

## **Colonial Legacies and Territorial Claims**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Most of today's nation-states experienced colonial rule at some point during the last two centuries, with well-studied economic, political, and social consequences after decolonization. This study examines a different form of the colonial legacy, involving the stability of the territorial status quo. We lay out a number of different forms that colonial legacies might take with respect to territorial claims, focusing both on relations between two former colonies and on relations between a former colony and its former colonial ruler. We then present and test hypotheses about the impact of these legacies on territorial claims. A combination of quantitative analysis with several brief case studies show strong evidence that colonial legacies affect territorial conflict after independence, with conflict more likely after violent decolonization and in relations between former colonies of the same colonizer.

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

In July 2008, the month before a paper describing this project was presented at a conference in Seoul, a series of events in the world headlines drew attention to the colonial origins of territorial claims. That month, Japan issued guidelines for how teachers should instruct their students about the Japanese claim to the islets known as Takeshima in Japan and as Dokdo in Korea. The South Korean government protested strongly against these guidelines, rejecting the Japanese claim as an extension of Japan's previous colonial rule over Korea. The Nigerian legislature debated a motion to reverse the government's decision to comply with an International Court of Justice ruling by handing over the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon, in a territorial claim that dates to the period when the two were colonies of Great Britain and France. Thailand and Cambodia also moved hundreds of soldiers to their border near the Preah Vihear temple, in another territorial claim that dates to the time when Cambodia was a French colony. While the details of these cases vary, in each case the territorial problem in question is said to have resulted from a colonial legacy.

Most nation-states in the international system were ruled as colonies or other dependencies of at least one foreign power,<sup>1</sup> so if colonial legacies do affect events after independence, much of the world seems likely to be affected. Recognizing this, scholars have examined the effects of colonialism on such economic phenomena as development or trade (e.g. Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Blanton, Mason, and Athow

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<sup>1</sup> The ICOW Colonial History data set, available at <<http://www.icow.org>>, reveals that 183 of 222 states that have existed in the modern interstate system (82.4%) have been ruled as a dependency or part of at least one foreign state.

2001; Athow and Blanton 2002; Easterly and Levine 2003; Mahoney 2003; Lange et al. 2006) and such political phenomena as democratic stability or ethnic conflict (e.g. Blondel 1972; Bollen 1979; Clague et al. 2001; Huntington 1984; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Lipset, Seong, and Torres 1993; Bernhard et al. 2004). Little systematic attention has been devoted to territorial claims or armed conflict, though, which is the purpose of the present paper.

We begin in Chapter 2 by discussing the possible forms that colonial legacies might take with respect to territorial claims, in order to approach this topic systematically. Newly independent states generally come into existence with borders that were established under colonial rule. Not only did the colonial ruler have an opportunity to shape the political, economic, and social development of its dependencies, but it also had an opportunity to settle their borders -- or to leave them unsettled. Actions taken during the colonial era may have substantial positive or negative impacts after independence, with respect to the stability of borders with neighboring states as well as relations with the former colonizer. We present a series of hypotheses about the conditions under which these different legacies are most likely to take effect.

The next two chapters present empirical analyses that are used to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents large-N quantitative analyses of the impact of colonial legacies on territorial conflict between neighbors. Chapter 4 then presents similar analyses of the impact of these legacies on territorial conflict between the former colonial power and its former colonies after they have achieved independence.

These two chapters offer important summaries of global patterns with respect to colonial legacies, and offer useful insight into the overall impact of these legacies. The results indicate that colonial legacies have had important and systematic effects on territorial conflict, with such

conflict being much more likely between neighbors who shared the same colonial ruler as well as where decolonization occurred through violent means. Furthermore, while territorial conflict between a new state and its former colonial ruler is relatively rare -- about one in eight states have at least one, half the rate for territorial conflict with neighboring states -- this conflict does tend to occur in predictable situations. The risk of conflict is roughly three times as high for states that achieved independence through violent means as for those that decolonized peacefully.

The following five chapters supplement the global analyses from Chapters 3 and 4 with more detailed examination of cases in each region of the world that has experienced substantial colonial rule. Chapter 5 examines the impact of colonial legacies on territorial conflict in the Americas, the first region to experience widespread decolonization. Europe is then addressed in Chapter 6, the Middle East in Chapter 7, Africa in Chapter 8, and Asia and Oceania in Chapter 9. These chapters offer a great deal of supporting evidence to the global analyses presented in Chapters 3 and 4, with much greater insight into how these general patterns have worked in specific cases.

