

**Bones of Contention:
Comparing Territorial, Maritime, and River Issues**

Paul R. Hensel

Department of Political Science
Florida State University
Tallahassee, FL 32306-2230
850-644-7318
phensel@garnet.acns.fsu.edu

Sara McLaughlin Mitchell

Department of Political Science
University of Iowa
341 Schaeffer Hall
Iowa City, IA 52242
319-335-2471
sara-mitchell@uiowa.edu

Thomas E. Sowers II

Department of Political Science
Lamar University
Beaumont, TX 77710
409-880-8539
Thomas.Sowers@lamar.edu

Clayton L. Thyne

Department of Political Science
University of Kentucky
1615 Patterson Office Tower
Lexington, KY 40506-0027
859-257-7029
Clayton.thyne@uky.edu

Bones of Contention: Comparing Territorial, Maritime, and River Issues

Abstract: Recent research suggests the importance of contentious issues as sources of militarized conflict. This paper advances an issue-based approach to world politics, focusing on disagreements over territory, maritime zones, and cross-border rivers. The authors characterize militarized conflict and peaceful techniques as substitutable foreign policy tools that states can adopt to resolve disagreements over issues, and present hypotheses to account for issue management based on issue salience and recent interaction over the same issue. Empirical analyses reveal that states are more likely to use both militarized conflict and peaceful methods when the issue at stake is more salient, both when the general issue type is considered more salient and when the specific issue under contention has greater within-issue salience. Recent issue management also plays an important role, as histories of both militarized conflict and failed peaceful settlements increase pressure to take further action to settle the issue.

Acknowledgments: This research was supported by National Science Foundation grants #SES-0079421 and #SES-0214417. Doug Lemke, Will Moore, and Brandon Prins contributed valuable comments, but the authors bear full responsibility for any errors and for all conclusions and interpretations expressed herein. All ICOW data codebooks and publicly released data sets are freely available at <<http://www.icow.org>>, including replication data for this article's analyses.

Keywords: contentious issues, conflict management, militarized disputes, territory, maritime, river

For several decades, scholars have called for an issues-based approach to world politics (e.g. O'Leary 1976; Potter 1980; Mansbach and Vasquez 1981; Diehl 1992; Vasquez 1993; Hensel 2001). This call has been met by research examining the issues involved in militarized conflict (e.g. Holsti 1991; Hensel 1996; Mitchell and Prins 1999; Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Senese 2005), as well as studies that examine both militarized and peaceful interaction over territorial issues (e.g., Hensel 2001; Huth and Allee 2002; Mitchell 2002). The appearance of so many studies is a promising sign, but there is an important gap in this literature. Aside from work on militarized conflict, which has only been able to measure issue salience with broad issue categories, there has been no systematic comparison of how issues are managed. If an issues approach is to become a serious scholarly research program, much more needs to be done to investigate the similarities and differences in the management of different types of issues, and to determine the extent to which multiple types of issues can be explained by the same theories and aggregated in the same analyses.

This paper uses newly collected data to compare states' management of three distinct types of issues: disagreements over territory, maritime zones, and cross-border rivers. We examine states' decisions to use both militarized and peaceful foreign policy tools to manage or resolve disagreements over these issues, emphasizing the impact of issue salience and recent interactions over the issue. Our findings suggest a number of commonalities in the handling of these issues: states are more likely to employ both militarized action and peaceful techniques over issues that are seen as more salient, that have already led to armed conflict, and that have experienced unsuccessful peaceful settlement efforts. We conclude by discussing implications of these results, and by suggesting possible directions for additional research on contentious issues.

An Issues Approach to World Politics

Hensel (2001) outlines a systematic approach to the study of issues, drawing from work by such scholars as Randle (1987), Holsti (1991), Diehl (1992), and Vasquez (1993). The central element of an issue-based approach is that policy makers are concerned with achieving their goals over specific issues, rather than simply pursuing such vague notions as power or security. An issue can best be described as "a disputed point or question, the subject of a conflict or controversy" (Randle 1987, 1), or with respect to armed conflict, "what states choose to fight over, not the conditions that led to the choice of military force as the means" (Diehl 1992, 333). Issues in world politics are thus the subjects of disagreements between nation-states.

Issues can involve competing views over the disposition of concrete or tangible stakes, such as control over a particular territory, the removal of a leader, or the implementation or termination of a specific policy (e.g., trade or immigration). Issues may also involve competing views on intangible stakes, such as influence, prestige, or ideological or philosophical questions (e.g., Randle 1987, 1-2; Holsti 1991, 18-19; Diehl 1992). Whatever the stakes, policy makers are concerned with issues because of the "values" that the issues represent, such as physical survival, wealth, security, independence, or status. Because of these values, issues vary in salience, which can be defined as "the degree of importance attached to that issue by the actors involved" (Diehl 1992, 334) or "the extent to which (but principally, the intensity with which) peoples and their leaders value an issue and its subject matter" (Randle 1987, 2).

Finally, state leaders may choose among numerous cooperative or conflictual policy tools to pursue their goals over issues. Leaders may choose to negotiate over their differences, either bilaterally or with the non-binding assistance of third parties. They may also agree to submit their disputes to binding third party judgments, or they may unilaterally threaten or use military

force to achieve their goals. From an issue-based perspective, these policy tools are best seen as substitutable techniques that can be used to pursue the same end of achieving issue-related goals.¹ The purpose of this paper is to examine states' choices between these techniques for managing issues. We focus on issue salience in terms of both general differences in salience between different types of issues (territorial, maritime, river) and variation in salience within each issue type being studied (e.g., high salience territory vs. low salience territory).

Categorizing Issue Types

Bearing these general points in mind, the success of any issue-based approach depends on the conceptualization of issues. It is not enough to argue that numerous issue types exist or that "issues matter" without guidelines for how to identify, categorize, or measure issues and their salience. An early effort by Rosenau (1971) classifies issues by the tangibility or intangibility of the values to be allocated and the means employed to effect allocation. Yet a single issue type, such as territory, may be important for both tangible and intangible reasons. Additionally, a variety of means can be used to effect allocation of any issue, ranging from military force to negotiations or adjudication. It would be difficult and misleading to categorize any particular issue as involving either tangible or intangible means. The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project categorizes issues into four categories based on the specific substantive area of contention, including military-security, political-diplomatic, economic development, and cultural status (e.g., Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997). However, these categories are not mutually exclusive. Territorial issues, for one, can be important for reasons related to any of these four categories. Holsti (1991) has provided the most comprehensive categorization by listing dozens of issues that have been at stake in war since 1648, but this list is meant as a description of the issues that have led to war rather than a comprehensive list of issues that might lead to war, and

there is no comprehensive theoretical differentiation between the various issues.

We propose an alternative categorization that is based on the *tangible* and *intangible* values that issues hold for the contending states. The following list -- adapted from Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), Maslow (1970), and Mansbach and Vasquez (1981, 58) -- represents the values that we believe are most useful for the study of international conflict and cooperation, sorted alphabetically rather than in any order of presumed importance:

Tangible Values

- Security: Safety from external danger (absence of threats or protection from threats)
- Survival: Provision of basic human needs (food/water/shelter)
- Wealth: Accumulation of resources, goods, or money (beyond basic human needs)

Intangible Values

- Culture/Identity: Related to one's cultural, religious, or ideological beliefs or identity
- Equality/Justice: "Fairness" or impartiality in the distribution of other values
- Independence: Ability to formulate and implement one's own policies
- Status/Prestige/Influence: The degree of respect one is accorded by others

Several scholars have attempted to rank values in relative importance. Holsti (1991, 24) for example, suggests that "Contests over strategic territory, for example, are more likely than disagreements over trade policy to generate contests of arms. Security is a more important value in most eras than is welfare." Similarly, Maslow produces a hierarchy of human needs, whereby higher needs become important only when more fundamental needs are met. Physiological needs, such as food and water, are most fundamental, followed by security needs, belongingness needs, self-esteem needs, and self-actualization needs. Yet Lasswell (1950, 56-57) explicitly rejected any effort to produce universal rankings: "While there may be similarities of 'motive, passion and desire' among various persons and cultures, there are differences as well, differences especially in the comparative importance attached to the various values. No generalizations can be made a priori concerning the scale of values of all groups and individuals... In particular, it is impossible to assign a universally dominant role to some one value or other." We follow

Lasswell in remaining agnostic over ranking the priority of values for nation-states, although (as will be seen) we attempt to rank issues by salience.

