

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND RIVALRIES

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Abstract: This paper reexamines the democratic peace in a longitudinal fashion. We extend the democratic peace proposition beyond isolated militarized disputes or wars to longer-term interstate rivalries. Rivalries of all types are rare among democratic dyads; there is only one case of enduring rivalry between consistently democratic states, and most conflictual relationships between democracies remain confined to isolated conflict. Second, we assess the effect of regime change on rivalry behavior when a regime change precipitates or ends a jointly democratic dyad. Enduring rivalries that include both joint democratic and non-democratic periods exhibit significantly lower dispute propensities while both rivals are democratic, although proto-rivalries show much smaller differences. Importantly, the pacifying effect of democracy appears to strengthen over time after the transition to joint democracy, which is consistent with the onset and deepening of democratic norms. Both proto- and enduring rivalries show a decreasing propensity for militarized conflict within a year of the transition to joint democracy, and this

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propensity decreases almost to zero within five years. Our results generally confirm and extend the robust effects of the democratic peace.

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"When the principle of equality spreads, as in Europe now, not only within one nation, but at the same time among several neighboring peoples, the inhabitants of these various countries, despite different languages, customs, and laws, always resemble each other in an equal fear of war and love of peace. In vain do ambitious or angry princes arm for war; in spite of themselves they are calmed down by some sort of general apathy and goodwill which makes the sword fall from their hands. Wars become rarer." --Alexis de Tocqueville (1988, 659-660)

Perhaps the most interesting and important body of conflict research in the last decade involves the so-called "democratic peace," or the empirical observation that democracies rarely fight each other. Most of the available evidence suggests that two democracies have almost never fought against each other in the modern era (Russett 1993; Ray 1995). Although an abundance of recent work has addressed this subject, we propose that new insights can be gained by looking at the democratic peace phenomenon through the lenses of the rivalry framework (Goertz and Diehl 1995b). Most existing analyses of the democratic peace (and, indeed, analyses of interstate conflict more generally) have been static and cross-sectional comparisons of democratic and non-democratic dyads, with little concern for the processes that generate interstate conflict or peace. In this study, we examine the dyadic effect of democracy over time, within the context of militarized interstate rivalries.

We contend that the rivalry framework is well suited to address some aspects of the democratic peace. The rivalry approach allows us to study the impact of democracy on entire periods of interstate relations, rather than its impact on isolated events such as crises or wars. The rivalry approach also allows us to study the impact of democracy longitudinally, focusing on changes in democracy levels as well as changes in conflict behavior over extended periods of

interstate rivalry. In short, this approach allows us to extend the democratic peace argument to new venues in order to test its scope, as well as to test the power and robustness of democracy's impact on international conflict behavior.

The Rivalry Approach and the Democratic Peace

The centerpiece of the rivalry approach to interstate conflict (Goertz and Diehl 1995b) is the notion of interstate rivalry. The concept of rivalry is a continuous one, ranging from isolated conflict between two states to proto-rivalry and full-fledged enduring rivalry (Goertz and Diehl 1992). Enduring rivalries, which involve frequent and intense militarized competition between the same pair of states over a broad time frame, are the longest and most severe form of rivalry. Proto-rivalries and cases of isolated conflict differ from enduring rivalries in several ways. Isolated conflict refers to short-term competitions that occur only sporadically, and do not generate a cycle of repeated crises or confrontations between the same adversaries. Proto-rivalries represent something of a middle ground between enduring rivalries and isolated conflict. Unlike isolated conflict, proto-rivalries involve repeated conflict between the same states, but they never develop into full-scale enduring rivalries because they fail to achieve the duration and frequency of militarized confrontations that characterize true enduring rivalries.

The rivalry framework suggests a number of changes in the way that we look at the democratic peace. First, it allows us to extend the democratic peace argument to phenomena beyond war. According to Doyle (1996), this is essential to test both the validity and elasticity of the democratic peace argument. Instead of asking whether or how often democratic states fight

wars, the rivalry framework allows us to focus on the frequency and types of rivalries in which democratic states become involved. This permits us to test whether the democratic peace applies to repeated conflict, or whether joint democracy both inhibits the initial outbreak of militarized conflict (which has already been established in the democratic peace literature) and also stifles repeated confrontations between the same states.