We conclude in Chapter 10 by discussing implications of these results. We believe that this study has offered an important first step in understanding the impact of colonial rule on territorial conflict after independence. These results are consistent with a wide body of quantitative research on armed conflict, and suggest that future work in this area should pay much greater attention should be paid to colonial legacies. We conclude with a call for further research on territorial claims, rather than just armed conflict, and on the techniques that can be used for peaceful conflict management. Relatively few of the armed conflicts over territory that are studied here escalated to the point of full-scale war, and indeed many territorial claims that

may be traced to colonial legacies never spawned a single military confrontation. Much more can be done to seek to understand why so many cases avoid conflict altogether, or if they do experience it, why they often manage to keep it confined to relatively low and bloodless levels.

## CHAPTER 2

### STUDYING COLONIAL LEGACIES AND TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

While numerous territorial claims might be said to be related to some sort of vague "colonial legacy," the analyst must be careful to specify exactly what is meant by this legacy and how it might be expected to affect territorial conflict. If this is not done in an analytically rigorous way, then the concept of colonial legacies offers little scientific value. We begin the theoretical section of this project by laying out what we believe to be the most important general patterns of colonial legacies with respect to territorial conflict. We then present hypotheses on the conditions under which each legacy is most likely to be relevant, which will be tested empirically in subsequent chapters.

We must begin this section by emphasizing that this project is not currently concerned with borders or territorial claims that involve the territory of at least one current colony or dependency. We consider such cases to be part of the colonial era itself, and note that the colonial "legacy" in such cases is still being developed. The impact of colonialism during the colonial era is likely to be much different than its impact after decolonization, and studying the colonial era is likely to require much more time and space than is possible in the current project. We plan to return to this topic in future research, though.

[Figure 2.1 about here]

We suggest that there are four broad categories of colonial legacies with respect to territorial conflict after independence, as depicted in Figure 2.1. With respect to the affected countries, the colonial experience might affect a former colony's territorial relationships with neighboring countries, as well as with the former colonizer. Furthermore, for either of these

types of territorial relationship, the colonial experience may either worsen or improve the relationship. We now discuss each of these four categories.

### **Colonial Legacy Improved Territorial Relations with the Former Colonizer**

The first form of colonial legacy that we consider involves post-independence relations between a former colony and its former colonial ruler. Because colonial rule inevitably involves close (if unequal) political and economic ties between the ruler and its colonies, it is unsurprising that many postcolonial states maintain relatively close ties with the ruler after decolonization. To the extent that the colonial ruler was able to replace local languages, religions, customs, and institutions with its own during a long period of colonial rule, its former colonies are likely to speak the colonizer's language and follow its religion after independence, and they may well retain political and economic institutions that are very closely related to those that the colonizer imposed.

A variety of research confirms the expectation that former colonies tend to maintain close relationships with their former rulers. Athow and Blanton (2002) find that African trade patterns established during the colonial period have tended to persist well after independence, with former British and particularly French colonies maintaining much higher levels of trade with the former colonizer after independence than would otherwise be expected. Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that former colonies receive a large portion of many former colonizers' foreign aid. Former colonizers such as Britain and France also maintain a military presence in many former colonies, and help to protect their former colonies from either internal or external military threats; Tillema's (1989) list of 269 foreign overt military interventions includes 80 cases where a former colonizer sent military forces into the territory of a former colony. Yet this often close

postcolonial relationship is not always positive. The dependency literature sees the continued close trade ties after independence as reflecting a continuation of the colonizer's domination of the former colony's economy, and both these economic ties and the military influence of the former colonizer can also be a source of pressure on the postcolonial government should it plot a course that diverges from the former colonizer's interests. Not all of Tillema's interventions were meant to support the former colony's government; former colonizers have sometimes come into armed conflict or taken other action against governments in their former colonies.

### **Colonial Legacy Worsened Territorial Relations with the Former Colonizer**

With respect to territorial claims, it would seem reasonable to expect territorial conflict between a colonizer and its former colonies to be relatively rare. Once the colonizer made the decision (voluntarily or otherwise) to pull out of the colony, it would seem relatively unlikely to return to the area for further territorial gains in the future. If it did so, though, either of two reasons would seem likely to be at work.

First, the former colonizer could decide that it needs the economic or strategic benefit that control of a specific territory might provide, as with a potential source of oil or other valuable resources, or a strategic position that can give important military benefits as a base for troop deployments, a coaling station when navies depended on them, or a vantage point from which to defend (or threaten) international shipping lanes.

Second, the process of decolonization may not have settled all of the outstanding issues to both sides' satisfaction, perhaps leading the former colony to pursue a desired territory from the colonizer or another of its colonies, or leading the former colonizer to pursue a territory that

would allow it to protect its citizens, its remaining colonies in the area, or other important interests.