Different types of issues can be seen as varying along these two dimensions of tangible and intangible salience. Although individual examples of each issue type may vary in both tangible and intangible salience, general types of issues may be classified as being relatively high or low along each dimension. "Relatively high" values indicate that a typical issue generally has important value for the state's leadership or for a substantial portion of its population. "Relatively low" values indicate either that the issue does not involve any meaningful salience of this type, or that it only has such value for a small portion of the state's population. Table 1 offers examples of issues that typically take on high or low values along each dimension.

[Table 1 here]

Territory, for example, is often described as quite important to states for both tangible and intangible reasons (e.g., Vasquez 1993; Hensel 1996; Hensel and Mitchell 2005). Territorial claims often involve land that contains economic and/or strategic value, thus relating to the tangible values of wealth and physical security. Beyond this tangible importance, many territories also take on enormous intangible significance, coming to be viewed as part of a state's national identity as well as being tied closely to the intangible values of independence and perhaps status/prestige. Although individual territorial claims may involve specific pieces of land with little tangible value or with little intangible significance for either participant, territorial issues in general may be seen as taking on relatively high values on both dimensions. Issues of regime survival also seem to take on high values of both tangible and intangible salience, at least for the members of the targeted regime (e.g., U.S. efforts to remove Fidel Castro and his regime from Cuba). Although the issue may be primarily intangible (involving influence or prestige) for

the challenger seeking to remove the regime, the targeted regime and its supporters likely see the issue as one of both physical survival (tangible) and continued independence (intangible).

Many issues can take on relatively high values along either the tangible or intangible dimension, while lacking in the other dimension. Issues involving cross-border water resources can be quite salient, particularly in water-scarce areas such as the Middle East, as can maritime issues for coastal states that depend heavily on fishing (e.g., the "Cod Wars" between the United Kingdom and Iceland). Yet river and maritime issues rarely approach territorial issues in intangible value. Similarly, Russian efforts to support pro-Russian candidates and policies in former Soviet republics and U.S. efforts to support pro-American candidates and policies in Latin America have much more to do with the intangible value of influence than with any tangible value for Russia or the United States. Austria's post-World War II demands over the treatment of ethnic Germans in South Tyrol and Russia's demands over the treatment of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states are based primarily on intangible values like identity and have little tangible value (neither Austria nor Russia seeks to annex the areas where their kinsmen live).

Finally, issues with little tangible or intangible value include issues associated with individuals, firms, or industries. Disagreements such as U.S. complaints over European subsidies to Airbus (a competitor to American aerospace firms) or a number of recent WTO disputes over shrimp imports may be important to individual firms or industries. Likewise, concern for a state's national who is imprisoned abroad, such as the 1994 American attempt to prevent the caning of U.S. citizen Michael Fay for vandalism in Singapore, may be quite important for the individual whose livelihood or freedom is threatened. Yet there is little tangible or intangible value in such issues for most of the state's leaders or population.

Based on this categorization of issues as having relatively high or low values of both

tangible and intangible salience, it is possible to offer some general expectations about the relative salience of different types of issues. We are not willing to offer a detailed ranking of, say, the dozens of issues identified by Holsti (1991). We do expect, though, that the most salient types of issues overall will be those that take on relatively high values of both tangible and intangible salience, such as claims to territory. Not only do these issues have tangible values at stake for the participants, but they also have the added complication of intangible values that are not easily negotiated or compromised. We classify issue types with relatively high values of either tangible or intangible salience (but not both) as having moderate salience overall. Examples include competing claims over maritime zones or cross-border rivers (tangible), as well as over the treatment of minorities or communal groups (intangible).² Finally, we consider issue types with relatively low values of both tangible and intangible salience as having low salience overall. Examples include issues related to specific individuals or corporations.

Salience within Issue Types

In addition to differences in salience between issues, the salience of specific issues *within* any general issue type can vary considerably. For example, some maritime areas may be highly salient to one or more states. The territorial sea around Iceland, for example, almost produced a war between Iceland and the United Kingdom in the 1970s because the fisheries in this area are extremely important to both claimants' economies. Other maritime areas are less salient to leaders. The United States contests Canada's claim of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, for example, arguing that it is an international waterway. However, commercial navigation through the Passage is not currently practical, and neither side views the issue as justifying drastic measures. Similarly, the Golan Heights territory is highly salient to both Israel and Syria for its strategic position as well as for its control over scarce water resources. In contrast, some

claimed territories, such as Navassa Island (claimed by Haiti from the United States), offer neither military nor economic benefits.

Variation in salience within issues might make a huge difference in understanding the linkage between issues and conflict. For example, Diehl (1992, 340) notes that "different issues may share some characteristic that make them equally likely to promote violence," and that "the same issue may prompt different behavior because of variation along one of the issue characteristic dimensions." While a variety of empirical analyses have found territorial issues to be more conflictual than other issues overall, then, it seems likely that certain non-territorial issues are also quite conflictual, and that certain territorial issues are much less conflictual than the overall patterns seem to indicate.

Hypotheses on Issue Management

As noted earlier, states may choose among numerous policy tools to pursue their goals with respect to contentious issues. They may threaten or use militarized force, or they may pursue peaceful settlement options, such as bilateral negotiations, negotiation with the non-binding assistance of third parties (e.g., good offices, inquiry, conciliation, or mediation), or submission of the issue to the binding judgment of a third party (e.g., arbitration or adjudication). We are interested in identifying factors that make leaders more or less likely to select each of these foreign policy options.³ The effectiveness of these different settlement techniques lies beyond the scope of the present paper, though, and will be left for future work.

Hypotheses on Issue Salience

We begin by considering the impact of issue salience, which is central to an issue-based conception of world politics. Most issue scholars argue that salience, or the value attached to an issue by the participants, affects the choices that the participants make over the management of

the issue. For example, Randle (1987, 9, 17) describes the existence of a contentious issue as creating the basic conditions for competition and conflict between states, but argues that more salient issues are more likely to produce the commitment of high levels of resources and the willingness to bear significant costs: "The severity of the conflict depends upon how intensely the parties value the matter at issue." Similarly, Diehl (1992, 339) suggests that salience could be a "loose necessary condition" for conflict behavior: "When the stakes are high enough, states will be willing to use military force to achieve their goals."⁴

From this perspective, policy makers should be willing to pursue costlier or riskier options to achieve their goals over issues that are considered highly salient than over less important issues. The threat or use of military force is a particularly dangerous option because it cannot guarantee a satisfactory outcome, but involves the risk of extensive human and economic costs. Low-salience issues are unlikely to be seen as justifying the costs and risks of military action, especially when more peaceful foreign policy techniques such as negotiations could be used instead. When a highly salient issue is at stake, though, leaders should be quite concerned with both gaining the benefits of winning on the issue and avoiding the costs of losing on the issue, which may outweigh the costs and risks of using force to achieve their goals.

