

Expanding the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project: Regime-Based Claims, Disputes and Means of Settlement 1816-1996

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ABSTRACT:

In this paper, I introduce the second phase of the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) research project: regime-based claims. I discuss the meaning of regime-based claims drawing from academic and legal studies of sovereignty, self-determination, intervention and recognition policy. I also cover the distinctions between these claims and other disputed issues such as territorial claims and policy disputes. I present a list of variables to be collected in this research project, and offer a preliminary list of regime-based claims in the Americas. I conclude by discussing future plans for the dataset, including data collection priorities and hypotheses to be tested empirically with the data.

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THE ICOW PROJECT: PHASE II

Collecting information about the issues relating to international conflict is nothing new. Books by Luard (1986) and Holsti (1991) catalog the international conflicts, providing an array of relevant issue(s) states fight over. Datasets such as the militarized interstate disputes (Jones, Bremer & Singer, 1996) and International Crisis Behavior (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 1997) provide a more statistical focus on the reasons why states engage in international conflict. Scholars have made extensive use of these sources in papers attempting to determine the causal relationships involved in conflict. The disputes dataset, in particular, has spawned a number of research projects attempting to identify which conflicts are likely to escalate to war, last longer, or produce an enduring rivalry.

Recently, international relations scholars have noted that these sources of conflict issues have certain limits to their viability. In particular, these datasets only cover those cases involving the existence of overt conflict and say little about those issues which do not escalate to the conflictual stage, or how frequent these issues arise in the international system, especially among those cases which don't involve threats, displays and uses of force (Hensel 1998). A certain "selection effects" problem exists in that these previous sources can only analyze conflict with conflict. Creating a dichotomy between disputes and wars only solves half of the problem of selecting upon the dependent variable. We need to know more about what leads some issues to escalate to that initial threshold of conflict.

A second shortcoming of the prior information on dispute issues stems from the lack of information about the details of the cases. Most of the literature and datasets simply treat each individual conflict issue as a dichotomous variable: it's an issue in a given dispute or it isn't. Thus, we can only identify the presence of an issue. Any additional information to be gleaned must be empirically analyzed in the context of other existing datasets on capabilities, alliances, regime type, etc. Very little information about the case itself can be analyzed. The trend may be changing somewhat, as Brecher & Wilkenfeld (1997) do provide summaries of their crises in their dataset in a larger publication. But there remains a vast amount of claims behavior information yet to be explored.

In response to these problems of non-conflictual issue cases, selection biases, and a dearth of information on the specifics of the cases, the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) research project was formed (Hensel, 1998). The ICOW project gathers

systematic data on specific interstate contentions of which only some escalate to any level of conflict exemplified in disputes and crises datasets. A dataset on all issues between states, not just conflicts, allows us to determine what leads some of these contentions to escalate to conflictual levels.

This paper presents the second phase of the Issue Correlates of War dataset, which focuses upon regime claims between states. Specifically, this dataset embodies cases where one state's regime challenges the legitimacy of another state's government. It is designed to encompass a vast array of cases, including covert action, interstate recognition, external overt impositions of regime change, propaganda, and legal challenges to a government's sovereignty on grounds of self-determination, human rights record, or protection of ethnic minorities. But this essay is more than just an outline for a research project. It will cover a number of hypotheses to be tested in future papers, which will give the reader a better look at the direction of analysis as well as the relevance of such a dataset in the context of international relations literature.

THE ICOW PROJECT

Much of the statistical analysis included in empirical literature on international relations can be traced to the Correlates of War (COW) research project, founded by the University of Michigan's J. David Singer. Researchers in the Correlates of War project have assembled an impressive array of data in a number of research topics such as alliances, capabilities, and disputes which have been utilized by a vast list of scholars perhaps too lengthy to adequately cite. Much of the data collected and analysis undertaken was conducted independent of any international relations theoretical ideology such as realism or liberalism, although the relevant information has been used by scholars to test hypotheses stemming from those research paradigms. Neither has the data been used to adequately prove the viability of one such theory at the expense of the other.

This is not to imply that the COW project acts as a rudderless ship, adrift without any common direction or purpose. Hensel (1998) notes that recent publications in international relations have begun to note the community of correlates of war scholars have fashioned a "mental model" when analyzing interstate conflict issues. This model seeks to explain the conditions which give rise to disputes and wars as well as the successes of peace strategies. Surprisingly enough, the empirical literature seems dedicated to establishing the causal processes of war given the precondition of a contentious dispute, without much analysis of what gave rise to the dispute in the first

place. Even those studies which claim to study the onset or origin of disputes seem to accept that a clean break exists between dispute versus no dispute, or confine such analysis to the precondition of dispute existence, thus falling into the selection bias trap mentioned in the introduction.

What is needed is the establishment of a research project designed to focus on the missing link between dispute and no dispute to determine of such issues provide some for of precondition for dispute existence. This is where a look at interstate issues can help, by providing that connection between amicable relations and escalatory conflict. It also provides a means of testing qualities of states and/or dyads which have some excuse to get into more serious militarized interstate disputes, but don't always escalate in each case.¹

Thus the rationale for the ICOW project is to illuminate that previous gray area of pre-dispute contentions between states and assist studies of interstate conflict which unintentionally bias their results by selecting on the dependent variable. ICOW also expands our ability to gauge the impact of peaceful strategies, by studying on the resolution of issues which do not involve overt threats, displays and uses of force. It also provides a fuller, richer analysis of the qualities of interstate issues which allow us to expand beyond the simple dichotomies provided in prior literature or datasets. Regarding the general deterrence example, scholars can look at all interstate issue claims to determine when states may have a reason to engage in future conflict, without using dispute information to predict the presence of disputes.

PREVIOUS ICOW WORK: TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

The first phase of the data project involved analysis of all territorial claims between states, including those which involve a great deal of hostility as well as those which remained far more low key and never escalated to the dispute stage. Though the ICOW work on territorial claims has not been fully completed, some preliminary results have been made available. Hensel & Tures (1997) discovered the efficacy of negotiations in territorial dispute resolution. Various claims characteristics and actor

¹ An example of an international relations subfield which has been plagued with such problems is the literature on deterrence. Scholarly research in this area has focused on post-dispute immediate deterrence and pre-dispute attempts at general deterrence. To avoid selection biases, scholars analyzing the latter category analyze all relevant dyads (those capable of reaching each other) and code disputes as general deterrence failures. Critics of the general deterrence studies have noted that the relevant dataset to be studied should include some preexisting penumbra of conflict among participants, as to distinguish likely instances of deterrence from cases of strong cooperation (where deterrence is unlikely to occur). Scholars like Huth & Russett (1993) have tried to solve the problem by only looking at enduring rivalries, although this still postulates the presence of preexisting conflict.

attributes enhanced the chances of claim resolution through bilateral and third party talks, though the past history of conflict between the states and the increasing value of the disputed territory served as a settlement inhibitors (Hensel & Tures, 1997). Currently, the project has just completed a detailed analysis of all claims in the Americas as well as European territorial claims.

In collecting data and coding the territorial cases, I made several interesting observations. First, there seems to be a great deal of confusion among several interstate contentions as to whether or not the claim is based upon territorial or regime based claims. These cases involve a great deal of highly salient conflict and coverage in international literature: North Ireland, Korea, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Arab-Israel, Iraq-Kuwait, U.S.-Panama are all cases in this theoretical gray area, and their resolution for taxonomic classification is an important task. Granted, most interstate claims, disputes and wars are not always over a single issue. But given that existing datasets (Jones, Bremer & Singer, 1996) and lists in existing literature seem to argue that some interstate contentions have an issue which supersedes others in importance, the next logical step is to study whether or not meaningful differences exist between the types of claims.