In either of these cases, the key to whether or not the colonizer and its former colony come into territorial conflict seems to be the relationship between them at the time of decolonization. If decolonization follows a peaceful path and the colony becomes independent on friendly terms with its former ruler, then neither of these scenarios appears to be likely. There would likely be few unresolved issues between colonizer and colony at the time of independence, and if there were (or if any should subsequently arise), the two states' generally cooperative relationship should allow them to settle their issues peacefully.

On the other hand, if decolonization follows a violent or hostile path, then either scenario would seem more plausible. Important issues related to the status of territories or the status of minorities in either the newly independent colony or in the colonizer's other possessions would seem likely to remain unresolved at independence, and the generally hostile relationship that follows decolonization would make such issues difficult to resolve cooperatively while creating an environment in which other issues should be more likely to arise. This emphasis on the process by which decolonization occurred is similar to an argument by Maoz (1989, 1996), who distinguishes between "evolutionary" states that gradually assume self-rule over time (with largely peaceful consequences for foreign relations after independence) and "revolutionary" states that arise through violent struggle (with much more conflictual consequences being typical).

### **Colonial Legacy Worsened Territorial Relations with Neighbors**

The second general form of colonial legacy that we consider involves aspects of the colonial period that worsen territorial relations between former colonies after independence, whether by creating territorial claims that might otherwise have been avoided or by worsening or escalating the management of claims. This perspective begins with the assumption that colonial powers generally pursued their own military, strategic, economic and political interests during the colonial era, doing little to further the interests of the colonies themselves (except to the extent that this occurred naturally through pursuit of the colonizer's own self-interest). For example, colonial powers typically oriented their colonies' economies around the export of raw materials and agricultural products needed by the colonial powers, rather than the development of their internal colonial markets. In colonial Spanish America, the individual colonies were restricted from trading with each other; few ports were created; and incentives for short-term Spanish economic gain were generally greater than the incentives of long-range local economic development (North et al. 1999: 32-35).

Politically, many colonies were ruled from abroad with little opportunity for self-rule. At independence, then, most former colonies lacked local leaders with real political experience, and their political institutions were often introduced hurriedly as the colonizers abandoned their colonies. In colonial Latin America, "autonomous institutions of self government existed only at the most local level, and possessed heavily circumscribed authorities" (North et al. 1999: 37). A variety of recent research has begun to examine the impact of colonial legacies on economic growth or development since independence, often focusing on the economic and political institutions that were created during the colonial era as a key explanatory factor (e.g. Hanson 1989; Grier 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine 2003; Mahoney 2003; Lange et al. 2006; Angeles 2007; Nunn 2007).

A similar point can be made regarding former colonies' borders. Colonial powers typically defined borders for their colonies with the colonizers' interests in mind rather than those of the colonies themselves, consistent with their political, social and economic management of the colonies. Indeed, colonial powers had incentives to disrupt any previously existing borders that might have been more "natural." The preservation of traditional political entities could lead to challenges against the colonizer's interests, which could be minimized by disrupting traditional forms of organization. This point is most noticeable in Africa, where colonial borders were typically drawn artificially at times like the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, and reflected the colonial powers' interests rather than local ethnic, tribal, economic, or other considerations. Athow and Blanton (2002: 220) note, for example, that the Berlin Conference and similar efforts were designed to delimit administrative boundaries in light of "how they could best break down traditional social and economic networks for more efficient social control and resource extraction." This lack of concern for the colonies' interests in the definition of borders would lead one to expect that borders defined during the colonial period should be contested frequently after independence because they did not reflect the interests of the local populations; once the entities on both sides of a colonial border obtain independence, they would seem likely to pursue revised borders that reflect their own respective interests rather than those of the former colonizer.

Another problem concerns the incentives for a complete and accurate demarcation between colonies. The colonizer may not have had an interest in expending great time and effort to establish clear and well-marked borders with neighboring colonies; clearly demarcated borders would only seem to be a concern in the event that the neighboring colony was beginning to threaten the resource extraction that attracted the colonizer in the first place. This lack of

incentives for clear demarcation would seem to be especially true for borders between two colonies ruled by the same foreign power. For example, the Spanish likely faced less pressure to settle borders between their former colonies in South America than to settle borders between their possessions and those of Portugal or Great Britain. To the extent that borders within a single colonizer's possessions were defined during the colonial era, there would seem to be a greater risk of incomplete or contradictory border delimitation because of the lack of urgency for defining and demarcating clear borders within the same empire.

