

**Project Summary**  
**"Bones of Contention: Comparing Territorial, Maritime, and River Issues"**

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This project is meant to improve scholarly understanding of how nation-states manage their contentious issues, focusing on disagreements over the ownership of territory, the use or abuse of shared rivers, and access to or rights in offshore maritime zones. While realists argue that states pursue a single goal of increasing power to survive, an issue-based approach contends that world politics involves contention over many different types of issues. Actors use numerous means to resolve disagreements over issues, including the unilateral initiation of militarized conflict, bilateral negotiations, and multilateral attempts involving binding or non-binding third party assistance. The manner in which states attempt to resolve their issues is hypothesized to depend heavily on the salience of the issue, as well as on past attempts to manage the same issue. Leaders should be more likely to resolve highly salient issues (such as claims to territory containing valuable resources) through bilateral negotiations or with militarized force, rather than seeking the help of third parties. Third party settlement should be more likely when there is a history of failed attempts to settle the issue in contention, while a history of successful peaceful settlement attempts should increase the prospects for future bilateral negotiations.

While these hypotheses have been supported with data on territorial issues, they should also be applicable to other issue types. This project focuses on the extension of this theoretical approach to two additional issues: rivers and maritime issues. The general hypotheses presented above are expected to apply to these issues in the same way that they have for territorial issues, but the collection of data on river and maritime issues also opens the door to the testing of additional hypotheses covering differences between issue types. Rivers and (to a lesser degree) maritime areas represent shared resources much more than the all-or-nothing question of ownership of territory, and as such, should increase the prospects for cooperative solutions over disputed areas. Furthermore, the degree of institutionalization of these issues is much greater in comparison to territorial issues. Maritime issues have been the focus of multiple Law of the Sea Conventions, and regional institutions have played a prominent role in helping to resolve disagreements over cross-national rivers. An issues approach suggests that the greater (global and regional) institutionalization will allow the more frequent and more successful management of disputes over rivers and maritime zones by peaceful means, relative to territorial issues.

Finally, while scholars have long argued that territorial issues are more salient than other issue types, the lack of appropriate data has limited analyses of issue salience to within-issue variation within the category of territorial issues. The collection of data on these two additional issue types will allow the first empirical tests of salience hypotheses with across-issue variation in salience, determining whether (for example) leaders are generally more likely to resolve highly salient general issue types (territorial issues) bilaterally or militarily than less salient types (river and maritime issues), even after controlling for within-issue variation in salience. In this proposal, we seek funding to support our ongoing data collection efforts for the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project. This additional support will help us to complete coding for territorial, maritime, and river claims for all regions of the world from 1816 to the present.

## **Project Description**

At least since the nineteenth century Prussian general Clausewitz, many international relations theorists have assumed that international conflict begins for a reason -- i.e., that conflicts begin because of two nation-states' desire to achieve their respective goals on one or more contentious issues (or in Clausewitzian terms, war reflects the pursuit of political goals by military means). Many explanations for militarized conflict and war implicitly or explicitly revolve around specific issues as sources of conflict, ranging from leadership of the international system to control over strategic territory. Yet despite calls from scholars such as O'Leary (1976), Mansbach and Vasquez (1981), and Diehl (1992), an explicit issue-based approach to world politics has been slow to develop. O'Leary (1976: 321) laments, "everybody knows' that issues are important... But what is equally obvious is that this 'obvious' fact has made little, if any, impact upon systematic research in the field." Writing sixteen years later, Diehl (1992: 337) notes that "despite initial positive reviews and more than a decade of time, the issue paradigm approach has not germinated such that its use is seriously evident, much less widespread, in the discipline." Even when issues have been considered theoretically, direct empirical analyses have been rare because of the lack of issues data in existing social science data sets and the difficulty of collecting original data related to issues.

This project advances an issues approach to world politics, extending research that has been funded by the National Science Foundation during the 2001 calendar year (grant # SES-0079421). The proposal begins by introducing the conceptual foundations and theoretical rationale behind an explicit issue-based approach, which depicts world politics as the quest for issue satisfaction by actors using numerous potential means. This approach is used to suggest empirically testable hypotheses on the occurrence and success of attempts to manage or settle issues. Data on the nature and management of territorial, river, and maritime issues will be collected to test these hypotheses, allowing researchers to overcome many of the data limitations that have plagued past research on issues. The proposal concludes by discussing the benefits of the proposed research.

### **Theoretical Model: Contentious Issues and World Politics**

The conceptual basis for an issues approach to world politics has been summarized most recently by Hensel (2001). This approach involves three central tenets, all of which help to distinguish this approach from alternative perspectives and to suggest new questions to ask in studying world politics. The first and most important of these three central tenets is that foreign policy is issue-directed. That is, rather than acting randomly or pursuing the single-minded goal of power or security (as is traditionally assumed in realist or neorealist approaches), states' foreign policies are intended to achieve favorable settlements of specific issues.<sup>1</sup>

The second tenet is that issues vary in salience. By itself, the argument that states are concerned with multiple types of issues does not necessarily imply that incorporating issues will make a difference in analyses of world politics. Even if numerous issues exist on the policy agenda, the specific issue(s) under contention at any point in time can only affect foreign policy decisions if issues vary in salience, which can be defined as "the extent to which (but principally, the intensity

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<sup>1</sup> According to an issues perspective, policy makers are concerned with issues because of the "values" that the issues represent. Mansbach and Vasquez (1981: 57-58) describe politics as the quest for value satisfaction, where "values" are abstract and intangible ends such as wealth, physical security, freedom/autonomy, peace, order, status, or justice. Because many such values can not be obtained directly, political actors often pursue desired values by contending over "stakes," which are more concrete and tangible objects that are seen as possessing or representing the desired values. One or more stakes and values are linked to form an "issue," or "a set of differing proposals for the disposition of stakes among specific actors" (Vasquez 1993: 46). Issues can involve competing views on concrete or tangible objectives, such as control over a particular piece of territory or cross-border resources, the protection of an ethnic or religious minority, or the removal of a particular leader, as well as competing views on intangible objectives such as influence, prestige, or ideology (see, e.g., Keohane and Nye 1977; Randle 1987; Holsti 1991; Diehl 1992).

