

January 2000 NSF Proposal - Project Summary
"Freshwater and Maritime Claims in World Politics"

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This project is meant to improve our understanding of how nation-states manage their contentious issues, focusing on disagreements between nation-states over shared fresh water supplies and over maritime zones to supplement recent research on territorial claims. A general issue-based approach to world politics has developed slowly since the mid-1970s, depicting world politics as the quest for issue satisfaction by actors using numerous potential means (including the unilateral initiation of militarized conflict, bilateral negotiations, and multilateral attempts involving binding or non-binding third party assistance). Empirically testable hypotheses are developed from this issue-based approach to account for the occurrence and success of attempts to manage or settle issues, emphasizing the salience of the issues, past attempts to manage the same issues, the regional and global institutional context, and characteristics of the adversaries.

Past research on contentious issues has been impeded by a lack of systematic data for empirical testing of propositions about the nature and management of contentious issues. Recent data collection by the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project has been able to overcome these problems by collecting data on the extent, salience, and management of territorial issues, offering substantial support for the hypotheses of the issues approach. The primary objective of this proposed research is to study freshwater and maritime issues in the same manner as this recent research on territorial issues. Data will be collected on all freshwater and maritime issues in the twentieth century, including the extent of the issues (the number of issues worldwide and the specific actors involved for each one), their salience (characteristics of each issue that make it more or less valuable to the involved states), and attempts to manage these issues unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally. This will allow the hypotheses from the general issues approach to be tested using these two additional issue types as a supplement to our current knowledge of territorial issues, and – in combination with the existing data on territorial issues -- will for the first time allow comparative study of the management of different issue types.

The results of the proposed analyses will have important implications for both theory and policy, ranging from improved academic understanding of processes of foreign policy making, negotiations, international law, and interstate conflict to the possibility of assisting governments in identifying possible peaceful solutions to their problems. This is especially important because the issues covered by this proposal, the management of often-scarce freshwater resources and of potentially oil- or fish-abundant maritime zones, are argued to be among the leading sources of conflict in the next century. The collection of freshwater and maritime issue data will also help to advance an issues approach to world politics, which has been slowed considerably by the dearth of systematic issues data; the few systematic data collections have primarily focused on the single issue of territory. Finally, the data sets to be collected under this proposal will be released publicly for use by other scholars in the field. While the creation of a new data resource is a secondary objective behind the improved testing of propositions on issues and world politics, this is an important side benefit that will be able to help the field of political science long after our original analyses with this newly collected data have been completed.

Project Description

At least since the nineteenth century Prussian general Clausewitz, many international relations theorists have assumed that international conflict begins for a reason -- i.e., that conflicts begin because of two nation-states' desire to achieve their respective goals on one or more contentious issues (or in Clausewitzian terms, war is the pursuit of political goals by military means). Many explanations for militarized conflict and war implicitly or explicitly revolve around specific issues as sources of conflict, ranging from leadership of the international system to control over strategic territory. Yet despite calls from scholars such as O'Leary (1976), Mansbach and Vasquez (1981), and Diehl (1992), an explicit issue-based approach to world politics has been slow to develop. O'Leary (1976: 321) laments that "'everybody knows' that issues are important... But what is equally obvious is that this 'obvious' fact has made little, if any, impact upon systematic research in the field." Writing sixteen years later, Diehl (1992: 337) notes that "despite initial positive reviews and more than a decade of time, the issue paradigm approach has not germinated such that its use is seriously evident, much less widespread, in the discipline." Even when issues have been considered theoretically, direct empirical analyses have been rare because of the lack of issues data in existing social science data sets and the difficulty of collecting original data related to issues.

This project advances an issues approach to world politics. The proposal begins by introducing the conceptual foundations and theoretical rationale behind an explicit issue-based approach, which depicts world politics as the quest for issue satisfaction by actors using numerous potential means. This approach is used to develop empirically testable hypotheses on the occurrence and success of attempts to manage or settle issues, emphasizing the salience of the issues, past attempts to manage the same issues, the regional and global institutional context, and characteristics of the adversaries. Data on the nature and management of freshwater and maritime issues will be collected to test these hypotheses, allowing the authors and future scholars to overcome many of the data limitations that have plagued past research on issues. We conclude the proposal by discussing the benefits of the proposed research for the academic and policy communities.

Theoretical Model: Contentious Issues and World Politics

The standard realist approach describes world politics as a struggle for power (Morgenthau 1967), or in its neorealist form (Waltz 1979), a struggle for security in an anarchic interstate system. From such a perspective, states have a single, all-encompassing goal: they "think and act in terms of interest defined as power." (Morgenthau 1967: 5) This perspective offers a parsimonious understanding of policy makers' goals and preferences in world politics. Our issue-based approach differs from realism in that it views world politics as an arena in which nations contend over many different types of issues, with very different implications for foreign policy decisions and interactions. We believe that an adequate understanding of interstate conflict and cooperation requires a focus on issues (see also Keohane and Nye 1977; Mansbach and Vasquez 1981; Diehl 1992). The following discussion identifies the central assumptions of a systematic approach to the study of issues.¹

Assumption 1: Foreign policy is issue-directed.

The primary assumption of an issue-based approach to world politics is that policy makers are concerned with issues. That is, rather than acting randomly or reacting to structural imperatives, policy makers make decisions in order to achieve their goals on certain issues. Such an approach closely resembles Clausewitz' portrayal of war as a political instrument, rather than an end to itself.

According to an issues perspective, policy makers are concerned with issues because of the "values" that the issues represent. Mansbach and Vasquez (1981: 57-58) describe politics as the quest for value satisfaction, where "values" are abstract and intangible ends such as wealth, physical security, freedom/autonomy, peace, order, status, or justice. Because many such values can not be obtained directly, political actors often pursue desired values by contending over "stakes," which are more concrete and tangible objects that are seen as possessing or representing the desired values. One or more stakes and values are linked to form an "issue," or "a set of differing proposals for the disposition of stakes among specific actors" (Vasquez 1993: 46). Issues can involve competing views on concrete or tangible objectives, such as control over a particular piece of territory or cross-border resources, the protection of an ethnic or religious minority, or the removal of a particular leader, as well as competing views on intangible objectives such as influence, prestige, or ideology (Keohane and Nye 1977; Randle

¹ It must be noted that this discussion is limited to the central assumptions of the scientific study of issues. Additional, more specific assumptions about state motivations or about the attractiveness or effectiveness of different tools for issue management may be required for the development of hypotheses on issue management, such as will be presented later in this proposal. For reasons of space, though, such auxiliary assumptions are beyond the scope of the present proposal.

1987; Holsti 1991; Diehl 1992). For example, the Golan Heights issue between Israel and Syria involves competing claims relating to values such as physical security (represented by specific territorial stakes offering the ability to detect military threats, defend oneself from attack, and control access to scarce fresh water), peace (the absence of actual and potential security threats from their rival), and status (with both Israeli and Syrian prestige affected by control over territory that is claimed by both countries). Any final resolution of the overall Golan issue will have to produce a mutually acceptable division of the Heights that balances Israeli and Syrian concerns for peace, security, and status.

Assumption 2: Both cooperative and conflictual foreign policy tools are substitutable means used to pursue issue-related ends.

Numerous cooperative or conflictual options may be chosen to pursue goals over issues, reflecting alternative mechanisms for allocating the disputed stakes; the common link is that these different policy options are substitutable means toward the same end. Policy makers may choose to take no action, allowing the issue to fester until it is forgotten or until one side chooses a more active strategy. Toward the peaceful end of the spectrum, leaders may choose to negotiate over their differences, either bilaterally or with the (non-binding) assistance of third parties, or they may submit their disputes to binding third party judgments. Leaders may also employ unilateral coercive action up to and including the use of military force to pursue their interests, in order to achieve their goals by force or by convincing an adversary to back down.