This discussion suggests a number of reasons that events during the colonial era could worsen relations between postcolonial states after independence:

(1) The first and most direct connection involves the existence of an unsettled border at independence. If the colonizer(s) that controlled the two sides of the border had not yet agreed on the status or location of the border upon decolonization, it seems probable that the border would remain under contention after the colonies became independent.

(2) Second, even if the colonizers themselves accepted the border before the colonies became independent, future challenges would seem likely if the colonies' residents disagreed with their colonial rulers' views on the border upon decolonization.

(3) Finally, even if both colonial governments and their residents accepted the border at independence, new claims could conceivably arise based on the way the border was settled. For example, new claims would seem to be possible if not likely if the colonizers had based the border on inaccurate or incomplete maps; if the border was shown in contradictory places on different maps; if the border split tribal, ethnic, or other groups or separated population centers from ports, valuable resource deposits, or other desired areas; or especially if such divisions were created by changing the border or reallocating territories from one unit to another during the

colonial era. In each of these situations, the colonial border may be regarded as unsatisfactory by the postcolonial state on one or both sides, leading to the outbreak of a territorial claim and potentially to armed conflict.

### **Colonial Legacy Improved Territorial Relations with Neighbors**

The final general form of colonial legacy that we consider involves aspects of the colonial period that improve territorial relations between former colonies after independence, whether by preventing territorial claims that might otherwise have started or by settling or deescalating claims once they have begun. There are several ways that this effect might have been reached. First, there could be a general argument that colonial borders -- however flawed -- should be preserved in the interest of preventing fratricidal conflict among newly independent states; this would presumably lead to the avoidance of territorial claims that otherwise might have been raised. Second, there could be a general sense of solidarity among postcolonial states, which might lead them to pursue more peaceful and cooperative solutions to their problems; this might not prevent territorial claims from beginning, but it would presumably help to ensure that they are managed peacefully rather than through armed conflict.

The first of these possibilities is closely related to the legal concept of *uti possidetis juris* or *uti possidetis de jure*, defined by *Black's Law Dictionary* as “The doctrine that old administrative boundaries will become international boundaries when a political subdivision achieves independence” (Garner 1999: 1544; see also Brownlie 1998: 133, Malanczuk 1997: 162-163, Prescott 1987: 105-106, Ratner 1996; Shaw 1997: 216). *Uti possidetis* first emerged in the modern sense with the decolonization of Latin America in the early 19th century, as the former Spanish colonies loosely applied the principle both in their frontier disputes with each

other and in those with Brazil (Brownlie 1998: 132; Ireland 1938: 321-328; Ratner 1996: 593-595; Shaw 1997: 356 ff).<sup>2</sup> Each state was to be recognized as possessing all territories that were presumed to be possessed by its colonial predecessor as of 1810 (for South America) or 1821 (for Central America), reflecting the last periods of unchallenged Spanish rule (and thus the last times that borders could be considered to have been under Spanish authority). Under this principle, there would be no possibility of new claims based on *terra nullius* (territory belonging to no state) or of claims by extraregional states. In addition, there should be little or no conflict among the bordering states themselves because of the clear identification of each border's location based on colonial-era administrative lines.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the Latin American origins of the modern *uti possidetis* principle, it has subsequently been applied elsewhere. Most notably, the principle is enshrined in the OAU's 1963 charter and 1964 Cairo Declaration, in which the African leaders pledged "to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of independence." The borders between European colonies in Africa were often unnatural, cutting across traditional ethnic or linguistic groups and producing ill-fitting multiethnic colonial entities. As a result, leaders in the region chose to avoid uncertainty and conflict by preserving their existing colonial boundaries; it was feared that allowing challenges to any African borders on the grounds of illegitimacy could lead to the emergence of challenges against virtually every African border for the same reason. (Malanczuk 1997: 162; Ratner 1996: 595-596; Zacher 2001: 221-223)

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<sup>2</sup> Brazil generally rejected the application of *uti possidetis de jure* in favor of *uti possidetis de facto*, an alternative doctrine that determines ownership of territory based on physical occupation rather than colonial title. Brazil used this alternative doctrine to argue for the expansion of its territory beyond the 1810 borders with former Spanish colonies such as Bolivia and Peru (see Ganzert 1934: 430 ff and Tambs 1966: 255 ff).