Second, the rivalry framework provides for a more dynamic, longitudinal research design that permits scholars to study the conflict behavior of dyads over their entire histories, including both democratic and non-democratic periods. Most existing research on the democratic peace has compared the conflict behavior of democratic dyads with that of non-democratic dyads at some arbitrary point in time. The rivalry approach is consistent with Spiro's (1994) and Russett's (1995) call to explore dyads over their histories in evaluating the democratic peace rather than just at one point in time. If dyads avoided militarized conflict while both states were democratic and were also found to have been peaceful in other periods, questions could be raised about the importance of joint democracy in maintaining the observed peace. Specifically, the longitudinal character of the rivalry approach can also help uncover changing conflict behavior over time in response to democratization. Thus, the second contribution of the rivalry approach is to provide an analysis of rivalries in which the states underwent a regime change toward or away from joint democracy, allowing scholars to assess the impact of joint democracy on rivalry dynamics by comparing behavior before and after the regime change.

A third contribution of the rivalry approach to the study of the democratic peace is an extension of the second. How strong is the impact of democracy on rivalry dynamics? Beyond

considering whether transitions toward or away from joint democracy affect conflict behavior within rivalry, we can also assess whether democracy can completely arrest a rivalry, preventing the recurrence of militarized confrontations after the regime transition. Thus, the rivalry approach can extend the democratic peace argument to new venues, help assess its impact by studying the impact of regime change on rivalry competition, and determine whether democracy has a strong enough effect to dramatically alter ongoing militarized competitions.

Our hypotheses begin with the first concern, extending the democratic peace argument to new phenomena. Our expectation is that democratic dyads will become involved in militarized rivalries of any type less frequently than other dyad types. This expectation is a logical extension of previous research on democracy and conflict, which has repeatedly found that democratic dyads engage in relatively less militarized conflict than other dyads -- particularly with regard to full-scale wars, but also to a lesser extent for lower-level militarized disputes (e.g., Bremer 1992, 1993; Russett 1993; Ray 1995; Mousseau 1998). Because militarized rivalry involves protracted adversarial relationships with multiple confrontations between the rivals, the previously observed rarity of militarized conflict between democracies suggests that democracies should also become involved in very few rivalries. Yet we also expect that this relationship will be even stronger for more severe forms of rivalry. That is, joint democratic dyads should be somewhat less likely than other types of dyads to engage in isolated conflict, which refers to an adversarial relationship that remains limited to one or two militarized confrontations. But democracies should be much less likely than other pairs of states to engage in proto-rivalries or enduring rivalries. Institutional constraints may make it difficult for leaders to mobilize their people behind militarized

confrontation, and even moreso for the repeated cycles of confrontations that comprise enduring rivalries. Democratic norms such as those favoring peaceful conflict resolution or friendly relations with other democratic states that respect their citizens' rights -- whether held by leaders, their constituents, or both -- may even work to halt the development of initial conflicts between democracies. Furthermore, such norms suggest that democratic states should be more likely to reach peaceful settlements after their initial confrontations that prevent them from cycling through repeated conflicts; agreements reached between democracies are likely to be seen as more legitimate and harder to undo than those involving authoritarian states (Dixon 1994).

Hypothesis 1: Democratic dyads will become involved in fewer rivalries than other dyads overall, and proportionally fewer of the more severe forms of rivalry.

Our second hypothesis concerns a specific subset of all interstate rivalries: those rivalries that experience at least one change in dyadic democracy status during the course of the rivalry. Such regime change rivalries offer a useful opportunity to reconsider the relationship between democracy and peace, because they allow us to study the effects of changing democracy levels within the same dyads while holding almost all other factors constant.¹ Such cases offer substantial advantages over the typical democracy-and-conflict research strategies, which have often compared the set of all democratic dyads with the set of all non-democratic dyads (either across time and space or within some limited domain such as "relevant dyads").

When a regime transition during an ongoing rivalry leads to the creation of a joint

democratic dyad (or to the reversal of joint democratic status), we expect the transition to have an important impact on rivalry behavior. If the pacifying effect of democracy is to be considered meaningful, then we should expect to observe a rapid reduction in the frequency or severity of militarized conflict within rivalries that undergo a transition to joint-democratic status.

According to the democratic peace argument, norms of conflict resolution should lead democracies to resolve their conflicts without having to resort to military force, and thus fewer disputes might be expected. Those militarized disputes that do occur may be settled more amicably because of those norms or because institutional constraints limit the ability of leaders to use military force to resolve conflicts. Psychologically (Hermann and Kegley 1995), there may be a sense that the rivals are part of the same group and that using military force is inappropriate. Differences may continue, but they should not be manifested in a militarized fashion. The democratic peace literature also indicates that peaceful and stable settlements are more likely between democracies, suggesting that the issues underlying a rivalry may be resolved quickly and that the rivalry should thus end quickly. Similarly, we should expect a noticeable increase in the frequency or severity of conflict in rivalries following a transition away from joint democracy.