This assumption reflects the impact of international anarchy, or the lack of an authoritative global actor that is capable of reaching and enforcing decisions to resolve disagreements between states. Indeed, if such an actor existed, then there would be little reason to study the management or resolution of issues, because all issues could be settled (and all settlements enforced) by the global Leviathan. This assumption also forces the analyst to think in terms of substitutable policy options that are available to states (Most and Starr 1989; Morgan 1990). Past research on contentious issues or on conflict management has examined the use of force over certain issues (e.g., Hensel 1996b; Senese 1996), the use of mediation or arbitration (e.g., Raymond 1994, 1996), and attempts to manage ongoing crises peacefully (e.g., Dixon 1993, 1994). As Most and Starr (1989: Chapter Five) point out, though, such studies are likely to be weakened by focusing on only one of multiple policy options available to states for the same purpose. A preferable alternative is to conceptualize each option -- militarized action, negotiations, or the resort to third parties -- as one component piece in a larger puzzle, with states choosing from a menu of options in pursuit of a particular (issue-related) goal. In short, by recognizing that multiple options are available to states for resolving their conflicts of interest, the issues approach introduced here allows for a more complete understanding of world politics than is possible in isolated studies of individual options.

Assumption 3: Actors' preferences and decisions regarding issue management are influenced by desires to maximize the probability of achieving issue-related goals and minimize the costs that are incurred in doing so, as well as by the salience they attach to the issue.

The first two assumptions suggest a framework for studying interactions between states from an issues perspective, with numerous policy options available for pursuing issue-related goals. In order to choose between these different options, policy makers are assumed to be driven by two primary considerations: achieving their desired settlement of the issue under contention and remaining in political power (see also Huth 1996). If foreign policy making is assumed to be issue-directed, then leaders must prefer to achieve their goals over the issue(s) in question. Similarly, leaders are assumed to prefer remaining in office to losing power, all else being equal.

In light of these considerations, an issue-based perspective suggests two important guidelines that policy makers use to evaluate and choose among the various policy options available to them. First, they wish to maximize the probability of achieving most or all of their issue-related goals. While trying to do so, they also wish to minimize the (military, economic, political, or social) costs incurred while pursuing these goals. If a state's leaders can accomplish their goals successfully and at a relatively low cost, then they are more likely to be able to retain political power. Alternatively, if they fail to accomplish their goals (or worsen the situation) or if their decisions lead to high costs, then they are likely to pay a heavy price in domestic political support and in their prospects for remaining in power (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Fearon 1994).

Decisions among possible settlement techniques are also assumed to be influenced by the salience that leaders attach to the issue in question. By itself, the argument that states are concerned with multiple types of issues does not necessarily imply that incorporating issues will make a difference in analyses of world politics. Even if numerous issues exist on the policy agenda, the specific issue(s) under contention at any point in time can only affect foreign policy decisions if issues vary in salience, which can be defined as "the extent to which (but principally, the intensity with which) peoples and their leaders value an issue and its subject matter" (Randle 1987:

2; see also Coplin et al. 1973, Diehl 1992). Without this assumption, behavior would remain constant across different types of issues, and the specific issue under contention would only be of interest for descriptive purposes. Once salience is considered, though, leaders can be seen as expending greater effort (and risking higher costs) to achieve favorable settlements on highly salient issues than on issues that are attributed less importance.²

Hypotheses on Contention over Issues

The issue-based framework that has been presented suggests that world politics can be conceptualized and studied as contention between states over issues using a variety of coercive or cooperative techniques. We now present explicit hypotheses on states' choices between settlement techniques in pursuit of issue-related goals. A number of issue-related factors can affect these choices, including issue salience, past interaction over issues, and the institutional context as well as characteristics of the adversaries themselves. Each factor is discussed with specific reference to both the policy tools that are chosen and the effectiveness of these tools.

It must be emphasized that these hypotheses are meant to be general in nature, with the goal of understanding contention over issues of any type. As a result, these hypotheses are not targeted specifically at territorial issues (the subject of most past data-based research on issues) or freshwater or maritime issues (the subjects of the present proposal). The differences between various types of issues are meant to be addressed by variables measuring issue salience, which -- as will be seen later -- can vary both across general types of issues (e.g., territorial versus maritime issues) and within each issue type (e.g., more versus less valuable pieces of territory).

Issue salience is expected to exert a great influence on the choice among policy options, with policy makers willing to pursue costlier or riskier options to achieve their goals over issues that are considered highly salient than over less important issues. In particular, unilateral military action is a relatively costly option, involving the risk of high military and economic costs should the adversary reciprocate with military action of its own. For low-salience issues, these costs and risks are unlikely to be seen as worthwhile, leading the states in question to prefer peaceful means, in which the costs are limited to failing to achieve one's (relatively unimportant) issue goals -- without the additional costs and risks inherent in military escalation. When highly salient issues are under contention, though, the costs of failing to achieve one's desired issue position are much greater, in terms of both failing to accomplish a leader's goals and alienating the domestic selectorate responsible for maintaining the leader in office. As a result, the costs of losing on such issues may be great enough to justify the risks and costs of using force to achieve their goals. In general, then, we expect that *states should employ bilateral negotiations or militarized action to pursue their goals over issues much more frequently than third party activity when the issue at stake is highly salient.*

To the extent that major powers, neighboring states, international organizations, or other third parties play a role in conflict management or prevention, we might expect that third party actors should be most likely to offer their services to minimize conflict over issues that are seen as highly salient. That is, third parties would appear to be more likely to offer assistance in settling issues that are seen as likely to threaten regional or global stability than to make similar offers over less salient issues. Yet the very issue salience that attracts third party attention may be expected to make the antagonists hesitant to accept third party assistance over issues of such importance.

Policy makers' hesitance to turn to third party assistance should be greatest for offers of legally binding third party assistance (arbitration or adjudication), in which the parties agree in advance to abide by the decision of the third party. Non-binding third party techniques (such as good offices, inquiry, conciliation, or mediation) may be seen as less threatening, because they emphasize the facilitation of communication between two adversaries, neutral fact-finding missions, or the suggestion of possible solutions that need not be accepted by either party. Unilateral or bilateral action may be generally preferable to the involvement of any third party, but if a third party is to become involved, the ideal form of involvement would be one allowing policy makers to reject any suggestions that they consider unfavorable. To the extent that antagonists either request third party assistance or accept a third party's offer of such assistance, then, *third party settlement attempts should be more likely to involve non-binding third party activities than binding third party decisions when the issue at stake is highly salient.*

With regard to the effectiveness of issue management attempts, more salient issues are expected to prove more difficult to resolve successfully. The final resolution of any issue requires that both sides view a settlement as beneficial, or at least as preferable to continued contention over the issue. Compromise over an issue -- essential to

² Moravcsik (1997) similarly suggests that states require a "purpose" or perceived underlying stake before they will act, and that the strength of their preferences for these stakes drives policy making. This argument is central to Moravcsik's critique of the realist argument that capability or power considerations drive policy making: "Nations are rarely prepared to expend their entire economic or defense capabilities, or to mortgage their entire domestic sovereignty, in pursuit of any single foreign policy goal" (Moravcsik 1997: 520). Instead, the primary determination of a state's willingness to expend resources in pursuit of any given foreign policy goal is the strength of that state's preferences for achieving that particular goal.

producing a settlement that both sides consider worthwhile -- is not likely to be difficult for leaders when the issue is relatively trivial, so once settlement attempts are set in motion on such issues, there should be a reasonable prospect for success. Yet when one or both actors view an issue as highly salient, they are likely to find compromise solutions unpalatable (and any domestic political opposition is likely to take advantage of any compromise to launch charges of treason or incompetence). We thus expect that *issue management attempts should be less successful when the issue at stake is highly salient.*

Whatever the salience or other characteristics of a given issue, two states' interactions in pursuit of issue-related goals rarely take place in a vacuum. Particularly when contention over a given issue has endured over time, the antagonists are keenly aware of the history of interactions over that issue. This history is likely to affect their subsequent decision making, by affecting each side's perception of the other side's preferences or the other's perceived issue salience, as well as each side's expectations about future actions and interactions. Several dimensions of the past relationship between two adversaries appear relevant to their interactions over a given contentious issue, including the frequency and success of recent attempts to settle the issue through both peaceful and militarized means.