with which) peoples and their leaders value an issue and its subject matter" (Randle 1987: 2; see also Coplin et al. 1973, Diehl 1992). Without this assumption, behavior would remain constant across different types of issues, and the specific issue under contention would only be of interest for descriptive purposes. Once salience is considered, though, leaders can be seen as likely to expend greater effort (and risking higher costs) to achieve favorable settlements on highly salient issues than on issues that are attributed less importance.<sup>2</sup>

The third and final tenet is that both cooperative and conflictual foreign policy tools are substitutable means used to pursue issue-related ends. Toward the peaceful end of the spectrum, leaders may choose to negotiate over their differences, either bilaterally or with the (non-binding) assistance of third parties, or they may submit their disputes to binding third party judgments. Leaders may also employ unilateral coercive action up to and including the use of military force to pursue their interests, in order to achieve their goals by force or by convincing an adversary to back down.<sup>3</sup> The common link is that these different options are alternative means toward the same end, allowing analysts to think in terms of substitutable policy options as advocated by scholars such as Most and Starr (1989) and Morgan (1990). Rather than studying the use of force, crisis management, mediation or arbitration separately (as has been done by Hensel 1996b, Dixon 1993, and Raymond 1994), the analyst is now encouraged to think about when and why each technique is likely to be chosen at any given point in time instead of (or in addition to) the other alternatives -- potentially leading to a more complete understanding of issue management than could be possible in an isolated study of only one management technique.

### **Past Research on Issues**

Most existing research on contentious issues has implicitly accepted this general issues approach, although few studies have addressed each of these points directly. The earliest systematic research on issues focused on general patterns of foreign policy, and remained largely descriptive in nature. More recent studies typically emphasize the impact of issues on militarized conflict, often examining the issues involved in known cases of militarized conflict to see which issues have been involved in the most conflicts (Holsti, 1991; Luard, 1986; Mitchell and Prins, 1999).

Another typical research strategy begins with a list of militarized disputes or crises, categorized by the issues involved in each case, and examines whether the types of issues at stake affect conflict behavior during and after the confrontation. Such research has generally found that militarized confrontations involving territorial issues are more escalatory than non-territorial confrontations (e.g., Gochman and Leng 1983; Hensel 1996b; Senese 1996). As with the studies mentioned above, though, most current data sets on issues remain limited to the issues involved in militarized conflict, and little is known about non-militarized attempts to manage or settle issues. As a result, hypotheses that are central to an issues approach -- such as those over attempts to resolve issues peacefully, or over the relative frequency of peaceful and militarized methods -- have generally been impossible to test in a systematic fashion.

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<sup>2</sup> Moravcsik (1997) similarly suggests that states require a "purpose" or perceived underlying stake before they will act, and that the strength of their preferences for these stakes drives policy making. This argument is central to Moravcsik's critique of the realist argument that capability or power considerations drive policy making: "Nations are rarely prepared to expend their entire economic or defense capabilities, or to mortgage their entire domestic sovereignty, in pursuit of any single foreign policy goal" (Moravcsik 1997: 520). Instead, the primary determination of a state's willingness to expend resources in pursuit of any given foreign policy goal is the strength of that state's preferences for achieving that particular goal.

<sup>3</sup> Policy makers may also choose to take no action over a given issue, allowing the issue to fester until it is forgotten or until one side chooses a more active strategy.

Recognizing the shortcomings of these past efforts, Paul Hensel created the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW)<sup>4</sup> project at Florida State University. Testing hypotheses from the general issues approach requires data that is not limited to issues that have already led to militarized conflict. ICOW began collecting data on all territorial claims between two or more nation-states since 1816, including data on the salience of each claim and on a variety of different attempts to settle each one.<sup>5</sup> This data set includes all claims -- regardless of whether or not they lead to militarized conflict (as in Luard's and Holsti's war data, the COW militarized interstate dispute data, or similar efforts) or to mediation or arbitration (as in Raymond's data on conflict management). This allows scholars to test propositions on the propensity of different issue types to lead to militarized conflict, mediation, arbitration, or any other type of activity, opening up new worlds of possible empirical analyses. An exclusive focus on attempts to manage issues that have become militarized (e.g., Dixon 1993, 1994; Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984) is likely to understate the effectiveness of peaceful means for dispute settlement, because it only examines the most intractable and conflictual issues and ignores cases that never reach such extreme measures. Indeed, less than fifteen percent of the peaceful settlement attempts in the ICOW territorial claims data began during militarized disputes or wars, meaning that 85 percent of these cases would be left out of the data sets that have been used to study conflict management. Furthermore, the ICOW data allows detailed measurement of the salience of claim, a great advance over past work that has been limited to comparing general types of issues (such as "territorial," "regime," and "policy" issues in the COW militarized dispute data).

### **ICOW Territorial Claims Data**

The use of the ICOW territorial claims data allows testing of additional hypotheses on the management of issues that could not be tested previously. Hensel (2001) proposes hypotheses on factors that should increase or decrease the likelihood of various issue management techniques.<sup>6</sup> The first factor is issue salience, or the extent to which leaders and their subjects value a given issue. For example, territory that contains valuable resources such as oil or precious metals will be more salient for leaders than territory that contains no such resources, *ceteris paribus*. Leaders are hypothesized to be more likely to rely on militarized force or bilateral negotiations to help resolve an issue of higher salience, but less likely to agree to binding third party assistance (such as arbitration).

Hensel (2001) also looks at the impact of previous interactions on the likelihood that various policy options are adopted to resolve disagreements over issues, expecting that past interactions over an issue are likely to affect subsequent decisions over the management of that issue. States are hypothesized to be more likely to employ militarized action or to accept third-party assistance when there is a longer history of unsuccessful attempts to resolve the issue. On the other hand, a history of successful peaceful settlement attempts is hypothesized to make bilateral negotiations more likely, and militarized or third party settlements less likely. Previous militarized confrontations are also thought to affect states' decisions; states with a longer history of militarized conflict are

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<sup>4</sup> The authors wish to thank J. David Singer for generously allowing the use of the term "Correlates of War" in the name of the ICOW project. It must be emphasized, though, that Singer and the COW project bear no responsibility for any decisions or data resulting from the ICOW project.

<sup>5</sup> ICOW project codebooks and papers that have used the data are publicly available through the ICOW web site at <<http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~phensel/icow.html>>. Upon publication of articles using ICOW data, the relevant data sets will also be made available at this location. Codebooks for the proposed freshwater and maritime claims data sets will also be made available at this location once completed.