The second factor I noticed was a relative dearth of literature on regime-based claims, especially in comparison to territorial claims. Some of this may be attributable to the highly visible nature of territorial claims or empirical literature which has found territorial disputes to be more likely to escalate to war (Vasquez, 1995; Hensel, 1996; Senese, 1996). Several recent academic publications have published extensive lists and summaries of territorial claims (Kaciowicz, 1994; Huth, 1996). Contentions over territory, even relatively peaceful, have not only come under the purview of political scientists, but geographers, historians, cartographers, and even psychologists and sociologists fascinated with the subject of innate “territoriality” among humans. Coverage of regime claims is a far more nebulous subject involving a great deal of technical nature which many scholars seem resigned to leave the matter to international lawyers and jurists. And while territorial claims may debate over the size of the Mosquito Coast for example, or how much of it belongs to Nicaragua, no one seems to dispute the existence of such a region (just who it belongs to). Concepts such as sovereignty, self-determination, human rights, legitimacy, right of secession and intervention and recognition of foreign governments is a far stickier subject, where little agreement exists among even the scholars who devote their careers to such analysis. And in comparison to territorial claims, where a line is drawn in the sand (Iraq-Kuwait) or an island set is battled over (Falklands), the battle lines for regime

claims are less distinct. A great deal of such regime-based claims involve some degree of secrecy (covert action, propaganda, secret arms shipments) less visible to empirical analysis. Furthermore, it is easier to see an invading army occupying a disputed region, some actions in regime-based claims (especially the clandestine ones) are debatable as to their occurrence. Counter-accusations can be made between original claimants or third party interveners as to given actions taken which represent more of one state's word against another than a more observable action in a territorial claim. It is for these reasons I feel that the literature on regime-based claims (especially lists of such claims) is far more lacking in volume than territorial cases.

Just because there is a lack of clarity on the definition of regime-based claims and a relative lack of information on the presence of regime-based conflicts should not imply that such a project is infeasible, or is impossible to undertake. In fact, these reasons imply that such a project is in need of pursuit.

THE ICOW REGIME-BASED CLAIMS DATA SET

This paper introducing the ICOW Regime-Based Claims Project will not only define such issue claims but separate them from other issue types. Codesheets and a partial list of cases in the Americas will be provided to the reader in the appendices. More importantly, a series of hypotheses should inform the reader about the direction and importance of the research, and reinforce the impression that this project is more than merely collecting data.

As mentioned earlier, several problems confront the ICOW project on regime-based claims. These claims not only have many opaque characteristics making them difficult to separate from other issues such as policy and territory bases of claims. Literature on regime-based claims per se is lacking relative to other issues. But the latter should not imply that there is no available literature to draw upon. Unlike territorial issues, which have been defined, discussed and subjected to a multitude of data-collection efforts, regime-based claims have not received such coverage in international relations. But plenty of literature exists upon a variety of subjects related to regime-based claims. A vast array of legal publications discuss covert action, recognition of governments, the legality of propaganda, and justification for interventions. International relations scholars have written extensively about human rights, self-determination and sovereignty. Though typically ignored by quantitative specialists for a lack of statistical testing of hypotheses, their works are no less relevant. In fact, I hope that projects like the ICOW research will hopefully integrate

such experts in fields where the material is difficult to test with other international academicians more proficient in quantitative analysis.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ANALYZING REGIME-BASED CLAIMS

History has been witness to numerous spectacular interstate contests over who will rule a given state. Classic battles were fought over the rights to a throne by two or more individuals, each often seeking support through external backing. Some of the conflicts escalated to involve nearly all European nations, as the Wars of Spanish and Austrian Succession did. Even after the age of monarchy had passed, states continued to battle each other over the rulership of a given state, especially budding ones, as competing alliances vied for membership by bringing new states on board or stealing players from the other team. Such conflicts spilled over into the Cold War era, as the United States and Soviet Union sought to keep allies in line or line up new supporters to gain regional advantage vis-a-vis the other.

Despite this tradition of conflict, it is highly surprising that few have sought to conduct such an extensive research on the issue. Coverage of regime-based claims has been relatively piecemeal. Tillema (1989), Pearson, Baumann & Pickering (1994), Kegley & Hermann (1996) and Regan (1996) look at interstate intervention, but only cover cases where overt force has been used and do not look at more peaceful claims of regime illegitimacy.

Much more has been written about territorial issues. Statistical Research has found that territorial issues may be more escalatory than other issue types, even when controlling for other factors typically responsible for dispute escalation (Vasquez, 1995; Hensel, 1996; Senese, 1996). But certainly such findings should not lead us to ignore the regime-based issues. First, given their nebulous definitional nature, regime-based disputes may exist where scholars have previously ignored or miscategorized them. Second, the evidence in these empirical studies typically comes from datasets which measure only cases where the issue has already escalated to some form of conflict. Work is only beginning in each ICOW phase (territorial and regime-based), which would allow us to compare conflictual and nonconflictual cases in each issue category. Third, even if the findings for the empirical research hold true when both sets of ICOW data on the two issues are compared, we should analyze the dual question of why territorial claims are more conflictual, or perhaps why regime-based claims are less conflictual.

DEFINITION OF A REGIME-BASED CLAIM

A regime-based claim is one which involves an explicit contention between two or more states over the legitimacy of rulership of a given state. The claim must be expressed by official representatives of the state's government. Examples of official representatives include heads of state or government ministers (secretary of state, general etc.) charged with the authority to speak on behalf of the state. Claims made by nonstate actors such as individuals, media or organizations like political parties (not in control of the state) are excluded unless they have been given authority by the state to act on its behalf. The claim may be directed either to the government in question, to the subjects of the government (encouraging the overthrow of the state), or to an international organization calling for action against a given government.

A problem occurs with cases such as covert action and propaganda, where the government does not usually formally announce its intentions to displace another government, but attempts such actions. In these cases, I will offer the ad hoc criteria of confirmation of such activity by two sources independent of each other (not one citing another). I will attempt to restrict my sources to reputable media cites, academic and legal publications. Critics challenging the validity of these sources are welcome to check the references of the coded cases and inform me about the presence of alternate sources of information with a different interpretation.

This definition is designed not to include the use of force as a criterion for inclusion. Though many regime claims may escalate to this level, numerous other types of regime issues will be included which do not report such a use of force. These include cases where a government may refuse to recognize another, or sever diplomatic relations. It can also represent cases of propaganda or economic sanctions. Also included would be situations where one state will take another to an international organization or court to arbitrate or adjudicate upon the legality of the state's government.

SEPARATING REGIME CLAIMS FROM TERRITORIAL ISSUES

As mentioned earlier, international criteria for statehood includes both a viable government and territorial integrity (Crawford, 1979). Such a definition is instrumental because it recognizes the separation of the two issues. The ICOW Research Project on Territorial Claims includes a variety of cases, including border delimitations (where states disagree about the exact placement of the border) and "limited sovereignty" (where one state claims a portion of another's territory, as Bolivia currently claims a strip of land lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific). In neither case are the countries

involved making their claim against the rulership of a foreign government; one state simply wants some territory held by the other state.