As we have already discussed, issue salience can have several different meanings. We expect militarized conflict to be more likely to be used for managing issues that are generally considered highly salient -- most notably territorial issues, which typically feature relatively high values of both tangible and intangible salience -- than for generally less salient issues with relatively low values of tangible and/or intangible salience.⁵ We also expect within-issue salience to have a similar effect, such that issues of any issue type that are more salient than other issues of the same type should be more likely to produce militarized conflict. In other

words, the use of militarized force should be more likely when a claim is highly salient, regardless of the general type of claim involved (territory, maritime, or river). This is one of the first studies to allow testing of both meanings of salience. Hensel (2001), for example, finds that militarized conflict is more likely over more salient territorial issues than over less salient territories, but that study could not determine whether similar patterns also hold for other issue types or whether that result is unique to territory. We thus propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1a: States are more likely to threaten or use militarized force over issue types that are generally more salient than over issues that are generally less salient.

Hypothesis 1b: States are more likely to threaten or use militarized force when the specific issue under contention is more salient.

Although we hypothesize that armed conflict should be more likely over highly salient issues than over less salient issues, conflict is not the only way that such issues will be handled, nor is it necessarily the most frequent way. We expect that peaceful settlement activities should also be more likely over highly salient issues than over those that are less salient. The main reason for the higher likelihood of peaceful activities is the expected costs and risks from different policy options. If the state believes that it can achieve its desired outcome through either military force or peaceful negotiations, then the option with the lowest costs should be more likely to be chosen (*ceteris paribus*). And when the issue is highly salient, it is reasonable to expect the costs of militarized conflict to be relatively high, as the opponent should be likely to oppose any military moves to settle the issue.

While there may not be a high probability of diplomatic success from a given round of peaceful settlement attempts, we expect that these options will be employed much more often when issues are salient. We also expect that third parties will be more likely to become involved in seeking to manage or settle highly salient issues, either as active participants in non-binding

settlement techniques (e.g., good offices or mediation), or by pushing the claimants to resolve their issues peacefully before they escalate and threaten regional stability. Indeed, we expect that peaceful activities should be even more likely than militarized conflict at any given level of salience, although both militarized and peaceful activities should be more likely as the salience of the issue increases.

As with militarized conflict, we expect peaceful issue management to be influenced by both meanings of issue salience. We expect peaceful settlement techniques to be more likely to be used for the management of issues that are generally considered highly salient -- most notably territorial issues -- than for managing generally less salient issues. We also expect within-issue salience variation to have a similar effect, such that issues of any issue type that are more salient than other issues of the same type should be more likely to produce peaceful settlement efforts.

This expectation leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2a: States are more likely to pursue peaceful settlement attempts over issue types that are generally more salient than over issues that are generally less salient.

Hypothesis 2b: States are more likely to pursue peaceful settlement attempts when the specific issue under contention is more salient.

Hypotheses on Past Issue Management

Beyond the impact of issue salience, we also expect interactions between states at one point in time to have important consequences for their relations in the future. For example, research on recurrent conflict and rivalry suggests that as states build up a longer history of militarized conflict, they view each other with much greater distrust and suspicion, leading them to see the other as a more serious threat in future relations. Furthermore, to the extent that earlier conflicts led to changes in the *status quo* (e.g., the seizure of disputed territory or the destruction of a river diversion project) or led to casualties, the history of conflict may harden both sides'

positions and promote militarized conflict as a more appropriate policy option. Drawing from such arguments, research on the evolution of interstate rivalry (e.g. Hensel 1999, 2001; Diehl and Goertz 2000) and repeated crises (Leng 1983; Colaresi and Thompson 2002) has found substantial evidence that states become increasingly likely to become involved in future militarized conflict as they accumulate a longer history of past conflict.

Hensel's (1999) evolutionary approach to rivalry suggests that past interactions between two states could lead them in either a more conflictual path toward rivalry or a more cooperative path toward better relations, depending on what the states do to each other and what outcome results. Most evolutionary research on rivalry has focused on militarized conflict as both the primary independent variable (the type of past behavior being studied) and the primary dependent variable (the type of future behavior being explained).⁶ Yet the general evolutionary arguments that have been laid out could potentially be applied equally well to peaceful forms of interaction, in terms of both the past behavior being studied and the future behavior being explained. Indeed, Hensel (1999) explicitly calls for extending this approach to non-militarized interactions, and Hensel (2001) examines evolution in both militarized and non-militarized dimensions of territorial claims in the Americas. The present study goes even further.

Past armed conflict is not the only form of interaction that can shape states' perceptions of the adversary, issue satisfaction, or expectations about the future. Armed conflict is only one of numerous tools that can be used to manage or settle contentious issues, and the occurrence and outcome of peaceful settlement techniques should have similar effects. Much like two states that have engaged in repeated armed conflict are likely to expect similar actions to continue in the future (e.g., Hensel 1999, 184-186; 2001, 88), two states that have repeatedly failed to settle their contentious issues peacefully are likely to expect their negotiating partner to be less interested in

compromise or peaceful settlement. This should increase the likelihood of armed conflict, as peaceful techniques seem less promising. On the other hand, just like two states that have not previously engaged in armed conflict, two states that have not yet gone through failed negotiations may be more optimistic about the prospects for a peaceful settlement, with less expectation of failure or armed conflict in the future. This should make peaceful options more appealing and militarized options less so.

Considering both militarized and peaceful past interactions leads us to suggest that future conflict should be more likely when states have longer histories of either past conflict or failed peaceful efforts, either of which should produce the expectation (on both sides) that peaceful techniques are unlikely to settle the issue successfully. As with salience, the same factors that predict greater armed conflict may also predict greater efforts to settle issues peacefully. When an issue has been marked by repeated conflict or by the repeated failure of peaceful efforts, the adversaries may attempt negotiations in an effort to avoid the risk of future conflict, if not to settle the conflict permanently. Third parties should also be much more likely to promote peaceful settlement in such situations, whether by direct involvement or simply by promoting direct negotiations between the claimants. This discussion suggests the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: States are more likely to threaten or use militarized force when they have a history of recent militarized conflict over the same issue and/or a history of recent failed attempts to settle the same issue peacefully.

Hypothesis 4: States are more likely to pursue peaceful settlements when they have a history of recent militarized conflict over the same issue and/or a history of recent failed attempts to settle the same issue peacefully.

It must be emphasized that issue characteristics alone will not explain all interstate behavior. We control for two other factors that we expect to have systematic effects: joint democracy and relative capabilities. Drawing from the vast literature on the democratic peace,

we expect militarized conflict to be less likely between two democratic adversaries than when one or both claimants are not democratic. Furthermore, because of the norms of peaceful conflict resolution that are said to characterize democracies' foreign policy, we expect peaceful conflict management to be more likely to be attempted between two democratic adversaries than when one or both claimants are not democratic (e.g. Dixon 1994; Russett and Oneal 2001).

The relative capabilities of the two claimants should also have an important effect. We expect militarized conflict to be most likely between evenly matched adversaries, and less likely in situations where one claimant is substantially stronger than its opponent (e.g., Organski and Kugler 1980; Kugler and Lemke 1996). We also expect peaceful conflict management to be less likely between uneven adversaries because the stronger state should have little urgency for settling its issues with a much weaker opponent. Peaceful settlement activities should be more likely between relatively even adversaries, which face a higher perceived risk of armed conflict and a greater risk of losing should they fail to settle their contentious issues (Hensel 2001).

Research Design

Testing the hypotheses presented above, like the development of the issues approach more generally, involves a number of specific data requirements. Multiple types of issues must be identified systematically, the salience of each issue must be measured in a way that allows comparison both within and across issue types, and both militarized and peaceful attempts to manage or settle each issue must also be identified. The Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project has attempted to meet each of these requirements and has currently completed the coding of data on three types of issues: territorial claims (Western Hemisphere and Western Europe from 1816-2001), maritime claims (Western Hemisphere and Europe from 1900-2001), and river claims (Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, and the Middle East from 1900-2001).