<sup>6</sup> More detail on these hypotheses is available in Hensel (2001). They are presented here in abbreviated form so that more attention can be devoted to additional hypotheses and details of the data that must be collected to test them.

hypothesized to be more likely to use further force, although they may also be willing to accept third party assistance because the issue has proven difficult to resolve.

Using the ICOW territorial claims data set, Hensel (2001) tests these hypotheses as well as several others concerning characteristics of the adversaries (such as joint democracy, relative capabilities, and the regional and global institutional context). Hensel's results support most of the hypotheses from this issue-based approach. Variations in issue salience affect the nature of attempts to settle the claims, with most types of action over the claim being more likely -- but submission to a binding third party decision being less likely -- when the claimed territory is more salient to policy makers. Recent interactions over the issue exert a substantial influence on later issue management, with action over a claim -- particularly militarized conflict -- being more likely when there is a history of either militarized conflict or unsuccessful negotiations. Important for the validity of an issue-based approach, these results for the impact of issues hold even after controlling for the characteristics of the claimants, which helps to overcome possible objections from realists or others who might argue that power is the primary determinant of foreign policy activity.

Research using the ICOW data on territorial claims has begun to contribute to the academic literature on contentious issues, interstate conflict, and conflict management. The study of issues -- particularly territorial issues -- has finally begun to expand beyond a focus on the issues involved in militarized conflict, both by including issues that never become militarized and by studying non-militarized issue settlement attempts. Whereas past research had revealed that militarized conflict over territorial issues tends to be more severe than conflict over other issues (and that territorial issues are the most common source of wars in the past four centuries), research using the ICOW data indicates that militarized conflict constitutes only one-fourth of all attempts to settle territorial claims. This research also indicates the importance of issue salience and past interactions over issues, which affect both the type of issue settlement attempts that are chosen and the effectiveness of the settlement attempts in predictable ways.

Of course, this research has not provided the final word on the role of issues in world politics. In particular, the research has focused exclusively on territorial claims in the past two centuries, usually in the Western Hemisphere; this data set needs to be extended to the rest of the world. Beyond finishing the territorial claims data collection for the entire world, though, what is needed next is the collection of comparable data on additional issues beyond territory. Little is known about the management of other types of issues, since empirical research that includes multiple issue types (such as studies of issues and dispute escalation to war) generally categorizes all non-territorial issues in a residual "other" category. Also, the lack of systematic data on any specific non-territorial issues renders direct cross-issue comparison virtually impossible. The remainder of this proposal discusses the collection of additional data on territorial, river, and maritime issues as an important extension of research on contentious issues in world politics.

### **New Issues and New Hypotheses**

While Hensel's (2001) hypotheses are only tested with data on territorial issues, the hypotheses can be extended to other issues as well. The remainder of this proposal will focus on the extension of this theoretical approach to two additional issues: rivers and maritime issues. The general hypotheses presented above should also apply to river and maritime issues, reflecting general tendencies of issue management rather than patterns that are unique to the specific issue of territory. Issues of higher salience should be more likely to become militarized for disagreements over rivers or maritime areas, as well as for territorial claims. For example, a disputed maritime area that contains valuable fish stocks or undersea oil resources or a major river in an otherwise

water-scarce region will be more salient for decision-makers, and hence should be expected to be more likely to generate militarized activity than less salient maritime zones or rivers. Furthermore, the effects of past peaceful or past militarized attempts to settle disagreements over rivers or maritime areas should be expected to influence the likelihood of the different types of settlement attempts, just as with territorial issues.

These two additional issue types have more important contributions to make, though, than simply expecting the same general dynamics that have already been identified for territorial issues. Although in some respects both maritime and river issues resemble territorial issues, there are also important differences between the three issue types, which raises the possibility of a number of additional hypotheses that could not be tested previously. One important hypothesis to be tested involves the general salience levels of different issue types. Past research on issues has suggested that territorial issues are likely to be the most salient issues facing leaders, at least partly because such issues typically involve both tangible value because of the contents of the claimed territory (such as valuable resources or strategic positions) and intangible value because of their intense psychological connection with national identity (e.g., Vasquez 1993; Hensel 1996b, 2000). As a result, maritime and river issues are expected to be less salient than territorial issues; both issue types primarily involve tangible value and generally take on less emotional or psychological importance. In combination with the general hypothesis about issue salience that was discussed above, this suggests that most maritime and river issues -- regardless of their specific details or of the characteristics of the claimants -- should be less prone to militarized conflict than territorial issues, less likely to lead to any type of settlement attempt at any given time because of their lower urgency, and more likely to produce treaties or agreements that are signed, ratified, and carried out by all parties involved. Highly salient maritime zones or rivers are still expected to lead to militarized confrontations, reflecting the impact of variation in issue salience within the general issue type, but such cases should be less frequent overall than in the territorial claims data because of the general variation in salience across different issue types.

Beyond salience levels, maritime and river issues differ from territorial issues in other important ways that might be hypothesized to affect issue management patterns. Territorial issues involve disputes over the ownership or sovereignty of a piece of land. Rivers that cross national boundaries, on the other hand, are shared resources, and disagreements over rivers rarely involve questions of all-or-nothing ownership of the entire river basin. As such, states would appear to be much more likely to develop cooperative solutions to manage their river issues, rather than employing militarized means.

The shared nature of river resources also gives a great deal of power to the upstream state; excess usage or pollution of the river upstream has very negative consequences for the downstream state. The importance of the location of states on the river is an issue that generally does not arise in the analysis of territorial issues. Because of this asymmetry in bargaining power, one might expect that the relative capabilities of two potential claimants would make an important difference in the occurrence and management of claims. If the upstream state is substantially stronger than the downstream state in relative capabilities, an explicit disagreement over the river is unlikely to develop in the first place. If such a claim does begin, one should expect the substantially weaker state to be unlikely to initiate militarized conflict against its much stronger upstream opponent; bilateral negotiations should be the most common settlement technique, and such claims are likely to last a much shorter time than claims between relative equals or featuring a stronger downstream state as claimant.

Maritime issues fall between territorial and river issues with respect to the object being claimed. On the one hand, maritime areas are claimed as part of a nation's sovereign space. The most recent Law of the Sea Convention establishes a 12-mile territorial sea limit for coastal states, a 24-mile contiguous zone, a 200-mile economic exclusive zone (EEZ), and a 200-mile continental shelf. Such limits are similar to territorial issues, in that they delimit the area over which a state exercises sovereignty. Yet many maritime resources cross multiple maritime zones. Many fishing stocks, for example, migrate from one area to another, and offshore oil fields may lie beneath several states' claimed economic zones. This suggests that some resources contained in the sea are shared between multiple states, which increases incentives for joint management of the shared resources, similar to river basin management.