We recognize that the pacifying effect of joint democracy may not be immediate, and may vary depending on the history of conflict between the adversaries during their rivalry before the regime transition (Hensel 1995). Indeed, the normative explanation for the democratic peace (see Russett 1993; Dixon 1994) would suggest that the pacifying effect of democracy should take some time to take effect, as the newly democratic society slowly develops the necessary norms

of peaceful conflict resolution after democratic political structures are put into place. Similarly, Mansfield and Snyder (1995) suggest that the process of democratization may actually increase the short-term likelihood of militarized conflict, due to the risks of a volatile rise in mass politics in a setting with relatively new and unstable democratic political institutions. It should be noted, though, that Enterline (1996) identifies numerous problems in Mansfield and Snyder's research design and evidence, and that his re-analyses indicate an immediate pacifying effect of democratization. In order to address these concerns, we will test for the possibility of a delayed pacifying effect of democracy that builds up over time, as well as the possibility of an almost immediate effect.

Hypothesis 2: Rivalries experiencing a regime change toward or away from joint democracy should be less conflict-prone while both rivals are democratic than while one or both is not democratic.

Research Design

We explore the democratic peace for all rivalries during the 1816-1992 period. In order to do this, we need to place interstate relationships along a continuum of rivalry, and we must measure the adversaries' conflict behavior at different points within each rivalry. We also must determine which states were democracies, in order to measure the level of democracy in each rivalry over time.

In order to identify a population of rivalries for our analyses, we rely on an operational definition that has been used frequently in recent rivalry research (e.g., Goertz and Diehl 1992, 1995a; Diehl and Goertz 2000). This definition involves an ordinal scale of three categories of conflictual relationships, distinguished from each other by the frequency of militarized conflict and by the duration of the relationship. An enduring rivalry is defined as a competition between states that involves six or more militarized disputes between the same two states over a period lasting at least twenty years; data are taken from the Correlates of War (COW) Project data set on militarized disputes (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996).² Proto-rivalries involve at least three militarized disputes, but lack either the required number of disputes (six) or the necessary duration (twenty years) to qualify as enduring rivalries; the typical proto-rivalry has 3-5 disputes and lasts less than 15 years. Isolated conflicts are the least severe category, consisting of one- and two-dispute interactions in a period of less than ten years. A rivalry is considered to begin with the outbreak of the first militarized dispute in the sequence, although when appropriate we also run alternative tests that exclude the twenty years of conflict before a sequence will qualify as a true enduring rivalry.

Classifications of regime type and democracy level follow Dixon (1994), and are based on Polity III data (Jagers and Gurr 1996). The Polity III data set includes an index of institutionalized democracy that ranges in value from zero to ten, based on five specific polity characteristics: competitiveness and regulation of political participation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. We employ Dixon's (1994) classification of democracies as states scoring at least a six on this index of

institutionalized democracy, which has been used quite often in recent research on democracy and conflict and which produces a credible distinction between democratic and non-democratic states. We have also substituted alternative measures of dyadic democracy, and find that our results are quite robust, with little substantive difference across different measures. This robustness greatly increases our confidence that our findings do not result solely from a quirk of data operationalization.³

Empirical Results

Our first hypothesis suggests that democratic dyads should become involved in fewer rivalries than other dyads overall, and even fewer of the more severe types of rivalry. The evidence, presented in Tables 1 and 2, supports this expectation. Table 1 lists the number of rivalries begun while both states were democratic, while one state was democratic, and while neither state was democratic. Additionally, this table lists the number of dyad-years in the interstate system since 1816 in which both, one, and neither members of a given dyad were democratic. These dyad-year totals are used to determine the probability of a rivalry breaking out in a dyad of each type during a given year. This number of rivalries is then compared with the expected number of rivalries that should have been observed for each dyad type based on the number of eligible dyad-years, if dyadic democracy has no impact on the probability of rivalry.

[Table 1 about here]

The "total" section of Table 1 indicates that a total of 66 rivalry relationships began while both states were democratic, which is significantly less than the 107 that should be expected

based on the number of joint democratic dyad-years in the interstate system. This finding is statistically significant both for joint democratic dyads alone ($Z = -3.93$, $p < .001$) and in a comparison of all three dyad types ($X^2 = 58.28$, 2 d.f., $p < .001$). Additionally, almost all rivalries that began while both states were democratic remained confined to low levels of conflict, with only eleven proto-rivalries and two enduring rivalries (as noted below, furthermore, only one remains joint democratic throughout its lifetime) emerging from the 66 total rivalries. All three types of conflict are significantly less likely to begin between two democratic adversaries. Table 1 also reveals that all three types of rivalry are somewhat less likely than expected to begin between one democracy and one non-democratic state across all three types of rivalry, and all three types are significantly more likely than expected for dyads in which neither side is democratic.