Identifying Contentious Issues

The most important requirement for systematic data on issues is evidence of explicit contention by official representatives of two or more nation-states. For the three current ICOW issue types, this means evidence that official representatives of at least one state make explicit statements claiming sovereignty over a specific piece of territory that is claimed or administered by another state, or contesting the use or abuse of a specific international river or maritime zone. Requiring explicit statement of a claim by official government representatives helps avoid charges of tautology, which might otherwise weaken or discredit the endeavor (e.g., by arguing that all wars are about territory because the combatants seek to capture territory to win the war, or by assuming that any conflict between neighbors sharing a river must be over the river itself).

It is also important that the claim be stated by official government representatives, or individuals authorized to state official government policy, and that this statement is not disavowed by other official sources. Many potential claims are stated by private individuals, legislators, corporations, rebel groups, or other actors, typically for personal or financial motivations. Unless official governmental representatives support the claim, though, it does not qualify for inclusion in the data set. For example, while various individuals have pushed for the creation of a Greater Albania incorporating parts of Kosovo, Serbia's Presevo Valley, and Macedonia as well as Albania itself, we have seen no credible evidence that this is the official position of the Albanian government.

Finally, this definition does not require any specific form of contention or interaction over the claim, beyond the explicit statement of the claim itself. In particular, it does not require that one or both sides resort to militarized force over the claim, meaning that the data set includes a number of cases that never led to the threat or use of force by either claimant. Similarly, it does not require that the adversaries negotiate over the claim, submit it to third party arbitration

or adjudication, or take any action whatsoever over the claim. Some cases may not lead to any action of any kind, instead being allowed to fade away gradually. Both peaceful and militarized actions over a claim are more properly the subject of systematic analysis using complete compilations of all issue claims, rather than tools to be used for case selection.

Based on these coding rules, the ICOW Project has identified a total of 244 claims to distinct territories, maritime zones, or rivers in the regions for which data collection is currently complete in version 1.10 of the ICOW data set, comprising 416 dyadic claims. This includes 122 territorial claims (comprising 191 dyadic claims), 86 maritime claims (143 dyadic claims), and 36 river claims (82 dyadic claims), covering a total of 10,041 claim-dyad-years (the unit of analysis). The complete list of cases is available on the ICOW web site at <http://data.icow.org>.

Dependent Variable: Issue Settlement Attempts

Each ICOW claims data set includes data on attempts to manage or settle the issues involved in a claim. In this paper we focus on two general dependent variables: militarized conflict and peaceful settlement attempts. Militarized attempts to settle issues are identified using version 3.02 of the Correlates of War Project's Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). Each militarized dispute that occurred between two adversaries involved in an ongoing territorial, river, or maritime claim was examined to determine whether the dispute involved an attempt to change the territorial, river, or maritime status quo with respect to that specific claim.⁷ This determination was based on standard news sources and diplomatic histories, as well as on the chronologies of each ICOW claim. This definition yields 318 militarized attempts to settle contentious issues (205 territorial, 19 river, and 94 maritime).

While militarized attempts to settle issues can be identified using readily available data sets, much more work is required to identify and code peaceful attempts to settle ICOW claims because this information is not available in any other social science data set. Four specific topics can be covered by these peaceful attempted settlements, including (1) negotiations meant to settle the entire claim; (2) negotiations over a smaller part of the claim; (3) negotiations over procedures for future settlement of the claim ("procedural" attempts, such as talks over submitting the claim to arbitration by a specific third party); and (4) negotiations over the use of the claimed territory, river, or maritime area without attempting to settle the question of ownership ("functional" attempts, such as talks over navigation along a disputed river border). All other negotiations, such as talks over a ceasefire to stop an ongoing crisis, are excluded.

The ICOW Project codes settlement attempts that involve bilateral negotiations, negotiations with non-binding third party assistance (inquiry, conciliation, good offices, or mediation), or submission of a claim to binding arbitration or adjudication (Hensel 2001). It is important to include all of these different types of peaceful settlement attempts because each is meant to accomplish the same goal of issue management. For example, data sets used in past research on issues or on conflict management (e.g., the MID, ICB, and SHERFACS data sets) have focused on armed conflict, and have only considered peaceful attempts to manage ongoing crises or wars. An exclusive focus on attempts to manage claims that have become militarized (e.g., Dixon 1993, 1994; Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984) is likely to understate the effectiveness of peaceful means for dispute settlement, because it examines only the most intractable and conflictual issues and excludes cases that avoided militarized conflict entirely. Indeed, less than nine percent of the peaceful settlement attempts in this paper's analyses (141 of 1687, or 8.4 percent) began during militarized disputes or wars, meaning that over 90 percent of these cases

would have been left out of most research on conflict management.⁸ Of the 1687 total peaceful settlement attempts, 1004 were for territorial claims, 190 for river, and 493 for maritime claims.

Independent Variables: Within-Issue Salience

Besides the differences between general issue types, which may be addressed easily with dummy variables to indicate whether a given observation is part of a territorial, maritime, or river claim, the ICOW project has collected an index of within-issue salience for each issue type. This allows scholars to distinguish between claims of higher and lower salience for a given issue type. According to our previous theoretical discussion, these measures should help us explain how risk influences foreign policy decisions given that decision-makers should be willing to pursue costlier or riskier options to settle disputes as issue salience increases. For each of the three current ICOW issue types, salience is measured through six different indicators, each addressing an aspect of the claimed issue that should increase its general value to claimant states. Each indicator is measured separately for each of the two states involved in a given dyadic claim, providing a possible range from zero (no valuable characteristics for either state) to twelve (all six characteristics are present for each state).

For territorial claims, the six indicators used to construct the general measure of territorial claim salience include (1) territory that is claimed by the state as homeland territory, rather than as a colonial or dependent possession, (2) territory located on the mainland rather than an offshore island, (3) territory over which the state has exercised sovereignty within the previous two centuries, (4) territory that is believed to contain potentially valuable resources, (5) territory with a militarily or economically strategic location, and (6) the presence of an explicit ethnic, religious, or other identity basis for the claim.⁹ The six indicators used to measure river claim salience are (1) river location in the state's homeland territory rather than in colonial or

dependent territory, (2) use of the river for navigation, (3) level of population served by the river, (4) the presence of a fishing or other resource extraction industry on the river, (5) use of the river for hydroelectric power generation, and (6) use of the river for irrigation. The six indicators for maritime claim salience are (1) maritime borders extending from homeland rather than colonial or dependent territory, (2) a strategic location of the claimed maritime zone, (3) fishing resources within the maritime zone, (4) migratory fishing stocks crossing into and out of the maritime zone, (5) the known or suspected presence of oil resources within the maritime zone, and (6) relation of the maritime claim to an ongoing territorial claim (involving maritime areas extending beyond either claimed coastal territory or a claimed island). Additional information on the coding of each variable is available in the codebooks for each respective data set, available on the ICOW project web site at <<http://www.icow.org>>.

It must be emphasized that this salience index is meant as a measure of variation in salience within each specific issue type, to help scholars distinguish between the most and least salient issues. This salience measure alone should not be assumed to give an accurate measure of the relative salience of different types of issues. For example, a river claim with a salience score of seven out of twelve is not necessarily more salient overall than a territorial claim with a salience score of six. Comparisons of that type will require variables measuring both issue type and within-issue salience, both of which are used in our analyses.

Independent Variables: Recent Issue Management

Testing Hypotheses 3 and 4 requires data on past militarized conflict over the issue and past failed peaceful settlement attempts. Militarized conflict is measured for these purposes as any militarized dispute over the issue in question within the previous ten years before the observation. Failed peaceful attempts include all peaceful settlement attempts (whether bilateral

or third party) within the previous ten years that failed to produce an agreement, or that produced an agreement that was not carried out by at least one of the sides. We measure each of these variables using a weighted score to indicate the number of events and how recently they occurred. Events in the most recent year before the observation contribute a value of 1.0 to the weighted score. Earlier events' weights decline by ten percent each year (e.g., an event ten years earlier contributes a value of 0.1). The weighted values for all events in the past decade are added together, producing a range from zero to 5.4 for recent militarized disputes, and from zero to 10.3 for recent failed peaceful settlement attempts.

