Colonial Legacies and Territorial Claims: A Preliminary Investigation

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Abstract: Most of today's nation-states experienced colonial rule at some point during the last two centuries, with well-studied economic, political, and social consequences after decolonization. This study examines a different form of the colonial legacy, involving the stability of the territorial status quo. We lay out a number of different forms that colonial legacies might take with respect to territorial claims, focusing both on relations between two former colonies and on relations between a former colony and its former colonial ruler. We then present and test hypotheses about the impact of these legacies on territorial claims. Our preliminary results show strong evidence that colonial legacies affect territorial conflict after independence, with conflict more likely after violent decolonization and in relations between former colonies of the same colonizer, although more detailed followup research is called for.

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In the month before this conference began, a number of territorial claims made world headlines, prompting statements by leaders and journalists alike about the colonial origins of the claims in question. Perhaps most relevant for this conference, in July 2008 Japan issued guidelines for how teachers should instruct their students about the Japanese claim to the islands known as Takeshima in Japan and as Dokdo in Korea. The South Korean government protested strongly against these guidelines, rejecting the Japanese claim as an extension of Japan's previous colonial rule over Korea. The Nigerian legislature debated a motion to reverse the recent handover of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon, in a territorial claim that dates to the period when the two were colonies of Great Britain and France. Thailand and Cambodia also moved hundreds of soldiers to their border near the Preah Vihear temple, in another territorial claim that dates to the time when Cambodia was a French colony. While the details of these cases vary, in each case the territorial problem in question is said to result from a colonial legacy.

Most nation-states in the international system were ruled as colonies or other dependencies of at least one foreign power,[1] so if colonial legacies do affect events after independence, much of the world seems likely to be affected. Recognizing this, scholars have examined the effects of colonialism on such topics as economic development, trade, democratic stability, and ethnic conflict. For example, many in the dependency (*dependencia*) tradition claim that today's unequal economic development can be traced back to the economics of the colonial era, when colonies were used primarily as sources of raw materials for their colonial rulers (e.g., Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978). Athow and Blanton (2002) find that trade patterns established in Africa during the colonial period have tended to persist well after independence. Blanton, Mason and Athow (2001) find a legacy of British rule to be associated with greater ethnic conflict after independence than a French colonial legacy. Several studies find a positive association between a British colonial legacy and stable democracy (e.g., Blondel 1972; Bollen 1979; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Bernhard et al. 2004), while the impact of French, Spanish, Portuguese, or Belgian rule appears to be negative (e.g., Huntington 1984; Lipset, Seong and

[1] The ICOW Colonial History data set, available at <http://www.icow.org>, reveals that 183 of 222 states in the modern interstate system (82.4%) have been ruled as a dependency or part of at least one foreign state at some point in the last 200 years.

Torres 1993). Little systematic attention has been devoted to territorial claims or armed conflict, though, which is the purpose of the present paper.

We begin by discussing the possible forms that colonial legacies might take, in order to approach this topic systematically. Newly independent states come into existence with borders that date back to colonial rule. Not only did the colonial ruler have an opportunity to shape the political, economic, and social development of its dependencies, but it also had an opportunity to settle their borders -- or to leave them unsettled. Actions taken during the colonial era may have substantial positive or negative impacts after independence, with respect to the stability of borders with other postcolonial states as well as relations with the former colonizer. We present a series of hypotheses about the conditions under which these different legacies are most likely to take effect. Preliminary empirical analyses suggest that colonial legacies have had important effects on territorial conflict, with such conflict being much more likely between neighbors who shared the same colonial ruler as well as where decolonization occurred through violent means. We conclude by discussing implications of these results, and by suggesting promising directions for future research on this topic.

Theoretical Development

While numerous territorial claims are said to be related to some sort of vague "colonial legacy," the analyst must be careful to specify exactly what is meant by this legacy and how it might be expected to affect territorial conflict. If this is not done in an analytically rigorous way, then the concept of colonial legacies offers little scientific value. We begin the theoretical section of this paper by laying out what we believe to be the three most important forms of colonial legacies with respect to territorial conflict. We then present and test preliminary hypotheses on the conditions under which each legacy is most likely to be relevant.

We must begin this section by emphasizing that this paper is not currently concerned with borders or territorial claims that involve the territory of at least one current colony or dependency. We consider such cases to be part of the colonial era itself, and note that the colonial legacy in such cases is still being developed. The impact of colonialism during the colonial era is likely to be much different than its impact after decolonization, and studying the

colonial era is likely to require much more time and space than is possible in the current project. We will return to this topic in a future followup paper, though.

Former Colony-Colonizer Relationships

The first form of colonial legacy that we consider involves post-independence relations between a former colony and its former colonial ruler. Because colonial rule inevitable involves close (if unequal) political and economic ties between the ruler and its colonies, it is unsurprising that most postcolonial states maintain relatively close ties with the ruler after decolonization. Particularly to the extent that the colonial ruler was able to replace local languages, religions, customs, and institutions with its own during a long period of colonial rule, its former colonies are likely to speak the colonizer's language and follow its religion after independence, and they may well retain political and economic institutions that are very closely related to those that the colonizer imposed.

A variety of research confirms the expectation that former colonies tend to maintain close relationships with their former rulers. Athow and Blanton (2002) find that African trade patterns established during the colonial period have tended to persist well after independence, with former British and particularly French colonies maintaining much higher levels of trade with the former colonizer after independence than would otherwise be expected. Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that former colonies receive a large portion of many former colonizers' foreign aid. Former colonizers such as Britain and France also maintain a military presence in many former colonies, and help to protect their former colonies from either internal or external military threats; Tillema's (1989) list of 269 foreign overt military interventions includes 80 cases where a former colonizer sent military forces into the territory of a former colony. Yet this often close postcolonial relationship is not always positive. The dependency literature sees the continued close trade ties after independence as reflecting a continuation of the colonizer's domination of the former colony's economy, and both these economic ties and the military influence of the former colonizer can also be a source of pressure on the postcolonial government should it plot a course that diverges from the former colonizer's interests. Not all of Tillema's interventions were meant to support the former colony's government; former colonizers have sometimes come into armed conflict or taken other action against governments in their former colonies.