<sup>3</sup> As typically applied, this doctrine only offered a general guideline for determining borders, and allowed two parties to depart from the colonial-era administrative boundaries through mutual

The general applicability of this principle is described well in the 1986 International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision in the *Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali)* case. The ICJ had been asked to settle the location of a segment of the border between Mali and Burkina Faso, both of which had been part of French West Africa before independence. In its judgment, the ICJ emphasized the legal principle of *uti possidetis juris*:

the principle is not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of international law, It is a general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power. (ICJ 1986: ¶ 20)<sup>4</sup>

The ICJ judgment in the Mali-Burkina Faso *Frontier Dispute* case also argued that the principle of *uti possidetis* should apply in any decolonization situation, regardless of the legal or political status of the entities on each side of the border:

The territorial boundaries which have to be respected may also derive from international frontiers which previously divided a colony of one State from a colony of another, or indeed a colonial territory from the territory of an independent State, or one which was under protectorate, but had retained its international personality. There is no doubt that the obligation to respect pre-existing international frontiers in the event of State succession derives from a

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agreement if desired (Brownlie 1998: 133; Ratner 1996: 593, 598-601; Shaw 1997: 216).

<sup>4</sup> See also Malanczuk (1997: 162-163), as well as the full ICJ judgment at <[http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icasess/iHVM/iHVM\\_ijudgment/iHVM\\_ijudgment\\_19861222.pdf](http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icasess/iHVM/iHVM_ijudgment/iHVM_ijudgment_19861222.pdf)>.

general rule of international law, whether or not the rule is expressed in the formula of *uti possidetis*. (ICJ 1986: ¶ 24)

The judgment went on to argue explicitly that this principle is so general as to apply regardless of geographic region or temporal era, rejecting the possibility that *uti possidetis* should not apply in Africa because the continent followed different legal principles than those followed in other regions or because this specific doctrine had not been proclaimed for Africa as of these two states' independence in 1960. This judgment suggests that -- at least by the 1980s -- the legitimacy of colonial borders was widely recognized as a standard legal principle that should help to prevent the outbreak of escalation of territorial claims between former colonies.

Beyond the principle of accepting colonial borders in order to avoid the risks inherent in territorial claims, a second way that the colonial legacy might reduce territorial conflict involves the creation of feelings of solidarity between former colonies. The history of anti-colonial struggle would appear to be a force favoring friendly relations with other former dependencies, each of which underwent similar struggles against colonial rule. To the extent that each colony achieved its freedom from the struggle against the same colonizer (and around the same time), there should be a greater sense of community among them, based on the shared identity of those who have fought against a common enemy. This sense of community should be strengthened by the shared language, religion, and other cultural details that are typically spread throughout a colonizer's possessions following decades of rule by the colonial power.

As Domínguez et al. (2003: 22) argue, "Most Spanish American elites accepted the norm that they were part of a larger cultural and possible political entity." Rather than disrupt the relations among the members of this fraternity of new states, there would appear to be an

incentive to avoid inflammatory issues such as territorial demands on neighbors, and to resolve outstanding issues as quickly and peacefully as possible. Domínguez et al. (2003: 22-23) suggest that “The consequence of the spreading ideology of Latin American solidarity, fostering peacemaking, was the evolution of the expectation and practice that countries from all the Americas should engage in conflict containment and conflict settlement wherever conflict emerged.” It is not clear, though, whether this solidarity among former colonies should extend to former dependencies of other colonial powers, which were colonized by a different foreign power and did not necessarily share the same language, religion, or culture.

### **Hypotheses on Colonial Legacies**

The preceding discussion suggests a series of hypotheses about colonial legacies and territorial conflict that can be tested empirically. We do not expect that any of these three approaches will be shown to be "the colonial legacy" with respect to territory. Instead, we expect that each approach is likely to be accurate in describing the effect of colonial rule on territorial stability in certain parts of the world and under certain conditions. This is why we present each approach with specific hypotheses that indicate when we expect it to be relevant, rather than presenting a single hypothesis or group of hypotheses about which individual approach best encapsulates colonial legacies with respect to territorial conflict.

The first two hypotheses concern relations between a former colonizer and its former colonies. As discussed earlier, we believe that the prospects for territorial conflict in such relationships depend heavily on the state of relations between the colonizer and colony at the time of independence. For the purposes of the present project, we conceive of former colonizer-colony relationships at independence based on how independence/decolonization was achieved.