A history of failures in peaceful settlement attempts is likely to indicate to decision makers that future peaceful means are unlikely to be successful, rendering militarized options more attractive than the continuation of deadlocked negotiations with a stubborn adversary. Indeed, Vasquez (1993: 46-48) suggests that war is only chosen as a viable means for pursuing one's goals "in the face of stalemate and the failure of normal politics to resolve fundamental issues." The failure of peaceful settlement attempts may also affect the likelihood of third-party options. Because of the record of failure in past attempts to settle the issue, third parties should be more likely to notice the issue and perhaps more likely to offer their assistance to help settle it before it escalates into a threat to regional or global stability. In such a case, the antagonists may also be more likely to solicit or accept third party assistance to help settle their differences; the general tendency to reject third party assistance as surrendering national sovereignty may be outweighed by the perception that the alternatives are unlikely to be costly and/or successful. In short, *states should be more likely to employ militarized action or third party assistance to pursue their goals when they have a longer history of failed peaceful settlement attempts.*

A history of recent militarized conflict should also be expected to influence perceptions of the adversary and expectations about the future. Focusing on territorial issues, Vasquez (1993: 147) suggests that how actors attempt to resolve such issues "will have a profound impact" on the level of hostility or friendship in their subsequent relations. Any use of force short of overwhelming victory, for example, is likely to "make territorial issues fester and produce long-term hostile relationships." Vasquez' suggestion is consistent with the findings of recent research on contentious issues and recurrent conflict. As Hensel (1996a, 1996b) finds, militarized conflict often sets the stage for future conflict between the same adversaries, with the occurrence of one confrontation -- particularly in confrontations over territorial issues -- typically increasing hostility and distrust between the adversaries, and making future confrontations increasingly likely. The increasing hostility and distrust that accompanies a history of militarized conflict is expected to reduce the likelihood of peaceful settlements being attempted, as the adversaries come to expect both that such settlement attempts will fail and that militarized means are likely to be used again. Similar to the earlier discussion about a history of unsuccessful settlement attempts, adversaries with a longer history of conflict should also be more likely than adversaries with no such history to attract offers of third party assistance to help resolve their issues peacefully. Adversaries with a longer history of conflict may also be more likely to accept third party assistance, once their problem is seen as intractable and unlikely to end definitively through their own actions.³ In short, *states should be more likely to employ militarized action or to accept third party assistance when they have a longer history of militarized conflict with each other.*

Almost paradoxically, a long history of either failed settlement attempts or militarized conflict may also increase the prospects for the success of any settlement attempts that are begun. Policy makers in such a situation may decide that it would be better to settle an issue peacefully (whether bilaterally or with third party assistance), rather than face the likely costs and risks associated with continued contention. Policy makers or political parties associated with the unsuccessful policies of the past may also be pressured politically or removed from office (through constitutional or other means) for their perceived failures, creating new opportunities for peace. The 1999 election of Ehud Barak over the incumbent Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel may be an example of such a phenomenon, given widespread dissatisfaction with Netanyahu's obstruction of the Middle East peace process and the hope that Barak could bring renewed vigor to the process. We thus expect that *issue management attempts*

³ Bercovitch and Diehl (1997), for example, find that while enduring rivalries represent only thirteen percent of all of the relationships in their data set, they attract nearly half of all mediation attempts.

should be more successful when there is a longer history of failed peaceful settlement attempts and when there is a longer history of militarized conflict over the issue.

It should also be noted that international institutions -- whether at the regional or global level -- might play an important role in shaping state decisions over their issues (see especially Vasquez 1993: Chapter Eight). Peaceful settlement attempts may be easier (and perhaps more effective) when the claimants are members of formal institutions that call for peaceful conflict management. When such institutions exist, there is likely to be a greater sense of obligation to manage conflicts peacefully between member states, along with greater pressure for a peaceful settlement from fellow members. Furthermore, each side may recognize the institution in question as a relatively impartial and appropriate third party conflict manager, opening new avenues for third party involvement that might have been more difficult to accept in the absence of such an institution. This suggests that *states should be more likely to employ peaceful settlement attempts and less likely to employ militarized action when they are both members of regional or global organizations calling for the peaceful settlement of disputes among their members.* Additionally, *issue management attempts should be more successful when both claimants are members of regional or global organizations calling for the peaceful settlement of disputes among their members.*

Despite the preceding discussion of the importance of issue-related factors, even vigorous proponents of an issue-based approach would agree that issues alone are unlikely to determine decisions and outcomes in world politics. While issues may establish the goals that states wish to pursue and may set certain parameters on the possible methods to be used in achieving those goals, decisions are likely to be constrained by characteristics of the involved actors. It would be ludicrous to argue that states make foreign policy decisions based solely on the issues at stake, with factors such as their (or their adversary's) capabilities playing no role; factors such as these may make certain options more likely and others virtually unthinkable. Indeed, as will be discussed later, one potentially valuable contribution of systematic data collection on issues is the prospect of comparative testing of issue motivations against power, democracy, and other explanatory factors as sources of foreign policy behavior.

For example, not all states possess the necessary military capabilities to achieve their goals by making a credible threat or by winning a battlefield victory, while some states may possess such overwhelming capabilities that they need not employ militarized means to achieve their goals. A variety of research indicates that roughly equal states are more conflict-prone than dyads in which one side is heavily preponderant over the other (e.g., Kugler and Lemke 1996). Furthermore, Raymond (1996) notes that many scholars of international law consider rough power parity to be a virtual precondition for the success of international law, with a preponderant state unlikely to trust its destiny to a (potentially biased or unfavorable) third party and unlikely to accept an unfavorable third party judgment. It appears reasonable to expect similar results with regard to issue management, with both militarized conflict and third party settlement attempts being more likely when the claimants are roughly equal in military capabilities -- thus offering both sides a reasonable expectation of success through militarized means -- than in more asymmetric dyads. Because both sides foresee a reasonable chance of victory, though, settlement attempts between relatively equal adversaries are likely to face difficulties in resolving an issue definitively. At least in the absence of a long history of costly conflict, neither of two relatively equal adversaries has much incentive to accept a final settlement of disputed issues that does not achieve most of its goals.

An additional factor that is likely to be important is political regime type. A large literature has examined the pacifying effects of democracy, arguing that democracies should be more likely than other types of states to settle disagreements with each other peacefully because of both democratic norms of peaceful conflict resolution and the constraining effects of democratic structures. If these arguments are correct, then two democracies contending over an issue should recognize that peaceful settlement attempts offer a reasonable prospect for successful issue resolution, and with lower costs than would be risked through military action. Furthermore, two democracies should see each other as likely to respect the process and outcome of a negotiated or third party settlement, allowing them to overcome the fear that the adversary will renege on any agreement that is reached -- making peaceful settlement attempts not only more likely to occur between democracies, but also more likely to succeed.⁴

⁴ Past research is consistent with this expectation, indicating that interstate crises between democracies are more likely than other crises to employ peaceful conflict management and to reach peaceful settlements during ongoing crises (Dixon 1993, 1994) and that democratic adversaries are less likely than other types of dyads to become involved in militarized conflict (e.g., Ray 1995). Also, norms of bounded competition make democratic states more inclined to turn to third parties for dispute resolution (Dixon 1993, 1994, 1996), and to agree to binding forms of third party assistance (Raymond, 1994). The data to be collected in this project includes information on the types of settlement attempts, ranging from bilateral negotiations, to non-binding third party interventions (good offices, inquiry and conciliation, mediation, multilateral negotiations), to binding forms of third party involvement (arbitration and adjudication), making it ideal for testing such hypotheses.

The Systematic Study of Issues

Some of the earliest systematic research on contentious issues focuses on general patterns of foreign policy, and remains largely descriptive in nature. O'Leary (1976), for example, attempts to count the number of issues over which different pairs of states interact. Beyond issue frequency, Mansbach and Vasquez (1981: Chapter One) examine variation in foreign policy behavior across different issues. They find that U.S.-West German and U.S.-Soviet behavior during the Cold War varied significantly by issue area, with certain issue areas generating almost exclusively conflictual behavior and others generating almost exclusively cooperative behavior.

More recent studies of issues typically emphasize the impact of issues on militarized conflict, rather than on the general patterns of conflict and cooperation studied in earlier research. One common focus of issues-based research is the examination of issues involved in known cases of militarized conflict, in order to see which issues have been involved in the most wars. Luard (1986) and Holsti (1991) find that territorial issues have been among the most frequent sources of war in the post-Westphalia era, although territory may be declining as a source of conflict in recent years. Similarly, Mitchell and Prins (1999) find that maritime and resource claims have been the most frequent issues involved in militarized disputes between democracies since World War II. Yet the issues examined in such studies are only identified after the outbreak of militarized conflict; little is known about how common these different issues are in world politics -- or about how countries with similar issue disagreements have been able to avoid militarized conflict.