With respect to territorial claims, it would seem reasonable to expect territorial conflict between a colonizer and its former colonies to be relatively rare. Once the colonizer made the decision (voluntarily or otherwise) to pull out of the colony, it would seem relatively unlikely to return to the area for further territorial gains in the future. If it did so, though, either of two reasons seem likely to be at work. First, the former colonizer could decide that it needs the economic or strategic benefit that control of a specific territory might provide, as with a potential source of oil or other valuable resources, or a strategic position that can give important military benefits as a base for troop deployments, a coaling station when navies depended on them, or a vantage point from which to defend (or threaten) international shipping lanes. Second, the process of decolonization may not have settled all of the outstanding issues to both sides' satisfaction, perhaps leading the former colony to pursue a desired territory from the colonizer or another of its colonies, or leading the former colonizer to pursue a territory that would allow it to protect its citizens, its remaining colonies in the area, or other important interests.

In either of these cases, the key to whether or not the colonizer and its former colony come into territorial conflict seems to be the relationship between them at the time of decolonization. If decolonization follows a peaceful path and the colony becomes independent on friendly terms with its former ruler, then neither of these scenarios appears to be likely. There would likely be few unresolved issues between colonizer and colony at the time of independence, and if there were (or if any should subsequently arise), the two states' generally cooperative relationship should allow them to settle their issues peacefully. On the other hand, if decolonization follows a violent or hostile path, then either scenario would seem more plausible. Important issues related to the status of territories or the status of minorities in either the newly independent colony or in the colonizer's other possessions would seem likely to remain unresolved at independence, and the generally hostile relationship that follows decolonization would make such issues difficult to resolve cooperatively while creating an environment in which other issues should be more likely to arise.

Colonial Legacy Worsened Territorial Relations

The second general form of colonial legacy that we consider involves aspects of the colonial period that worsen territorial relations between former colonies after independence,

whether by creating territorial claims that might otherwise have been avoided or by worsening or escalating the management of claims. This perspective begins with the assumption that colonial powers generally pursued their own military, strategic, economic and political interests during the colonial era, doing little to further the interests of the colonies themselves (except to the extent that this occurred naturally through pursuit of the colonizer's own self-interest). For example, colonial powers typically oriented their colonies' economies around the export of raw materials and agricultural products needed by the colonial powers, rather than the development of their internal colonial markets. In colonial Spanish America, the individual colonies were restricted from trading with each other; few ports were created; and incentives for short-term Spanish economic gain were generally greater than the incentives of long-range local economic development (North et al. 1999: 32-35). Politically, many colonies were ruled from abroad with little opportunity for self-rule. At independence, then, most former colonies lacked local leaders with real political experience, and their political institutions were often introduced hurriedly as the colonizers abandoned their colonies. In colonial Latin America, "autonomous institutions of self government existed only at the most local level, and possessed heavily circumscribed authorities" (North et al. 1999: 37).

A similar point can be made regarding former colonies' borders. Colonial powers typically defined borders for their colonies with the colonizers' interests in mind rather than those of the colonies themselves, consistent with their political, social and economic management of the colonies. Indeed, colonial powers had incentives to disrupt any previously existing borders that might have been more "natural." The preservation of traditional political entities could lead to challenges against the colonizer's interests, which could be minimized by disrupting traditional forms of organization. This point is most noticeable in Africa, where colonial borders were typically drawn artificially at times like the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, and reflected the colonial powers' interests rather than local ethnic, tribal, economic, or other considerations. Athow and Blanton (2002: 220) note, for example, that the Berlin Conference and similar efforts were designed to delimit administrative boundaries in light of "how they could best break down traditional social and economic networks for more efficient social control and resource extraction." This lack of concern for the colonies' interests in the definition of borders would lead one to expect that borders defined during the colonial period should be contested frequently

after independence because they did not reflect the interests of the local populations; once the entities on both sides of a colonial border obtain independence, they would seem likely to pursue revised borders that reflect their own respective interests rather than those of the former colonizer.

Another problem concerns the incentives for a complete and accurate demarcation between colonies. The colonizer may not have had an interest in expending great time and effort to establish clear and well-marked borders with neighboring colonies; clearly demarcated borders would only seem to be a concern in the event that the neighboring colony was beginning to threaten the resource extraction that attracted the colonizer in the first place. This lack of incentives for clear demarcation would seem to be especially true for borders between two colonies ruled by the same foreign power. For example, the Spanish likely faced less pressure to settle borders between their former colonies in South America than to settle borders between their possessions and those of Portugal or Great Britain. To the extent that borders within a single colonizer's possessions were defined during the colonial era, there would seem to be a greater risk of incomplete or contradictory border delimitation because of the lack of urgency for defining and demarcating clear borders within the same empire.

This discussion suggests a number of reasons that events during the colonial era could worsen relations between postcolonial states after independence. The first and most direct connection involves the existence of an unsettled border at independence. If the colonizer(s) that controlled the two sides of the border had not yet agreed on the status or location of the border upon decolonization, it seems probable that the border would remain under contention after the colonies became independent. Second, even if the colonizers themselves accepted the border before the colonies became independent, future challenges would seem likely if the colonies' residents disagreed with their colonial rulers' views on the border upon decolonization. Finally, even if both colonial governments and their residents accepted the border at independence, new claims could conceivably arise based on the way the border was settled. For example, new claims would seem to be possible if not likely if the colonizers had based the border on inaccurate or incomplete maps; if the border was shown in contradictory places on different maps; if the border split tribal, ethnic, or other groups or separated population centers from ports, valuable resource deposits, or other desired areas; or especially if such divisions were created by

changing the border or reallocating territories from one unit to another during the colonial era. In each of these situations, the colonial border may be regarded as unsatisfactory by the postcolonial state on one or both sides, leading to the outbreak of a territorial claim and potentially to armed conflict.

Colonial Legacy Improved Territorial Relations

The final general form of colonial legacy that we consider involves aspects of the colonial period that improve territorial relations between former colonies after independence, whether by preventing territorial claims that might otherwise have started or by settling or deescalating claims once they have begun. There are several ways that this effect might have been reached. First, there could be a general argument that colonial borders -- however flawed -- should be preserved in the interest of preventing fratricidal conflict among newly independent states; this would presumably lead to the avoidance of territorial claims that otherwise might have been raised. Second, there could be a general sense of solidarity among postcolonial states, which might lead them to pursue more peaceful and cooperative solutions to their problems; this might not prevent territorial claims from beginning, but it would presumably help to ensure that they are managed peacefully rather than through armed conflict.