If the former colony achieved independence through violent means, such as an armed rebellion against the colonizer, then it is likely that the new state will be in a state of difficult relations with its former colonizer, auguring poorly for cooperative relations and suggesting that future conflict might be likely. On the other hand, if the colony achieved independence through more peaceful means (such as an orderly, planned transition), then it is likely that it will be on much better terms with the former colonizer, and subsequent conflict should be much less likely:

***Hypothesis 1:** Territorial conflict should be more likely between a former colonizer and one of its former colonies when the colony achieved independence through violent means.*

***Hypothesis 2:** Territorial conflict should be less likely between a former colonizer and one of its former colonies when the colony achieved independence through nonviolent means.*

The remaining two hypotheses concern relations between two states that were both dependencies of some foreign power. Here, several factors seem to be quite relevant, at least for the preliminary analyses in the present project. As before, we expect the process by which the former colony achieved independence to play an important role. Where one or both states along a border achieved independence through violent means, the independence setting was less conducive to an orderly process whereby borders were accepted and clearly marked. In contrast, where both achieved independence peacefully, there was likely more time -- and a less threatening environment -- to allow the establishment of stable and accepted borders. Furthermore, we believe that there is an important distinction between two former colonies that were both ruled by the same colonizer (as in the borders between former Spanish colonies in Latin America or between former French colonies in West Africa) and two former colonies that

were ruled by different colonizers (as in the borders between Spanish colonies and Brazil in Latin America or between British and French colonies in Africa).

These two factors suggest the following hypotheses. It should be noted that Hypotheses 4a and 4b are drawn from different theoretical perspectives. Lacking any clear a priori theoretical reason to expect either one to receive greater support, we prefer to test both empirically, rather than artificially choosing one as the favored hypothesis.

***Hypothesis 3:** Territorial conflict should be more likely (ceteris paribus) between two former colonies when at least one of them achieved independence through violent means than when both achieved independence through nonviolent means.*

***Hypothesis 4a (internal borders):** Territorial conflict should be more likely (ceteris paribus) between two former colonies of the same colonial power than between two former colonies of different colonial powers or between a former colony and a state that was not colonized, due to the lower urgency for the colonizer to establish clear and accepted borders during the colonial era.*

***Hypothesis 4b (solidarity):** Territorial conflict should be less likely (ceteris paribus) between two former colonies of the same colonial power than between two former colonies of different colonial powers or between a former colony and a state that was not colonized, due to the greater sense of solidarity between the former colonies after independence.*

These hypotheses include the all-important "ceteris paribus" qualifier to emphasize that none is likely to tell the whole story by itself. We can think of these two factors as working together, such that the most dangerous situation might be a border between two colonies of the

same colonial power that achieved independence through violent means, and the least dangerous should be a border between two colonies of different colonial powers that each achieved independence through peaceful means.

It is important to note that we do not see the colonial legacy as anything close to deterministic, with certain legacies almost invariably producing long and bloody disagreements and others almost certainly avoiding trouble altogether. Rather, the general legacy of colonial rule is best seen as establishing a more (or less) conflictual baseline for states' interactions over their borders after independence, by creating borders that are seen as more legitimate or more flawed (depending on which perspective is being applied). Whatever this baseline value, though, the states' leaders will make and implement decisions over borders for reasons that are in their own domestic and/or international interests. For example, drawing from past work on the management of territorial claims (e.g., Huth 1996; Hensel 2001; Huth and Allee 2002), we expect that the salience (value) of a given piece of territory will affect states' interactions over that territory; claims over highly salient territory should typically last longer and be more likely to generate militarized conflict than claims over relatively valueless territory.

Finally, in the interest of thoroughness, we must also consider one final possibility: that there is no meaningful colonial legacy that affects post-independence territorial conflict in any systematic way. We do not consider this a separate theoretical perspective on colonial legacies, but rather a null model that can be used as a comparison for the other legacies discussed above. Evidence suggesting support for this null model in a large-N quantitative study could mean one of two things. It might mean that there is no meaningful connection between the colonial era and post-independence territorial conflict across a large set of cases, however meaningful a connection there may seem to be in any individual case. Alternatively, it could mean that there

are multiple types of connections at work that cancel out each other's effects in such a large study, and that our research design did not prove to be adequate at distinguishing these separate effects. We will attempt to distinguish between these two possibilities if the results of our preliminary analyses suggest stronger support for this null model than for the hypothesized forms of colonial legacies.