Separation of regime-based claims from territorial claims becomes a stickier issue when we consider the third category of ICOW territorial claims: “total sovereignty.” In these cases, the challenger state refuses to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the target state and seeks to annex most or all of the target (Hensel, 1998). Such a case certainly sounds like a situation where one state calls into question the legitimacy of the other to function as a ruler of the state.

The best means of providing a distinction seems to be having regime-based claims only cover cases where the challenger state recognizes the right of existence of the other, but wants to change only the government of the target. The territorial claim has the challenger fundamentally denying such an existence of the target state, and seeks incorporation of that state with its own territory.

Perhaps a comparison of cases can make the issue less cloudy. Two of the bloodiest cold war contentions, Korea and Vietnam, serve as examples of territorial claims of total sovereignty. North Korea refuses to recognize the existence of South Korea, and seeks to incorporate the Republic of Korea to the South with its own Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea. The same can be said of North and South Vietnam. Neither recognized the existence of the other to function as a state. If Vietnam was, for example, a regime-based claim, then when North Vietnam defeated the South in 1975, it would have likely established a separate government, but kept the state of South Vietnam still in existence. Of course this did not happen at all. A more recent case includes Iraq’s attempt to make Kuwait “the 19th. Province of Iraq” and claim that Kuwait has no right to exist in the international community. If this was a regime-based claim, Iraq would have likely invaded Kuwait, then established a puppet regime more to its liking, then left, rather than attempt to annex it, as Saddam Hussein tried. Other examples of total sovereignty cases which are coded in the ICOW Territorial Claims include North Ireland, Guatemala-Belize, West & East Germany. In each of these cases, the challenger refuses to recognize the existence of the latter as either a separate entity or a colonial possession of another. A resolution of these claims in favor of the challenger would most likely abolish the other as an independent entity or colony.

As for relevant examples of regime-based claims, the Soviet Union-Hungary contention of 1956 is an excellent example of a regime-based claim. The USSR invaded Hungary, executed the head of state (Nagy), installed a regime more to its liking (Kadar), but did not make Hungary a direct part of the Soviet Union, though the

USSR maintained a significant troop presence (International Commission of Jurists, 1957). The Soviets thus did not abolish the independent state of Hungary (though it certainly put constraints on the actions of the Hungarians for more than 30 years). This makes the claim regime-based, rather than a territorial case. Other similar cases include the United States-Dominican Republic, Vietnam-Cambodia, Syria-Lebanon. In each case, the challenger did not annex the target, but replaced the government with one more to its liking.

SEPARATION FROM POLICY-BASED ISSUES

Distinctions between regime-based claims and policy issues are also necessary for the definition of the former. When the claim involves a challenge by one country to another's policy is made, but no statement is issued questioning that government's sovereignty, then the issue is policy-based. Two cases of United States vs. Cuba disputes during the Kennedy Administration should prove helpful. In 1961, the Bay of Pigs incident occurred, involving tacit U.S. government support of Cuban exiles attempting to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro. In 1962, the U.S. and Cuba again locked horns over the latter's agreement to house Soviet missiles pointed at America. The Bay of Pigs represents a case of a regime-based claim, as the US government challenged the legitimacy of the Castro regime by sending exiles to displace him. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the US objected to the Cuban policy of having Soviet missiles, but the issue at hand in October of 1962 was confined to the policy alone, though some government officials did secretly toy with the idea of ousting Castro. Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis serves as an example of a policy-based dispute. Other policy-based disputes include challenges among Middle East states over water rights from damming rivers (Iraq-Turkey), supporting terrorism (U.S.-Libya) or flying U2 spy-planes in another's airspace (Soviet Union-U.S.).

SEPARATION FROM CIVIL WARS AND COLONIAL SECESSION

Civil wars and cases of colonial secession present a different sort of problem, in that each case has the potential to become a regime-based dispute. In the case of civil wars, both entities in question must have formal international recognition for the claim to be considered a technical regime-based dispute.² At this phase of the

² For example, Biafra's secessionist attempt against Nigeria in the late 1960s does not qualify as a regime-based dispute. But if another state had recognized Biafra (let's say, Togo) then a regime claim would occur between Nigeria and Togo (for "interfering in Nigerian affairs through its recognition policy") until Biafra became an independent state or ended its civil war. A real life example of the latter occurred during the late 1930s, when Britain opened diplomatic relations with the Franco's Nationalist forces in Spain,

project, international recognition will be represented by an academic proxy, the Correlates of War interstate system.³

Cases of colonial secession will be judged along similar criteria to the civil war cases. Both entities need to be recognized as members of the interstate system (Correlates of War membership). Rebellions such as the Algerian crisis (early 1960s), Indian Independence movements (1930s-1940s), the Baltic nations and the Soviet Union (1940-1991) and the Indonesian attempts at colonial secession from the Dutch all fail to qualify as regime-based disputes. But once independence has been achieved by a former colony, any attempts by the former colonizer to reestablish its authority constitutes a regime-based claim.⁴

VARIABLES IN THE DATASET

Annual data will be collected for a number of variables in each regime-based claim in the dataset. What variables will be recorded will be related to the aims of the project: in addition to providing a dataset on issue claims, several hypotheses about these actions will be provided to the readers for future empirical analysis. This section of the paper discusses the coding rules used for data collection. Variable names will be shown in all caps, for easier identification.

IDENTIFICATION OF CLAIMS

Each regime claim in the dataset will receive an arbitrary code number (CLAIM), which will assist in identifying the particular claim, but will perform no other function. I will also attempt to assign a name (NAME) to the claim to ease the identification of the

almost two years before the loyalist Spanish Republican forces officially surrendered. Spain claimed that Britain's actions represented an illegal intervention into Spanish affairs, though Britain argued the Nationalists had essentially achieved *de facto* control over Spain (Lauterpacht, 1947).

³ See Small & Singer (1982) for coverage of the criteria for international community membership.

⁴ When Belgium sent in paratroopers into the Congo (after Congo had achieved independence) to support in the Katanga secessionist movement in the early 1960s, it became a regime-based claim (Crawford, 1979). Another example is the Angolan case; before 1975, Portugal was recognized as the undisputed ruler of the southwest African nation. But once the Portuguese left, interventions by the Cubans and South Africans in support of rival factions made the case a regime-based dispute, since at least one of the factions is recognized by the international community as possessing *de facto* control over Angola (Galloway, 1978; Quaye, 1991).

contention. This should be especially helpful for dyads which have several distinct claims.⁵

CLAIM BEGINNINGS & ENDINGS

Regime-based claims are included in the dataset the first year they meet the criteria previously described. This means that the claim is included the initial year a government leader or representative claims that another state is illegitimate or takes measures to displace another government through such means as covert action or subtle propaganda. While the overt claims should be relatively reasonable to assess a beginning, the latter will undoubtedly prove difficult to determine a time origin. An exhaustive search of archives must be taken to ascertain the beginning date of the claim.

As for the ending of claims, we again confront the distinction between overt and covert actions in claims. Conclusions of overt-based claims are entered when an official government representative publicly renounces a plan or policy of questioning another government's legitimacy.⁶ In cases of recognition, for example, the conclusion of the claim will occur when the challenger state's government officially recognizes the government of the target state. When the government of a challenger state announces an abandonment of fomenting internal insurrection against a target state or the conclusion of overt intervention occurs, the claim is said to have ended.⁷ Claims can also be separated if they are non-consecutive.⁸

⁵ Examples include the US non-recognition of the USSR 1918-1933 (Lauterpacht, 1947) and mutual Cold War attempts at propaganda through Voice of America and corresponding Soviet tactics at destabilization (Murty, 1989).

