated; now he ceased to hope and became an instrument in the hands of his ministers. The dream of Franco-German amity was shattered for ever... Jealousy on the one side, suspicion on the other; these became the fixed rule on the frontier of the Rhine."

Interestingly, the Seven Weeks' War also marks the sixth militarized interstate dispute between France and Prussia without a substantial conflict-free gap, according to the Correlates of War (COW) Project. As a result, this is also the spot where many quantitative definitions of rivalry would classify the relationship between France and Prussia / Germany as a full-fledged enduring rivalry (e.g., Goertz and Diehl 1993; Hensel 1995). There certainly will be other cases where the identification of rivalry is not so similar between quantitative definitions and case study-based work, so we should be careful not to draw too much from this one example, but it should still serve to give us a little more confidence in the face validity of some of our rivalry measures.

#### *The End of Rivalry*

The militarized portion of the Franco-German rivalry seems to have ended with the close of World War II and the subsequent Allied occupation. France and Germany did not engage in any further militarized confrontations or crises after the end of the war, and have now seen five decades without the occurrence of any overt militarized conflict. When considering the ending of the Franco-German rivalry, though, we must consider more than simply the absence of militarized conflict; we must consider the perceptions and feelings of the former rivals, and attempt to identify a point at which a return to militarized confrontation was considered to be unlikely.

A longer-term perspective on rivalry would allow for a cooling-down period after the conclusion of the last crisis would extend the rivalry before the rivalry can be considered ended. For the Franco-German rivalry, such a perspective leads me to identify the year 1955 as the end of the rivalry. That was the year that Germany regained full sovereignty with the Paris Agreements and joined both NATO and the Brussels Pact. Germany has not pressed France on the territorial revisions after the war, and the issues that pervaded the rivalry for a century or more now seem to be resolved. New contentious issues have arisen, regarding monetary policy or European political integration, but the two former rivals now cooperate very closely on economic and even security matters, and neither side has expressed any willingness to use militarized means to try to achieve its goals regarding their differences. By 1955, then, Germany and France were cooperating both politically and economically, and neither side considered the other to pose an immediate threat to their own national security.

#### *Linkages with Other Rivalries*

The rivalry was linked with other rivalries or dyadic relationships at various times. Some of these linkages can help to explain the origins, timing, and ending of these rivalries, as well as some of their conflict propensity and escalation. I now examine each of these linkages, in order to try to understand how they influenced the onset,

continuation, or termination of the Franco-German rivalry and to understand how relevant the dyadic level of analysis is for the study of this rivalry.

Conflict or rivalry with external actors outside of the rival dyad itself seemed to help postpone the outbreak of the rivalry, by involving one or both actors in another rivalry that was seen as more salient and more threatening to national security interests. The Franco-German rivalry, for example, was limited in intensity while Prussia and Austria tried to resolve their contest for leadership of Germany. Until Prussia defeated Austria and the other German states in the Seven Weeks War and created the North German Confederation around itself, France saw Prussia primarily as a potential threat that had not yet been realized, and Prussia focused much of its attention on the problems of Austria and the other German states. With the rapid Prussian victory, though, Prussia was able to face westward across the Rhine, and France recognized Prussia / Germany as a primary threat to French security and interests. In this sense, the Prussian rivalry with Austria was closely linked to the Franco-German rivalry, because it had to be resolved before Prussia could offer a serious offensive challenge to France.

Conflict behavior between France and Germany was also influenced by linked rivalries during the course of their rivalry. Much like the Austrian-Prussian rivalry had occupied Prussia's attention in the first half of the nineteenth century, the Anglo-French rivalry would occupy much of France's attention at the end of that century and the Anglo-German rivalry would help to influence some decisions by both Germany and France in the early twentieth century. France's colonial confrontations with Britain in the late nineteenth century had the effect of diverting some French attention and resources from the Franco-German rivalry, at least until the rapprochement following Fashoda. After Fashoda, France was free to devote more attention to its problems with Germany, especially after Britain allied with France in the Triple Entente and became an adversary or rival of Germany as well. This Triple Entente and the Anglo-German rivalry exacerbated the Franco-German rivalry, both by increasing France's wartime capabilities and by giving France an ally that also opposed many of Germany's aims. The Anglo-French rivalry thus helped restrain the Franco-German rivalry by offering another rivalry to occupy French attention, and the Anglo-German rivalry led to the worsening of relations between France and Germany.