Another illuminating point in Table 1 concerns the probability of rivalry breaking out, which is presented in the final column. Although the probability of any type of rivalry beginning in any given dyad-year is low overall (the probabilities in the table range from .00004 to .00294), it is instructive to compare these probabilities across dyad types. Joint democratic dyads have a .00142 probability of beginning any type of rivalry in a given year, while the probability is 1.36 times greater (.00193) for mixed dyads with only one democracy, and over twice as great (.00294) for dyads containing no democracies. The probability of enduring rivalry is almost three times greater for dyads with only one democracy and four times greater for dyads with no democracies than for joint democratic dyads. Overall, there is a consistent pattern of decreasing rivalry formation in dyads with fewer democracies. Furthermore, although the differences are

apparent for all categories of rivalry, the disparities are greater for more extreme types of rivalry (that is, the findings are most stark with respect to enduring rivalries).⁴

These results strongly support Hypothesis 1, because joint democratic dyads are much less likely than other types of dyads to become involved in rivalries of any type. Pairs of democratic adversaries account for a small absolute number of all rivalry relationships -- only 66 rivalries of any type, and only two enduring rivalries -- but a skeptic might suggest that this is only because the small number of joint democratic dyads in recent history offer few opportunities for rivalry. As Table 1 reveals, when the opportunity for rivalry is considered, the few observed cases of joint democratic rivalry are significantly fewer than might be expected if democracy has no impact on the likelihood of rivalry.

Nevertheless, the impact of democracy on rivalry is primarily evident at the outset. That is, joint democracy is most effective at preventing the beginning of rivalries between two states. Once a rivalry has begun, though, the pacifying effect of democracy appears to weaken. The probability of a rivalry, once started, evolving from isolated conflict into more advanced forms (proto- or enduring rivalry) is lower under conditions of joint democracy, but the differences between joint democracies or other dyads are relatively modest.⁵

[Table 2 about here]

It is also important to consider the democratic status of rival adversaries during the course of their rivalry. Although Table 1 categorizes rivalries based on the democratic status of their participants at the outbreak of rivalry, the regime type of one or both rivals may change during the course of the rivalry. A rivalry that begins with one or no democratic adversaries may later

see both become democratic, and a rivalry that begins between two democracies may see the end of democratic rule in one or both states. Table 2 thus expands on Table 1 by considering the regime type of rival adversaries over the entire duration of their period of rivalry, classifying each rivalry as always joint democratic, never joint democratic, or "mixed" (including both joint democratic and non-democratic periods).

A total of sixty-two rivalries remain joint democratic for their entire duration between 1816-1992, including only eight proto-rivalries and one enduring rivalry.⁶ Most conflictual relationships between two democracies thus remain confined to relatively low conflict levels, with 85.5 percent of such relationships remaining limited to the level of isolated conflict and only 1.6 percent reaching full-fledged enduring rivalry. Twenty-three more rivalries change regime type during the duration of the rivalry, meaning that they experienced both joint democratic and non-democratic periods during the course of the rivalry, including nine proto-rivalries and ten enduring rivalries.⁷ The vast majority of all rivalries, though, never experience any periods of joint democracy. Over eighty percent of the cases in each type of rivalry avoid joint democracy throughout their entire duration, including 1081 of the 1166 rivalries in Table 2 (92.7 percent).

Although the number of cases is small, it is nonetheless startling that 43.5 percent of the mixed cases (those that have joint democracy at some point in the rivalry, but not for the whole period) are enduring rivalries; this is at least nine times greater than the probability of enduring rivalry in conflictual relationships in which the adversaries maintain their initial regime types. Further investigation with bivariate analyses of variance reveals that such mixed cases involve

significantly more militarized disputes ($F = 31.10, p < .001$) and a significantly longer average rivalry duration ($F = 27.94, p < .001$) than consistently authoritarian or, particularly, consistently democratic rivalries. This suggests the possibility -- beyond the scope of the present study -- that regime instability or political change in general may complicate the settlement of issues between long-time adversaries and thereby prolong rivalries. An alternative explanation for the high frequency of enduring rivalry in mixed dyads is that proto- and particularly enduring rivalries simply have a greater opportunity to experience regime changes during their lifetime, because of their greater duration. The typical case of isolated conflict lasts less than five years, which offers much less opportunity for regime types to change than the decades that characterize enduring rivalries. Even if isolated conflict cases are removed from analysis, though, "mixed" proto- and enduring rivalries continue to average more militarized disputes ($F = 3.68, p < .03$) and longer durations ($F = 2.41, p < .10$) than consistently authoritarian or democratic rivalries, with over twice as many disputes and twice as long a duration as consistently democratic rivalries.