⁶ Again, problems will undoubtedly occur with identifying the termination of covert actions. Heavy reliance will be placed upon claims sources to determine when these actions were officially terminated, but even most archives identify the endpoints of such policies. Such ad hoc measures must be undertaken until the project can offer a more definitive solution to the coverage of secret government activities against another government.

⁷ Special mention should be given to the beginnings and endings of regime-based claims in the context of multiple disputes. Country A can have a policy of non-recognition of Country B's government from 1960 to 1990, and also back a covert attempt to displace B's regime from 1973-1974. In most cases, this claim would represent one claim with multiple strategies of legitimacy challenges unless it can be shown that the two actions were independent of each other. Though such a case would be rare, it is not entirely inconceivable. Angola, for example, can challenge South Africa's colonial *transkei* regime in Namibia and simultaneously the legitimacy of the apartheid regime in South Africa, and the claims would be coded separately because of the basis of the claim (two separate issues).

⁸ For example, the U.S. withdrew recognition of the Castro regime in 1959 until 1960, then conducted the Bay of Pigs operation a year later (Galloway, 1978). Each action (the non-recognition and the covert action) would be coded separately since the non-recognition had lapsed before the Bay of Pigs was

IDENTIFICATION OF ACTORS

Upon identification of the regime-based claims, it will be important to record the relevant actors in the claim. This will include all actors participating in attempts to control a nation's regime. While some cases remain strictly bilateral, there are some which will involve more than two actors. Those cases will be handled in the manner I described in the section on multilateral claims; a claim sheet will be made to cover the entire claim and each dyadic interaction will be recorded separately. Thus the dataset includes information on the number of nation-state actors (ACTORS) and the relevant dyads (DYADS) involved in each claim.

There are cases where an entire organization has declared the regime of a nation to be illegitimate. In these cases, all organization members who actively participated in the resolution (not abstaining, etc.) or provided peacekeepers or logistic support are considered claimants.⁹

A thornier issue comes when the United Nations General Assembly passes some resolution against a country. Such a case will only count as a regime-based claim if (a) a specific country is identified, and (b) the resolution explicitly claims that the state's government is illegitimate in some way and should be replaced.¹⁰

An arbitrary code number will be used to categorize each dyadic claim (DYADNUM), which only serves as an identification mark and has no other inherent properties. Each participant in the dyad will also be identified by the number assigned to it by the Correlates of War project. Each will be labeled as either the challenger

initiated. It is important to note that claim will be coded as concluded when the claim is dropped, not upon the conclusion of military action taken during the claim (unless the military action can be shown to be an independent claim attempt; either the issue is separate or the claim attempt is non-consecutive).

⁹ For example, the OECS in 1983 proclaimed that the coup leaders against the Bishop regime in Grenada were illegitimate governmental authorities, and the members (except for Grenada, which did not even have a representative present) voted for action (Moore, 1984). So even though only the United States, Barbados and Jamaica sent troops, OECS nations (Dominica, Antigua & Barbuda, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines and St. Kitts & Nevis) who publicly supported the resolution will be included as regime claimants (Moore, 1984)

¹⁰ Thus blanket condemnations against Israel should not be accepted as regime claims (most deal with the return of occupied territories anyway or some critique of military action) unless they explicitly state that the Israeli government is not recognized as legal and should be replaced by a Palestinian authority. Nor will broad base decolonization proposals be accepted, such as the 1960 UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, XV Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Delupis, 1974) unless a specific country is targeted. An example of the latter is the 1974 UN General Assembly Resolution UN General Assembly Resolution 3061 XXVIII declaring Portugal's actions in Guinea-Bissau a violation of international law (Crawford, 1979).

state (SIDE A) or target of the contention (SIDE B). The challenger is not the state which necessarily brings the case to international attention. It is the government which seeks to alter the other's government. The target state is the one whose government is facing manipulation by a foreign source.¹¹ Another means of describing the situation is that the target is satisfied with its internal governmental status quo, while the challenger is dissatisfied with the target's status quo regime situation, and seeks to alter it.

Of course, the battle lines are not always so clear cut. What about the Yemeni case where the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia backed separate leaders? In these cases, the faction holding (or is closer to holding) de facto control over the state will be listed as the target, and the other side will become the challenger.¹² In cases where some distinction is still yet unascertained, the coding of sides A & B will have to remain arbitrary, but will closely reflect these principles as much as possible.

As with territorial claims, regime-based claims can involve more than two actors. For example, the Yemeni case of the 1960s involved the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia each backing a separate leader for the Yemeni government, with Britain backing the Saudi claim (Donelan & Grieve, 1973). The United States action against Grenada in 1983 involved support from the OECS alliance, as well as Barbados and Jamaica (Moore, 1984). Each claim in the dataset will be coded at two levels of analyses: the overall claim and the specific dyadic relationships involved in that claim. Each individual dyadic contention involving the claimants to Yemen in the 1960s will be recorded separately where two states' claims to the country's regime overlap. The Yemeni claim as a whole will also be coded as a single claim, actions consistent with the territorial claims phase of the ICOW project (Hensel, 1998).

TIME FRAME OF CLAIM

¹¹ Therefore, if Taiwan announces it has uncovered a secret plot by the Chinese intelligence to assassinate the Taiwanese president, then China is coded as the challenger (SIDE A) and Taiwan is the target (SIDE B).

¹² In the Yemeni case, the ousted Imam fled to Saudi Arabia to seek backing for a counter-coup against republican forces. Therefore, Yemen and its strong supporter the UAR will be targets, while the Saudis and British supporters become the targets. Of course, neither the Saudis nor British were actually directly trying to unseat the UAR's Nasser in this case, but his proxy leader in Yemen. If we, however, noted that the United Arab Republic had intervened in Yemen's internal affairs to oust the Imam (ex ante the revolution against the Imam) then Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the British supporters might become the targets and the UAR would be the challenger. Post-revolution tactics by the Imam and his supporters, though interpreted counter-coup-like actions, would still remain "targets."

The ICOW project will attempt to code all claims from 1816 through the end of 1996, though future updates will be made. The beginning and ending of the claims will be identified by the month and year in which the claim qualified under the coding rules described earlier. The month and year that the claim is made (BEGDATE) is based upon official government statements or public record of the event by state leaders or their appointed representatives. The ending date (ENDDATE) will be recorded in a similar fashion, with month and day included. It should be noted that earlier stages of the project may only be able to provide the year of claim initiations and suspensions because it may be difficult to historically ascertain when a covert action or propaganda scheme was abandoned.

An additional variable (RESOLVED) will be included to identify the means of claim resolution (if it is). The values are: (0) indicates that the claim is still ongoing past the end of 1996, (1) means the claim is simply dropped from the agenda and is not pursued by either side, (2) the claim is officially renounced through public statement by the challenger state, (3) either the challenger has agreed to end its intervention or claim against the target, or the target has agreed to a third party ruling and a compromise is reached, or (4) either the target recognizes the challenger's claim (without acceding to a third party resolution) to the seat of government or the challenger recognizes the target's right to exist.¹³

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CLAIM

Until now, the coding scheme remains fairly consistent with the ICOW project on territorial claims. But from here on, the characteristics and classifications will take on a much different set of relevant variables and distinctions, designed to be not only more in line with the dataset users' ability to study the claim, but to adequately test the hypotheses presented later in this paper.