The first of these possibilities is closely related to the legal concept of *uti possidetis juris* or *uti possidetis de jure*, defined by *Black's Law Dictionary* as "The doctrine that old administrative boundaries will become international boundaries when a political subdivision achieves independence" (Garner 1999: 1544; see also Brownlie 1998: 133, Malanczuk 1997: 162-163, Prescott 1987: 105-106, Ratner 1996; Shaw 1997: 216). *Uti possidetis* first emerged in the modern sense with the decolonization of Latin America in the early 19th century, as the former Spanish colonies loosely applied the principle both in their frontier disputes with each other and in those with Brazil (Brownlie 1998: 132; Ireland 1938: 321-328; Ratner 1996: 593-595; Shaw 1997: 356 ff).[2] Each state was to be recognized as possessing all territories that were presumed to be possessed by its colonial predecessor as of 1810 (for South America) or

[2] Brazil generally rejected the application of *uti possidetis de jure* in favor of *uti possidetis de facto*, an alternative doctrine that determines ownership of territory based on physical occupation rather than colonial title. Brazil used this alternative doctrine to argue for the expansion of its territory beyond the 1810 borders with former Spanish colonies such as Bolivia and Peru (see Ganzert 1934: 430 ff and Tambs 1966: 255 ff).

1821 (for Central America), reflecting the last periods of unchallenged Spanish rule (and thus the last times that borders could be considered to have been under Spanish authority). Under this principle, there would be no possibility of new claims based on *terra nullius* (territory belonging to no state) or of claims by extraregional states. In addition, there should be little or no conflict among the bordering states themselves because of the clear identification of each border's location based on colonial-era administrative lines.[3]

Despite the Latin American origins of the modern *uti possidetis* principle, it has subsequently been applied elsewhere. Most notably, the principle is enshrined in the OAU's 1963 charter and 1964 Cairo Declaration, in which the African leaders pledged "to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of independence." The borders between European colonies in Africa were often unnatural, cutting across traditional ethnic or linguistic groups and producing ill-fitting multiethnic colonial entities. As a result, leaders in the region chose to avoid uncertainty and conflict by preserving their existing colonial boundaries; it was feared that allowing challenges to any African borders on the grounds of illegitimacy could lead to the emergence of challenges against virtually every African border for the same reason. (Malanczuk 1997: 162; Ratner 1996: 595-596; Zacher 2001: 221-223)

The general applicability of this principle is described well in the 1986 International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision in the *Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali)* case. The ICJ had been asked to settle the location of a segment of the border between Mali and Burkina Faso, both of which had been part of French West Africa before independence. In its judgment, the ICJ emphasized the legal principle of *uti possidetis juris*:

> the principle is not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of international law, It is a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power. (ICJ 1986: ¶ 20)[4]

[3] As typically applied, this doctrine only offered a general guideline for determining borders, and allowed two parties to depart from the colonial-era administrative boundaries through mutual agreement if desired (Brownlie 1998: 133; Ratner 1996: 593, 598-601; Shaw 1997: 216).

[4] See also Malanczuk (1997: 162-163), as well as the full ICJ judgment at <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/Icases/iHVM/ihvm_ijudgment/ihvm_ijudgment_19861222.pdf>.

The ICJ judgment in the Mali-Burkina Faso *Frontier Dispute* case also argued that the principle of *uti possidetis* should apply in any decolonization situation, regardless of the legal or political status of the entities on each side of the border:

> The territorial boundaries which have to be respected may also derive from international frontiers which previously divided a colony of one State from a colony of another, or indeed a colonial territory from the territory of an independent State, or one which was under protectorate, but had retained its international personality. There is no doubt that the obligation to respect pre-existing international frontiers in the event of State succession derives from a general rule of international law, whether or not the rule is expressed in the formula of *uti possidetis*. (ICJ 1986: ¶ 24)

The judgment went on to argue explicitly that this principle is so general as to apply regardless of geographic region or temporal era, rejecting the possibility that *uti possidetis* should not apply in Africa because the continent followed different legal principles than those followed in other regions or because this specific doctrine had not been proclaimed for Africa as of these two states' independence in 1960. This judgment suggests that -- at least by the 1980s -- the legitimacy of colonial borders was widely recognized as a standard legal principle that should help to prevent the outbreak of escalation of territorial claims between former colonies.

Beyond the principle of accepting colonial borders in order to avoid the risks inherent in territorial claims, a second way that the colonial legacy might reduce territorial conflict involves the creation of feelings of solidarity between former colonies. The history of anti-colonial struggle would appear to be a force favoring friendly relations with other former dependencies, each of which underwent similar struggles against colonial rule. To the extent that each colony achieved its freedom from the struggle against the same colonizer (and around the same time), there should be a greater sense of community among them, based on the shared identity of those who have fought against a common enemy. This sense of community should be strengthened by the shared language, religion, and other cultural details that are typically spread throughout a colonizer's possessions following decades of rule by the colonial power.

As Domínguez et al. (2003: 22) argue, "Most Spanish American elites accepted the norm that they were part of a larger cultural and possible political entity." Rather than disrupt the relations among the members of this fraternity of new states, there would appear to be an incentive to avoid inflammatory issues such as territorial demands on neighbors, and to resolve outstanding issues as quickly and peacefully as possible. Domínguez et al. (2003: 22-23) suggest

that “The consequence of the spreading ideology of Latin American solidarity, fostering peacemaking, was the evolution of the expectation and practice that countries from all the Americas should engage in conflict containment and conflict settlement wherever conflict emerged.” It is not clear, though, whether this solidarity among former colonies should extend to former dependencies of other colonial powers, which were colonized by a different foreign power and did not necessarily share the same language, religion, or culture.

Hypotheses on Colonial Legacies

The preceding discussion suggests a series of hypotheses about colonial legacies and territorial conflict that can be tested empirically. We do not expect that any of these three approaches will be shown to be "the colonial legacy" with respect to territory. Instead, we expect that each approach is likely to be accurate in describing the effect of colonial rule on territorial stability in certain parts of the world and under certain conditions. This is why we present each approach with specific hypotheses that indicate when we expect it to be relevant, rather than presenting a single hypothesis or group of hypotheses about which individual approach best encapsulates colonial legacies with respect to territorial conflict.