Given that rivalries are constructed with militarized dispute data, it may not be especially surprising that we confirm for rivalries what has been found previously for wars and disputes, that democratic states are less likely to confront each other with the threat or use of military force. Yet the overall frequency of militarized conflict between democratic adversaries tells us little about the type of rivalry relationships in which these conflicts occur. A small number of disputes could be spread across a number of one- or two-dispute isolated conflicts, or these disputes could be concentrated in a few democratic enduring rivalries. The rivalry approach has thus helped to extend the traditional democratic peace literature, demonstrating that not only are

militarized disputes relatively rare among democracies, but they are also generally not repeated between the same states.

Our remaining analyses focus on the set of "mixed" or "regime change" rivalries, in which the rivals become jointly democratic or move away from that status during the course of an ongoing rivalry. As Table 2 reveals, there are twenty-three such regime change rivalries in our data set: four cases of isolated conflict, nine proto-rivalries, and ten enduring rivalries. The remainder of our analyses of regime change rivalries focus on the nineteen cases of proto- or enduring rivalry that change democracy status during the rivalry. Cases of isolated conflict typically last for only short periods of time and (by definition) include no more than two militarized disputes, which does not offer a satisfactory basis for meaningful comparison across democratic and non-democratic periods.

[Table 3 about here]

Hypothesis 2 suggests that regime change rivalries should be less conflict-prone in periods during which both rivals are democratic than when one or both of the rivals is not democratic. Table 3 addresses this hypothesis by examining the probability of militarized conflict occurring during an ongoing interstate rivalry, based on the rivals' democratic status in each year of their rivalry.⁸ The results generally support our expectations, indicating that militarized conflict in regime change rivalries is less likely in periods when both rivals are democratic than in periods when at least one rival is non-democratic. Overall, militarized disputes break out in twenty-two percent of all the years in which both are democratic, compared with 34.3 percent of the years in which only one state is democratic and 33.3 percent of the years

in which neither is democratic. This result is statistically significant for enduring rivalries ($X^2 = 9.90, p < .01$) and overall ($X^2 = 9.37, p < .01$), although the effect is weaker in proto-rivalries because there is virtually no difference between dyads including one or two democracies.⁹

It could be argued that the first twenty years of each enduring rivalry should be excluded from analysis because the adversaries did not yet qualify as enduring rivals under our definition, and because they were unlikely to recognize their relationship as a true enduring rivalry. If these years are excluded from analysis, leaving a set of cases that can be clearly agreed to represent the context of enduring rivalry, the results are even stronger than those reported in Table 3.

Militarized conflict occurs in 13.6 percent of all joint democratic years and 34.9 percent of all mixed years after at least twenty years have passed in the rivalry relationship; there are only six such years with no democracies, rendering this final category essentially meaningless for purposes of comparison.

On the one hand, then, there does appear to be some pacifying effect on dispute occurrence when joint democracy is present. On the other hand, this effect is apparent only for enduring rivalries, with regime change proto-rivalries showing little difference in patterns of dispute occurrence based on the democracy status of the adversaries. Past research indicates that rivalries have a certain kind of stability that is not easily dislodged (Goertz and Diehl 1995a; Hensel 1996), and the results in Table 3 suggest that even changes in the regimes of the two rivals may not be enough to change their conflict patterns. Militarized disputes generally persist in joint democratic phases of regime change rivalries, occurring in over one-fifth of all years in question, for both proto- and enduring rivalries. This suggests that the dynamics driving the

rivalries may be stronger than any pacifying effects of joint democracy, at least in the short term after a democratic transition. Yet this table has not considered the timing of the joint democratic phase in the larger rivalry context; these disputes among democracies may be concentrated in the beginning or the ending of the rivalries in question, or they may be distributed relatively evenly across time. We conclude our analyses by examining the specific timing of militarized conflict in regime change rivalries, relative to the dyadic transition to joint democracy.

[Table 4 about here]

As noted earlier, the normative explanation for the democratic peace would suggest that the pacifying effects of joint democracy in a rivalry might not be felt for a substantial period of time, as democratic norms slowly develop within society. Table 4 offers insight into this temporal dimension of democracy, breaking down the effect of democracy in regime change rivalries by the length of time that both rivals have qualified as democracies (i.e., the time since the transition to joint democracy during an ongoing rivalry). This will allow us to determine whether the lower conflict propensity under joint democracy is felt immediately or only after some lagged period. This analysis also allows us to investigate recent claims that democratizing periods are especially dangerous (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 1995).