Furthermore, there are likely to be systematic differences in the way states manage claims over river and maritime issues relative to territorial issues. The level of international institutionalization across the three issue areas varies considerably. Maritime issues have generated much more multilateral action than territorial issues, offering the prospect of analyzing an issue area that is influenced more heavily by outside forces. The vast majority of states have signed the most recent Law of the Sea Convention, and states appear to have been willing to submit many of their maritime disputes to relevant institutions. Dyadic or regional institutions also appear to have played a role in the resolution of river issues. The collection of systematic data on different issue types will allow examination of the success of global and regional institutions in resolving various issue claims; in this regard it is particularly important to collect data on each geographic region, as the extent of institutionalization has varied greatly across region as well as over time.<sup>7</sup>

### **Data on Territorial, River, and Maritime Issues**

The three ICOW data sets are all collected using comparable coding rules and procedures. All three begin with the requirement of explicit contention by official government representatives over one or more specific territories, cross-border rivers, or maritime zones.

Territorial claims involve disagreement over the ownership of a specific piece of territory between two or more nation-states. Such claims range in scope from demands for small border adjustments to claims over the full territory of the target state. Claimed territory often has tangible value to one or both states, such as strategically defensible positions or valuable resources that are thought or known to be located in the territory. Some territorial claims also involve an ethnic, religious, or other identity basis, when one or both claimants' kinsmen live in the territory or it contains sites of great cultural or religious significance to them.

River claims involve disagreements between two or more nation-states over access to or usage of a shared river.<sup>8</sup> Typical grounds for the disagreement include a downstream state's objection to pollution, excessive irrigation, or the construction of dams by an upstream state, which will decrease or degrade the quality of water available to the downstream state. Several notable cases have led to militarized conflict, such as numerous incidents between Israel, Syria, and Jordan in the 1950s and 1960s surrounding attempts by each side to divert water from the Jordan River,

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<sup>7</sup> There are multiple avenues for research on the effectiveness of global and regional institutions in their abilities to help resolve states' contentious issues. For example, some scholars have claimed that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has been much more successful at settling territorial claims in comparison to other regional organizations (such as the OAS). Because the final version of the ICOW data will include territorial claims for each region in the world, we will be able to bring empirical evidence to bear on this question (and others) more effectively.

<sup>8</sup> It is important to note that river claims do not overlap with territorial claims as closely as might be imagined. While both types of claims often involve bordering states, river claims are much more likely to involve contention over access to or usage of the cross-border water resource than to involve claimed ownership of a river that may traverse thousands of miles of territory in the target state (and perhaps other states as well).

and more recent threats between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq over the construction of dams on the Euphrates River. Other disagreements have been managed more peacefully, such as Mexican-American disagreements over pollution in the Rio Grande and damming on the Colorado River.

Maritime claims involve disagreements between two or more nation-states over access to or usage of a maritime area. Some cases, like the “Cod Wars,” involve one state (Iceland) claiming a territorial sea area that is not recognized by others (Great Britain). Other disputes arise due to two or more coastal states having competing claims to areas where their economic exclusive zones overlap (such as the recent Korean disputes). Such disputes often stem from a disagreement over the status of an uninhabited “rock” as an island, such as Venezuela’s maritime claims around Aves Island and counterclaims raised by nearby Caribbean states. Also, for economic reasons, citizens of one nation may simply violate another states’ territorial sea or economic exclusive zone. Fishermen often follow migratory fish stocks, which can produce conflict once the fishermen have violated another nation’s sovereign maritime area.

Data collection on all three issues data sets is currently underway. Data on territorial claims in the Americas, Europe, and the Middle East has been completed over the past three years, with the support of the Political Science department at Florida State University. Data collection on river and maritime claims began in the 2001 calendar year with support from the National Science Foundation. All three data sets are either completed or near completion for these first three regions, with the necessary information already collected and preliminary case listings already compiled; final coding for all three regions will be completed for all three data sets by the time this current proposed grant begins.

Each of these datasets identifies actual claims over territory, rivers, or maritime zones, based on extensive searches through general (and more specific) historical news sources and diplomatic histories. For each claim, we construct a chronology of events, based on the information we have collected. Based on this chronology and other pertinent information, we code every attempt to peacefully settle the claim, indicating *inter alia* the years of each settlement attempt, the type of settlement (bilateral negotiations, good offices, inquiry and conciliation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, and multilateral negotiations), information about third party actors involved, and the outcome of each settlement attempt (such as the signing of a treaty resolving the claim). We also code a number of variables about the specific characteristics of each claim, many of which are used in the construction of our salience indices.<sup>9</sup> We turn now to some preliminary analyses of the data we have collected thus far in the Americas.

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<sup>9</sup> Salience for each issue type is measured with a twelve-point index, with six indicators measuring the presence of factors that are expected to make a claimed territory, river, or maritime zone more valuable to states. Each indicator contributes up to two points to the overall total (one point per state involved in the claim). Low salience includes cases with zero to four points on this index, indicating the presence of no more than two of these six indicators of salience. Moderate salience includes cases with five to seven points on this index, indicating the presence of several of these salience indicators. High salience includes cases with at least eight points in this index, indicating the presence of at least four of the indicators (or for cases of asymmetric salience, even more of the indicators for one state, such as a case with all six indicators for one state and at least two for the other). The six indicators for territorial claim salience are homeland territory (versus colonial or dependent territory), mainland territory (rather than an offshore island), contiguity of the claimed territory to the nearest portion of the state, the presence of valuable resources in the territory, a militarily or economically strategic location for the territory, and the presence of an ethnic, religious, or other identity basis for the claim. The six indicators for river claim salience are homeland territory (versus colonial or dependent territory), navigational importance of the river, level of population served by the river, the presence of a fishing or other resource extraction industry on the river, hydroelectric power generation along the river, and irrigational value of the river. The six indicators for maritime claim salience are homeland territory (versus colonial or dependent territory), strategic location, fishing resources, migratory fishing stocks, oil resources, and relation to an ongoing territorial claim.