Control Variables

Joint democracy is measured as a dummy variable indicating whether both sides were considered political democracies during the year of observation. We use a threshold of six or higher on the Polity IV index of institutionalized democracy to define a state as a democracy. Relative capabilities are measured using the Correlates of War (COW) project's Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score for each state, taking the proportion of the dyad's total capabilities held by the strongest side (Singer 1988). The lowest possible value of 0.5 indicates that the two sides are exactly even during the year in question, while the highest possible value of 1.0 indicates that the stronger side holds all of the dyad's capabilities.

Empirical Analyses

Our theory suggests that states are more likely to threaten or use military force over their contentious issues when the general issue type is more salient, when the specific issue at stake has greater within-issue salience, and when the adversaries have more experience with recent militarized conflict over the same issue and/or recent failed efforts to settle the same issue peacefully. We also hypothesize that states are more likely to attempt peaceful settlement of

their contentious issues in similar circumstances -- when the general issue type is more salient, there is greater within-issue salience, and greater experience with recent militarized conflict or failed peaceful efforts. Thus peaceful and militarized means for managing contentious issues are substitutable and driven by similar processes. We now test these hypotheses using logistic regression analysis, beginning with an aggregated analysis of all three issue types, and then separate analyses for each issue type.

Table 2 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis of both militarized conflict and peaceful settlement attempts over territorial, maritime, and river issues. All results are reported using one-tailed significance tests and robust standard errors. Table 3 supplements these analyses by presenting the marginal impact of each variable.

[Tables 2 and 3 about here]

With respect to militarized conflict, there is a statistically significant difference between the three general issue types, but only when recent issue management is not considered (Model I). With territorial issues left out as the referent category, conflict is less likely over maritime issues ($p < .035$), while there is no significant difference for river issues ($p < .23$), but these results lose their significance once recent issue management is added (Model II). This suggests that territorial issues are more likely than maritime or river issues to produce militarized conflict overall, but that once the first confrontation has begun, there is little difference between these three issues in future conflict propensity. Within-issue salience significantly increases the likelihood of armed conflict in both analyses ($p < .001$). As Table 3 indicates, the probability of militarized conflict increases substantially with issue salience, regardless of the issue type, from a baseline probability around .01 (i.e., one militarized dispute per every hundred eligible years) with a within-issue salience value of zero to approximately five times that probability with the

maximum possible salience value of twelve. This pattern holds for all three issue types, which indicates that the general issue-based theoretical approach gives us quite a bit of purchase for understanding the likelihood of militarized confrontation over contentious issues.

Other factors beyond salience also play an important role. Recent militarized conflict and failed peaceful efforts both significantly increase the likelihood of additional conflict ($p < .001$). As Table 3 indicates, a change from zero to 1.0 in the weighted recent conflict measure -- consistent with having a single militarized dispute in the previous year, or several disputes further back in the past decade -- more than doubles the risk of conflict (from .021 to .050). The maximum value of 5.4 increases the probability of conflict to .751.¹⁰ The failure of recent peaceful settlement attempts has a statistically significant effect, though the substantive effect is notably smaller. A change from zero to 1.0 increases the probability of conflict by about eighteen percent (from .022 to .026), and the maximum value increases this probability to .105.

These results are consistent with our hypotheses, with greater within-issue salience and, to a lesser extent, more salient general issue types substantially increasing the probability of armed conflict. How the claimants have managed their issue in the past decade also has an important role, with both militarized conflict and failed peaceful efforts greatly increasing conflict. These results also hold after controlling for characteristics of the claimants themselves. Both control variables perform as expected, with conflict being significantly less likely between two democracies ($p < .03$) and between less evenly matched adversaries ($p < .001$).

Turning to peaceful issue management efforts, Models III and IV of Table 2 suggest that greater attention is devoted to more salient issues, as within-issue salience significantly increases the probability of peaceful settlement attempts ($p < .001$). However, the results are not as straightforward for differences between issue types. Maritime claims are significantly less likely

($p < .001$) than the referent group of territorial claims to see peaceful efforts, as expected, but river claims are significantly more likely ($p < .001$, two-tailed test). This may reflect the influence of one or more factors beyond issue salience levels -- perhaps higher perceived benefits from cooperation over shared river resources than from attempted cooperation over territorial or maritime issues, both of which involve stronger components of sovereignty over a specific piece of land or portion of the sea. For example, Prescott (1987, 131-133) suggests that "resource development disputes" -- such as disagreements over shared rivers -- are generally easier to resolve than "territorial disputes" because they may be settled through division or joint exploitation for mutual benefit, and their settlement does not require the transfer of territory. Peaceful settlement of river claims may also be more likely than peaceful settlement of territorial claims because parties rarely have an emotional attachment to rivers, and altering claims to rivers does not require the resettlement of people across national boundaries. In any case, Table 3 indicates that all three issue types show similar patterns of within-issue salience, with the most valuable issues (salience=12) of each issue type being more than twice as likely as the least valuable (salience=0) to be the subject of peaceful settlement attempts in any given year.

Greater attention is also devoted to issues that have been handled in more threatening ways in the recent past, with peaceful management efforts being significantly more likely when there have been more recent militarized disputes ($p < .001$) and more failed peaceful settlement attempts ($p < .001$). Moving from zero to 1.0 on the weighted scale of recent conflict increases the probability of peaceful efforts from .110 to .145 (an increase of approximately one-third). The same change in the weighted scale of recent failed peaceful efforts increases the probability even further, from .096 to .146 (an increase of roughly one-half). Finally, joint democracy increases the probability of peaceful conflict management ($p < .001$), while a greater capability

imbalance reduces this probability ($p < .001$).

Table 3 also suggests some instructive comparisons between issue management techniques. As discussed above, the baseline probability of militarized conflict in any given year ranges from about .01 to .05 depending on issue type and within-issue salience. It is much more likely that peaceful techniques will be employed to manage an issue, with baseline probabilities ranging from .055 to .228 depending on issue type and within-issue salience. This is consistent with Hensel's (2001) finding that militarized conflict makes up a relatively small portion of attempts to settle territorial claims in the Western Hemisphere, and indicates that focusing primarily on militarized conflict, as in most existing research on contentious issues, misses most attempts to manage or settle issues, even for the most salient issues.

[Table 4 about here]

The final table disaggregates the analyses from Table 2 into separate analyses for each issue type (territorial, maritime, river). Models I-III in Table 4 report a disaggregated analysis of militarized conflict. In general, the results from Table 2 hold across all three issue types, suggesting that these results reflect general patterns of issue management that are not unique to one type of issue. For example, all three issue types see a significantly increased risk of militarized conflict when there is greater within-issue salience and more recent militarized disputes over the issue, and both territorial and maritime issues see an increased risk when there have been more recent failed settlement attempts. For the control variables, two of the three individual issue types (territorial and river) show significant effects in the same direction as in the aggregated analysis; the effect for the third issue type (maritime) is in the same direction, but misses conventional levels of statistical significance.

Finally, Models IV-VI in Table 4 report a disaggregated analysis of peaceful settlement

attempts. As with the analysis of militarized conflict, the results are generally similar across issue type, although only one variable -- a history of failed peaceful settlement attempts -- is significant for all three issue types. For the other variables, the results are significant for either one or two issue types, and they are generally in the same direction for all three. There is no case where a variable that is significant in one direction for one issue type is anywhere close to significant in the opposite direction for another. For both militarized and peaceful settlement attempts, then, it appears reasonable to include multiple issue types in aggregated analyses. There are no major differences in the management of these three issues, at least for the regions that are currently covered by ICOW data collection.