Table 4 distinguishes between years in which both rivals were not democratic, years in which the rivals had been consistently democratic since the rivalry began, years in which a formerly non-democratic rivalry made a transition to joint democracy,¹⁰ and years in which the rivalry has recently become joint democratic during the period of rivalry. The table indicates the number of militarized disputes that occurred, the number of rivalry-years of each type, and the

mean number of disputes per year; as many as four disputes occur in several individual rivalry-years in the data set. The results indicate that the transition year (the year in which the rivalry first qualifies as a joint democratic dyad) is an especially dangerous time.¹¹ The likelihood of a dispute is generally greater in that year than in any other part of the rivalry, with roughly twice as many disputes per year as in subsequent years. There is a substantial drop off in conflict propensity after the transition year, with the mean number of disputes per year quickly declining by almost half within five years and then approaching zero. Importantly, only one militarized dispute -- a 1991 dispute between Ecuador and Peru, in the eleventh year after their 1980 transition -- occurs more than five years after an uninterrupted dyadic transition to joint democracy. That single case occurs during a proto-rivalry, in a total of thirty-three rivalry-years that follow at least five years of interrupted joint democracy in proto-rivalries; no subsequent militarized conflict occurs in the 47 eligible rivalry-years within enduring rivalries.

It may be suggested that these results are inflated artificially by the 1992 end of analysis, which does not offer a sufficiently long time for most of the proto- or enduring rivalries in our data set to have ended. Yet thirteen proto- or enduring rivalries have remained democratic for 6-10 years, none of which have experienced militarized conflict during that particular period, and the Ecuador-Peru dispute is the only militarized conflict in the 11-15 year period for the eight rivalries that have reached this time. It may also be argued that these results are influenced by the rivalry context at any point in time, with the results expected to differ for enduring rivalries that have lasted at least twenty years (or, indeed, that this entire observation depends on rivalries lasting this long, because enduring rivalries by definition could not have ended before their

twentieth year). Yet enduring rivalries show the same trend both in their first twenty years and in subsequent periods, with the mean number of disputes per year declining by over one-third in the five years after the transition and reaching zero after the fifth year.

In short, these results appear to be robust across rivalry types and across temporal phases of enduring rivalries. Taken together, this evidence strongly suggests an important effect from democracy, which begins shortly after the democratic transition and then strengthens over time.¹² It further suggests that the strengthening effect of democracy may eventually be strong enough to end the militarized phase of most rivalries, at least as long as the two adversaries remain democratic. It is certainly possible for a reverse transition to remove the democratic system in at least one of the two rival states, though, perhaps through an abrupt change such as a coup or through the suspension of democratic rights and freedoms by a leader with authoritarian tendencies. When such a reversal occurs, there is little reason to believe that the pacifying effects of a longstanding joint democratic tradition will continue, and the rivalry may begin to intensify again.

Conclusions

This study has reexamined the democratic peace in a longitudinal fashion, through the lenses of international rivalries. Our first goal has been to extend the democratic peace argument beyond individual disputes or wars to interstate rivalry. We find that rivalries have been rare among democratic dyads; only two enduring rivalries began when both sides were democratic, and only one remained joint democratic for the entire duration of the rivalry. This finding is

consistent with existing research on isolated forms of conflict such as militarized disputes or wars, and helps indicate the robustness of the democratic peace phenomenon.

Our second purpose has been to assess the effect of regime change on rivalry behavior when a regime change either produces or ends a period of joint democracy. Those rivalries that include both joint democratic and non-democratic periods exhibit significantly lower dispute propensities while both rivals are democratic, particularly with regard to enduring rivalries. Furthermore, democracy appears to have a lagged effect, with the propensity for militarized conflict decreasing immediately to some extent but dissipating more rapidly with the passage of time. This finding is consistent with the onset and deepening of democratic norms, indicating that the pacifying effect of democracy may take longer to set in than the time required to create democratic institutions, but that once these norms set in (and combine with already-existing institutions) rivalry is very difficult to continue.

The democratic peace has inspired numerous studies and great debate in the academic community in recent years. Our contribution to this research milieu has been to demonstrate the utility of moving away from purely cross-sectional analyses of democracy and war to dynamic and longitudinal assessments of the relationship between joint democracy and interstate conflict. Our results generally confirm the robust effects of the democratic peace, while extending the democratic peace literature to the phenomenon of rivalry and offering additional insight into the existence and timing of a democratic pacifying effect between recent adversaries. It is to be hoped that future scholars will continue to advance this literature, both by determining how well

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it applies to new phenomena and by fine-tuning our understanding of phenomena that have already been examined.