The first two hypotheses concern relations between a former colonizer and its former colonies. As discussed earlier, we believe that the prospects for territorial conflict in such relationships depend heavily on the state of relations between the colonizer and colony at the time of independence. For the purposes of the present paper, we conceive of former colonizer-colony relationships at independence based on how independence/decolonization was achieved. If the former colony achieved independence through violent means, such as an armed rebellion against the colonizer, then it is likely that the new state will be in a state of difficult relations with its former colonizer, auguring poorly for cooperative relations and suggesting that future conflict might be likely. On the other hand, if the colony achieved independence through more peaceful means (such as an orderly, planned transition), then it is likely that it will be on much better terms with the former colonizer, and subsequent conflict should be much less likely:

Hypothesis 1*: Territorial conflict should be more likely between a former colonizer and one of its former colonies when the colony achieved independence through violent means.*

Hypothesis 2*: Territorial conflict should be less likely between a former colonizer and one of its former colonies when the colony achieved independence through nonviolent means.*

The remaining two hypotheses concern relations between two states that were both dependencies of some foreign power. Here, several factors seem to be quite relevant, at least for the preliminary analyses in the present paper. As before, we expect the process by which the former colony achieved independence to play an important role. Where one or both states along a border achieved independence through violent means, the independence setting was less conducive to an orderly process whereby borders were accepted and clearly marked. In contrast, where both achieved independence peacefully, there was likely more time -- and a less threatening environment -- to allow the establishment of stable and accepted borders. Furthermore, we believe that there is an important distinction between two former colonies that were both ruled by the same colonizer (as in the borders between former Spanish colonies in Latin America or between former French colonies in West Africa) and two former colonies that were ruled by different colonizers (as in the borders between Spanish colonies and Brazil in Latin America or between British and French colonies in Africa).

These two factors suggest the following hypotheses. It should be noted that Hypotheses 4a and 4b are drawn from different theoretical perspectives. Lacking any clear a priori theoretical reason to expect either one to receive greater support, we prefer to test both empirically, rather than artificially choosing one as the favored hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3*: Territorial conflict should be more likely (ceteris paribus) between two former colonies when at least one of them achieved independence through violent means than when both achieved independence through nonviolent means.*

Hypothesis 4a*: Territorial conflict should be more likely (ceteris paribus) between two former colonies of the same colonial power than between two former colonies of different colonial powers, due to the lower urgency for the colonizer to establish clear and accepted borders during the colonial era.*

***Hypothesis 4b**: Territorial conflict should be less likely (ceteris paribus) between two former colonies of the same colonial power than between two former colonies of different colonial powers, due to the greater sense of solidarity between the former colonies after independence.*

These hypotheses include the all-important "ceteris paribus" qualifier to make explicit that none is likely to tell the whole story by itself. We can think of these two factors as working together, such that the most dangerous situation might be a border between two colonies of the same colonial power that achieved independence through violent means, and the least dangerous should be a border between two colonies of different colonial powers that each achieved independence through peaceful means.

It is important to note that we do not see the colonial legacy as anything close to deterministic, with certain legacies almost invariably producing long and bloody disagreements and others almost certainly avoiding trouble altogether. Rather, the general legacy of colonial rule is best seen as establishing a more (or less) conflictual baseline for states' interactions over their borders after independence, by creating borders that are seen as more legitimate or more flawed (depending on which perspective is being applied). Whatever this baseline value, though, the states' leaders will make and implement decisions over borders for reasons that are in their own domestic and/or international interests. For example, drawing from past work on the management of territorial claims (e.g., Huth 1996; Hensel 2001; Huth and Allee 2002), we expect that the salience (value) of a given piece of territory will affect states' interactions over that territory; claims over highly salient territory should typically last longer and be more likely to generate militarized conflict than claims over relatively valueless territory.

Finally, in the interest of thoroughness, we also consider one final possibility: that there is no meaningful colonial legacy that affects post-independence territorial conflict in any systematic way. We do not consider this a separate theoretical perspective on colonial legacies, but rather a null model that can be used as a comparison for the other legacies discussed above. Evidence suggesting support for this null model in a large-N quantitative study would likely mean one of two things. It could mean that there is no meaningful connection between the colonial era and post-independence territorial conflict across a large set of cases, however meaningful a connection there may seem to be in any individual case). Alternatively, it could mean that there

are multiple types of connections at work that cancel out each other's effects in such a large study, and that our research design did not prove to be adequate at distinguishing these separate effects. We will attempt to distinguish between these two possibilities if the results of our preliminary analyses suggest stronger support for this null model than for the hypothesized forms of colonial legacies.

Research Design

In order to evaluate these preliminary hypotheses on the impact of the colonial legacy, we will run a logistic regression ("logit") analysis of territorial conflict in the modern era. Like most quantitative studies of international conflict, we focus on the Correlates of War (COW) project's interstate system, 1816-2001.[5] Specifically, we focus on all pairs of neighbors during this time frame, using the COW contiguity data set to identify all pairs of states and/or colonies[6] that share a land border or a sea border of no more than 400 miles. We believe that states sharing such sea borders are close enough to have a reasonable opportunity for armed conflict, particularly for the former colonies that are the focus of our study. While states separated by this distance might reasonable engage in armed conflict over territorial or other issues, as illustrated by such examples as Nicaragua and Colombia over the San Andres and Providencia island group or Eritrea and Yemen over the Hanish Islands, it would be ludicrous to use the absence of conflict between such distant former colonies as Belize and Israel to test the impact of colonial legacies on armed conflict. Each observation in our data set represents one year in the history of one pair of neighbors, with the goal of determining the conditions under which territorial conflict is most likely to break out.

Measuring Territorial Conflict

We measure territorial conflict using the COW project's Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set, which covers interactions involving the threat, display, or use of military force

[5] All COW data sets used in this study -- the interstate system, contiguity, MID, and national material capabilities -- are available at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org>.

[6] Colonial contiguity is an important part of our study, particularly for studying former colonizer-colony dyads, where part of our theoretical expectation involved threats to the former colonizer's interests in nearby possessions that are not yet independent. As a result, we consider borders between states and other states' colonies or between two different states' colonies in our analyses.

between two or more nation-states (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). We are only interested in militarized disputes over territorial issues, so we limit the data set to cases in which at least one of the participants is coded as seeking to revise the territorial status quo during the dispute. This information is available as part of the publicly available MID data set, but the original form in which it is provided can be misleading for multiparty disputes such as the world wars, when most of the participants did not engage in territorial conflict against most other participants. To avoid such misleading cases, we use a modified version of the MID data that has been evaluated more carefully for territorial issue codings by the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project, as described by Hensel et al. (2008). This differs from the original MID data only in the coding of which MIDs involve territorial issues, based on additional research using various historical and news sources.