Finally, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union would ultimately prove to be responsible for helping to end the Franco-German rivalry. The threat posed by a common enemy to the east helped push France and Germany toward closer cooperation with each other and with the rest of western Europe after the end of World War II. This cooperation or integration of western Europe was aided immensely by the United States and eventually NATO, which helped to provide security guarantees to reassure France against the danger of a renewed German threat. This common threat alone can not explain the end of the rivalry, because other factors were involved, such as the severe social and economic crises facing both sides after World War II, the strong economic incentives for cooperation between them (and with the remainder of the Western allies), and the futility and high costs of war as a policy instrument (which they had experienced twice in the past forty years). None the less, the mutual threat posed by the Eastern bloc would soon come to overshadow the threat that each rival perceived in the other.

These linkages of other rivalries with the Franco-German rivalry were important in many ways, but they were never the sole cause of actions within the rivalry. Throughout the duration of the rivalry, France and Germany continued to pose the primary security threat to each other. Dyadic interaction remains very important as a basis for studying the rivalry, especially in terms of identifying the stakes or issues under

contention between the rivals. The territorial stakes in the rivalry -- Alsace, Lorraine, the Saar, and so on -- were typically dyadic in nature. Even in situations where other actors had some interest in seeing one rival or the other achieve control of these territories, or where other actors claimed the territories for themselves, contention over the territories remained primarily dyadic and the external actors served mostly to influence the dyadic interaction between the rivals.

Thus, the stakes under contention in this rivalry were primarily dyadic in nature, at least for the time period covered by this rivalry. Other, linked rivalries were most important as influences on the conduct of these two rivals, rather than as sources or determinants on their behavior. The timing of crises or wars between these dyadic rivals may have been influenced by German relations with Austria, Britain, and Russia, French relations with Britain and Italy, or the Cold War. Nonetheless, these external relations did not seem to be a primary source of the conflict between France and Germany.

### **The Evolution of Rivalry**

As mentioned earlier, three specific aspects of the evolution of rivalry are examined: the frequency of conflict, severity of conflict, and patterns in sub-militarized relations. Each of these aspects is now addressed separately.

#### *Frequency of Conflict*

The frequency of conflict tended to increase over time as the adversaries accumulated more of a legacy of past conflict. France and Germany showed a tendency to engage in disputes in clusters later in their rivalry. After engaging in only four confrontations over the nearly three decades from 1830-1858, they then became involved in five more confrontations from 1859-1871. After this cluster their conflict frequency decreased again, with only a few confrontations occurring between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I, but after World War I they became involved in another cluster of disputes over the two decades leading up to World War II.

These results support the large- $N$  analyses on conflict frequency in evolving rivalries (Hensel 1995). Those earlier analyses had shown that overall, conflict tends to be more likely to recur and tends to recur after shorter intervals as the adversaries accumulate a longer history of past conflict. The Franco-German rivalry shows a similar pattern, with sporadic conflict early in the relationship being followed by clusters of many disputes occurring in rapid succession.

#### *Severity of Conflict*

The severity of conflicts tended to increase as the rivals accumulated a longer history of past confrontations. France and Germany fought three full-scale interstate wars during their rivalry, and all three wars came after a number of earlier confrontations. The Franco-Prussian War and the two world wars occurred in France and Germany's seventh, fourteenth, and twentieth disputes, respectively, according to the Correlates of War Project's data on militarized interstate disputes.

There also seemed to be a tendency for sub-war disputes to be seen as more severe or more likely to escalate to war as the rivalry progressed. Even minor incidents between France and Germany in the decades following the Franco-Prussian War provoked crises that were seen as involving a high risk of war, whereas the earlier Franco-Prussian disputes over such issues as Belgium or Syria had not been seen as involving that same risk.

These findings again support the findings of the analyses presented by Hensel (1995). Those findings showed that, overall, confrontations tend to be somewhat more

severe in later phases of rivalry. The most severe crises and wars occurred after the rivals had already engaged in a number of less severe past confrontations. Not every dispute in later phases of the rivalry was more severe than some of their earlier disputes, of course; minor disputes and incidents tended to occur after especially severe crises or wars in the later phases. None the less, even many of these more minor cases tended to be accompanied by the perception of a high risk of war (or the renewal of a recently completed war). Even if the relationship is not perfect or linear, then, confrontations occurring in later phases of the rivalry tended to be more severe than earlier confrontations.