## Preliminary Analyses in the Western Hemisphere

Rather than discuss in detail all of the data that has been collected so far, this section of the proposal provides some basic descriptive information about the ICOW data collected in the Western Hemisphere (North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean) for each of the issue areas: territorial, river, and maritime claims. The goal here is to demonstrate the utility of the ICOW data for testing numerous theoretical hypotheses. Territorial claims are currently coded from 1816-2000, while river and maritime claims are collected from 1901-2000.<sup>10</sup>

The first topic to be examined involves the frequency of actual claims relative to the number of potential claims. For territorial claims, it is reasonable to assume that any two states with contiguous land borders have an opportunity to become involved in a territorial claim. For river claims, any dyad that shares a cross-border river might be counted as a potential river claim -- but there are thousands of streams or rivers that cross borders, most of which are not depicted or named even on the best world atlases. As a result, the list of potential river claims is limited to "major rivers," or rivers of at least 100 miles total length that enter the physical territory of at least two states. Finally, potential maritime claims are based on overlapping territorial sea and/or economic exclusive zones up to 200 nautical miles (Pratt, 2000-2001).<sup>11</sup>

Table 1 reveals that there are 40 potential territorial claims, 162 potential river claims, and 60 potential maritime claims in the Americas. 39 of the 40 land borders (97.5%) have been disputed at some point in the past two centuries; 35 of 40 (87.5%) have been the subject of an explicit territorial claim at some point in the twentieth century. The percentage of actual claims for rivers and maritime zones is much smaller. 26 of the 60 overlapping maritime zones (43.3%) have produced a maritime claim, whereas only 14 of the 162 cross-border major rivers (8.6%) have been contested. Not surprisingly, territorial claims are the most frequent. This is consistent with the argument that territorial claims are very salient to leaders (being high in the tangible and intangible dimensions), and thus much more likely to be the subject of a claim. It also makes sense that maritime claims would be the next most frequent, largely because many disputed maritime zones stem from contested land borders or claimed islands that might form the basis for a large maritime zone, and that river claims would be the least frequent.<sup>12</sup>

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**Table 1: Potential and Actual Claims in the Americas**

	<u>Years</u>	<u>Actual / Potential Claims</u>	<u>% Claimed</u>
Territorial Claims	1816-2000	39 / 40 Land borders	97.5%
	1901-2000	35 / 40	87.5
River Claims	1901-2000	14 / 162 Major rivers	8.6
Maritime Claims	1901-2000	26 / 60 Adjoining maritime zones	43.3

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<sup>10</sup> There are several reasons to limit river and maritime claims data collection to the twentieth century. First, particularly for maritime claims, such issues simply do not appear to have been important enough to many states to generate explicit claims until some time in the twentieth century. Second, and perhaps related to the first reason, historical sources have not given such issues anywhere near the attention that is given to territorial claims until the twentieth century, leaving us much less confident in our ability to identify most relevant claims or to collect sufficient data on claim characteristics or attempts to settle each claim.

<sup>11</sup> Each data set can include additional claims not represented on these lists of potential claims, such as territorial claims to islands by geographically distant adversaries, claims over rivers as short as twenty or thirty miles, or maritime claims involving fishing rights that are disputed between distant adversaries. For the purposes of Table 1, though, such additional claims are left out, because of the impossibility of constructing a meaningful list of the many thousands of small islands or short rivers; this table only indicates the proportion of these listed potential cases that have been the subject of at least one explicit ICOW claim. The remaining tables in this paper use the full list of all claims, regardless of whether they appear in Table 1's list of potential claims.

<sup>12</sup> While not all maritime claims are related to territorial claims, there are enough cases where such a link exists to complicate the delimitation of maritime areas.

While territorial claims have been the most frequent type of contentious issue in the Americas, one could argue that the number of territorial claims should decline over time as borders become established, and states resolve their territorial disagreements. Indeed, several scholars (Holsti 1991; Luard 1986) have argued that territory has been declining as a source of war in recent decades, although both were focusing on the issues involved in full-scale wars rather than on the overall frequency of territorial issues. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to expect river and maritime claims to become more frequent over time for two reasons. First, a state's level of economic development should affect its ability to exploit the resources contained in rivers and oceans. Most maritime claims, for example, did not arise until after World War II precisely because states did not have large fishing fleets and oil companies competing for oceanic resources. Likewise, the ability of a state to develop hydroelectric power plants on a river depends on its overall level of economic development. Second, the resources contained in the ocean and freshwater rivers have become much more scarce over time. Canada, for example, has had disputes with a variety of states (such as the United States, Spain, and France) to protect the dwindling oceanic fish stocks in and outside their economic exclusive zone. More broadly, the total world catch of marine fish reached a record high of 86 million metric tons in 1989, before beginning a rapid decline in thirteen of nineteen FAO statistical areas (Bailey, 1996).

**Table 2: Frequency of Claims (and Dyads) in the Americas**

	<u>1816-1900</u>	<u>1901-1950</u>	<u>1951-2000</u>	<u>Total</u>
Territorial Claims	63 (82)	29 (66)	26 (35)	75 (114)
River Claims	---	7 (9)	15 (18)	18 (27)
Maritime Claims	---	16 (19)	43 (57)	44 (58)

Table 2 presents information on claim frequency over time in the Americas. This table reports both the total number of claims (where each disputed area is counted as one claim) and the total number of dyadic claims (where a disputed area may have multiple dyadic claims).<sup>13</sup> The total number of claims is higher in Table 2 than in Table 1, because the former includes claims over other issues (islands and other noncontiguous territories, small rivers, or noncontiguous maritime zones) that were not identifiable as potential claims in practical terms. There have been a total of 75 territorial claims from 1816-2000, 18 river claims from 1901-2000, and 44 maritime claims from 1901-2000. As the aggregated totals indicate, territorial claims have been the most frequent type of issue claim in the Americas. When the overall time periods are disaggregated, however, the earlier expectation with respect to the frequency of these issues over time is supported. Territorial issues have become less frequent over time; there are 63 active territorial claims in the nineteenth century and only 26 active claims in the latter half of the twentieth. Table 2 also shows that river and maritime claims have become much more frequent over time, as expected. Only seven river claims and sixteen maritime claims were active between 1901-1950, while fifteen river claims and 43 maritime claims have been active at some point between 1951-2000. The same temporal trends hold for dyadic claims, as well.