In addition to the main analyses that study the outbreak of armed conflict over territorial issues, we also report analyses that only study the outbreak of fatal armed conflicts over territory. The MID data includes a large number of militarized disputes that lasted a relatively short time and never involved a serious perception that full-scale war was likely, because they involved isolated threats to use force of displays of force but never led to deaths on the battlefield. In order to make sure that the results are not being drive by such low-level disputes, we focus our second set of models on cases that produced at least one battlefield fatality among regular military forces during the course of the dispute. These cases are much more serious and much closer to war than isolated threats, so limiting the analysis to fatal disputes offers a reasonable level of assurance that the results are meaningful and do not reflect isolated posturing by leaders. As it turns out, though, none of the key variables in our model changes when we run the analysis with this more restrictive set of cases.

Measuring Colonial Legacies

Our measurement of colonial legacies is based on version 0.5 of the ICOW project's Colonial History data set.[7] This data set records the colonizer(s), if any, that ruled over each member of the COW interstate system before independence, as well as whether or not the state achieved independence through violent or peaceful means. For the purposes of this paper's

[7] This data set, like all ICOW project data sets, is available at <http://www.icow.org>.

preliminary analyses, these two pieces of information are combined into six dummy variables, based on the colonial history of the countries and the process by which they became independent:

- Same colonizer, violent independence: both states were colonized by the same colonial power, and at least one of them became independent violently[8]
- Same colonizer, nonviolent independence: both states were colonized by the same colonial power, and both became independent through nonviolent means
- Different colonizers, violent independence: the states were colonized by different colonial powers, and at least one of them became independent violently
- Different colonizers, nonviolent independence: the states were colonized by different colonial powers, and both became independent through nonviolent means
- Former colonizer-colony, violent independence: one state was colonized by the other, and became independent violently
- Same colonizer, nonviolent independence: one state was colonized by the other, and became independent through nonviolent means

For now, we do not distinguish between different types of empires. Some work on colonial legacies distinguishes between overseas empires (such as the Spanish empire in Latin America) and land empires (such as the Hapsburg or Ottoman empires), but for now we consider either type of empire interchangeably; we may revisit this decision in future research. Our analyses also include a dummy variable to indicate current colonial borders, in which at least one side of the border is currently a colony.

Control Variables

Our analyses also control for three variables that have repeatedly been found to be important in past quantitative studies of international conflict. We use the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score from the COW project's National Material Capabilities data set to measure the disparity in relative capabilities between each pair of states. The specific measure used is the percentage of total capabilities held by the stronger state, which can range from 0.50 (where the two states are exactly even) to 1.0 (where the stronger state holds all of the capabilities in the pair). We use the Polity IV data to measure the presence or absence of joint democracy, which is defined as present when both sides have values of at least six out of a

[8] There is no meaningful difference in results if this variable is only coded for cases where both states (rather than either one) became independent through violent means, which suggests that at least one violent independence is sufficient to produce the expected effect.

possible ten on the Polity index of institutionalized democracy.[9] Finally, we include a dummy variable to distinguish between pairs of states that share a land border and those that are separated by 1-400 miles of open seas. While we believe that states separated by no more than 400 miles of sea still have a reasonably high chance of armed conflict in any given year and should thus be included in this study, evidence suggests that states sharing a land border increases the risk of conflict even further, so we control for this in our analyses.

Empirical Analyses

Our analyses begin with a simple bivariate analysis, reported in Table 1. The top half of this table compares the territorial conflict propensity of neighboring states, with one observation per pair of states (regardless of whether the pair had a border for one year or for nearly two centuries, although most have at least several decades of observation). Whether we are examining all territorial conflict or only the more serious category of fatal territorial conflicts, the most dangerous situation is a pair of states that were both colonized by the same colonial power, at least one of which became independent through violent means. Such cases experience roughly twice as many territorial conflicts as any other category in either portion of the table, although this difference is only statistically significant for total territorial conflicts; there is no significant difference for fatal conflicts. There is little difference between nonviolent same-colonizer pairs, violent different-colonizer pairs, and "other" pairs of states (in which one or both states were never colonized and thus have no meaningful colonial legacy), while different-colonizer pairs that both achieved independence through nonviolent means are the least prone to territorial conflict.

The bottom half of Table 1 then examines all former colonizer-colony relationships, in order to determine whether such relationships are more likely to lead to territorial conflict when the colony achieved independence violently. As hypothesized, violent independence processes greatly increase the risk of territorial conflict, and this result is statistically significant at the .03 level for all conflicts and .01 for fatal conflicts. It is worth comparing the figures to the results from the top half of this table, though. Even the much more dangerous category of colonies that achieved independence through violent means only experiences about as much territorial conflict

[9] The Polity IV data set is available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>.

as the three middle categories from the top half of the table, far behind same-colonizer pairs that achieved independence violently and well ahead of different-colonizer pairs that achieved independence peacefully.[10]

Table 1's simple bivariate analyses were not able to control for the impact of other factors that might plausibly affect conflict behavior. Table 2 presents the results of a logit analysis of territorial conflict that accounts for the control variables discussed earlier. The results are largely similar to those presented in Table 1, though, and generally support all four of our hypotheses. Beginning with the hypotheses on former colonizer-colony relationships, Hypothesis 1 suggested that territorial conflict would be more likely for such relationships after colonies became independent through violent means, and Hypothesis 2 suggested that territorial conflict would be less likely for such relationships after colonies became independent through peaceful means. Both hypotheses are supported by the evidence reported in this table, with each effect being statistically significant at the .05 level or better for both all territorial conflict and fatal territorial conflicts.

Turning to relations between postcolonial states, Hypothesis 3 suggested that territorial conflict should be more likely in pairs of states in which at least one achieved independence through violent means, and Hypotheses 4a and 4b suggested that territorial conflict should be more (or less) likely in pairs of states that had both been colonized by the same colonial power than in pairs with different colonial powers. Hypotheses 3 and 4a also receive support from Table 2, while Hypothesis 4b appears to be unsupported. Both colonial legacy variables with violent independence -- whether same-colonizer or different-colonizer legacies -- significantly increase the risk of territorial conflict overall as well as the risk of fatal territorial conflict. Pairs of states with the same colonizer that both achieved independence nonviolently are also significantly more likely to experience territorial conflict, while pairs with different colonizers that achieved independence nonviolently are significantly less likely to experience territorial conflict. For purposes of comparison, current colonial borders (those that feature a current colony on at least one side of the border) are significantly less likely to experience territorial conflict overall, and not significantly different from cases with no colonial legacy to experience fatal territorial conflict.