**Figure 2.1: Types of Colonial Legacies**

<i>Type of Relationship for Postcolonial State:</i>	<b>Colonial Legacy Worsened Territorial Relations:</b>	<b>Colonial Legacy Improved Territorial Relations:</b>
<b>Relations with Neighboring States:</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Borders unresolved at decolonization</li> <li>• Borders settled, but not marked adequately (or based on faulty information)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Borders settled to both sides' satisfaction at independence</li> <li>• Agreement that borders, even if flawed, must be accepted (<i>Uti Possidetis</i>, OAU?)</li> </ul>
<b>Relations with the Former Colonizer:</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Colonizer seeks to retain control of valuable territories</li> <li>• Colonizer seeks to recover territories with its kinsmen</li> <li>• Former colony seeks to acquire more territory from colonizer</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All territorial and related issues settled at independence</li> <li>• Colonizer has no further interests in the area after decolonization</li> </ul>

## CHAPTER 3

### TERRITORIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN NEIGHBORS: GLOBAL PATTERNS

We now begin to evaluate the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. Our empirical analyses will start with two chapters using quantitative methodology to identify global patterns in the impact of colonial legacies on territorial conflict. We will then present separate chapters of case studies to look more closely at specific cases of territorial conflict in each geographic region that has had a history of colonial rule, which will offer a useful supplement to the global analyses as well as a much more detailed understanding of how colonial legacies have mattered in individual cases.

#### Research Design

In order to evaluate our hypotheses, we will run a logistic regression ("logit") analysis of territorial conflict in the modern era. Like most quantitative studies of international conflict, we focus on the Correlates of War (COW) project's interstate system, 1816-2001.<sup>5</sup> Specifically, in Chapter 3 we focus on all pairs of neighbors during this time frame, using the COW contiguity data set to identify all pairs of states and/or colonies<sup>6</sup> that share a land border or a sea border of no more than 400 miles. We believe that states sharing such sea borders are close enough to have a reasonable opportunity for armed conflict, particularly for the former colonies that are the focus of our study. While states separated by this distance might reasonably engage in armed

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<sup>5</sup> All COW data sets used in this study -- the interstate system, contiguity, MID, and national material capabilities -- are available at <<http://www.correlatesofwar.org>>.

<sup>6</sup> Colonial contiguity is an important part of our study, particularly for studying former colonizer-colony dyads, where part of our theoretical expectation involved threats to the former colonizer's interests in nearby possessions that are not yet independent. As a result, we consider borders between states and other states' colonies or between two different states' colonies in our analyses.

conflict over territorial or other issues, as illustrated by such examples as Nicaragua and Colombia over the San Andres and Providencia island group or Eritrea and Yemen over the Hanish Islands, it would be ludicrous to use the absence of conflict between such distant former colonies as Belize and Israel to test the impact of colonial legacies on armed conflict. Each observation in our data set represents one year in the history of one pair of neighbors, with the goal of determining the conditions under which territorial conflict is most likely to break out.

### **Measuring Territorial Conflict**

We measure territorial conflict using the COW project's Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set, which covers interactions involving the threat, display, or use of military force between two or more nation-states (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004). We are only interested in militarized disputes over territorial issues, so we limit the data set to cases in which at least one of the participants is coded as seeking to revise the territorial status quo during the dispute. This information is available as part of the MID data set, but the original form in which it is provided can be misleading for multiparty disputes such as the world wars, when most of the participants did not engage in territorial conflict against most other participants. To avoid such misleading cases, we use a modified version of the MID data that has been evaluated more carefully for territorial issue codings by the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project, as described by Hensel et al. (2008). This differs from the original MID data only in the coding of which MIDs involve territorial issues, based on additional research using various historical and news sources.

In addition to the main analyses that study the outbreak of armed conflict over territorial issues, we also report analyses that only study the outbreak of fatal armed conflicts over territory. The MID data includes a large number of militarized disputes that lasted a relatively short time

and never involved a serious perception that full-scale war was likely, because they involved isolated threats to use force or displays of force but never led to deaths on the battlefield. In order to make sure that the results are not being driven by such low-level disputes, we present alternative analyses using only those cases that produced at least one battlefield fatality among regular military forces during the course of the dispute. These cases are much more serious and much closer to war than isolated threats, so limiting the analysis to fatal disputes offers a reasonable level of assurance that the results are meaningful and do not reflect isolated posturing by leaders. As it turns out, though, the key findings remain supported when we run the analysis with this more restrictive set of cases.

### **Measuring Colonial Legacies**

Our measurement of colonial legacies is based on version 0.5 of the ICOW project's Colonial History data set.<sup>7</sup> This data set records the colonizer(s), if any, that ruled over each member of the COW interstate system before independence, as well as whether or not the state achieved independence through violent or peaceful means. For the purposes of this project's preliminary analyses, these two pieces of information are combined into six dummy variables, based on the colonial history of the countries and the process by which they became independent:

- Same-colonizer legacy, violent independence: both states were colonized by the same colonial power, and at least one of them became independent violently<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> This data set, like all ICOW project data sets, is available at <<http://www.icow.org>>.

<sup>8</sup> There is no meaningful difference in results if this variable is only coded for cases where both states (rather than either one) became independent through violent means, which suggests that at least one violent independence is sufficient to produce the expected effect.