<sup>13</sup> Issues are studied based on specific claims by policy makers, or explicit goals that are expressed with regard to preferred settlements of a specific type of disagreement. Issue claims are aggregated based on the specific topic under contention, whether it is a piece of territory, a river, or a maritime zone. If there are multiple actors who claim a particular area, then there are multiple dyadic claims for the overall claim. For example, Venezuela's claim to a 200-mile economic exclusive zone around Aves Island is contested by many Caribbean states, including Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent. This is treated as a single maritime claim involving five separate dyadic claims (each state versus Venezuela).

Table 3 examines the frequency of the various types of settlement attempts (bilateral negotiations, non-binding and binding third party involvement, and militarized conflict) based on the salience of the issue claim (high, moderate, or low). We begin by discussing the results comparing the three issues of territory, rivers, and maritime zones. As hypothesized, there is a significant difference across issue types in both bilateral negotiations ( $p < .01$ ) and militarized conflict over the claimed territory, river, or maritime zone<sup>14</sup> ( $p < .09$ ); states are more likely to trust the militarized option and their own decisions at the negotiating table when the issue at stake is more important to them. The result for non-binding third party involvement (taking such forms as good offices, inquiry, conciliation, or mediation) is not statistically significant, while territorial claims have produced significantly more appeals to binding third party adjudication or arbitration ( $p < .01$ ). Territorial claims generate an average of 1.36 militarized disputes over territorial issues, while maritime claims produce an average of 0.81 disputes and river claims only 0.15 each. Similarly, territorial claims generate roughly twice as many rounds of bilateral negotiations and of non-binding third party assistance as do maritime claims, and somewhat more than river claims.<sup>15</sup>

With regard to issue management patterns within each issue type, all three issues generally produce the expected results. In almost every analysis, claims of high salience generate more bilateral negotiations, non-binding third party assistance, and militarized conflict than do claims of moderate or especially low salience. For example, territorial claims of high, moderate, and low salience generate 2.67, 1.12, and 0.51 militarized disputes over territorial issues respectively, indicating that the most salient claims produce much more militarized conflict than the least salient ( $p < .02$ ). River claims do not produce any noteworthy differences based on salience levels for any type of settlement attempt, nor are there any significant differences for third party activities in territorial claims, although at least part of the problem may be the relatively small number of river claims in the Americas.<sup>16</sup> Highly salient maritime claims exhibit a greater likelihood of bilateral negotiation, non-binding third party settlement, and militarized conflict.

Taken together, these analyses suggest that the salience of a contentious issue strongly influences the ways in which states try to settle their differences. States are more likely to use militarized means and bilateral negotiations to settle highly salient claims. Furthermore, claims over issues that are more salient in general, such as territory, last longer than claims over less salient issues, such as cross-border rivers. These analyses demonstrate the impact of variation in salience both within and across issue types, offering the first systematic empirical examination of multiple issues.

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<sup>14</sup> Militarized disputes over territory are identified as such by the COW Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (Jones, et al. 1996). Disputes over river and maritime issues have been identified by the authors, who examined historical sources to determine whether each militarized dispute occurring during an ICOW river or maritime claim appears to have involved river or maritime issues, respectively. Approximately one-fourth of all disputes between the claimants actually involved the specific river or maritime zone involved in the claim.

<sup>15</sup> The only surprise in the upper portion of the table lies in the results for binding third party settlements, with territorial claims averaging one such settlement per three claims; this is four times the average for maritime claims, and no such settlements have occurred in Western Hemisphere river claims ( $p < .01$ ). This result may indicate in part that maritime or especially river claims are easier to resolve bilaterally or with non-binding assistance than are territorial claims, leaving no need to turn to binding third party judgments. It may also indicate that river claims lack an appropriate international body to resolve claims through adjudication, at least in the twentieth century Western Hemisphere, or that river claims rarely generate the militarized conflicts or stalemated negotiations that may lead states to choose a binding third party technique. Further research on additional regions should help to clear up the explanation, particularly if it relates to the level of institutionalization in each region.

<sup>16</sup> These analyses are based on comparisons of mean values across just 27 dyadic river claims. Another possible explanation is that the Western Hemisphere does not provide enough variation in river characteristics or water scarcity, at least at the national level; the Amazon basin in South America has been estimated to account for twenty percent of all global river runoff, approximately triple the total for all of Europe. It is to be expected that the inclusion of river claims from additional regions will help to clarify this finding.

**Table 3: Attempts to Manage Issues in the Americas**

Frequency of Settlement Attempts (mean per claim):

**A. Comparison of Issue Types**

<u>Claim Saliency</u>	Bilateral	Third Party:		Militarized Conflict
	<u>Negotiations</u>	<u>Non-binding</u>	<u>Binding</u>	<u>over Claim</u>
Territorial Claims:	4.61	1.15	0.32	1.36
River Claims:	3.00	0.95	0.00	0.15
Maritime Claims:	2.18	0.61	0.08	0.81
	<i>F</i> = 9.27***	<i>F</i> = 0.96	<i>F</i> = 6.05***	<i>F</i> = 2.51*

**B. Territorial Claims**

<u>Claim Saliency</u>	Bilateral	Third Party:		Militarized Conflict
	<u>Negotiations</u>	<u>Non-binding</u>	<u>Binding</u>	<u>over Territorial Claim</u>
High Saliency	7.42	1.91	0.33	2.67
Moderate Saliency	4.81	1.07	0.40	1.12
Low Saliency	2.03	0.59	0.23	0.51
	<i>F</i> = 14.11***	<i>F</i> = 2.16	<i>F</i> = 0.74	<i>F</i> = 4.45**

**C. River Claims**

<u>Claim Saliency</u>	Bilateral	Third Party:		Militarized Conflict
	<u>Negotiations</u>	<u>Non-binding</u>	<u>Binding</u>	<u>over River Claim</u>
High Saliency	2.86	1.43	0.00	0.43
Moderate Saliency	3.73	1.00	0.00	0.07
Low Saliency	1.25	0.00	0.00	0.00
	<i>F</i> = 1.20	<i>F</i> = 1.25	<i>N/A</i>	<i>F</i> = 1.05

**D. Maritime Claims**

<u>Claim Saliency</u>	Bilateral	Third Party:		Militarized Conflict
	<u>Negotiations</u>	<u>Non-binding</u>	<u>Binding</u>	<u>over Maritime Claim</u>
High Saliency	4.46	1.31	0.15	2.27
Moderate Saliency	2.35	0.59	0.06	0.36
Low Saliency	0.62	0.19	0.05	0.24
	<i>F</i> = 4.31**	<i>F</i> = 2.50*	<i>F</i> = 0.67	<i>F</i> = 6.11***

\*  $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ 

Another important dimension of issue management is the effectiveness of different types of settlement attempts, rather than their simply frequency. Numerous different measures of effectiveness can be imagined, but three would seem to be especially important. The short-term effectiveness of a given settlement attempt can be measured by whether or not the attempt produced a treaty, agreement, award, or similar outcome. The medium-term effectiveness can be measured by whether or not this agreement (if any) was actually carried out by the participants. The longer-term effectiveness can be measured by whether or not the attempt ended the claim. All three of these dimensions of effectiveness are addressed by the ICOW coding of settlement attempts.