¹³ Readers will undoubtedly note that classifications 2 and 4 sound an awful lot like each other, and a distinction should be identified. An example of classification two came in the infamous "balloon case" of 1955-1956, where the United States leased space from a West German landowner to fly balloons over Hungary, which dropped leaflets highly critical of the Hungarian Communist government. Protests by the Soviets and Hungarians (as well as the unwieldiness of the campaign) led the U.S. to officially suspend the program in autumn of 1956 (Murty, 1989). The United States did not drop the claim (1) nor did it announce an acceptance of the Hungarian Communist regime (4). Rather, it officially renounced an action designed to destabilize the Hungarian government. Had the Hungarian government been ousted by pro-West forces aided by public support from the balloon leaflets (a matter of the highest arbitrary discretion) or if the Hungarian government, fearful of public resentment from the propaganda, called new elections in a compromise to end the balloon campaign or agreed to step aside, then we could classify this resolution as a "4."

The first distinction will center on how the claim is presented to the international community (CLAIM INITIATION). This remains an important characteristic, as will be seen in the discussion on claim resolution. The first value “1” represents all formal claims, or those which are initiated within a recognized international institution (United Nations, League of Nations, International Court of Justice, etc.). Formal claims will also include those brought before regional organizations officially recognized by international institutions (i.e. their membership includes states and their treaties are typically deposited with the relevant international organization).¹⁴ This should cover all cases from 1920 to 1996. As for cases before 1920, I am attempting to construct an adequate proxy.¹⁵

Not all claims are introduced to international organizations by the relevant states for several reasons. First, the challenger or target may not be a recognized state under international auspices, and many organizations have a criterion that qualifies only states to initiate claims (many international courts require this). Second, a government which has been overthrown often cannot introduce its claim in the international organization because it has been displaced. In these cases, a third party may make a claim on behalf of a government or non-state entity.¹⁶

¹⁴ As for claims brought to the UN, they can be formally presented before the Security Council, General Assembly, Trusteeship Council, etc. The same applies to cases initiated at the League of Nations; they can go before the Council of Ministers or Conference of Ambassadors, etc. Thus, regime-based claims brought before Amnesty International alone will not be coded as formal because their membership is not one purely of states, despite whatever sympathies Amnesty International might have in the UN or worldwide. Claims brought before the Organization of American States, however, will be judged as formal claims.

¹⁵ This of course, presents a problem when analyzing cases before World War I, given that no supranational organization officially existed (though claims brought before the Hague Court should qualify). As a temporary measure, cases brought to the attention of the “supra-alliance” or Concert of Powers including England, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia should qualify, given that cases were officially presented before the Concert for resolution. Though this takes on a “Eurocentric” quality, I suspect that many non-European claims were initiated and discussed (especially colonial issues or actions of the great powers in other continents). And certainly little prevented South American countries, unable to have their claims heard before the Concert, from taking those claims to the Hague Court. I am open to suggestions for a suitable replacement from those who fail to see this ad hoc decision as viable.

¹⁶ An example of the first distinction of third party claims occurred in 1966, when Ethiopia and Liberia initiated a claim in the International Court of Justice on behalf of Namibia (an entity which did not have statehood at the time) against the South African-backed *transkei* regime (Quaye, 1991). An example of the latter occurred in 1973 when a US-backed coup toppled the Allende regime. Since Allende had been killed and his supporters scattered, we would not expect the new US-backed Pinochet regime to initiate a formal claim against the United States’ covert action in court or the U.N. But Cuba did bring the matter before the United Nations on behalf of Allende’s government as a protest against American action (Reisman & Baker, 1992). Thus the Namibian case and the US-Chilean contention represent cases of third party claims.

There are also several situations whereby the challenger or target state may not wish to present their case to a formal audience. First, preparing and defending a case before the international community is a costly strategy, with the success of action not always guaranteed. Some states may thus feel that it would do no good to bring the case before an organization like the U.N. or the League of Nations. Imagine Czechoslovakia's dilemma during the early stage of Prague Spring. While they could note (and so could the international community) attempts by the Soviets to bring down Dubcek's government in 1968, what good would it do to bring the matter before the UN security council, knowing the Soviets would likely veto any action. Preparing such a case might bring international sympathy, but little else. Therefore, some countries may feel it is in their best interests to avoid the costly procedure of formalizing a claim in the international organization, and make a broad-based public appeal or openly denounce such actions.

Second, it is not necessarily in the best interests of the challenger to reveal the contention. These scenarios include cases of covert action and propaganda. Obviously, a challenger might not want to reveal that he or she is secretly supplying rebels in another country to the United Nations! Third, especially in cases of recognition, a state may feel its policy is its own business and not that of the purview of international organizations. These cases will be classified as informal claims for the variable CLAIM INITIATE.

CLAIM BASIS VARIABLES

Governments who initiate challenges against another government usually have some form of motivation for risking international condemnation and possible reprisals by the target or others. A series of dichotomous variables will be included to determine the presence of such a claim basis, given that many regime-based conflicts exist over several possible contentions. The first dichotomous variable SELF-DETERMINATION seeks to capture whether the challenger is pressing for some form of electorate choice for the target regime's subjects. This may include allowing all or a portion of the subjects to vote or in another way choose their own leader. Another variable HUMAN RIGHTS determines whether the purpose of the action by the challenger is made on the basis of human rights.¹⁷ Another claim basis variable is

¹⁷ Since "human rights" is a fairly vague concept, the mission must include the protection of the rights of target states' subjects. The purpose of this variable is to establish that the claims are made, not as to whether or not they are honored in practice. Syria may claim that their intervention in Lebanon is for "humanitarian" reasons, even if they actually cause more rights abuses than they protect the people from.

ETHNIC, used to identify the presence of cases where one state intervenes in another to preserve an ethnically-composed state, to protect against the target state's abuses of an ethnic minority (which runs the challenger state's government), or to permit an ethnic minority to secede (even if it does not join with the challenger state).¹⁸

Another claim purpose may be more economic in origin. The variable DEVOLUTION represents cases where one government may take action against another (on the basis of the target regime's legitimacy) because the target has not agreed to live up to prior treaties, or agreements concerning trade and investment.¹⁹ A final claim basis variable ALLIANCE is designed to represent cases where a regime has broken an alliance with another state before the regime-challenge has been initiated. This might present a motive for a challenger to take action against a target and replace the government with one which would reestablish the alliance bonds. The presence of an alliance will be judged according to the presence of an alliance in the Correlates of War dataset on alliances (Small & Singer, 1968, with updates).

CONTEXT OF THE CHALLENGE

In addition for providing stated (and often alleged) motives for a challenge against another regime, several factors should be analyzed which would illuminate the context in which such a contention would arise. These would allow us to identify when such a claim might occur in the future.

REGIME CHANGE is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the regime has officially changed its leadership (legally or illegally). This would allow us to analyze whether or not the source of contention is a change in government or whether the existing government adopted a policy or series of policies leading a challenger to question the government's legitimacy. But there are multiple forms of regime change. The dichotomous variable EXTRALEGAL refers to cases where the target government has undergone an extraconstitutional change in government. Finally, MULTIPLE RULER captures those cases where more than one ruler is

¹⁸ A good example is the Rwandan Tutsi government's support of Zaire's rebel forces, given Zaire's actions in the previous genocide in Rwanda and Mobutu Sese Seko's alleged backing of Hutu rebels.