Another typical research strategy begins with a list of militarized disputes or crises, categorized by the issues involved in each case, and examines whether the types of issues at stake affect conflict behavior during and after the confrontation. Such research has generally found that militarized confrontations involving territorial issues are more escalatory than non-territorial confrontations (e.g., Gochman and Leng 1983; Hensel 1996b; Senese 1996). As with the studies mentioned above, though, most current data sets on contentious issues remain limited to the issues involved in militarized conflict, and little is known about non-militarized attempts to manage or settle issues. As a result, hypotheses that are central to an issues approach -- such as those presented in this proposal -- have generally been impossible to test in a systematic fashion.

This proposal represents an attempt to address these shortcomings of past research on issues. Testing hypotheses such as those developed above requires issues data that is not limited to issues that have already led to militarized conflict (or to any other single type of settlement attempt). Additionally, meaningful tests of an issues approach require indicators of issue salience, as well as data on both militarized and peaceful attempts to manage or settle issues. Although such data are not presently available for most issue types or for most types of settlement attempts, the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW)⁵ Project at Florida State University has begun to address these needs for territorial issues. Over the past two years, ICOW researchers have collected data on all territorial claims between two or more nation-states since 1816, including data on the salience of each claim and on a variety of different attempts to settle each one.⁶ The present proposal is meant to extend this data collection effort beyond territory to two additional issue types, in order to allow more comprehensive testing of propositions about issues and direct comparison of the management of different issue types.

Perhaps the most important requirement for systematic data on issues is explicit evidence of contention involving official representatives of two or more nation-states over the issue type in question; without explicit contention there is no reasonable way to identify issues. For the ICOW territorial claims data, this means evidence that official representatives of at least one state make explicit statements claiming sovereignty over a specific piece of territory that is claimed or administered by another state. Several types of sources are used to generate the data, beginning with general geographic and historical reference sources at the regional or global level (e.g., Anderson 1993; Biger 1995; Ireland 1938). Further sources consulted include military and diplomatic histories of the participants and news reports from sources such as the *New York Times*, *Times of London*, and *Facts on File*.⁷

⁵ The authors wish to thank J. David Singer for generously allowing the use of the term "Correlates of War" in the name of the ICOW project. It must be emphasized, though, that Singer and his colleagues at the COW project in Ann Arbor bear no responsibility for any decisions or data resulting from the ICOW project.

⁶ ICOW project codebooks and papers that have used the data are publicly available through the ICOW web site at <<http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~phensel/icow.html>>. Upon publication of articles using ICOW data, the relevant data sets will also be made available at this location. Codebooks for the proposed freshwater and maritime claims data sets will also be made available at this location once completed.

⁷ A recent review (Hensel 1998) indicates that this territorial claims data set compares favorably to other existing territory- or issue-related data sets (Holsti 1991; Kocs 1995; Huth 1996; the ICB crisis data; and the COW militarized dispute and territorial change data sets). Only one Western Hemisphere territorial claim appearing in these alternative data sets was missing from the ICOW data set in 1998 -- subsequently added on the basis of further research -- while the ICOW data covers a longer time frame,

Table 1 presents an illustrative list of selected territorial claims meeting the ICOW criteria. A total of 126 unique pieces of territory have been claimed in the Western Hemisphere and Europe during the years 1816-1996,⁸ involving a total of 197 dyadic claims (where territories such as Alaska or Belize have involved several pairs of claimants). These 197 claims have averaged 39.4 years in duration, or 37.1 years after excluding 33 cases that are ongoing past the end of data collection. Of the 164 dyadic claims that have ended, 23 were simply dropped or renounced by one of the claimants, 57 ended through bilateral negotiations between the claimants, 58 ended with the (binding or non-binding) assistance of third parties, and 26 ended for other reasons (such as the end of the Guatemalan-British claim to Belize once Belize became independent, replacing Britain as the claim target).

Table 1: Selected Territorial Claims, 1816-1996

<u>Territory</u>	<u>Claimants</u>	<u>Militarized?</u>
St. Croix-St. John Rivers	USA - UK (1816-1842)	No
Belize	Guatemala - UK (1868-1981)	Yes
	Guatemala - Belize (1981-)	Yes
Ica	Brazil - Ecuador (1854-1922)	No
Chaco Boreal	Bolivia - Paraguay (1878-1939)	Yes
Falkland/Malvinas Islands	Argentina - UK (1841-)	Yes
Gdansk/Danzig	Germany - Poland (1919-1939)	Yes
Taba	Israel - Egypt (1981-1988)	No

With regard to claim salience, the ICOW territorial claims data set includes numerous indicators that may be used to measure the salience of claimed territory. Several of these indicators reflect the "intrinsic importance" (Diehl 1992) of the claimed territory, contributing to the salience of the claimed territory for all involved parties, while others may reveal asymmetries in claim salience for different participants ("relational importance"). Intrinsic indicators of claim salience include the area and population of the claimed territory, as well as indicators of whether or not it is thought to contain valuable resources and whether or not there is an explicit ethnic or religious dimension to the claim. Most claimed territories in the data set are habitable, with three-fourths including some permanent population, although only ten percent of the claims involve territory that contains a major city of 100,000 or more residents. Somewhat surprisingly, only about one-fourth of the claims involve territory that is believed or known to contain valuable resources such as oil or tin (28 percent) or involve an explicit ethnic or religious dimension (23 percent). Relational indicators of salience include the contiguity of the claimed territory to each claimant and the distinction between homeland territory and dependencies. Most territorial claims in the data set involve claims to territory that both claimants see as their own homeland territory, although nearly one-third (24 of 197) involve a foreign dependency of one or both claimants (exemplified by claims involving the Guianas, which include both claims among the European colonizers and claims between the colonizers and their colonies' South American neighbors). Similarly, over half of the claims involve two participants sharing direct land or river borders to the territory in question, but 21 involve at least one more distant claimant in the same region and 60 involve at least one participant that is located more than 200 miles from the territory. Taken together, these intrinsic and relational indicators allow scholars to distinguish between claims by salience, which offers a great deal of potential for an issue-based approach that sees issue salience as central to states' decisions and interactions over issues. They also allow us to identify the tangible and intangible importance of each territory, with such indicators as area, population, and resources measuring tangible value and such indicators as the homeland/dependency distinction and ethnic or religious value measuring intangible importance.

The ICOW project also collects data on all attempts to settle a territorial claim through bilateral negotiations, with non-binding third party assistance (inquiry, conciliation, good offices, or mediation), or through binding arbitration or adjudication (see Akehurst 1987; Levi 1991; von Glahn 1996). The 197 claims in the Americas and Europe have given rise to an average of 5.2 peaceful settlement attempts, including a total of 607 rounds of bilateral negotiations, 330 attempts involving non-binding third party assistance, and 85 submissions to binding third party arbitration or adjudication. These 197 claims have also led to 235 militarized interstate disputes over territorial issues and 126 exchanges of territory between the claimants. Half of these settlement attempts (514 of 1022) have covered the entire territory involved in the claim, while six percent have been limited to a portion of

includes numerous cases missing from the others, and is the only collection to offer data on both issue salience and specific settlement attempts for each territorial claim.

⁸ These two regions are the furthest along. The Middle East portion of the territorial claims data has not yet been fully checked for errors, and Africa and Asia are still being collected as of this writing.

the territory and over forty percent have been functional (involving the usage but not sovereignty of the territory) or procedural (involving terms for future talks, submission of the claim to arbitration, or similar topics).⁹ Only 59 percent of these attempts have led to the signature of a treaty or agreement, and not all of these agreements have been carried out. Twenty percent of the 603 agreements were not ratified by at least one of the parties, 37 percent were not carried out by at least one party, and only 21 percent contributed directly to the end of contention over most or all of the claimed territory. There is also great variation in the terms of these agreements, one fourth of which call for the exchange of territory between the claimants. About one sixth of the agreements involve minor or major concessions by claim challengers and another sixth involve concessions by the targets; the remaining agreements involve either no concessions or roughly equal concessions by both sides. This attempted settlement data collection allows many potential analyses, including the probability or effectiveness of each type of attempt and the terms of each agreement (such as which types of states generally make greater concessions).