[10] Is is worth noting that the bottom half of Table 1 is not limited to neighboring states, unlike the top half of this table, so these numbers may be more impressive than first appearances suggest.

Another useful way to compare the results of logit analyses is through the analysis of the predicted probabilities of conflict in certain situations according to the model. Table 3 presents the predicted probabilities of both forms of territorial conflict for each of the colonial legacy situations that we have discussed. The baseline probabilities of conflict are relatively low, with an annual predicted probability of .024 (or roughly one conflict every 42 years) for all territorial conflicts and a much lower probability of .007 (or roughly one every 143 years) for fatal territorial conflict. These low probabilities are not too surprising. as there have been less than 1000 territorial conflicts in the entire interstate system since 1816, and far fewer fatal territorial conflicts. More instructive are the changes in predicted probabilities in the various colonial legacy categories. The probability of territorial conflict increases by one-third to one-half when either or both of the hypothesized risk factors -- violent independence or a shared same-colonizer legacy -- is present. Interestingly, the most dangerous situation in this table appears to be a former colonizer-colony relationship following violent decolonization, which has roughly double the conflict risk of the baseline category.[11]

We now supplement these analyses by looking in greater detail at each of the three general types of colonial legacies that were discussed earlier. In doing so, we draw from these results as well as from other supplementary analyses using the same data and other research on related topics.

Colonizer-Former Colony Relationships

We begin by considering cases of territorial issues between a former colonizer and one of its former colonies. We had hypothesized that territorial conflict would be more likely when the colony achieved independence through violent means, but less likely when it achieved independence nonviolently. Both hypotheses were supported by the analyses, suggesting that the

[11] It is worth noting that unlike Table 1, the analyses reported in Tables 2 and 3 are limited to neighbors, which are widely known to be more conflict-prone than more distant states. This indicates that former colonizers are quite likely to engage in conflict with their former colonies that are located near their own territory or their other colonial possessions, although it does not say anything about more distant former colonizer-colony relationships; including such cases in this analysis would have distorted the rest of the analysis, which was based on the assumption that all cases in the table have a reasonably high risk of armed conflict.

relationship between colonizer and colony at the time of independence plays a very important role afterward.

The most dangerous former colonizer-colony relationship in the past two centuries is the relationship between Greece and the Ottoman Empire or Turkey, following Greek independence in 1829. This pair has accounted for 29 territorial conflicts since that time, eight of which produced fatalities. This case certainly fits our earlier discussion of the most dangerous situation, as Greece achieved independence through a violent rebellion, and many issues remained unresolved upon independence. Greece and Turkey have subsequently engaged in armed conflict over their land border as well as the status of Cyprus and a number of small Aegean Sea islands. Further investigation reveals that territorial conflicts have been much more common in land empires such as the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires, with fully one-third of such cases (17 of 51) being followed by at least one territorial conflict after independence. Just under six percent of former colonies from overseas empires (8 of 138, or 5.8%) engaged in territorial conflict with their former colonial rulers.

Colonial Legacy Worsened Territorial Relations

The second type of colonial legacy that we discussed involved situations where the history of colonial rule seems to have worsened territorial relations between states after their independence. Along these lines, we hypothesized that territorial conflict would be most likely in pairs of states that had both been ruled by the same colonizer, as well as in pairs of states in which at least one had achieved independence through violent means. These expectations were generally supported by our quantitative analyses, suggesting that even these simple measures of the colonial legacy are quite successful at predicting conflict behavior after decolonization.

This evidence is generally consistent with the observations of past scholars. Despite the good intentions behind the application of *uti possidetis* in Latin America, the doctrine's application appears to have been plagued by several serious problems (Brownlie 1998: 132-133; Hill 1945: 155; Prescott 1987: 105-106, 199 ff; Ratner 1996: 594, 607-608). One issue was that the Spanish had employed a wide variety of administrative units, with different borders often delimiting military, political, and religious entities; several different newly independent states could thus claim possession of the same territory based on inheritance from different Spanish

entities. The Spanish often changed the borders of their administrative units over time through seemingly arbitrary royal decrees or cédulas from Madrid, raising questions about which state's colonial predecessor actually possessed a given territory under Spanish rule. For example, a Spanish royal order in 1803 transferred the islands of San Andrés and part of the Mosquito Coast from the Captaincy-General of Guatemala (today's Central America) to the Viceroyalty of Santa Fé (today's Colombia); both Costa Rica and Nicaragua claimed after independence that this transfer had only referred to military jurisdiction and had not changed political sovereignty (Ireland 1941: 164-165). Other borders were never clearly marked due to ignorance of local geography, as the entire continent was never completely explored or settled under Spanish rule. For example, the Bolivia-Chile and Bolivia-Paraguay borders were defined only vaguely and incompletely in Spanish documents and maps, allowing each side in these respective territorial claims to argue that its colonial predecessors had explored and administered territory beyond the presumptive border lines that were inherited at independence (Fifer 1972).

Similar observations can also be made in other regions. The example of India and Pakistan stands out as one where the colonizer's actions either created or worsened what became a serious territorial problem that has currently lasted more than six decades and shows no signs of ending soon. Before leaving their South Asian colonial possessions, the British decided to partition British India in to a majority Muslim state and a majority Hindu state. While most of the leaders of the princely states that made up British India chose to join the postcolonial state that best reflected the religion of their populations, the (Hindu) maharajah of Kashmir hesitated to join either new state, leading to demands and then armed revolt by his majority Muslim constituents. Facing this threat, he then announced Kashmir's accession to India, which has been followed by more than six decades of demands and armed rebellion by the majority Muslim population of Kashmir as well as the Pakistani government. It is not clear that different decisions by the British colonial government would have been able to prevent serious conflict throughout the entire former British India, but a strong argument could be made that the British actions as they were leaving the area did little to manage or settle the potential issues that arose almost immediately upon independence.

Colonial Legacy Improved Territorial Relations

The final type of colonial legacy that we discussed involving situations where the history of colonial rule seems to have improved territorial relations between states after their independence. Among these lines, we hypothesized that territorial conflict should be less likely between former colonies of the same colonizer. Furthermore, the mirror image of Hypothesis 3 was the expectation that postcolonial relations between states that achieved independence through peaceful processes should be more stable and peaceful than relations between states that achieved independence violently. The evidence turns out to be mixed. Where a colonial border divided the possessions of two different colonizers, and especially when both sides of the border achieved independence through peaceful means, postcolonial relations have generally been marked by much greater cooperation and stability, and much less territorial conflict. The expectation of greater solidarity between former colonies of the same colonial power was not supported at all, though, regardless of how the colonies achieved their independence.