With respect to the short-term measure of reaching an agreement, there is no significant difference in effectiveness across the issue types, indicating that -- at least in the aggregate -- each issue type appears to be managed with equal effectiveness; this table is limited to territorial and river claims because final coding of settlement attempt details is not yet complete for maritime claims in the Americas. Issue saliency plays an important role, though, with agreements being

reached in 56% of all settlement attempts involving high-salience issues, 58% for moderate salience, and 68% for low salience ( $p < .07$ ). The form of the settlement attempt is also quite important, with almost all binding third party settlement attempts -- 94.6% -- producing some agreement (e.g. arbitral or judicial award), relative to 60.0% of all bilateral negotiations and only 43.7% of all non-binding third party attempts ( $p < .001$ ).

**Table 4. Effectiveness of Settlement Attempts**

Type of Settlement Attempt	Reach Treaty or Agreement?	Carried Out by Both?	Agreement Ends Claim?
<b>A. Comparison of Issue Types</b>			
Territorial Claim	59.1%	70.0%	21.5%
River Claims	52.9	73.9	32.6
	$X^2=1.22$	$X^2=0.30$	$X^2=2.94^*$
<b>B. Comparison of Salience Levels</b>			
High Salience	55.8%	65.7%	17.4%
Moderate Salience	57.7	68.8	22.2
Low Salience	68.1	86.1	36.7
	$X^2=5.53^*$	$X^2=11.70^{***}$	$X^2=12.11^{***}$
<b>C. Comparison of Settlement Types</b>			
Bilateral Negotiations	60.0%	69.0%	17.5%
Non-Binding Third Party	43.7	72.7	24.2
Binding Third Party	94.6	80.0	71.4
	$X^2=33.98^{***}$	$X^2=2.05$	$X^2=53.18^{***}$

Once an agreement has been reached, there is no difference between territorial and river claims in carrying it out ( $p < .59$ ), although agreements are somewhat more likely to end river claims than territorial claims ( $p < .09$ ). Claim salience levels are also important in these medium-term and longer-term dimensions of effectiveness, with agreements over low-salience claims being significantly more likely both to be carried out by both parties and to end the claim ( $p < .01$ ). Finally, the type of settlement attempt influences effectiveness, with agreements reached via third party techniques -- particularly binding arbitration and adjudication -- being significantly more likely to end claims than bilateral agreements ( $p < .001$ ). This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that a third party decision may offer a way for leaders to save face while agreeing to a settlement that would have been politically impossible to agree to in face-to-face negotiations.

Of course, the preliminary analyses presented here have been overly simplistic, meant more for their descriptive and illustrative value than for reaching any definitive conclusion about the role of issues in world politics. More meaningful analyses require the inclusion of relevant control variables, as well as additional independent variables related to past interactions over the same issue. At least with regard to Western Hemisphere territorial claims, Hensel (2001) has found strong evidence that past interaction over the issue exerts a strong influence over subsequent attempts to manage the issue, and Hensel and Tures (2001) have found a similar result for the effectiveness of settlement attempts. Despite the simple bivariate nature of these tables, though, they do appear to indicate both the similarity of issue management processes across issue types in several respects and the existence of important differences between issues in other respects.

### Proposed Data Collection and Analysis

This grant proposal is meant to fund several distinct phases of research. To begin, the initial data collection on territorial, river, and maritime claims will be extended to the remaining regions of the world that have not been addressed in current ICOW research: Africa, Asia, and Oceania. Once

those data sets are completed, the three complete data sets will be used to study the management of contentious issues more completely than has been possible in the past. This section begins by explaining the need for completing the three remaining regions and the approach that will be used.

### **Extension to Africa, Asia, and Oceania**

As noted above, we have collected data on all three issues in the Americas, Europe, and the Middle East. These three regions offer a meaningful basis for the systematic study of each type of issue, with a wide range of cases from developed states with a long history of independence (Western Europe) to developing states with a long history as independent states (South America) and developing states that have obtained their independence in the last century or less (Eastern Europe and the Middle East). These regions offer important variation in the specific issues being studied, such as the disparity in fresh water availability between the Americas and the water-scarce Middle East. They also offer important variation in levels of institutionalization, with Western Europe being perhaps the most advanced region of the world in terms of political and economic institutionalization and the Middle East being at the other extreme, and with the Americas falling in the middle.

While the first three regions offer important bases for the study of issues, though, there are many reasons that this data collection effort needs to be extended to the remaining three regions of Africa, Asia, and Oceania. There is systematic variation across regions in the world with respect to the degree of regional institutionalization, the average level of economic and political development, along with the timing of states gaining independence. A focus on only a few regions will hinder our ability to compare these various factors, and their impact on the initiation and settlement of contentious issues. Furthermore, collection of data for all regions in the world will make the ICOW data more attractive for scholars wishing to utilize the data to test other theoretical hypotheses.

The ICOW project's initial focus on issues in the Americas, Europe, and the Middle East appears likely to have identified approximately half of all territorial, river, and maritime issues over this time period. The project has identified and coded 196 territorial claims so far, including 75 in the Americas, 90 in Europe, and 31 in the Middle East. In the course of this data collection, the sources that have been consulted have preliminarily identified an additional 198 claims from the remainder of the world (119 in Africa and 79 in Asia and Oceania). The eventual total for Africa is likely to be somewhat smaller, as experience in the first three regions suggests that some of these sources tend to classify many non-territorial questions as "border disputes," but the total for Asia and Oceania should be somewhat larger with the inclusion of a number of territorial claims over islands that were not identified by some of the general sources consulted so far.

A total of 48 river claims have been identified so far, involving 18 rivers in the Americas, twenty in Europe, and ten in the Middle East. While there is not yet a concrete estimate of the number of river claims in the remainder of the world, there should be at least as many as were found in the first three regions. Wolf et al. (1999) identify 106 international river basins in Africa, Asia (excluding seven Middle Eastern basins that they label as Asian), and Oceania. Many of these 106 basins are located in generally dry settings, particularly in Africa, and as such are likely to be contested quite vigorously by the riparian countries.