Comparison with Past Data Collections

This collection of data on territorial claims, claim salience, and settlement attempts offers numerous possibilities for research on issues, resolving problems that have limited the value of past issue-related data collections. First, this data set includes all claims -- regardless of whether or not they lead to militarized conflict (as in Holsti's war data, the COW militarized interstate dispute data, or the ICB or Sherfacs crisis data) or to mediation or arbitration (as in Raymond's data). This allows scholars to test propositions on the propensity of different issue types to lead to militarized conflict, mediation, arbitration, or any other type of activity, opening up new worlds of possible empirical analyses. Indeed, an exclusive focus on attempts to manage claims that have become militarized (e.g., Dixon 1993, 1994; Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984) is likely to understate the effectiveness of peaceful means for dispute settlement, because it only examines the most intractable and conflictual issues and ignores cases that never reach such extreme measures.

A related advantage of this data set is that it includes many cases that have been left out of alternative data sets on conflict management. Most quantitative work on conflict management has had to focus on attempts to manage ongoing crises, using data from the ICB crisis data set (Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984), Sherfacs (Dixon 1993, 1994, 1996), or similar compilations. Yet less than fifteen percent of the settlement attempts described above begin during ongoing militarized disputes or wars, meaning that 85 percent of the ICOW cases would be left out of the data sets that have been used in most recent research on conflict management. Raymond's (1994, 1996) data on international arbitration and mediation offers a partial exception, as it includes numerous cases that began outside of the context of ongoing militarized conflict. Yet Raymond's data is limited to conflict management cases involving at least one major power and involving states that share a direct or indirect border, and his data set ends in 1965; only a small fraction of cases in the ICOW territorial claims data set would appear in Raymond's compilation.

Another advantage of the ICOW data comes from its indicators of claim salience, beyond simple distinctions between two or three categories of general issue types. For example, quantitative research on issues and militarized disputes (e.g., Hensel 1996b; Senese 1996) has generally distinguished between two categories of issues: "territorial" issues, which include all disputes in which territory was at stake for at least one participant, and a residual category of "other" issues. Similar limitations have affected research on conflict management by Dixon, Raymond, and others; issue salience distinctions (when used at all) are generally limited to a small number of broad issue categories. With the ICOW territorial claims data, numerous indicators of salience are collected, offering the opportunity to employ much more detailed distinctions than simply "territorial" versus "other" issue types.¹⁰

Initial Results from ICOW Research on Territorial Claims

Hensel (1999) uses the ICOW territorial claims data for the Western Hemisphere to study the occurrence of different types of settlement attempts. His results support most of the hypotheses from this issue-based approach. Variations in issue salience affect the nature of attempts to manage or settle the claims, with action over the claim being more likely -- but submission to a binding third party decision being less likely -- when the claimed territory is more salient to policy makers. Recent interactions over the issue exert a substantial influence on later issue management, with action over a claim -- particularly militarized conflict -- being more likely when there is a history of either militarized conflict or unsuccessful negotiations. Important for the validity of an issue-based approach,

⁹ The data set excludes crisis management attempts that only attempt to produce a ceasefire and do not cover the ownership or usage of territory, as well as calls for settlement (by the claimants or by third parties) that do not lead to actual negotiations.

¹⁰ It may reasonably be argued that one weakness of the current ICOW data is that it only covers one general issue type, whereas alternative data sets -- while not offering detailed salience indicators -- at least offer multiple issue types. This is a major point of the present proposal, which aims to extend ICOW to additional issues.

these results for the impact of issues hold even after controlling for the characteristics of the claimants, which helps to overcome possible objections from political realists or others who might argue that power is the primary determinant of foreign policy activity. Claimant characteristics also affect issue management in consistent ways; democracies are more likely to negotiate over their territorial claims, and action over a claim is more likely when the challenger state is even with or stronger than its adversary. Hensel and Tures (2000) find similar results in examining the effectiveness of different types of settlement attempts, again using the ICOW territorial claims data for the Western Hemisphere. Indicators of claim salience typically produce strong results in the expected directions, along with characteristics of the settlement attempt and of the adversaries.

The ICOW territorial claims data set has also been useful for testing hypotheses that are not directly related to issues. Mitchell (1999) argues that as the number of democratic states increases in the international system, the rule of law inherent in democratic nations is more likely to become an international rule of law. She examines the temporal evolution of one specific democratic norm, the propensity for nation states to seek the aid of third parties in the settlement of disputes. Using the ICOW data on settlement attempts in the Americas, and contrary to previous research, she finds that democratic dyads were more likely to attempt to settle their disputes bilaterally, relative to mixed and autocratic dyads. She argues that initially, democratic norms of compromise and nonviolence allow for the possibility of bilateral negotiations, but once a dispute becomes difficult to resolve, these same norms allow for the intervention of third parties. She also finds that non-democratic and mixed dyads have been much more likely to use third party settlement attempts for territorial disputes in the post-World War II period (marked by a greater proportion of democracies in the world) than in earlier periods, supporting her primary hypothesis.

Taken together, these initial studies using the ICOW data on territorial claims have begun to contribute to the academic literature on contentious issues, interstate conflict, and conflict management. The study of issues -- particularly territorial issues -- has finally begun to expand beyond a focus on the issues involved in militarized conflict, by both including issues that never become militarized and studying non-militarized issue settlement attempts. Whereas past research indicated that militarized conflict over territorial issues tends to be more severe than conflict over other issues (and that territorial issues are the most common source of militarized conflict), research using the ICOW data indicates that militarized conflict constitutes only one-fourth of all attempts to settle territorial claims. This research also indicates the importance of issue salience and past interactions over issues, which affect both the type of issue settlement attempts that are chosen and the effectiveness of the settlement attempts in predictable ways. Of course, this recent research using the ICOW data has not provided the final word on the role of issues in world politics. In particular, the research has focused exclusively on territorial claims in the past two centuries, usually in the Western Hemisphere. Current data collection is expanding the ICOW territorial claim project to the rest of the world, addressing one current limitation of this data set. What is needed next is the collection of comparable data on additional issues beyond territory. Virtually nothing systematic is known about the management of other specific types of issues, since empirical research that includes multiple issue types (such as studies of issues and dispute escalation to war) generally categorizes all non-territorial issues in a residual "other" category. Also, because the only available data sets on the nature and management of issues focus on territorial claims, direct comparison of different types of issues is currently impossible. The remainder of this proposal discusses the collection of additional data on freshwater and maritime issues as an important extension of research on contentious issues in world politics.

Planned Data Collection

Before discussing specific issue types to be collected, we must identify the dimensions along which different issues vary, as a guide to data collection. Issues are important to states for a variety of reasons, which we categorize in terms of the tangible and intangible value to the contending states. Perhaps most obvious are the tangible values associated with many issues, such as their contribution to a state's physical security, wealth, or even basic human needs such as food, water, and living space. Less obvious, yet often important, are more intangible values such as order, status or prestige, and justice. Different types of issues can be seen as varying along these two dimensions of tangible and intangible salience to states, ranging from issues with high tangible and high intangible salience to those with low salience on both dimensions. Territory, for example, is typically described as quite important to states for both tangible and intangible reasons (e.g., Vasquez 1993; Hensel 1996, 2000). Territorial claims often involve land that contains economic and/or strategic value, thus relating to the tangible values of wealth and physical security. Beyond this tangible importance, many territories also take on enormous intangible significance, coming to be viewed as part of a state's national identity; the deep ties of Jews to Palestine/Israel and of Serbs to Kosovo offer two dramatic examples. Although individual territorial claims may involve specific pieces of

land with little tangible value or with little intangible significance for either participant, in general territorial issues are seen as taking on high values on both dimensions.¹¹

At the opposite end of the spectrum, issues with little tangible or intangible value include international athletics or economic issues associated with individuals or small groups. Victory in the Olympic Games or the World Cup may contribute somewhat to a state's prestige, and obtaining the release of a state's national imprisoned abroad or protecting foreign investments by the state's corporations may be quite important for the individual or corporation involved, but there is little tangible or intangible value in such issues for the vast majority of the state's leaders or populace. It is difficult to imagine comparing such issues with the importance attached to territory that is seen as a state's historical homeland, economic livelihood, and primary defensive perimeter.