Notes

¹Maoz (1997) looks at a series of dyads and compares their militarized dispute propensity during periods of joint democracy and other regime configurations; he finds that joint democratic periods are much less dispute prone than others. Nevertheless, his comparisons are made across a broad sweep of time and space, and it is not clear how comparable the past two centuries really are with respect to the frequency or impact of democracy. Indeed, Mitchell et al. (1999) suggest that the effect of democracy on war has changed substantially over this period. Our focus on changes within individual rivalries, which range from a few years in duration for isolated conflict cases to an average of forty years or more for enduring rivalries, is less subject to this limitation and provides a better basis for comparison, as we are comparing periods in close proximity to one another in the same ongoing competition.

²Our data and analysis files are available at <<http://data.icow.org>>. The list of rivalries and coding criteria can be found at <<http://www.pol.uiuc.edu/faculty/diehl.html>>.

³We found similar results using Russett's (1993) dichotomous and continuous joint democracy indicators, as well as Dixon's (1994) continuous democracy indicators.

⁴We recognize that some of the newly democratic dyads in the last few decades have not had the twenty-year period in which to become enduring rivalries. Yet those democratic dyads have had the opportunity to become involved in isolated conflict and proto-rivalries, and have been less likely than other dyads to do so. This suggests that the results on enduring rivalries, which are the strongest, are not likely to disappear with the passage of time. These findings are also consistent with those of Maoz (1997), who looks at dispute behavior among all dyads, all politically relevant dyads, and enduring rivalry dyads.

⁵The transition probabilities for movement from isolated conflicts to proto-rivalries -- or the probability that a given dyad will advance at least as far as proto-rivalry -- are 19.7 percent, 26.01 percent, and 23.85 percent for conflicts that begin as joint democratic, mixed, and non-democratic dyads. The transition probabilities for movement from proto-rivalries to enduring rivalries are 15.4 percent, 21.1 percent, and 23.45 percent for joint democratic, mixed, and non-democratic dyads. Thus, joint democratic dyads at each level are somewhat less likely to reach the next level than are equivalent dyads of other regime types, although the differences are not especially great.

⁶The enduring rivalry between two democracies is the nineteenth-century rivalry between the United States and Great Britain. The rivalry generated eight militarized disputes, but none of these disputes escalated to full-scale war.

⁷The ten enduring rivalries that experience limited periods of joint democracy include rivalries involving the United States against Ecuador and Peru in the mid-to-late twentieth century, Great Britain, France, and Belgium against Germany in the early twentieth century, Israel against Syria due to a brief period of Syrian democracy according to the Polity III data, Turkey against Greece and Cyprus in the late twentieth century, Japan against South Korea, and India against Pakistan. Of these, only the Cyprus-Turkey case experiences enough democracy to average joint democratic status over the entire period of rivalry. The other nine cases remain non-democratic on the average, reflecting protracted periods of non-democratic rule in one or

both states and only limited periods in which both states could be considered political democracies.

⁸This table includes the active militarized portion of each rivalry, or the period between the outbreak of the first dispute in the rivalry and the conclusion of the final dispute. Additionally, it includes a fifteen-year period after the end of the final militarized dispute in the rivalry, because a new dispute in this period would have had the effect of extending the rivalry. This approach allows us to capture a possible effect of democratization on the avoidance of future conflict that would extend a rivalry, which might have been missed by stopping the analysis with the conclusion of the final dispute in each rivalry.

⁹There is no systematic relationship between joint democracy and the severity of disputes (measured on a 0-200 scale; see Diehl and Goertz 2000) in these regime change rivalries.

¹⁰The transition years in which a rivalry becomes joint democratic are treated separately because of the difficulty in identifying exact dates on which the dyad became democratic, as well as because of the (domestic and international) uncertainty that accompanies such a regime change, which might be expected to increase conflict levels relative to times with more established political systems of either democratic or authoritarian nature.

¹¹Table 4 appears to suggest a surprising finding about democracies and dispute propensity. While democratic dyads are less dispute prone overall, proto-rivalries that begin between two democracies but subsequently undergo regime transitions appear to be substantially more dispute prone while democratic. Yet we must note that this observation is based on only three cases -- Rhodesia-Botswana (beginning in 1969), Turkey-Syria (1955), and Malaysia-Philippines (1968) -- which makes broad generalizations difficult. It may be that these rivalries share some structural characteristics that make them especially dispute prone, or that democracy is difficult to sustain in particularly intense rivalries. We consider it more likely that this is a statistical artifact, though, because (by definition) a rivalry begins with one dispute per year in the first year; only one of these three proto-rivalries in question remained joint democratic for longer than three years, leaving a very short time to reduce the initial one dispute per year average. In any case, this observation involves three proto-rivalries that only appear in this table because they later experience a transition away from joint democracy, and we are hesitant to attach too much importance to such a small number of cases selected on the basis of subsequent events.