A large number of maritime claims should also be identified in the remaining regions of the world. The ICOW project has currently identified 147 maritime claims, including 44 in the Americas, 66 in Europe, and 37 in the Middle East. Based on the same general sources, an additional 162 likely maritime claims have already been identified in the remainder of the world, including 62 in Africa and 100 in Asia and Oceania.

Taken together, the collection of all three data sets in all three regions is expected to take two years to complete. The 196 territorial claims that have been identified so far have taken over two years to collect, albeit largely without any dependable source of funding for graduate student research assistants or for summer faculty salaries. The river and maritime claims that have been identified so far have taken a full year of NSF funding, covering both summer salary for the two faculty investigators and several graduate student research assistants each semester. With the funding requested in this proposal, two years of summer salary and research assistant support should be adequate for the completion of all three data sets for the entire world.

### **Planned Empirical Analyses**

After finishing data collection, the completed ICOW data on territorial, maritime, and river claims can be used to test the hypotheses on issue management that were presented earlier. The results of this project will help to make major advances in the study of issues in world politics, beyond the advances that have already been made with the territorial claims data. All three issue data sets are designed to be comparable by including the same type of explicit claims, the same type of salience indicators, and the same types of settlement attempts. As a result, the existence of these three complete data sets will for the first time allow comparative study of the management of different issue types -- which is vital to the development of an issues approach.

The study of interstate conflict -- as well as the study of negotiations and third party conflict management -- can also be extended by this project's conceptualization of militarized conflict as only one of numerous substitutable policy options available to states for a specific purpose (the management or settlement of specific issues). Such a reconceptualization allows hypothesizing and analysis of the conditions that are likely to lead to the selection of different options, as well as considering the different effects that each factor or condition might have. Some of the factors studied with the Western Hemisphere territorial claims data have been found to have different effects on the likelihood of different options, giving a much more complete picture of the effects of each factor and of the influences on each option than has been possible with past research. For example, more salient issues increase the likelihood of militarized conflict, bilateral negotiations, and non-binding third party assistance, while decreasing the likelihood of submission to a binding third party decision. Similarly, parity in relative capabilities increases the likelihood of militarized conflict or submission to a binding third party decision, while a capability imbalance in favor of the challenger increases the likelihood of bilateral negotiations; an imbalance in favor of the target state increases the likelihood that the status quo will remain uncontested without any peaceful or militarized attempts to settle the issue.

The results will also provide a more detailed understanding of the effects of water scarcity and maritime disagreements on world politics than is currently possible, by indicating the extent to which countries facing disagreements over such issues employ peaceful versus military means in settling their issues and the extent to which different approaches are likely to be successful at resolving the issues. The few studies that have dealt with water scarcity issues or maritime disagreements and conflict have generally followed impressionistic research designs, involving the intensive study of a single case (as with Lowi's 1995 study of the Jordan River basin) or a brief listing of prominent cases that have made news headlines. None of these studies have attempted to compile a list of all cases of actual or potential water scarcity problems around the world, nor have they made any systematic effort to collect additional information about the magnitude of each such problem or about attempts to manage these problems through peaceful or military means. This proposed project will thus fill an important gap in the political science field, both by studying an

important topic that has not been addressed systematically by past research, and by producing an original data set that can be employed by other political scientists in their own research.

While the creation of a new data resource is a secondary objective behind the improved testing of propositions related to issues, this would be an important resource for the study of world politics long after these planned analyses with this newly collected data have been completed. The ICOW data set on territorial, river, and maritime claims will be useful in testing numerous additional propositions on phenomena in world politics beyond issue management. Arguments that certain types of states (such as democracies) are less likely than others to contend over certain types of issues can be tested more meaningfully with data that are collected independently from data on militarized conflict. The ICOW data sets will thus help to overcome a potential criticism of research by Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1997) and Mitchell and Prins (1999). Both studies examine the issues at stake between democracies but their contributions are limited to issues involved in militarized disputes, which are unlikely to be representative of all issues under contention (particularly for democracies, which are known to become involved in fewer militarized disputes overall than other types of adversaries).

Analyses of peaceful conflict management techniques (e.g., Dixon 1993; Raymond 1994) can benefit from the collection of data on a specific type of disagreement between states, which allows the study of all attempts to manage such disagreements -- whether or not the adversaries become involved in militarized conflict (Dixon) or employ third-party settlement assistance (Raymond). Because data are collected on characteristics of each claim, analyses of conflict management techniques can also benefit from the measurement of issue salience, which has been impossible with recent research by Dixon, Raymond, and others. States involved in territorial, river, and maritime claims also offer an excellent set of cases to be used in testing propositions about status quo dissatisfaction (e.g., Kugler and Lemke 1996), because the existence of the claims clearly indicates a form of dissatisfaction with the local (dyadic or regional) status quo and additional data on claim salience can be used to indicate the extent of this dissatisfaction.

The broad temporal span of the ICOW data will facilitate analysis of the impact of significant changes in the regional (e.g., with the development of the European Union) and global (e.g., the development of the Law of the Sea) institutional context on the settlement of various issues over time. Beyond the role of institutions, these proposed data sets -- together with the territorial claims data already collected and a similar data set on regime claims being collected by a former Ph.D. student at Florida State -- will allow scholars to compare the impact of issues with that of more traditional realist factors such as power. Mansbach and Vasquez (1981; Vasquez 1993), among others, have argued strongly against a realist interpretation of world politics on a variety of theoretical, empirical, and other grounds; these data sets will finally allow for a direct comparison of the realist "power politics" approach with an "issue politics" approach.

Finally, this project will also be able to offer guidelines for policymakers, which may be quite important if the prognosticators are correct about river and maritime issues as important sources of future conflict. The data sets to be created can be used as early warning indicators to help identify likely maritime or river trouble spots before they explode into armed conflict, and to evaluate the relative risks of each such trouble spot. Furthermore, this project will help to increase scholars' understanding of how these problems can best be resolved short of overt militarized conflict, or how they can best be handled to minimize conflict and prevent its recurrence. The dozens or hundreds of claims that have already ended can be used to generate useful lessons about conflict management that can then be applied to the cases that are still ongoing or that may arise in the future.

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