Between these extremes, a variety of issues take on relatively high values along the tangible or intangible dimensions, while lacking in the other dimension. Issues involving prestige or influence (at the local, regional, or global level) are primarily intangible in nature, typically offering little tangible benefit. On the other hand, issues involving national-level economic factors such as the primary sectors of the national economy are primarily tangible in importance. We propose to extend the ICOW project to several of these intermediate issues, focusing on freshwater and maritime issues. While both of these issues are primarily tangible in value, additional work outside of the ICOW project has begun to address issues with more intangible importance. For example, research on major power competition for regional or global dominance -- central to power transition theory, among other topics -- can be seen as addressing a largely intangible issue. Additionally, one of our doctoral students, John Tures, has begun collection of an ICOW data set on international challenges to the leadership of one or more nation-states ("regime claims"). While such claims are clearly of tangible importance for the leader being challenged, they are typically important to the challenger state for more intangible reasons related to influence, prestige, or -- for cases that follow a coup or irregular regime change -- perhaps order or justice. Once these proposed data sets have been completed and analyzed, we plan to expand the ICOW project to additional issue types, likely including at least one issue type that generally takes on high intangible but low tangible value and at least one with low values on both dimensions.

This proposed expansion of the ICOW project to additional issue types is necessary to the advancement of the issues approach beyond territorial issues (highly salient though they may be, on both the tangible and intangible dimensions). Research using the ICOW territorial claims data set has been able to study the impact of variation in issue salience within the category of territorial claims, but has been unable to address variation across different types of issues. As a result, past research has been forced to adopt the imperfect solution of assuming that territorial issues are generally more salient than are most other types of issues, while not being able to compare territorial issues with a baseline composed of other issue types. The collection of additional issue data under this proposal will allow direct comparison of different types of issues for the first time, including variation in issue salience both within each issue type and across the different issues -- finally allowing systematic, cross-issue research on the ways that issues are managed.¹²

¹¹ We believe that this classification scheme is superior to alternative schemes that have been presented in past research. For example, Rosenau (1971) classifies issues by the tangibility or intangibility of the values to be allocated, as well as the tangibility or intangibility of the means employed to effect allocation. Yet many issues -- particularly territorial issues, as noted above -- are seen as extremely important for both tangible and intangible reasons, complicating the classification of the values as either tangible or intangible. Additionally, a variety of means can be used to effect allocation of any type of issue, ranging from military force to negotiations or third-party adjudication; it would be both difficult and misleading to categorize any particular issue as involving primarily tangible or intangible means. The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project has attempted to categorize issues by the specific substantive area of contention, using four categories: military-security, political-diplomatic, economic development, and cultural status (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997). Yet these categories are not mutually exclusive; territorial issues, for one, can be important for reasons related to all four categories.

¹² An apparent alternative to collecting complete data (with salience indicators and settlement attempts) on several issue types is to collect data on a much larger set of issues, although this would have to cover a much more limited time frame to be feasible in a two-year project. Yet it is difficult to imagine a research strategy by which "all issues" could be studied for all of the types of settlement attempts that must be examined to test issue hypotheses such as those presented earlier. This would involve identifying every case of bilateral negotiations, binding or non-binding third party assistance, and militarized conflict involving at least two nation-states during the chosen time period and identifying the issues involved; and while the type of settlement attempts to be studied could be limited to make data collection more feasible (as in past data collections of arbitration or militarized disputes), this would greatly reduce the value of the project by reducing the number of hypotheses that could be tested. Additionally, if a limited time period is chosen to increase the number of issues being collected, we would lose the ability to test hypotheses on the role of past interaction over the same issues, which is an important component of the issue approach presented earlier in this proposal. In short, we feel that this approach offers the greatest potential payoff for the systematic study of issues over a two-year time period, and we have every intention of collecting data on additional issue types after the proposed freshwater and maritime claims data sets are completed.

Freshwater Claims

The first issue data to be collected involves questions of access to or usage of freshwater resources. Water is vital to human existence, but fresh water resources suitable for drinking or agriculture are distributed very unevenly around the world. For example, the Amazon River accounts for twenty percent of all global river runoff – triple the combined total runoff for all of Europe -- and the Congo/Zaire River accounts for thirty percent of all runoff in Africa. Similarly, Oceania as a region has over twenty times the per capita water availability of Asia, largely because of rich water resources and low populations (Gleick 1993b: 3-4). At least nine Middle Eastern countries already use more water each year than can be replenished through either renewable internal water sources or river inflows from other countries, and twelve countries around the world are unable to provide even minimally acceptable supplies of fresh water per capita; both lists are expected to lengthen considerably in the next several decades (Gleick 1993b: 105-106). Many fresh water resources are shared across nation-state borders, whether in the form of rivers that form or run across a border or lakes that touch two or more states; at least thirteen countries depend on water sources beyond their borders for three-fourths or more of their total river flow (Gleick 1993b: 108).

Given the importance of water and its increasing scarcity around the world, many commentators suggest that disagreements over shared water resources will be a leading source of conflict in the twenty-first century (e.g., Gleick 1993a; Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994; Homer-Dixon, et al, 1993). Yet despite the apparent importance of water as a current or future source of interstate conflict, shared water resources have not been the subject of systematic social science data collection, and little is known about the processes of negotiation or conflict over such resources. Most of what we know (or think we know) about conflict or negotiations over fresh water comes from isolated case studies of individual countries, or from unsystematic impressions of general trends. Little effort has been devoted to compiling a systematic list of cases of potential water-related disagreements across a broad geographic scope or a lengthy time span. Until we have a more systematic data set like that proposed in this project, the scholarly community will be unable to make meaningful statements about the changing frequency of such problems over time or about the connections between such problems and the outbreak of conflict.

Conceptually, freshwater issues involve disagreements between two or more nation-states over access to or usage of a shared water resource.¹³ Typical grounds for the disagreement include a downstream state's objection to pollution, excessive irrigation, or the construction of dams by an upstream state, which will decrease or degrade the quality of water available to the downstream state. Table 2 lists several examples of freshwater claims in the post-World War II era. Several notable cases have led to militarized conflict, such as numerous incidents between Israel, Syria, and Jordan in the 1950s and 1960s surrounding attempts by each side to divert water from the Jordan river, and more recent threats between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq over the use of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (particularly in the wake of Turkish dam construction). Other disagreements have been managed more peacefully, such as Mexican-American disagreements over pollution in the Rio Grande and damming on the Colorado River.

Table 2: Selected Freshwater Claims

<u>River</u>	<u>Claimants</u>	<u>Militarized?</u>
Columbia	Canada – USA	No
Colorado	Mexico - USA	No
Rio Grande	Mexico - USA	No
Tigris-Euphrates	Syria - Turkey	Yes
	Iraq - Turkey	Yes
	Iran - Turkey	No
Jordan	Israel - Syria	Yes
	Israel - Jordan	Yes
	Syria - Jordan	No

Freshwater issues offer an important alternative to the existing data on territorial issues. Most scholars of issues suggest that territory is the single most salient issue, and that any other issue is likely to take on lower salience for policy makers (e.g., Vasquez 1993). As a result, the current emphasis on territory in the issues literature may overstate the likelihood of military action over issues and understate the prospects for peaceful management of

¹³ It is important to note that freshwater claims do not overlap with territorial claims as closely as might be imagined. While both types of claims often involve bordering states, freshwater claims are much more likely to involve contention over access to or usage of the cross-border water resource than to involve claimed ownership of a river that may traverse thousands of miles of territory in the target state (and perhaps other states as well).

issues. Data collection on alternative issues is needed for a more complete picture of issue management in the modern world. Fresh water issues appear likely to take on lower salience for leaders than territorial issues, *ceteris paribus*, suggesting that most fresh water issues will be less prone to militarized conflict than territorial issues, perhaps less likely to lead to any type of settlement attempt at any given time because of their lower urgency, and perhaps more likely to produce treaties or agreements that are signed, ratified, and carried out by all parties involved. Yet certain water issues (e.g., where a single river provides the primary water source for a water-poor country) may also be more salient than certain territorial issues (e.g., those involving an economically worthless piece of desert with little strategic value). It might be expected that such highly salient water issues will be managed much like highly salient territorial issues, rather than like their less salient water counterparts.