Taken together, these analyses suggest that the salience of a contentious issue strongly influences the ways in which states try to settle their differences. States are more likely to use both militarized conflict and peaceful methods when the issue at stake is more salient, both when the general issue type is considered more salient and when the specific issue under contention is higher in within-issue salience. Recent issue management also plays an important role, as histories of both militarized conflict and failed peaceful settlements increase pressure to take further action to settle the issue. These patterns generally hold across all three issue types being studied, even after controlling for the impact of joint democracy and relative capabilities. Our analyses demonstrate the impact of variation in salience both within and across issue types, which produces the first systematic empirical examination of multiple issues.

To assess the robustness of our results, we examined several additional specifications of the independent variables.¹¹ First, rather than examining the effect of all militarized disputes on settlement attempts, we limited the measure to fatal militarized action within the previous five and ten years (dropping less severe instances of militarized action).¹² Results for each of these

specifications remained consistent with our original measure, which provides further evidence that any type of militarized dispute between the parties is significantly more likely to yield future militarized or peaceful settlement attempts, regardless of the issue type.

Second, it is possible that the effect of previous militarized disputes is dependent upon their outcome, rather than simply their occurrence. For instance, a pattern of long-running stalemated militarized disputes may push the disputing parties to attempt to settle the issue peacefully (Zartman 1989). To test this, we included a variable indicating whether or not the parties' most recent militarized dispute ended in a stalemate. As expected, the claimants are significantly more likely to attempt both militarized and peaceful settlements following a stalemated militarized dispute. However, this effect matters only for territorial and river claims when considering militarized settlement attempts, and only for territorial claims when considering peaceful settlement attempts.

Third, while our theory considers only the effect of previous peaceful settlement attempts that ended in failure on the likelihood of future settlement attempts, it is possible that previous successful settlement attempts also affect future settlement attempts. For instance, we might expect success with previous peaceful settlements to lead to continued peaceful settlement attempts, and fewer militarized settlement attempts. To test this, we include a variable counting the number of recent successful settlement attempts, using the same weighting scheme described earlier in this paper. As expected, successful peaceful settlement attempts are generally more likely to lead to future peaceful settlement attempts. Surprisingly, though, past successful settlement attempts do not significantly decrease the likelihood of future militarized settlement attempts. This finding concurs with similar findings in the rivalry literature, which suggest that past efforts to settle rivalries through mediation have an insignificant effect on the future

incidence and escalation of militarized action between the rivals (Bercovitch and Diehl 1997).

Finally, our theory suggests that a variety of independent variables will simultaneously affect the likelihood of both militarized and peaceful settlement attempts, which is why we use logistic regression in our analyses. However, it is possible that states may purposefully choose one settlement type in lieu of the other. For instance, states may prefer to settle highly salient issues peacefully to avoid the risk of a severe conflict. One way to test for potential substitution between conflict management techniques is to run the analyses using multinomial logistic regression, which allows both dependent variables to be analyzed in the same model. The results in our online appendix demonstrate that the results remain consistent whether using the logistic or multinomial approach.¹³ Ultimately, these alternative tests provide continued support for our primary theory, while suggesting several interesting avenues to explore in future research.

Conclusions and Implications

International relations scholars often assume that states' foreign policy interests are dominated by a single overarching goal, such as the maximization of power or survival in an anarchic environment. We believe that this vision of world politics is quite limited, and we argue that states contend over many issues -- some of which are more salient or important than others. It is important to examine how different contentious issues are managed because foreign policy decisions vary based on the issue at stake and the salience of the issue at hand. We have argued that different types of issues vary along two general dimensions of salience: the tangible importance of an issue, such as economic or strategic value, and the intangible importance of an issue, such as prestige or identity value. Territorial issues are generally salient for both tangible and intangible reasons, while maritime and river issues generally lack the intangible dimension and are less salient overall. The salience of issues within each general issue type (territorial,

river, and maritime claims) varies as well, with some cases of each type being much more important to leaders than others.

States can choose from a number of techniques to resolve disagreements over issues, ranging from militarized conflict to bilateral negotiations to submission to third parties. We contend that states should be more likely to employ militarized conflict over more salient issues, in terms of both issue types that are generally more salient (particularly territory) and cases with higher within-issue salience. We also argue that such issues should be more likely to produce peaceful settlement attempts than less salient issues, although we leave the effectiveness of these peaceful efforts for future research. We expect that peaceful efforts to resolve issues with greater salience -- while more frequent than such efforts over less salient issues -- are less likely to be successful. We further expect that past efforts to manage a given issue will have an important influence on subsequent efforts to manage the same issue, with both militarized conflict and peaceful settlement attempts being more common for issues with recent histories of armed conflict and/or failed peaceful efforts. Empirical analyses of territorial, river, and maritime claims provide support for each of these hypotheses.

These results suggest a number of implications for the future development of a systematic issues approach to world politics. First, while this study offers important clues about when states are most likely to choose various techniques for issue management, it does not address the effectiveness of these different techniques. While this study suggests that both militarized and peaceful settlement attempts are most likely to be employed in similar situations -- over issues that are more salient, when armed conflict has erupted recently, and when recent peaceful attempts have failed -- characteristics of both the issues and the claimants are likely to have different effects on the success of these different techniques. Studies of the effectiveness of issue

management can also contribute to the scholarly literature in important ways, because most research on this topic (e.g. Dixon 1993, 1994; Andersen et al. 2001; Greig 2001) has been limited to management of militarized crises or rivalries. Well under half of the issues in this study have produced even a single militarized dispute, and over ninety percent of the peaceful settlement attempts did not begin while a militarized dispute was ongoing between the claimants. This suggests that the conflict management literature has systematically excluded a large fraction of management efforts, and that this exclusion may have biased the results of this research by focusing only on the most difficult cases, thereby understating the ability of settlement techniques to resolve issues peacefully.

Collection of data on distinct issue types also allows empirical analysis of different efforts to construct international institutions. For example, Zacher (2001) has suggested that a norm of territorial integrity has emerged over the last century, although his evidence relies exclusively on international crises. The ICOW territorial claims data set includes two centuries of territorial issues, allowing systematic analysis of the extent to which this developing norm has led to the settlement of existing claims to territory, avoidance of militarized conflict over them, or avoidance of claims that might have emerged following decolonization. With respect to rivers, hundreds of international treaties have been signed over international rivers, and the ICOW river claims data set allows analysis of the extent to which these treaties (or the institutions that they created) have prevented or settled serious disagreements over the rivers in question (Hensel, Mitchell and Sowers 2006). Finally, decades of effort culminated in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which in principle should promote the peaceful management of maritime resources. The ICOW maritime claims data set allows systematic analysis of whether this convention has had the intended effect (Nemeth et al 2007). Beyond

analysis of issue specific institutions, we can also learn more about the characteristics of institutions that may enhance the effectiveness of their conflict management efforts such as institutionalization, average democracy levels, or average member preference similarity (Hansen, Mitchell, and Nemeth 2007). Together, these issue areas have the potential for great increases in our understanding of the promise or pitfalls of international institutions for the management of issues in world politics.