Turning to other research, there is some suggestion that *uti possidetis* and similar doctrines were responsible for the general avoidance of territorial conflict in the Americas and Africa, even if (as noted above) several scholars see the application of these doctrines as having been plagued by numerous flaws. Zacher (2001: 229) argues that the principle of *uti possidetis* "had some impact in promoting greater order" in Latin America, although it was not always respected by every country in the region, and Malanczuk (1997: 162-163) notes that most newly independent states have accepted this general principle of the inheritance of colonial borders. Domínguez et al. (2003: 21) argue that "Given immense geographic spaces, seemingly insurmountable barriers such as the Andean mountains or the extensive dense tropical forests that filled much of Central and South America, state leaders with limited resources found it cost-effective to honor and rely on *uti possidetis* to address most border issues," and that while interstate war frequently occurred in postcolonial Central and South America, "*Uti possidetis juris* held successfully over time, with six exceptions, the last of which occurred in 1941." Kacowicz (1995: 270; see also Kacowicz 1994: 227-228) suggests that -- while there have been a few wars or near-wars in the region -- "the vast majority of border disputes in South America have been resolved peacefully, leading to some cession or exchange of territories. The basis for a peaceful settlement of those disputes was established through the principle of *uti possidetis*, according to which the Latin American countries recognized the colonial borders as their post-

independence international frontiers." Turning to Africa, Kacowicz (1995: 271) and Zacher (2001: 229) conclude that African borders -- particularly in West Africa -- have generally been respected, in line with uti possidetis. Yet there is evidence that the application of uti possidetis in Latin America was plagued with problems, as noted above, and other scholars are skeptical of related efforts in Africa. For esample, Prescott (1987: 105) notes that the 1964 OAU declaration was meant to prevent the emergence of territorial disputes in Africa, but concludes that "Unfortunately, it has not succeeded in that intention." The ultimate effectiveness of such efforts is a matter for a followup paper to address more directly than has been possible in this paper's global analyses.

Moving beyond armed conflict for the moment, it is worth noting that many of the territorial cases that have been submitted to the International Court of Justice involve shared colonial legacies. A brief glance through the list of contentious ICJ cases identifies nineteen that have involved territorial issues.[12] Of these, nearly half -- nine of nineteen -- involved two states that had both been colonies of the same colonizer, most notably pairs of former Spanish colonies in Latin America or former French colonies in West Africa. Another five involved two states that had been ruled by different colonizers or empires, and the remaining five included at least one state that was a colonizer rather than a colony of another state; none of these territorial cases involved a colonizer and one of its former colonies. By no means does this offer definitive proof that sharing a colonial legacy greatly increases states' willingness to settle their territorial issues peacefully through adjudication, but it is certainly consistent with this suggestion. Future research should do more to investigate the impact of colonial legacies on peaceful conflict management, as well as on armed conflict itself.

Discussion

This paper has been a preliminary effort to investigate the impact of colonial legacies on territorial claims between independent nation-states. We began by laying out three distinct types of legacies that might be at work, and by presenting a series of hypotheses about the conditions

[12] The list of cases is available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3>. This figure of nineteen territorial cases excludes another nineteen that exclusively involved sovereignty over maritime zones (with no mainland or island territory at stake) or the use of cross-border rivers.

under which each type of legacy should be most likely. These hypotheses were tested through quantitative analyses of territorial conflict over the past two centuries. Overall, these analyses generally offer strong support for most of our hypotheses, suggesting both that colonial legacies can have an important impact, and that our approach in this project has a great deal of potential for understanding these legacies.

These analyses suggest that the common tendency to refer to "colonial legacies" or to the "colonial origins of today's problems" may have a basis in fact. Over the past two centuries, territorial conflict between neighbors has been more likely between former colonies than between other states, particularly when at least one of them achieved statehood through violent processes or when both were dependencies of the same foreign power. Territorial conflict has also been quite likely between former colonizers and their nearby former colonies, at least for colonies that achieved independence violently; nearby colonies that achieved independence through peaceful processes are significantly less likely to become involved in territorial conflict with their former colonial ruler.

Taken together, this evidence suggests that processes and decisions in international relations are influenced by events in the distant past. While international relations scholars have frequently focused on the impact of recent events such as armed conflicts or war, this study's results show that events several centuries ago -- indeed, long before the modern state became independent -- can also have a strong and systematic effect. This is also consistent with a variety of work on other potential influences of colonialism, which has found important connections between colonial histories and political or economic conditions within postcolonial states.

This project is still in a very preliminary stage, though, and much remains to be done to investigate the impact of colonial legacies on territorial conflict. Over the course of this project (particularly the remaining portion covered by the grant from the Northeast Asian History Foundation), we have a number of other plans for improving and extending this basic research. One area for further development is a more detailed examination of individual cases of borders or other claimed territories, which will allow us to gain a much clearer understanding of how these colonial legacies work. Quantitative analyses such as those presented in this paper are very useful for identifying important patterns and relationships, but case studies offer a better chance to investigate the specific processes at work in these general patterns.

In conducting these case studies, we plan to focus more on specific events during the colonial era as influences on territorial stability after independence. In the preliminary analyses reported here, we have used broad categories to measure the colonial legacy -- whether two states shared the same or different colonizers, and whether at least one of them achieved independence through violent means. Our theoretical discussion of the different types of colonial legacies suggests that much more may be at work, though, and case studies will be helpful for identifying other factors to study in greater detail. For example, while violent or nonviolent decolonization processes are useful measures of the way that colonial rule ended and have very strong effects in this study's preliminary analyses, it may be at least as important to investigate the status of each border when the colonial era ended (such as whether the border had been settled to both sides' satisfaction, mapped clearly and accurately, and marked accurately on the ground). Even violent decolonization processes may not be likely to lead to territorial claims or armed conflict over borders that were accepted and demarcated at independence, and even peaceful decolonization processes may not be enough to prevent future conflict over borders that were still challenged or were unmarked at independence. Borders with a history of conflict or changing possession during the colonial era may be more likely to lead to post-independence challenges, as one or both new states may seek to reverse past losses and regain previously held territory after independence; the same may also be true for colonially imposed borders that separate members of tribal, ethnic, or other identity groups or otherwise seem to set the stage for post-independence conflict. The impact of colonial history after independence may also depend on the length of colonial rule (whereby a longer colonial period means a greater opportunity for the colonizer's actions to affect subsequent events) or on the details of how the colonies were run (e.g., with settlement-oriented colonies being run very differently from colonies that were used primarily for resource extraction). And there may be important differences based on the type of empire; in this preliminary study we have grouped overseas empires like European possessions in Latin America and Africa together with land empires like the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. It is certainly possible that there are important differences in the ways that these different types of empires' legacies affect territorial stability after independence.[13] We will investigate these

[13] Some preliminary analysis suggests that when the other factors that are currently in our model are considered, states that emerged from land empires such as the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires experience less territorial conflict with neighbors than those that emerged from overseas

options in our case studies, and to the extent that it is possible, we will use factors such as these to improve our quantitative analyses in followups to this paper.