### *Sub-Militarized Relations*

The impact of the rivalry on domestic politics and on sub-militarized relations between the adversaries tended to increase over time. There was great domestic pressure on French policy-makers to recover Alsace-Lorraine and to avenge the humiliation of 1870, which may have helped lead to more belligerent French policy toward Germany and certainly helped lead to the harsh settlement imposed on Germany after World War I. This pressure also helped to block attempts to cooperate with Germany over other issues. When Germany reached its 1884-1885 "colonial entente" with France to frustrate British aims in Africa, there was a huge domestic uproar in France, as the masses refused to cooperate with Germany after Alsace-Lorraine had been taken. The official who had arranged the entente with Germany was hounded from office, nationalistic and revanchist officials came into office over the next few years, and several trivial incidents sparked talk of war with Germany over the next few years (Bridge and Bullen 1980: 133-135). In Germany, too, popular dissatisfaction with the settlement of World War I helped to make possible Adolf Hitler's rise to power in 1933, and helped to make possible the manipulation of German nationalism in the approach to World War II.

Although the earlier analyses of the evolution of rivalry did not directly address sub-militarized relations between the rivals or the impact of rivalry on domestic politics, the Franco-German case supports the general outlines of the evolutionary approach to rivalry. The media and public opinion on each side of the rivalry, as well as opposition parties in government, tended to oppose giving in to the adversary or making compromises and tended to advocate more aggressive foreign policies. As the rivalry continued, furthermore, large numbers of scholars and policy-makers on each side focused on advertising their side's rights to the disputed territory and supporting these rights through (often selective) searches of the historical and documentary evidence. Geopoliticians and scholars in both Germany and France undertook countless studies regarding the historic German or French titles to their disputed territories. Each of these examples helped to exert pressure on policy-makers, encouraging belligerent or conflictual attitudes toward the rival and creating obstacles to more cooperative initiatives (or, in the case of the opposition parties in government, often blocking the results of such initiatives by refusing to ratify treaties or agreements).

### **Accounting for Evolution**

The next role of this paper's case study is to examine the impact of factors that I expect to help account for much of this observed evolution of rivalry. The outcomes of successive crises and wars between the rivals seemed to exert a great impact on conflict behavior in their aftermath, both in the short term and in the longer term. The issues or stakes under contention in the rivalry also seemed to be important, in the sense that territorial issues seemed to be more escalatory than more positional issues (although the combination of both types of issues may be at least partly responsible). Changes in the relative capabilities of the two sides, particularly the growth of Prussian and then German capabilities relative to those of France, also seemed to play a large role in the origin and

early escalation of the rivalry. I now examine the effects of both past conflicts and contentious issues on the evolution of conflict behavior and rivalry.

#### *Past Conflict Outcomes and Severity*

There are many examples in the history of the Franco-German rivalry where the outcome or settlement of one particular crisis or war leads to subsequent escalation or de-escalation in conflict behavior between the rivals. These examples come from the history of both France and Germany, and have had similar effects on both states. Furthermore, some types of outcomes may actually produce different short-term and longer-term effects on subsequent escalation levels.

Mann (1968: 31-32), for example, argued that the Prussian collapse at Jena in 1806 and the subsequent French treatment of Prussia had an "unfavorable effect" on Franco-Prussian or Franco-German relations. Because France continued to torment Prussia while the south German states benefited from their relationship with Napoleon, Prussia was "barely on speaking terms" with him and many Prussians started to dream of a war of liberation. Similarly, even after the settlements of the Congress of Vienna, Prussian academics and even the masses called for a return of the left bank of the Rhine, calling the Rhine "Germany's river, not Germany's frontier," and France called for the return of the Rhineland to France because the banks of the Rhine formed France's natural frontier (Mann 1968: 43, 72-73).