Finally, this study demonstrates that systematic data may be collected on both contentious issues and issue salience, overcoming a major obstacle to systematic issue-based research (Diehl 1992). The ICOW project has collected systematic data on three issues, creating appropriate measures of salience for each one, yet many other issue types could be collected in the future. The three issues that have been collected all feature prominent tangible components of salience, but future research could address issues with more intangible than tangible salience. For example, it may be worthwhile collecting data on interstate disagreements related to identity groups. When Austria has objected to Italian treatment of the ethnic Germans in South Tyrol since World War II, it has generally been concerned with intangible salience related to the Austrians' cultural ties with the affected community. Austria has had little tangible salience in this case, because it has not sought to annex the territory where the ethnic Germans live; Austria would receive little tangible benefit even if all of its demands were met. Collecting systematic data on issues such as this would allow comparison of an issue with generally high values of both tangible and intangible salience (territorial) with issues that generally have tangible salience (river and maritime claims) and issues that generally have intangible salience (identity-based or communal claims).¹⁴

References

- Andersen, Pelle, Justin Baumgardner, J. Michael Greig, and Paul F. Diehl. 2001. Turning down the heat: Influences on conflict management in enduring rivalries. *International Interactions* 27:239-274.
- Bercovitch, Jacob and Paul F. Diehl. 1997. Conflict management of enduring rivalries: The frequency, timing, and short-term impact of mediation." *International Interactions* 22:299-320.
- Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1997. *A study of crisis*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Colaresi, Michael P. and William R. Thompson. 2002. "Hot spots or hot hands? Serial crisis behavior, escalating risks, and rivalry." *Journal of Politics* 64:1175-1198.
- Diehl, Paul F. 1992. What are they fighting for? The importance of issues in international conflict research. *Journal of Peace Research* 29:333-344.
- Diehl, Paul F., and Gary Goertz. 2000. *War and peace in international rivalry*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Dixon, William J. 1993. Democracy and the management of international conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37:42-68.
- Dixon, William J. 1994. Democracy and the peaceful settlement of international conflict. *American Political Science Review* 88:14-32.
- Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. The MID 3 data set, 1993-2001: Procedures, coding rules, and description. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21:133-154.
- Greig, J. Michael. 2001. Moments of opportunity: Recognizing conditions of ripeness for

- international mediation between enduring rivals. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45:691-718.
- Hansen, Holley, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Stephen C. Nemeth. 2007. "Mediating interstate conflicts: Regional vs. global international organizations." Working paper.
- Hensel, Paul R. 1996. Charting a course to conflict: Territorial issues and militarized interstate disputes, 1816-1992. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15:43-73.
- Hensel, Paul R. 1999. An evolutionary approach to the study of interstate rivalry. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 17:175-206.
- Hensel, Paul R. 2001. Contentious issues and world politics: The management of territorial claims in the Americas, 1816-1992. *International Studies Quarterly* 45:81-109.
- Hensel, Paul R., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Thomas E. Sowers II. 2006. Conflict management of riparian disputes: A regional comparison of dispute resolution. *Political Geography* 25:383-411.
- Hensel, Paul R., and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2005. Issue indivisibility and territorial claims. *GeoJournal* 64:275-285.
- Holsti, Kalevi J. 1991. *Peace and war: Armed conflicts and international order, 1648-1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Huth, Paul K., and Todd Allee. 2002. *The democratic peace and territorial conflict in the twentieth century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kugler, Jacek, and Douglas Lemke, eds. 1996. *Parity and war: Evaluations and extensions of "The War Ledger"*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Lasswell, Harold J., and Abraham Kaplan. 1950. *Power and society*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

- Leng, Russell J. 1983. "When will they ever learn? Coercive bargaining in recurrent crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27:379-419.
- Mansbach, Richard, and John Vasquez. 1981. *In search of theory: A new paradigm for global politics*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Maslow, Abraham H. 1970. *Motivation and personality*, 3rd ed. New York, NY: Harper Collins.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. 2002. A Kantian system? Democracy and third party conflict resolution. *American Journal of Political Science* 46:749-759.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. 2002. "A kantian system? Democracy and third party conflict resolution." *American Journal of Political Science* 46:749-759.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Brandon C. Prins. 1999. Beyond territorial contiguity: Issues at stake in democratic militarized interstate disputes. *International Studies Quarterly* 3:169-183.
- Most, Benjamin A., and Harvey Starr. 1993. *Inquiry, logic and international politics*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
- Nemeth, Stephen C., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Elizabeth A. Nyman, and Paul R. Hensel. 2007. "UNCLOS, EEZs, and the management of maritime claims." Working paper.
- O'Leary, Michael. 1976. "The role of issues." In James Rosenau, ed., *In search of global patterns*. New York, NY: Free Press, pp. 318-325.
- Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. 1980. *The war ledger*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Potter, William C. 1980. Issue area and foreign policy analysis. *International Organization* 34:405-427.
- Prescott, J. R. V. 1987. *Political frontiers and boundaries*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Randle, Robert. 1987. *Issues in the history of international relations*. New York, NY: Praeger.

- Raymond, Gregory A. 1994. Democracies, disputes, and third party intermediaries. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38:24-42.
- Reinhardt, Eric. 2001. Adjudication without enforcement in GATT disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45:174-195.
- Rosenau, James N. 1971. "Pre-theories and theories of foreign policy." In James N. Rosenau (ed.), *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Russett, Bruce, and John R. Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating peace: Democracy, interdependence, and international organizations*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Senese, Paul D. 2005. Territory, contiguity, and international conflict: Assessing a new joint explanation. *American Journal of Political Science* 49:769-779.
- Singer, J. David. 1988. Reconstructing the correlates of war data set on material capabilities of states, 1816-1985. *International Interactions* 14:115-132.
- Vasquez, John A. 1993. *The war puzzle*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Vasquez, John A., and Marie T. Henehan. 2001. Territorial disputes and the probability of war, 1816-1992. *Journal of Peace Research* 38:123-138.
- Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, and Michael Brecher. 1984. International crises, 1945-1975: The UN dimension. *International Studies Quarterly* 28:45-67.
- Zacher, Mark W. 2001. The territorial integrity norm: International boundaries and the use of force. *International Organization* 55:215-250.
- Zartman, William. 1989. *Ripe for resolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Table 1
 Variations in Issue Types based on Tangibility and Salience

	<i>Relatively Low Intangible Salience</i>	<i>Relatively High Intangible Salience</i>
<i>Relatively High Tangible Salience</i>	River (Turkish dam projects on Euphrates River) Maritime (Cod Wars)	Territory (Golan Heights, Alsace-Lorraine) Regime survival (Castro)
<i>Relatively Low Tangible Salience</i>	Firms or industries (Airbus subsidies, shrimp imports) Treatment of individuals (caning of Michael Fay)	Identity (treatment of Germans in South Tyrol) Influence (Russia and elections in former Soviet republics)

Table 2
Likelihood of Militarized and Peaceful Settlement
Attempts of Maritime, River, and Territorial Issues

	Militarized Conflict		Peaceful Techniques	
	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV
<i>Issue Salience:</i>				
Maritime Claim	- 0.24** (1.83)	0.02 (0.12)	- 0.52*** (6.70)	- 0.31*** (3.83)
River Claim	- 0.20 (0.80)	- 0.13 (0.50)	0.46*** (4.63)	0.39*** (3.59)
Within-Issue Salience	0.22*** (8.18)	0.13*** (4.89)	0.13*** (9.62)	0.08*** (5.37)
<i>Recent Management:</i>				
Militarized Disputes	--	0.92*** (12.08)	--	0.31*** (5.24)
Failed Peaceful Attempts	--	0.16*** (3.58)	--	0.47*** (14.69)
Joint Democracy	- 0.20* (1.37)	- 0.32** (1.95)	0.43*** (5.94)	0.29*** (3.79)
Capability Imbalance	- 2.07*** (5.58)	- 1.53*** (3.75)	- 1.42*** (7.03)	- 0.95*** (4.42)
Constant	- 3.16*** (8.01)	- 3.49*** (8.32)	- 1.59*** (7.50)	- 1.98*** (8.84)
N:	9940	9940	9940	9940
LL:	- 1295.47	- 1186.60	- 3728.55	- 3522.21
X ² :	155.43	387.10	246.56	545.99
	p < .001 (5 d.f.)	p < .001 (7 d.f.)	p < .001 (5 d.f.)	p < .001 (7 d.f.)