Data on freshwater claims will be addressed through data collection strategies that are comparable to the present territorial claims data set.¹⁴ To be included in our data set, freshwater claims require evidence of explicit contention between official representatives of two or more states over access to or usage of cross-border water resources; claims by farmers or local politicians not authorized to speak for the national government are excluded. As with the territorial claims, any case of disagreement over freshwater resources meeting these criteria is included; freshwater claims are identified without reference to potential dependent variables such as the outbreak of militarized conflict, submission of the claim to arbitration, or eventual settlement of the claim.

A number of indicators will be used to measure the salience of each freshwater claim. Rivers and lakes vary greatly in water volume, with higher-volume rivers or lakes generally being more salient than those of lower volume (*ceteris paribus*). The need for water also contributes to the salience of each individual body of water, with countries facing greater shortages being likely to see an international river or lake as more salient. Water demand and shortages can be measured by comparing annual water withdrawal and annual replenishable water supply, as well as by the percentage of the population with access to safe drinking water. Rivers and lakes that contribute to important sectors of the national economy are also likely to be seen as more salient; examples include those that are used heavily for fishing, irrigation, or resource extraction. Other characteristics that are likely to affect issue management include pollution and dam construction by upstream states, which will also be measured.

We will also collect data on all attempts to settle each freshwater claim, including bilateral negotiations, multilateral attempts with either binding or non-binding third party assistance, and the unilateral threat, display, or use of military force. Each bilateral or multilateral settlement attempt will be coded for the dates of negotiations, the identities of the participants (including any involved third-party actor as well as the claimants themselves), and the nature of the talks (whether they cover the entire claim, a limited part of it, or only procedures to be used in future settlement attempts). Additionally, each attempt will be coded for whether or not it leads to a treaty or agreement. For those that do produce an agreement, additional data will be collected to indicate the balance of concessions by each side in the agreement and to indicate whether or not the agreement was ratified and/or carried out by both sides. Militarized settlement attempts will be adapted from the COW militarized interstate dispute data, by using historical sources to examine all militarized disputes that occur during ongoing claims to determine whether or not they explicitly involved contention over the water claim (rather than over other, unrelated issues).

Sources to be used for this data collection include standard historical books and articles and major world newspapers, as well as more specialized sources focusing on water in individual countries or regions. A list of candidate cases and data on characteristics of major lakes and rivers will be taken from the 1978 UN Register of International Rivers and a 1999 update in the *International Journal of Water Resources Development*, UNEP's World Lakes Database, Czaya (1981), Gleick (1993b, 1998), van der Leeden et al. (1990), the World Resource Institute's biannual World Resources volumes and accompanying CD-ROM data base, and similar sources. These sources will allow us to make an exhaustive list of every potential case, because there are a limited number of international rivers and lakes in the world and each one's riverine countries are known; each of these potential cases can then be examined carefully to determine the existence and timing of freshwater claims among the participants. Annual data on river flows will be taken from the Global River Discharge data base (RivDis) and the Global Runoff Data Centre (GRDC), and will be supplemented by national sources such as the Hydro Climatic Data Network (HCDN) data base on international rivers flowing through the United States. Data on settlement attempts will be adapted from the UN FAO's Systematic Index of International Water Resources Treaties, Declarations, Acts, and Cases by Basin (UN FAO 1978, 1984) and from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (Hamner and Wolf 1998), both of which contain summaries of numerous water-related treaties (but few or no examples of

¹⁴ The freshwater and maritime data sets will be limited to the twentieth century, though, because of problems with the availability of relevant data. Water availability and maritime zones have been seen as important concerns for a much shorter time than territorial disputes, meaning that much less information is available on these issues for earlier periods.

settlement attempts that did not lead to treaties). Such treaty compilations will be supplemented by the sources noted above to identify unsuccessful settlement attempts that did not lead to the signature of treaties.

Preliminary data collection on the freshwater claims data set has begun in the summer of 1999 under a small summer research grant from Florida State University. During this summer grant period, we have collected preliminary data on river flows and water shortage across the world, and we have begun collecting data on water claims and settlement attempts in the Middle East. This preliminary research indicates the viability of the project, as the needed data have generally been available for both the Middle East and the remainder of the world, and progress has been relatively rapid for a project still in the planning stage.

Maritime Claims

Our second goal is the collection of data on maritime claims, which have generally been overlooked in the study of territorial claims. The recent clash between the two Koreas demonstrates the potential conflict arising from competing claims to maritime areas. In the early part of June last year, the South Korean government was trying to prevent North Korean fishing vessels from entering a disputed crab-rich area of the Yellow Sea. The conflict came to a head on June 15 when a North Korean gunboat was sunk and the armed forces of both countries were put on full alert. Such a conflict demonstrates the salience of maritime resources for nations, especially in maritime areas rich in fish, oil, or mineral resources.

Maritime issues are similar to freshwater issues in that both involve increasing competition and scarcity of resources. In the post World War II period, the number of national claims to ocean areas increased substantially due to the increase in the number of sovereign states covering more land on the planet and the rise in the realizable economic value of the oceans (Buzan, 1978:1). The oceanic resources that once seemed inexhaustible have begun to decline, especially with respect to marine fisheries. The total world catch of marine fish reached a record high of 86 million metric tons in 1989, before beginning a rapid decline in thirteen of nineteen FAO statistical areas (Bailey, 1996). Increasing scarcity of marine resources poses a threat of greater conflict over maritime areas in the future.

In response to the increased number of maritime disputes since World War II, the United Nations held its first Law of the Sea Convention in 1958. This was followed by additional conferences in 1960, 1973-1982, and 1982-1994. The most recent Law of the Sea Convention governs all aspects of ocean space, including delimitation, environmental issues such as pollution, and marine scientific research. The treaty specifies a 12-mile territorial sea limit for coastal states, a 200-mile economic exclusive zone (EEZ), and a 200-mile continental shelf. Yet the interpretation of these limits becomes problematic, especially in areas where more than one nation-state can make a legitimate claim. And states have demonstrated their resolve to protect oceanic areas that they claim; in the "Cod Wars" of early 1970s, for example, Iceland fought to protect its claimed 50 mile territorial sea by firing at and ramming British and West German trawlers.

Such disputes occur quite frequently in the international system. Mitchell and Prins (1999) find that of the 97 militarized disputes between democracies from 1946-1992, 42 (43%) were fought over maritime issues. Similarly, Parfit (1995) identifies at least twelve recent international incidents -- many of them involving militarized action by naval patrol boats -- related to disputes over depleted fish stocks. Table 3 lists some prominent recent examples of competing maritime claims, many of which have led to militarized action.

Table 3: Selected Maritime Claims

Primary Nature of Claim	Claimants	Militarized?
Fishing	North Korea - South Korea	Yes
Fishing ("Cod wars")	Iceland - UK	Yes
Fishing	Canada - Spain	Yes
Fishing	Japan - New Zealand	No
Exclusive Economic Zone	Guinea-Bissau - Senegal	No
Oil, Mineral Resources	Greece-Turkey	Yes
Oil	Colombia-Venezuela	Yes

Conceptually, maritime issues involve disagreements between two or more nation-states over access to or usage of a maritime area.¹⁵ Some cases, like the disputes between Iceland and Great Britain in the 1970s, involve

¹⁵ Although in some respects maritime issues resemble territorial issues, since both involve sovereignty over a particular section of the globe and the resources contained within, there are also important differences. For example, claims to maritime areas generally lack the intangible importance that characterizes territorial claims; it is much harder to organize national pride or identity around a distant, featureless sea than it is for territory on dry land. Furthermore, there appear to be differences in the way

one state (Iceland) claiming a territorial sea area that is not recognized by others. Other disputes arise due to two or more coastal states having competing claims to areas where their economic exclusive zones overlap (such as the current Korean dispute). Also, for economic reasons, citizens of one nation may simply violate another states' territorial sea or economic exclusive zone. Fishermen often follow migratory fish stocks, which can produce conflict once the fishermen have violated another nation's sovereign maritime area. States can also fight to acquire or maintain access to trade routes. Strategic locations such as naval chokepoints could potentially lead to conflict between the state controlling the chokepoint and additional states whose trade routes are affected by it; examples include Gibraltar, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Suez and Panama Canals.