The history of the Napoleonic Wars, with its legacy of France's invasion and defeat of Prussia, would come up again in subsequent relations between France and Germany. Haffner (1980: 132) argued that the 1870 Franco-Prussian War saw the explosion of elemental national hatreds on both sides, "fed more by memories of the days on the first Napoleon than by the cause of the war of 1870." The occupation of France after the Napoleonic Wars -- particular by the Prussians, who were the least disciplined of the occupying forces -- also created some bitterness and resentment among the French. The sufferings, costs, and terror of this occupation would be brought up as anti-German propaganda as late as 1919 (Schroeder 1994: 554).

One reason for the harsh peace terms in 1871, like the harsh terms levied against Germany in 1919 and 1945, was the wish to postpone the recurrence of militarized conflict. To Bismarck in 1871, the harsh peace terms and especially the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine "were precautions against a French war of revenge, a war which he was now expecting as a future certainty" (Haffner 1980: 132). Bismarck had long been convinced that France would not forgive a defeat by Germany, and he became even more convinced of this when he saw how the Franco-Prussian War became a people's war fed by intense nationalism on each side. Bismarck declared in 1870, for example, that "Germany wants peace and will make war until she gets it... This peace will be secured by a line of fortresses between Strasburg and Metz, as well as by those two towns which will protect Germany against the dread of a second attack by France" (originally from Heinrich von Poschinger, *Conversations with Prince Bismarck*; cited in Putnam 1971: 181). Similarly, Bismarck had long called Strassburg "the key to our house," and if France were to be an enemy for a long period of time -- as he expected -- he would rather have safe possession of that key for his own defenses (Haffner 1980: 133).

Not surprisingly, then, the settlement imposed on France after the Franco-Prussian War was seen as entirely unacceptable by France. The indemnity of five billion francs was considered unduly large, and the occupation was resented, but the hardest part was Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. As Albrecht-Carrié (1973: 165) noted, "the combination of the humiliation of military defeat with a concrete grievance fed the French feeling of irreconcilability and a desire for revenge." Bismarck in 1871 correctly

recognized the troubles that would be caused by annexing part of French-speaking Lorraine, although he underestimated the problems that would come from Alsace: "we are keeping Metz; but I confess I do not like that part of the arrangement. Strasburg is German in speech, and will be so in heart ten years hence. Metz, however is French, and will be a hotbed of disaffection for a long time to come" (originally from Heinrich von Poschinger, Conversations with Prince Bismarck; cited in Putnam 1971: 182)

Bridge and Bullen (1980: 119) described Franco-German hostility after 1871 as "an immovable obstacle to real harmony," although not a threat to peace in the immediate aftermath of the war; France was too weak in isolation to attempt to overthrow the 1871 settlements, and no other power had any desire to do so. Even if France felt weakened enough by the outcome of the war that it could not pursue its revisionist goals immediately, though, the lost provinces gave rise to the phrase "think of it always, speak of it never," and the desire to regain these losses would haunt Franco-German relations until France had recovered the territories in 1919 (Albrecht-Carrié 1973: 167). Several generations of Frenchmen could not forget the bitter experience, which resulted in "mutually distrustful and suspicious" relations between France and Germany, "highly susceptible in case of the smallest friction, ready to take offense and respond with threats at the first emergency" (Phillipson 1918: 28).

At the peace conference after World War I, French premier Clemenceau demanded the return of all of Alsace-Lorraine back to the 1870 frontier, which was never questioned by the other Allies. But furthermore, because of France's recognition of its own long-term weakness relative to Germany, he also demanded that the Saar be annexed to France and that Germany be removed from the left bank of the Rhine, in order to insure French security. They ended up not receiving these demands, but the Allies did take some measures to insure French security, such as keeping the Rhineland under Allied occupation until Germany had paid its reparations, and detaching the Saar from Germany pending a plebiscite in fifteen years on its eventual status (Albrecht-Carrié 1973: 367-368).

Similar emotions would follow in post-World War I Germany and post-World War II France. After suffering enormous losses to Germany, including a four-year occupation, France was determined to be compensated for its losses through territorial gains and reparations payments, and the French demanded (and finally received) an occupation zone in Germany. France hoped to weaken Germany permanently and to remove Germany's control of the industrial complex of the Ruhr and the Saar, beyond recovering French territorial losses (Hanrieder 1967; Tint 1972).