¹²Again, there appears to be no relationship between dispute severity and length of democracy. If anything, disputes in the transition year appear to be somewhat less severe overall, although more frequent.

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Table 1: Dyadic Regime Type and Probability of Rivalry Onset

Rivalry Type	Eligible Dyad-Years*	Rivalries Begun	Rivalries Expected	Probability of Rivalry
Isolated Conflict	509,122	880		.00173
Both Democratic	46,519	53	80	.00114
One Democratic	255,588	364	442	.00142
Neither Democratic	207,015	463	358	.00224
$X^2 = 54.05$ (2 d.f), $p < .001$				
Proto-Rivalry	509,122	223		.00044
Both Democratic	46,519	11	20	.00024
One Democratic	255,588	101	112	.00040
Neither Democratic	207,015	111	91	.00054
$X^2 = 9.95$ (2 d.f), $p < .01$				
Enduring Rivalry	509,122	63		.00012
Both Democratic	46,519	2	6	.00004
One Democratic	255,588	27	32	.00011
Neither Democratic	207,015	34	26	.00016
$X^2 = 5.87$ (2 d.f), $p < .055$				
Total	509,122	1166		.00229
Both Democratic	46,519	66	107	.00142
One Democratic	255,588	492	585	.00193
Neither Democratic	207,015	608	474	.00294
$X^2 = 58.28$ (2 d.f), $p < .001$				

* The "eligible dyad years" column excludes a total of 6675 dyad-years in which a rivalry was already ongoing, meaning that a new rivalry could not begin: 317 in which both states were democratic, 3041 in which one side was democratic, and 3317 in which neither side was democratic.

Table 2: Dyadic Regime Type during Interstate Rivalries

Dyadic Regime Type during Rivalry	Type of Rivalry:			Total
	Isolated Conflict	Proto-Rivalry	Enduring Rivalry	
Always Joint Democratic	53 (85.5%)	8 (12.9)	1 (1.6)	62
Mixed (Sometimes Joint Democratic)	4 (17.4%)	9 (39.1)	10 (43.5)	23
Never Joint Democratic	823 (76.1%)	206 (19.1)	52 (4.8)	1081
Total	880 (75.5%)	223 (19.1)	63 (5.4)	1166

Table 3: Dyadic Regime Type and Militarized Dispute Propensity in Regime Change Rivalries

Dyadic Regime Type	Militarized Dispute Years	Non-Dispute Years	Total
Proto-Rivalry			
When Both Democratic	18 (22.0%)	64	82
When One Democratic	15 (21.7)	54	69
When Neither Democratic	6 (33.3)	12	18
Total	39 (23.1)	130	169
$X^2 = 1.20$ (2 d.f.), $p < .55$			
Enduring Rivalry			
When Both Democratic	29 (22.0%)	103	132
When One Democratic	89 (38.0)	145	234
When Neither Democratic	4 (30.8)	9	13
Total	122 (32.2)	257	379
$X^2 = 9.90$ (2 d.f.), $p < .01$			
Overall			
When Both Democratic	47 (22.0%)	167	214
When One Democratic	104 (34.3)	199	303
When Neither Democratic	10 (33.3)	21	31
Total	161 (29.4)	387	548
$X^2 = 9.37$ (2 d.f.), $p < .01$			

Table 4: Length of Democracy and Militarized Conflict in Regime Change Rivalries

Length of Joint Democracy	Conflict Propensity:		
	Proto-Rivalry MIDs/Yrs (Mean)	Enduring Rivalry MIDs/Yrs (Mean)	Total MIDs/Yrs (Mean)
Not Joint Democratic	23 / 88 (0.26)	120 / 247 (0.49)	143 / 335 (0.43)
Joint Democratic since Rivalry Start	11 / 14 (0.79)	1 / 2 (0.50)	12 / 16 (0.75)
Transition Year	3 / 8 (0.38)	12 / 17 (0.71)	15 / 25 (0.60)
1-5 Years	5 / 30 (0.17)	26 / 66 (0.39)	31 / 96 (0.32)
6-10 Years	0 / 19 (0.00)	0 / 34 (0.00)	0 / 53 (0.00)
11-15 Years	1 / 11 (0.09)	0 / 13 (0.00)	1 / 24 (0.04)
16-20 Years	0 / 3 (0.00)	0 / 0 (0.00)	0 / 3 (0.00)
Total	43 / 173 (0.25)	159 / 379 (0.36)	202 / 552 (0.37)

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