Data on maritime claims will be addressed through data collection strategies that are comparable to the territorial claims and freshwater claims data sets. To be included, maritime claims require evidence of explicit contention between official representatives of two or more states over access to or usage of a maritime area; claims by individual fishermen or companies not authorized to speak for the national government are excluded. As before, maritime claims are identified without reference to potential dependent variables such as the outbreak of militarized conflict, submission of the claim to arbitration, or eventual settlement of the claim.

A number of variables will be used to measure the salience of each individual maritime claim. Resources contained in the claimed maritime areas are obviously an important determinant of the intrinsic importance of a claim. We will collect data on the actual and potential number of fish caught in the area, and the actual and potential amount of offshore oil or minerals in the seabed. We will also determine the relational importance of the contents of the claimed area for each nation's economy, including the percentage of the total economy based on fishing or oil/mineral production. We will also code information on the existence of migratory fish stocks in the claimed areas and on the importance of the area for navigation (e.g., whether the area is considered to be a naval chokepoint). It will also be useful to determine the military/strategic value of maritime areas, such as the presence of naval fleets and military personnel. Settlement attempts will also be collected, just as for the other data sets.

Sources to be used include standard historical books and articles and major world newspapers, as well as more specialized sources focusing on maritime issues in individual countries or regions. First we will create a list of all claimed territorial sea and exclusive economic zone areas for each country, using information from sources such as Alexander (1967), Degenhardt (1991), Lay, et al (1973), Prescott (1975), Simmonds (1983), U.S. State department documents, and UN documents on the Law of the Sea. Data on competing maritime claims will be derived from the general sources listed above, in addition to information that we have already collected (identifying over sixty claims) from Degenhardt (1991), Kidron and Segal (1984, 1987) and Mitchell and Prins (1999).¹⁶ Data on ocean resources, such as fish catches and offshore oil production, are available from the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, the World Resources Institute, Brown (1999), Degenhardt (1991) and Seager (1995). Data on settlement attempts will be collected from a variety of sources, including the United Nations Treaty Series, Dean (1967), Degenhardt (1991), Gamble (1972), Lay et al (1973), and standard international treaty sources.

Planned Empirical Analyses

After collecting the data on freshwater and maritime issues, we will use both this newly collected data and the existing ICOW data on territorial claims to test the hypotheses on issue management that were developed earlier. The results of this project will help to make major advances in the study of issues in world politics, beyond the advances that have already been made with the territorial claims data. The freshwater and maritime issue data sets to be collected will be comparable to existing data on territorial issues, for the first time allowing comparative study of the management of different issue types -- which is vital to the development of an issues approach.

The study of interstate conflict -- as well as the study of negotiations and third party conflict management -- can also be extended by this project's conceptualization of militarized conflict as only one of numerous substitutable policy options available to states for a specific purpose (the management or settlement of specific contentious issues). Such a reconceptualization allows hypothesizing and analysis of the conditions that are likely to lead to the selection of different options, as well as considering the different effects that each factor or condition might have.

states manage these claims; maritime issues appear (at face value, at least, without the benefit of extensive systematic research) to have led to much more multilateral action than territory, offering the prospect of analyzing an issue area that is influenced more heavily by outside forces than territory -- although it is unclear for now (and an important topic for study) whether this multilateral nature has helped or hindered resolution of maritime claims.

¹⁶ We have reason to believe that we will be able to generate an exhaustive list of maritime claims. The requirement of explicit statements by official government representatives eliminates the most unclear cases, which are those involving local politicians or fishermen. Furthermore, particularly in the Law of the Sea era, the United Nations and related international organizations have been very interested in recording claims and disagreements of this type, albeit not in a systematic fashion associated with rigorous social science data sets.

Some of the factors studied with the Western Hemisphere territorial claims data have been found to have different effects on the likelihood of different options, giving a much more complete picture of the effects of each factor and of the influences on each option than has been possible with past research. For example, more salient issues increase the likelihood of militarized conflict, bilateral negotiations, and non-binding third party assistance, while decreasing the likelihood of submission to a binding third party decision. Similarly, parity in relative capabilities increases the likelihood of militarized conflict or submission to a binding third party decision, while a capability imbalance in favor of the challenger increases the likelihood of bilateral negotiations; an imbalance in favor of the target state increases the likelihood that the status quo will remain uncontested without any peaceful or militarized attempts to settle the issue.

The results will also provide a more detailed understanding of the effects of water scarcity and maritime disagreements on world politics than is currently possible, by indicating the extent to which countries facing disagreements over such issues employ peaceful versus military means in settling their issues and the extent to which different approaches are likely to be successful at resolving the issues. The few studies that have dealt with water scarcity issues or maritime disagreements and conflict have generally followed impressionistic research designs, involving the intensive study of a single case (as with Lowi's 1995 study of the Jordan River basin) or a brief listing of prominent cases that have made news headlines. None of these studies have attempted to compile a list of all cases of actual or potential water scarcity problems around the world, nor have they made any systematic effort to collect additional information about the magnitude of each such problem or about attempts to manage these problems through peaceful or military means. Our proposed project will thus fill an important gap in the political science field, both by studying an important topic that has not been addressed systematically by past research, and by producing an original data set that can be employed by other political scientists in their own research.

While the creation of a new data resource is a secondary objective behind the improved testing of propositions related to issues, this will be an important resource for the study of world politics long after our original analyses with this newly collected data have been completed. The ICOW data set on territorial, freshwater, maritime, and regime claims will be useful in testing numerous additional propositions on phenomena in world politics beyond issue management. Arguments that certain types of states (such as democracies) are less likely than others to contend over certain types of issues can be tested more meaningfully with data that are collected independently from data on militarized conflict. The ICOW data sets will thus help to overcome a potential criticism of research by Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1997) and Mitchell and Prins (1999). Both studies examine the issues at stake between democracies but their contributions are limited to issues involved in militarized disputes, which are unlikely to be representative of all issues under contention (particularly for democracies, which are known to become involved in fewer militarized disputes overall than other types of adversaries).

Analyses of peaceful conflict management techniques (e.g., Dixon 1993; Raymond 1994) can benefit from the collection of data on a specific type of disagreement between states, which allows the study of all attempts to manage such disagreements -- whether or not the adversaries become involved in militarized conflict (Dixon) or employ third-party settlement assistance (Raymond). Because data are collected on characteristics of each claim, analyses of conflict management techniques can also benefit from the measurement of issue salience, which has been impossible with recent research by Dixon, Raymond, and others. States involved in territorial, freshwater, maritime, and regime claims also offer an excellent set of cases to be used in testing propositions about status quo dissatisfaction (e.g., Kugler and Lemke 1996), because the existence of the claims clearly indicates a form of dissatisfaction with the local (dyadic or regional) status quo and additional data on claim salience can be used to indicate the extent of this dissatisfaction.

The broad temporal span of the ICOW data will facilitate analysis of the impact of significant changes in the regional (e.g., with the development of the European Union) and global (e.g., the development of the Law of the Sea) institutional context on the settlement of various issues over time. Beyond the role of institutions, these proposed data sets -- together with the territorial claims data already collected and the regime claims data being collected by our student -- will allow scholars to compare the impact of issues with that of more traditional realist factors such as power. Mansbach and Vasquez (1981; Vasquez 1993), among others, have argued strongly against a realist interpretation of world politics on a variety of theoretical, empirical, and other grounds; these data sets will finally allow for a direct comparison of the realist "power politics" approach with an "issue politics" approach.

Finally, this project will also be able to offer guidelines for policymakers, which may be quite important if the prognosticators are correct about freshwater and maritime issues as sources of future conflict. The data sets to be created can be used to identify likely maritime or freshwater trouble spots before they explode into armed conflict. Furthermore, this project will help to increase our understanding of how these problems can best be resolved short of overt militarized conflict, or how they can best be handled to minimize conflict and prevent its recurrence.

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