¹⁹ A special example may include cases where the prior regime recognized the rights of private property, but new government did not and began expropriating landholdings of foreigners. One regime may seek revenge by attempting to undermine the expropriator. This was relatively common in confrontations between the United States and Latin American nations who chose or were about to choose socialist governments or those advocating a policy of land reform.

recognized as the legitimate sovereign.²⁰ As with the claim basis variables, discussion of these variables' importance will be made in the section on hypotheses.

REGIME TRANSITION VARIABLES

Given that a regime change has occurred, many further distinctions should be analyzed. First, SECESSION identifies the claim as one where part of a target state has broken away from another, and has been either recognized or supported by a challenger before the target recognizes the independence as official. An example might be the German recognition of the Bosnian government in 1992 before the Serb-led Yugoslav government was in any mood to grant independence. The dichotomous variable COLONY measures cases where challengers recognize a colony's right to independence from the colonizer.²¹

Another important factor is whether or not a switch in regime type has occurred. That is, the regime change involves a switch from an autocracy to democracy, or vice versa.²² This measure will not be a carbon copy of the EXTRALEGAL variable though. It is possible for a constitutional monarchy to be replaced by a military junta and no change in regime type to occur.²³

The final two variables in this category cover cases where regime changes involve some degree of violence. If the transition is one involving armed attacks, political deaths or assassinations of important figures, it will receive a "one" in the dichotomous variable VIOLENCE; all others will receive a "zero." Another variable LEADER DEMISE captures cases where the leader of the country has been killed

²⁰ This can be bilateral, such as the United States government's recognition of King Constantine in the late 1960s while the Greek military junta claimed de facto control of the state (Galloway, 1978). Or it can be multilateral, as witnessed by the case of Yemen in the 1960s, where the UAR, the Yemeni republic and Saudi Arabia recognized multiple rulers.

²¹ An example includes the aforementioned Ethiopia and Liberia claim against South Africa's colonization of Namibia. Other cases included the former Spanish colonies in Central and South America. The United States recognized most of these new republics in 1822, but Spain refused to grant such recognition until 1836 (Galloway, 1978; Crawford, 1979).

²² Whether or not such a regime type change occurs will be measured according to Polity III dataset (Jagers & Gurr, 1995) with Dixon's measure of democracy (6 or higher = democracy). If the regime type change has occurred, it will be coded as a one, all others will receive a zero score.

²³ I am contemplating including a variable (MARX) for ideological change, indicating a switch in government to or from Communist control. This will also reflect cases where one country states that part of its mission is to either impose a Marxist regime or oppose one. Given the extreme arbitrary nature of this variable in historical coverage, I have not yet resolved whether or not this dichotomous variable will be included in the final ICOW research project on regime-based disputes.

during the transition. As my discussion in the hypotheses section will argue, the problem of regime-based claims becomes more intractable when the leader is killed, making it more difficult to assign legitimacy to a successor.

PRESSURE TACTICS

This category of variables gauges what sort of pressures the challenger uses against the target. This includes MILITARY, a dichotomous variable which involves measuring any regime-based claim which involves a militarized dispute²⁴ Another dichotomous variable ECONOMIC, captures all cases where either (1) economic sanctions are applied, or (2) economic support (in the form of products, credits or loans) previously promised is denied. Finally, DIPLOMATIC includes all cases where recognition is withheld or diplomatic relations are suspended.²⁵

CLAIM RESOLUTION VARIABLES

In addition to the RESOLUTION variable identifying how the contentions are resolved, I will include several other variables related to claim resolution. These will center on those cases where the third party has attempted to resolve a claim and the characteristics of those third parties. For example, is the third party a major or minor power? Are they from the same region? Is the third party an international organization, and if so, is it inter-governmental or non-governmental? The codes for these actors will be consistent with those developed for the ICOW research project on territorial claims.

Along with the general claims dataset and the dyad-claim dataset, an additional dataset will be made available to report all cases of settlement attempts. These include bilateral and multilateral settlement attempts, as well as those brokered by third parties (which are not original parties to the regime-based claim). Other variables in this section include the extent of the settlement (does it end a militarized dispute or

²⁴ As measured by the Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996) dataset on MIDs.

²⁵ In these situations, it is fairly difficult to separate cases where a country deliberately withholds recognition and those situations where recognition has not been granted due to the slow-churning wheels of government and natural bureaucratic red tape. As a compromise, I include only those cases where the challenger government formally announces a deliberate campaign of target regime non-recognition for longer than a month or the target state has not been recognized for a period of six months. Another reason for this criteria is that there are also cases where states have adopted a policy known as the Estrada doctrine, where recognition is automatically granted to any regime establishing de facto control, regardless of the legality of transition or the type of government formed (Galloway, 1978). Thus, relying only on the absence of a formal regime claim from each and every individual state will over-inflate the regime-based claims cases.

resolve the entire claim?), whether or not the agreement was ratified and/or complied with, and the type of attempted settlement (mediation, arbitration, good offices, adjudication?).

RESEARCH AIMS OF THE PROJECT: HYPOTHESES

In future presentations, I will conduct empirical analyses of the Issues Correlates of War project on regime-based claims. This section will discuss several hypotheses which will be tested to let the reader know the direction of the project.

Hypothesis 1: Costs of Separation Argument. Conflict between the challenger and target states will be greater if the ties between the two states were greater prior to the target's regime change.

This argument assumes that the most conflictual cases of regime-based claims are caused by the dissolution of once-amicable relations between the challenger and the former regime in the target state. For example, Bueno de Mesquita (1981) argues that the presence of intra-alliance conflict is related to a deterioration in interstate relations between the two allies. The target may contemplate disengaging itself from the alliance and if the challenger values the alliance, it will attempt to insert a government more favorable to maintaining the alliance. I would extend that argument to cases when target states threaten to sever economic ties/break economic agreements or colonial scenarios where the colonizer is reluctant to surrender its lucrative arrangement with its former sphere of influence. Auxiliary hypotheses include:

Hypotheses 1a: Conflict between the claimant states is greater if both states shared an alliance prior to the change in one state's regime.

Hypotheses 1b: Conflict between the claimant states is greater if the claim is devolution-based.

Hypotheses 1c: Conflict between the claimant states is greater if the a colonial arrangement is involved.

Greater conflict is also measured in two ways: duration of the dispute and greater magnitude of the conflict (higher level of force, more casualties, etc.).

Hypothesis 2: Force of Claim Argument. The greater pressure exerted by the challenger state against the target state, the greater the duration of the claim between both states.

This argument operates under the premise that the more pressure that is used by a challenger state to change the regime of a target state, the longer the claim takes to be resolved. Greater pressure makes the target less likely to accede to the

demands of the challenger, and makes the head of the target state less likely to abdicate in favor of the challenger's hand-picked successor. The alternate hypothesis is that the increased pressure may be more likely to succeed in displacing the target regime (especially the military pressure), but one of two things is likely to occur. First, the target government supporters might attempt a counter-coup against the challenger's government preference. Second, such military pressure could produce an international outcry, leading to pressure against the challenger to at least stand-down military forces or economic sanctions, if not withdraw the claim. The auxiliary hypotheses are:

Hypothesis 2a: Conflict between both claimant states is longer if military pressure is exerted by the challenger state.

Hypothesis 2b: Conflict between both claimant states is longer if economic pressure is exerted by the challenger state.