These results support the findings of the analyses presented by Hensel (1995). Stalemates were typically followed by relatively short periods of stability. Similarly, decisive outcomes and compromises typically produced greater stability in their aftermath, and when renewed conflict broke out shortly after such an outcome it tended to be less severe or escalatory. For example, the decisive, imposed outcomes to the three Franco-German wars, with their territorial annexation and large reparations payments, typically produced short-term stability in their aftermath or were followed by minor disputes, by leaving the defeated side unable to reverse the settlement. Nonetheless, such policies seemed to be counterproductive in the long run because of the drastic increases in hostility and grievances that they may cause in the defeated state, which may lead to long-term escalation and instability after the short-term effects have been overcome by the defeated state.

### *Contentious Issues*

The Franco-German rivalry involved a mixture of types of issues. Perhaps the most prominent or the most memorable issue in the rivalry is that of territory. France and Germany have fought repeatedly over several pieces of territory along the Rhine River, particularly Alsace-Lorraine but also including the Saar, Ruhr, and Rhineland areas. Each of these territories has changed hands several times in the numerous crises, wars, and peace settlements that have involved these adversaries over the past few centuries. The interstate border between France and Germany was at stake in one form or another for the entire duration of the Franco-German rivalry.

This border came to take on greater significance after the rivals had fought over it several times, and particularly after it had changed ownership. For example, the history of invasion through Alsace left Bismarck determined to annex that territory in 1871 as a means of preventing further attacks. France after each of the world wars also saw Germany's industrial areas of the Ruhr and the Saar as critical to German war-making capabilities, and sought to limit or remove German control of those areas as much as possible. Furthermore, Mann (1968: 43, 72-73) describes how both French and Germans came to view the Rhine as a national symbol, inspiring intense nationalism, demands for the return of lost territory, and patriotic songs with such lines as "They shall not have it, the free German Rhine." This symbolism and patriotism helped to make the Rhine into a kind of national deity, and helped to prevent either side from understanding the other's point of view regarding claims to the banks of the Rhine.

Another territorial issue at stake in this rivalry, at least for a few decades at the close of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, involves African colonies. In particular this includes the borders between the two colonial empires, and Morocco was the subject of two prominent crises before World War I. The colonial issues were only relevant for the approximately three decades in which Germany actively pursued a colonial empire; when the German colonies were removed after World War I, colonial borders ceased to be an important issue in the rivalry.

Finally, regional-level positional or structural issues were at stake for much of the history of the rivalry. Both sides struggled for regional political and economic hegemony and for influence or position in Europe on a broad scale, ranging from the disputes over Belgium, Syria, and Italy in the early history of the rivalry to the disputes over Poland and Czechoslovakia before World War II. The specific contents of these positional or hegemonic issues varied across different time periods, not showing the consistency of the territorial questions over Alsace-Lorraine and the left bank of the Rhine.

The Franco-German rivalry seems to have been more escalatory when territory was explicitly under contention than when it was not. That is, there seems to have been less stability and disputes seem to have been more escalatory or war-prone, especially after a given piece of territory has changed hands forcibly in recent memory. The Rhine River and Alsace-Lorraine appear again and again as rallying cries in the history of both France and Germany, and they would change hands each time the rival that did not possess them won a decisive victory.

Issues of influence or position do not seem to have been as war-prone or escalatory as territory, or to have contributed as much to the general escalation when both types of issues were at stake. There were two disputes over Belgium in the early 1830s, but otherwise these issues only produced one dispute each, whereas issues involving territory like Alsace-Lorraine or the Ruhr were involved in multiple disputes. Contesting regional hegemony can not have helped to improve relations between France and Germany, but it also does not seem to have had the same escalatory effects as territory.



It is possible, though, that the combination of territorial and positional stakes makes relations more conflictual or more escalatory. For example, Alsace-Lorraine can not be described as an immediate cause of the First World War, because the war initially came out of events in the Balkans. Once the war began and French and German forces began fighting, though, Phillipson (1918: 27-28) argued that the Alsace-Lorraine question quickly moved from the margin of French consciousness to become the focus of this consciousness. At this point, a solution to the question -- in the form of a reversal of the 1871 annexation -- became an essential objective for France. If this latter suggestion is correct, then it would be very difficult to distinguish the separate effects of territorial and positional stakes in a single rivalry that includes both elements.