Absolute values of robust Z statistics in parentheses: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (one-tailed tests).

Table 3
Marginal Effects

	Militarized Conflict Probability (Change)	Peaceful Techniques Probability (Change)
Territorial Claim		
Saliency=0	.010	.074
Saliency=12	.049 (+ .039)	.167 (+ .093)
Maritime Claim		
Saliency=0	.010	.055
Saliency=12	.050 (+ .040)	.128 (+ .073)
River Claim		
Saliency=0	.009	.105
Saliency=12	.043 (+ .034)	.228 (+ .123)
Recent Militarized Disputes		
0 (min.)	.021	.110
1	.050 (+ .029)	.145 (+ .035)
5.4 (max.)	.751 (+ .701)	.402 (+ .257)
Failed Peaceful Attempts		
0 (min.)	.022	.096
1	.026 (+ .004)	.146 (+ .050)
10.3 (max.)	.105 (+ .079)	.933 (+ .787)
Joint Democracy		
0 (no)	.023	.115
1 (yes)	.017 (- .006)	.147 (+ .032)
Capability Imbalance		
.50 (min.)	.039	.151
1.0 (max.)	.018 (- .021)	.100 (- .051)

Note: Calculations are based on Model II and Model IV from Table 2, with all other variables held at their mean or modal values. Estimates were generated using the MFX command in Stata 9.

Table 4
Likelihood of Settlement Attempts of Territorial, River, and Maritime Issues: Disaggregated Analyses

	Model I Territorial Claims	Model II River Claims	Model III Maritime Claims
<u>Militarized Settlement Attempts</u>			
Within-Issue Salience	0.14*** (4.00)	0.11* (1.38)	0.12*** (2.49)
Militarized Disputes	0.84*** (9.10)	0.76*** (2.85)	1.08*** (7.16)
Failed Peaceful Attempts	0.21*** (3.33)	0.05 (0.23)	0.12* (1.60)
Joint Democracy	-0.48** (1.78)	-1.47* (1.40)	-0.19 (0.81)
Capability Imbalance	-1.77*** (3.43)	-5.23*** (3.23)	-0.66 (0.91)
Constant	-3.34*** (6.11)	-0.43 (0.30)	-4.14*** (5.65)
N:	6022	762	3156
LL:	- 734.65	- 77.14	- 369.28
X ² :	270.26	34.62	104.80
	Model IV Territorial Claims	Model V River Claims	Model VI Maritime Claims
<u>Peaceful Settlement Attempts</u>			
Within-Issue Salience	0.11*** (5.87)	0.01 (0.24)	0.03 (1.06)
Militarized Disputes	0.34*** (4.76)	-0.15 (0.44)	0.31** (2.21)
Failed Peaceful Attempts	0.45*** (11.00)	0.30*** (4.36)	0.61*** (8.06)
Joint Democracy	0.41*** (4.08)	0.83*** (4.01)	-0.06 (0.48)
Capability Imbalance	-1.12*** (4.01)	-0.37 (0.43)	-0.48 (1.20)
Constant	-2.06*** (7.00)	-1.60*** (2.35)	-2.25*** (5.07)
N:	6022	762	3156
LL:	- 2162.11	- 358.26	- 978.62
X ² :	390.08	38.56	107.99

Absolute values of robust Z statistics in parentheses: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (one-tailed tests).

¹ Our definition of substitutability is consistent with Most and Starr's original conceptualization of the term. Instead of attempting to identify mutually exclusive outcomes from a given set of independent variables, we suggest that a given factor (e.g. issue salience) could be expected to simultaneously "lead to, stimulate or 'cause' a variety of empirically distinct foreign policy acts, events or behaviors" (Most and Starr 1993, 106). In other words, states do not choose one foreign policy tool (e.g. militarized force) in lieu of another tool (e.g. bilateral talks), but treat the tools as complementary choices for resolving contentious issues.

² For now, we do not differentiate between the general salience level of issue types that have primarily tangible salience and those that have primarily intangible salience. Some scholars have suggested that primarily intangible issues should be more difficult to resolve than primarily tangible issues (e.g., Vasquez 1993, 192). Yet the difficulty of dividing an issue or reaching a compromise solution is conceptually distinct from issue salience, and it is not clear that (*ceteris paribus*) states assign greater value to an issue that is difficult to divide than to one that is more easily divisible. For a more in-depth discussion of issue divisibility, see Hensel and Mitchell (2005).

³ An earlier paper (Hensel 2001) separated peaceful settlement attempts into three categories: bilateral negotiations, non-binding third party activities, and binding third party activities. That distinction is impractical in the present paper, though, particularly with our focus on the management of each individual issue type as well as aggregated analyses. For example, there are too few binding third party activities to run certain analyses.

⁴ Diehl (1992, 339) also emphasizes that this is not a sufficient condition: "States may find other ways short of war to achieve their goals (i.e. threats or compromise) or other necessary

conditions may be absent," and notes that war may even occur on occasion when salience is relatively low due to low expected costs or other opportunity-related factors.

⁵ Even if a specific territorial issue has low within-issue salience, states could conceivably handle it as a salient issue because of the importance often attributed to territory in general. As Hensel (1996) notes, territory seems likely to have reputational importance as an indicator of how a state might be expected to handle other issues in the future. Showing weakness over any territorial claim may lead other states to begin or escalate territorial claims against the state.

⁶ Besides the general expectation that more past conflict makes future conflict more likely, Hensel (1999) argues that the outcomes of previous confrontations also have an important impact, which might move the adversaries in either a more peaceful or more conflictual direction. This outcome-specific effect lies outside of the scope of the present paper, which focuses primarily on issue salience, but it would be worth investigating in future research on issue management.

⁷ Although the MID data set includes some information about issues -- dispute participants may be coded as seeking to alter the territorial, policy, regime, or "other" status quo -- we examine each militarized dispute to be sure. Not all disputes coded by COW as involving territorial issues meet our coding rules. For example, disputes over fishing rights or maritime zones with no mainland/island component involve maritime rather than territorial issues, and not all pairs of adversaries in multiparty disputes are contending over their own territorial issues. We have also identified several militarized disputes that did involve territorial issues but were not coded as such by COW, and we have added our own codings for river and maritime issues.

⁸ Raymond's (1994) data on international arbitration and mediation offers a partial exception, as it includes numerous cases that began outside of the context of ongoing militarized conflict. Yet

Raymond's data is limited to conflict management cases involving at least one major power and involving states that share a direct or indirect border, and his data set ends in 1965. Thus, only a small fraction of our cases would appear in Raymond's compilation.

⁹ See Hensel and Mitchell (2005) for more discussion of each indicator of territorial salience.

¹⁰ We should note, however, that such values are extremely rare. The mean value of this variable is 0.14, and less than 50 of the 9944 observations have values of 3.0 or higher. Extreme values on the variable measuring failed peaceful attempts are also rare; the mean is 0.43, and less than 50 observations have values of 6.0 or greater.

¹¹ Results for alternative variable specifications are available in an online appendix.

¹² Limiting the militarized dispute variable to fatal militarized disputes drops the number of non-zero observations from 1382 in the original models to 333 for militarized disputes within the previous 10 years, and 226 for militarized disputes within the previous 5 years.

¹³ The primary difference is that a handful of coefficients drop from significance in the multinomial models, but they never change signs. Overall, these results suggest that policy makers do not necessarily choose exclusively peaceful *or* militarized means to settle an issue claim, but often employ multiple foreign policy tools to pursue their issue related goals.

¹⁴ It may also be worth comparing the management of these issues, all of which are generally considered to be salient for national leaders and/or for relatively large segments of their constituents, with recent work on the management of international trade disputes (e.g., Reinhardt 2001). While trade disputes are quite salient for the firms or industries involved, they generally have little impact on most members of society, and would thus be considered as having generally low salience along both the tangible and intangible dimensions.