Finally, another important followup will involve more of an emphasis on territorial *claims* and on territorial *conflict management* rather than the armed conflict over territory that has been studied here. While armed conflict over territory is the subject that (rightly) attracts the most attention from both scholars and policymakers, it is only part of the story of colonial legacies. Most of the effects of colonial legacies in this preliminary study appear to have been dangerous, increasing the risk of armed conflict over territory after independence. Yet it is quite possible that certain types of colonial legacies can have a much more positive effect, either preventing the outbreak of territorial claims in the first place (and thus making armed conflict over territory impossible) or helping to promote the peaceful management of territorial claims. And even colonial legacies that appear to increase armed conflict can still generally be overcome; not all borders in even the most dangerous situations identified by our model led to deadly territorial conflict, so future research would do well to investigate how some otherwise similar borders were managed without the bloodshed that characterizes so many other cases. Our future work in this area will focus much more on the impact of colonial histories on the outbreak, peaceful management, and ending of territorial claims, drawing from my work with the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project's data set on territorial claims (e.g., Hensel 2001; Hensel et al. 2008; Hensel et al. 2009).

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empires, but more territorial conflict against the former colonizer. Further thought about possible theoretical explanations is required before we can add empire type to our model, though. It may be that land empires' borders are typically settled more definitively than overseas empires' because the border directly adjoins the territory of the colonizer/empire itself, which might explain why there is less territorial conflict along such borders after independence. It may also be that former colonizers are more likely to become involved in territorial conflict with states that emerged from land empires than from overseas empires simply because these states are located closer to the former ruler's territory, and thus have potentially greater value to the former ruler as well as being more accessible than former colonies overseas. We have not thought through these possibilities enough to be confident in adding them to our model yet, though.

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Table 1: Bivariate Analysis of Colonial Legacies and Territorial Conflict

A. Contiguous States Classified by Colonial Legacies:

	Any Territorial Conflicts		Fatal Territorial Conflicts	
Type of Relationship	Mean (SD)	*% with 1+*	Mean (SD)	*% with 1+*
Same colonizer legacy:				
Violent independence (N=75):	2.33 (5.41)	*44.0%*	0.72 (1.93)	*30.7%*
Nonviolent (122):	0.81 (3.78)	*17.2%*	0.39 (2.27)	*9.0%*
Different colonizer legacy:				
Violent independence (131):	0.89 (3.94)	*21.4%*	0.31 (1.56)	*12.2%*
Nonviolent (68):	0.44 (1.07)	*20.6%*	0.09 (0.29)	*8.8%*
Other (289):	1.06 (3.12)	*27.0%*	0.33 (1.11)	*15.2%*
	F=3.07 (p<.02)		F=1.66 (p<.16)	
	684 d.f. (4/680)		684 d.f. (4/680)	

B. Former Colonizer/Colony Relationships:

	Any Territorial Conflicts		Fatal Territorial Conflicts	
Type of Relationship	Mean (SD)	*% with 1+*	Mean (SD)	*% with 1+*
Violent independence (N=87):	0.87 (3.34)	*19.5%*	0.29 (1.00)	*14.9%*
Nonviolent independence (125):	0.16 (0.66)	*7.2%*	0.03 (0.17)	*3.2%*
	F=5.42 (p<.03)		F=7.83 (p<.01)	
	211 d.f. (1/210)		211 d.f. (1/210)	

Table 2: Accounting for Territorial Conflict between Neighbors

Variable	Model I: Any conflict	Model II: Fatal conflict
Colonial Legacies		
Same colonizer:		
Violent independence	0.34 (0.10)***	0.35 (0.18)**
Nonviolent independence	0.36 (0.13)***	0.82 (0.21)***
Different colonizers:		
Violent independence	0.25 (0.11)**	0.38 (0.19)**
Nonviolent independence	- 0.16 (0.20)	- 0.71 (0.46)
Former colonizer-colony:		
Violent independence	0.76 (0.12)***	0.81 (0.19)***
Nonviolent independence	- 0.45 (0.23)**	- 1.26 (0.59)**
Current colonial border	- 0.35 (0.13)***	- 0.37 (0.23)
Controls		
Capability disparity	- 1.38 (0.22)***	- 1.44 (0.38)***
Joint democracy	- 0.51 (0.13)***	- 0.51 (0.22)**
Land border	1.38 (0.10)***	1.48 (0.18)***
Constant	- 3.96 (0.21)***	- 5.19 (0.37)***
	N=43,582	N=43.582
	X^2=450.82	X^2=186.75
	(10 df, p<.001)	(10 df, p<.001)

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 (robust standard errors in parentheses)

Table 3: Marginal Effects

Condition	Predicted Annual Probability of Territorial Conflict, with change from baseline prediction: Any Conflict	Fatal Conflict
Baseline (no colonial legacy)	.024	.007
Current colonial dyad (colony on one/both sides of border)	**.017 (- .007)**	.005 (- .002)
Shared same-colonizer legacy:		
Violent decolonization	**.034 (+ .013)**	**.010 (+ .003)**
Nonviolent decolonization	**.034 (+ .010)**	**.017 (+ .009)**
Different-colonizer legacy:		
Violent decolonization	**.031 (+ .007)**	**.011 (+ .003)**
Nonviolent decolonization	.021 (- .003)	.004 (- .004)
Former colonizer-colony:		
Violent decolonization	**.050 (+ .026)**	**.017 (+ .009)**
Nonviolent decolonization	**.016 (- .008)**	**.002 (- .005)**

Notes

• Calculated from Model I of Table 2 using the MFX command in STATA version 9.2; all other variables held at their mean or modal values for purposes of this calculation.

• Entries in **bold** represent effects that were statistically significant in Table 2 at the .05 level.

• Numbers may not add up exactly due to rounding.