Hypothesis 2c: Conflict between both claimant states is shorter if only diplomatic pressure is exerted by the challenger state.

Conflict in this context is measured by the length of the claim between both states.

Hypothesis 3: Magnitude of Change Argument. The greater the amount of regime change in the target state, the greater the amount of conflict (between the claimants) and the longer the duration of the claim.

This argument contends that the greater amount of change in the target state, the less likely both sides will have a status quo ex ante to derive a solution from. If the prior regime has been replaced by extralegal means, it will be more difficult to reestablish the legal head of state (especially if he or she is assassinated).

Hypothesis 3a: Conflict is more likely and claims last longer if the target state has undergone a shift in regime type.

Hypothesis 3b: Conflict is more likely and claims last longer if the target state has undergone an extraconstitutional change in government.

Hypothesis 3c: Conflict is more likely and claims last longer if the target state's original head of state has been killed.

Hypothesis 4: Formal & Institutional Peace Argument. The more institutionalized the dispute-resolution process, the greater the likelihood that the regime claim will be settled.

This argument utilizes the settlement dataset to study the efficacy of various dispute-resolution attempts. Given that regime-based claims, unlike territorial claims, are less divisible (it is easier to divide a disputed territory in half than it is to divide a "throne" into two equal parts), it often takes an external third party or organization to settle the issue. In bilateral settlement attempts of regime-based claims, one typically must accede to the wishes of the other state. A target state may be more willing to risk

confrontation that unilaterally abdicate. Furthermore, if a greater degree of pressure has been used, the hostility between the parties is more likely to forestall a diplomatic settlement. Auxiliary hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 4a: The regime claim is more likely to be resolved if the claim is formal-based.

Hypothesis 4b: If military or economic pressure is used by the challenger state, then the dispute is less likely to be resolved bilaterally.

Hypothesis 4c: If military or economic pressure is used by the challenger state, then the dispute is more likely to be resolved by a third party.

FUTURE PLANS FOR THE ICOW PROJECT'S SECOND PHASE

Once the ICOW project on regime-based claims has been completed, the data gathered and the initial hypotheses tested, there are several potential aims for the ICOW project's second phase. First, the regime-based claims list will be compared to other lists of regime claims for validity checks. Such sources include Luard's and Holsti's lists, as well as all claims in the MID's and ICB data coded as being over regime-issues. This will allow me to determine what claims I missed or offer claims not included in other works. Second, the data from the ICOW regime-based claims will be compared to the territorial issue dataset to compare several factors from the two issues, including claim length, level of conflict and means of resolution. This way we can better evaluate prior empirical works on inter-issue comparison in international relations.

Once the regime-based claims have been collected and analyzed, future projects on issue claims will commence. Proposed topics include purely ethnic and religious contentions, economic issues, resources claims and policy-based conflicts. Of course, this list does not represent a comprehensive list of all possible issue contentions in the international sphere, and suggestions are welcome. The only criteria we insist upon is that they correspond to the original aims of the ICOW project: that not all claims involve overt military confrontation and that they offer a greater understanding of the bridge between perfectly amicable relations and outright interstate hostility in order to enhance our theories of what leads to the presence of militarized disputes and wars.

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APPENDIX

PROVISIONAL LIST OF REGIME-BASED CLAIMS
IN THE AMERICAS: 1816-1996

I have compiled a temporary collection of regime-based claims in the Americas. These include cases of non-American claims against American states, but not American state claims against outside powers. This list actually represents all dyads in the regime-based claims. A more updated list will be available at a future date.

CHALLENGER	TARGET	YEAR(S)	CLAIM SUBJECT
United States of	Spain	06/1822-1836	Recognition Colombian Govt.
United States of	Spain	12/12/1822- 12/28/1836	Recognition Mexican Govt.
United Kingdom of	Spain	02/02/1825-1836	Recognition Argentine Govt.
United States of	Spain	03/15/1825-1836	Recognition Federal Republic of Central America*
United Kingdom of	Spain	04/18/1825-1836	Recognition Colombian Govt.
United Kingdom of	Spain	12/28/1826- 12/28/1836	Recognition Mexican Govt.
Spain VII	Mexico	1828-1829	Ferdinand
Honduras	Guatemala	1848	Counter-Revolution Central American Republic Issue
Nicaragua	Guatemala	1848	Central American Republic Issue
El Salvador	Guatemala	1848	Central American Republic Issue
United States	Nicaragua	1855-1857	Nonrecognition of Rivas-Walker Govt.
United Kingdom	United States	1861-1867	<i>Trent</i> Case: CSA & USA= Belligerents*
France	Mexico	10/31/1861 05/15/1867	Installation of Emperor Maximillian
Spain Intervention	Mexico	10/31/1861	Military

Britain Intervention	Mexico	04/1862 10/31/1861	Supporting France Military
United States	Venezuela	04/1862 1862	Supporting France Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
Guatemala	Costa Rica	01/1865- 02/17/1878	Recognition of Guatemala's ex- President Barrios
Nicaragua	Costa Rica	01/1865- 02/17/1878	Recognition of Guatemala's ex- President Barrios
El Salvador	Costa Rica	01/1865- 02/17/1878	Recognition of Guatemala's ex- President Barrios
United States	Peru	1866	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
El Salvador	Honduras	02/1871- 07/31/1871	Harboring Political Refugees (vs Govt.)
Honduras	El Salvador	03/25/1872	Plots to Overthrow Government
Guatemala	Honduras	12/1873	Politic. Intervention vs. President Arias
El Salvador	Honduras	12/1873	Politic. Intervention vs. President Arias
Honduras	El Salvador	04/01/1876- 03/31/1878	Salvador's support of Ousted Leíva
Guatemala	El Salvador	04/01/1876- 03/31/1878	Salvador's support of Ousted Leíva
Costa Rica	Guatemala	03/22/1885- 04/02/1885	Forming of Central American Union
El Salvador	Guatemala	03/22/1885- 04/02/1885	Forming of Central American Union
Nicaragua	Guatemala	03/22/1885- 04/02/1885	Forming of Central American Union
El Salvador	Guatemala	07/21/1890- 11/15/1890	Harboring Revolutionaries
United States Cuban	Spain	1898	Support of
United States	Colombia	10/19/1903 1920(?)	Insurrection Supporting Panamanian Insurrection
El Salvador	Guatemala	06/1906- 07/18/1906	Harboring Revolutionaries
Nicaragua	Honduras	01/1907- 04/1907	Supporting Revolution
El Salvador	Honduras	07/1908 12/19/1908	Supporting Revolution Groups