Again, the findings from this case study are consistent with the analyses presented by Hensel (1995). These findings, like the existing research, suggest that issues considered more salient by policy-makers tend to produce more escalatory behavior and a greater likelihood of conflict recurrence. This case study has also offered a valuable contribution beyond the existing research, by allowing us to see how the issues and the salience attached to them can change over the evolution of a rivalry. Alsace-Lorraine took on much greater significance to each side as the rivalry evolved, eventually being assigned a level of importance by policy-makers that far outweighed any objective indicator of their value. This increasing salience of issues over time seems to have contributed to the duration of the rivalry, because each side became increasingly unwilling to abandon or compromise its claims as the rivalry went on and the issues became so important symbolically and psychologically, coupled with the impact of other factors like the outcomes of previous confrontations that had produced changes in the disposition of the issues.

### *Relative Capabilities*

One factor that seems to have been an important contributor to processes of escalation within the rivalry involves the two states' relative capabilities, in both a static and a dynamic sense. Appendix I shows a series of objective indicators of France's national capabilities relative to Germany's, including military, industrial, and demographic measures and an overall index. It is certainly not foolproof to rely on an objective measure collected many years after the events originally happened, since the effects of capabilities depend more on each side's subjective perceptions of the two sides' relative capabilities than on any actual objective measure, but I include the appendix as a means of examining these effects as well as possible given my present time and resource constraints.

It should be noted that France begins with much higher relative capabilities than Prussia on all four measures. A capability score of .500 indicates exact parity in capabilities, anything higher reflects a French advantage, and anything lower reflects a German advantage. At the outset of this period, France was one of Europe's strongest states, and Prussia was still in the second tier of Europe's power hierarchy. At this time Prussia was not seen as having the capability to overcome a major adversary on the offensive battlefield, although it was seen as strong enough for its own self-defense; as a result, Prussia was not taken as much of an immediate threat to France, relative to some of the other European powers. Prussia quickly industrialized, though, and saw almost continual relative gains in demographics.

With the Prussian triumph in the Seven Weeks War of 1866 and the resulting addition of smaller German states to Prussian control, Germany's capability increased dramatically relative to that of France. At this point France was suddenly alarmed about Prussia / Germany's success against Austria on the battlefield, and France began to take the German threat more seriously; Prussia itself had not felt ready to challenge France

militarily until defeating Austria. With Germany acknowledged to be at or above France's level of capabilities (subsequently shown very clearly on the battlefields of the Franco-Prussian War), both sides took a much more active interest in each other's affairs, and full-fledged rivalry could be considered to have arrived. From that point on, Germany would continue to gain in relative capabilities almost non-stop, with the exceptions of the postwar settlements after the two world wars, and even then it did not take long for the Germans to recover relative to France.

These changes in relative capabilities are closely related to the rivalry behavior of the two adversaries. All three of the rivalry's wars occurred after Germany came near or surpassed France's relative capabilities, while none of their crises in the earlier years when France was more preponderant came close to that level of escalation. Similarly, a glance at the chronology of events in the rivalry suggests that Germany and France were more prone to get involved in crises after the Seven Weeks' War, with a regular stream of crises ranging from the 1875 "war scare" from a Berlin newspaper to the 1905 and 1911 Morocco crises. Once Germany approached France's capability and both sides began watching each other more closely, small events seemed to be more likely to lead to diplomatic incidents of crises -- although it must be recognized that this may be due to the effects of rivalry itself; Hensel (1994b, 1995) suggests that as a rivalry extends further back into time, there is a tendency for grievances and hostility to accumulate and for future conflict to be more likely in a shorter period of time.

### **Conclusions**

The results of this paper suggest that an evolutionary approach to rivalry can be very useful, in the sense that many basic aspects of the rivalry relationship changed over the duration of the rivalry, as well as before and after the rivalry. France's perceptions of the threat posed by Prussia -- in terms of both capabilities and intentions -- changed dramatically over the course of a few years in the mid-nineteenth century. Both France and Germany showed some tendency to "learn" from previous confrontations and to carry hostility and grievances for substantial periods of time. The accumulated legacy of past events tended to weaken the prospects for subsequent cooperation as the rivalry continued, and the expectation of continued rivalrous interaction led both sides to try to impose decisive outcomes on the adversary so as to minimize the danger of future war. While this may seem painfully obvious to the casual observer or to the careful scholar of history, it has not yet been reflected in most of the existing systematic research on rivalry, which continues to treat rivalry as a static, all-or-nothing concept -- a given dyad in a given time period either is an enduring rivalry, or it is not.