United States	Nicaragua	1909-1910	Anti-Zelaya Coup Support
United States	Honduras	01/20/1911	Aided anti-Dávila Rebellion
United States	Nicaragua	08/04/1912-08/1925	Marines sent to restore order
United States	Mexico	02/19/1913-07/14/1914	Non-Recognition of Huerta Government
United States	Haiti	07/28/1915-08/15/1934	Army Mission vs. Internal Chaos
United States	Dominican Republic	05/05/1916-07/02/1934	Marines sent to restore order
United States	Costa Rica	01/27/1917-08/1919	Nonrecognition of Tinoco Government
United Kingdom	Costa Rica	1917-1923	Nonrecognition of Tinoco Government
Honduras	El Salvador	03/07/1920	Aiding & Abetting Ousted Araujo
United States	Bolivia	08/12/1920-12/1920	Nonrecognition of Revolution Govt.
United States	Mexico	1921-1923	Nonrecognition of Obregón Govt.
United States	Chile	1924	Nonrecognition of Revolution Govt.
United States	Honduras	04/20/1925	Marine Intervention La Ceiba
United States	Nicaragua	01/1926	Nonrecognition of Chamorro Govt.
United States	Nicaragua	08/1926-01/02/1933	Marines sent to restore order
United States	Ecuador	1927-1928	Nonrecognition of Revolution Govt.
Mexico	Nicaragua	1928	Support for U.S. action*
United States	El Salvador	12/03/1931-01/26/1934	Nonrecognition of Martinez Govt.
Guatemala	El Salvador	12/03/1931-1933	Nonrecognition of Martinez Govt.
Honduras	El Salvador	12/03/1931-1933	Nonrecognition of Martinez Govt.
Costa Rica	El Salvador	12/03/1931-01/03/1934	Nonrecognition of Martinez Govt.
United States	Chile	1932	Nonrecognition of Revolution Govt.
Nicaragua	Honduras	04/1936-05/27/1936	Base for Rebels*
El Salvador	Honduras	04/1936-05/27/1936	Base for Rebels*
United States	Bolivia	1937	Nonrecognition

Germany	Uruguay	1940	until recognition of Chaco Peace Attempted Pro-Nazi Coup
United Kingdom	Bolivia	12/1943 06/23/1944	Axis Sympathies of Maj. Villarroel*
United States	Bolivia	12/1943 06/23/1944	Axis Sympathies of Maj. Villarroel*
Rio Pact (19 nations)	Bolivia	12/1943 06/23/1944	Axis Sympathies of Maj. Villarroel*
United Kingdom	Argentina	02/1944 03/27/1945	Axis Sympathies of General Farrell*
United States	Argentina	02/1944 03/27/1945	Axis Sympathies of General Farrell*
Rio Pact (20 nations)	Argentina	02/1944 03/27/1945	Axis Sympathies of General Farrell*
United States	Venezuela	1948	Nonrecognition on rights record
Dominican Republic	Haiti	1950	Propaganda
Haiti	Dominican Republic	1950	Propaganda
Guatemala	Dominican Republic	1950	Propaganda
Cuba	Dominican Republic	1950	Propaganda
United States	Guatemala	1951-1954	Assist in Overthrow of Arbenz Regime
United States	Cuba	1959-1961	Bay of Pigs: Back Insurrection
Dominican Republic	Venezuela	06/1960	Assassin Attempt vs. President Betancourt
United States	Dominican Republic	1960-05/30/1961	Aid in Trujillo's Assassination
United States	El Salvador	1961	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
United States	Dominican Republic	01/01/1962 01/18/1962	Econ & Military Pressure vs. Coup
Cuba &	OAS Nations	01/1862-03/1862	Propaganda
OAS Nations Sanction	Cuba	03/1862	Revolution Support Economic
Costa Rica	Argentina	03/30/1962-???	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
Venezuela	Argentina	04/05/1962-???	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
United States	Peru	07/18/1962 08/17/1962	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.

Venezuela	Ecuador	07/1963	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
Costa Rica	Ecuador	07/1963	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
Honduras	Ecuador	07/1963	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
United States	Dominican Republic	10/04/1963	Pressure vs. anti-Bosch Coup
Venezuela	Brazil	12/14/1963	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
Costa Rica	Brazil	1964	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
United States	Chile	1964-1970	Political Intervention
United States	Dominican Republic	04/1965	IAPF Peacekeeping
Brazil	Dominican Republic	09/21/1966	Intervention
Honduras	Dominican Republic	04/1965	IAPF Peacekeeping
Paraguay	Dominican Republic	09/21/1966	Intervention
Nicaragua	Dominican Republic	04/1965	IAPF Peacekeeping
Costa Rica	Dominican Republic	09/21/1966	Intervention
El Salvador	Dominican Republic	04/1965	IAPF Peacekeeping
United Kingdom	Dominican Republic	09/21/1966	Intervention
Canada	Dominican Republic	1965-1966	Nonrecognition of Deña and/or Imbert
United States	Argentina	06/1966	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
Cuba	Bolivia	07/15/1966	Insurrection
United States	Peru	1960s	Support (Guevara)
Venezuela	Peru	10/02/1968	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
Dominican Republic	Peru	10/25/1968	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
El Salvador	Peru	10/02/1968	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
United States	Panama	10/25/1968	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
Venezuela	Panama	10/12/1968	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
Ecuador	Panama	11/13/1968	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
		10/12/1968	Nonrecognition of

United States	Chile (Cuba initiates)	11/13/1968 1970-1973	Revolutionary Govt. Anti-Allende Coup Support
France	Chile	1973	Nonrecognition of Pinochet Govt.
Italy	Chile	1973	Nonrecognition of Pinochet Govt.
Yugoslavia	Chile	1973	Nonrecognition of Pinochet Govt.
Cuba	Chile	1973	Nonrecognition of Pinochet Govt.
Soviet Union Nonrecognition	Chile	1973	
Mexico	Chile	1973	of Pinochet Govt. Nonrecognition of Pinochet Govt.
Sweden	Chile	1973	Nonrecognition of Pinochet Govt.
Finland	Chile	1973	Nonrecognition of Pinochet Govt.
Nicaragua Action vs.	El Salvador	1980s	Covert
Soviet Union Action vs.	El Salvador	1980s	Duarte Govt. Covert
Cuba Action vs.	El Salvador	1980s	Duarte Govt. Covert
United States	Nicaragua	03/09/1981 03/23/1990	Duarte Govt. Covert Action vs. Sandanista Govt.
Honduras	Nicaragua	11/1981 03/23/1990	Harboring Contra Revolutionaries
Costa Rica	Nicaragua	1982-05/08/1986	Harboring Contra Revolutionaries
United States	Grenada	10/24/1983 12/15/1983	OECS Peacekeep Intervention
Barbados	Grenada	10/24/1983 12/15/1983	OECS Peacekeep Intervention
Jamaica	Grenada	10/24/1983 12/15/1983	OECS Peacekeep Intervention
Antigua	Grenada	10/24/1983 12/15/1983	OECS Operation Backing
Dominica	Grenada	10/24/1983 12/15/1983	OECS Operation Backing vs. Coup
Montserrat	Grenada	10/24/1983 12/15/1983	OECS Operation Backing vs. Coup
St. Kitts/Nevis	Grenada	10/24/1983 12/15/1983	OECS Operation Backing vs. Coup

St. Lucia	Grenada	10/24/1983 12/15/1983	OECS Operation Backing vs. Coup
St. Vincent & The Grenadines	Grenada	10/24/1983 12/15/1983	OECS Operation Backing vs. Coup
United States	Panama	1989-1990	Military Intervention
United States	Haiti	1991-1995	Sanctions & Peacekeeping Operation
OAS Nations	Haiti	1991-1995	Sanctions & Peacekeeping Operaton

CURRENTLY UNLISTED

Columbia	Peru	1821	Bolivar Pressure
United States	Venezuela	???	Pressure vs. Paez Government
United Kingdom	Mexico	???	Nonrecognition of Miramón Govt.
“3 Central American Republics”	Panama	10/12/1968 11/13/1968	Nonrecognition of Revolutionary Govt.
United States	Haiti	1986	Pressure on Duvalier Govt.

* = Evidence exists shows some support for the existence of a regime-based claim, but much more research is needed to confirm this.