I have identified some factors here that seem to be helpful in accounting for some of these changes in the rivalry context of relations between two adversaries. For example, the outcomes and consequences of prominent crises or wars seemed to play an extremely important part in influencing subsequent relations between the rivals, in both short-term and longer-term relations. The issues at stake also seemed to be important, in the sense that territorial issues seemed to be very difficult to resolve to both sides' satisfaction, particularly after territory traditionally claimed or occupied by one state has been seized by its rival. Furthermore, external actors seemed to exert an important influence on the rivalry process at many different portions of the rivalry. In each of these cases, the results from the Franco-German rivalry also support the results from earlier large-*N* research on rivalries.

It is to be hoped that future research on rivalry will be able to extend from this type of detailed analysis of individual cases. It is difficult to draw conclusions about the effects of any given factor or set of factors on rivalry behavior, when I am only drawing from the history of a single rivalry. This is one especially important potential benefit of

the combination of case studies and large- $N$  research. Such efforts offer the opportunity to examine a fairly large number of cases in more detail than would normally be the case in studies of interstate conflict and rivalry, as well as the opportunity to draw comparative conclusions from this entire set of cases.

Future research could also profitably address the apparent evolution of international relationships over time. Both the Franco-German case and the large- $N$  analyses presented in existing research on rivalry suggest that processes of interstate conflict and rivalry show evidence of evolution over time. It would now be desirable to put more effort into accounting for this evolution, both in large- $N$  studies and in more detailed analysis of individual cases.

Future research, particularly work using detailed case studies, could also benefit greatly from looking at cases of dyadic relationships that did not evolve all the way to enduring rivalry. This paper has examined the conflict behavior of a single pair of adversaries that eventually became enduring rivals, in order to see whether or not their conflict behavior showed evidence of evolution over time. A more complete analysis of the evolution of rivalry, though, should also analyze cases that did not reach such an advanced phase of rivalry. This would allow us to study whether conflict behavior shows similar evolutionary patterns in dyads that never advanced past the earlier phases of rivalry, and whether or not there seem to be important differences that can be used to distinguish at the beginning of a relationship whether two adversaries are likely to become enduring rivals or whether they are likely to end their militarized relationship short of that point.

Furthermore, the ending of this rivalry suggests that it is indeed possible to produce a stable peace fairly quickly between two longtime adversaries, even after a century of conflict and the occurrence of three full-scale wars. It would be useful to follow up on this and to try to understand how generalizable this lesson is, by looking in more detail at the ending of other rivalries as well. Such detailed studies of the ending of rivalries might also usefully examine whether there might be more desirable ways to end such long-standing conflicts, short of the bloody and economically devastating wars that helped to end the Franco-German rivalry.

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**Appendix: Relative Military Capabilities in the Franco-German Rivalry  
(taken from perspective of France)**

<u>Year</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Industrial</u>	<u>Demog.</u>	<u>Overall</u>
1820	.666	.610	.773	.683
1830	.734	.714	.762	.737
1840	.806	.681	.750	.746
1850	.798	.684	.714	.732
1860	.800	.623	.731	.718
1870	.582	.452	.594	.543
1880	.594	.397	.499	.496
1890	.518	.331	.441	.430
1900	.502	.247	.392	.380
1910	.471	.232	.350	.348
1920	.874	.258	.378	.503
1930	.768	.392	.331	.497
1940	.407	.191	.266	.288
1955	.711	.368	.397	.492
1960	.670	.363	.396	.476
1970	.502	.349	.406	.419
1980	.497	.371	.391	.420
1990	.493	.385	N/A	N/A

**NOTES:** The relative capability figures in this appendix reflect France's proportion of the total capabilities in the dyad -- i.e., France's total divided by the combined total of France and Prussia (1820-1860) / Germany (1870-1940) / West Germany (1955-1990).

Military indicators: military personnel, military expenditures

Industrial indicators: iron/steel production, energy consumption

Demographic indicators: total population, urban population

Overall measure: evenly-weighted composite of all six indicators

Data source: National Material Capabilities dataset, Correlates of War Project  
(University of Michigan)