- Same-colonizer legacy, nonviolent independence: both states were colonized by the same power, and both became independent through nonviolent means
- Different-colonizer legacy, violent independence: the states were colonized by different colonial powers, and at least one of them became independent violently
- Different-colonizer legacy, nonviolent independence: the states were colonized by different colonial powers, and both became independent through nonviolent means
- Partial colonial legacy, violent independence: only one of the states was colonized; it became independent violently
- Partial colonial legacy, nonviolent independence: only one of the states was colonized; it became independent through nonviolent means

For the main analyses, we do not distinguish between different types of empires. Some work on colonial legacies distinguishes between overseas empires (such as the Spanish empire in Latin America) and land empires (such as the Hapsburg or Ottoman empires); see, for example, Bernhard et al. (2004: 227). We treat these two types of empire interchangeably in our primary analyses, although we will return to this topic in a followup analysis that is meant to investigate the robustness of our results.

Our analyses also include a dummy variable to indicate current colonial borders, in which at least one side of the border is currently a colony. As we noted earlier, we do not believe that these cases offer a fair test of the impact of colonial legacies, because their ultimate legacy is not yet determined. Before the colony becomes independent, there may will be further adjustments to the border and further changes to the colony's relationship with neighboring states, which might increase or reduce the risk of future territorial conflict. Nonetheless, these cases must be

controlled for in our analyses, because they reflect neither a completed colonial legacy nor the absence of any colonial legacy.

### **Control Variables**

Finally, our analyses control for three variables that have repeatedly been found to be important in past quantitative studies of international conflict, in order to make sure that these factors are not distorting the apparent impact of colonial legacies. We use the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score from the COW project's National Material Capabilities data set to measure the disparity in relative capabilities between each pair of states. The specific measure used is the percentage of total capabilities held by the stronger state, which can range from 0.50 (where the two states are exactly even) to 1.0 (where the stronger state holds all of the capabilities in the pair and the weakest state holds none). We use the Polity IV data set to measure the presence or absence of joint democracy, which is defined as present when both sides have values of at least six out of a possible ten on the Polity index of institutionalized democracy.<sup>9</sup> Finally, we include a dummy variable to distinguish between pairs of states that share a land border and those that are separated by 1-400 miles of open seas. While we believe that states separated by no more than 400 miles of sea still have a reasonably high chance of armed conflict in any given year and should thus be included in this study, evidence suggests that states sharing a land border increases the risk of conflict even further, so we control for this in our analyses.

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<sup>9</sup> The Polity IV data set is available at <<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>>.

### **Quantitative Analyses**

Our analyses begin with simple bivariate tables, to illustrate the basic relationships at work before moving on to more complex multivariate analyses. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 investigate the relationship between colonial legacies and territorial conflict between neighbors, with one observation for each pair of states in the modern interstate system (regardless of whether the pair had a border for one year or for nearly two centuries, although most have at least several decades of observation). Table 3.1 examines the likelihood that any given pair of bordering states will become involved in armed conflict over territory, while Table 3.2 examines the average number of such conflicts that are experienced.

[Tables 3.1 and 3.2 about here]

Whether we are examining all territorial conflict or only the more serious category of fatal territorial conflicts, the results are quite consistent. The most dangerous situation involves a pair of states that were both colonized by the same colonial power, at least one of which became independent through violent means. Close behind is a pair of states with a "partial" colonial legacy, composed of one state that was never colonized in the modern era and one former colony that became independent through violent means. Nearly half of such cases -- 44.0% of the former category, and 43.5% of the latter -- become involved in at least one armed conflict over territory after independence, and more than a fourth (30.7% and 26.1% respectively) escalate at least one such conflict to the point of fatalities. "Partial" legacy cases with nonviolent independence have been the third most conflictual, with 31.2% experiencing armed conflict over territory after independence and 14.3% escalating to fatalities at least once. The remaining categories, which generally involve nonviolent independence processes or different-colonizer legacies, are less than half as likely as the two most dangerous categories to experience territorial conflict, with figures very close to the "other" category of borders that have no colonial legacy.

These differences are statistically significant for both total and fatal territorial conflicts ( $p < .001$ ), suggesting strong support for our expectation that both same-colonizer colonial legacies and violent independence processes should be especially dangerous.

The oneway analysis of variance (ANOVA) models presented in Table 3.2 generally support the crosstabulations reported in Table 3.1 by comparing the average number of conflicts that each type of colonial legacy experiences after independence. It is entirely possible, for example, that Table 3.1 could blur the differences between two categories that had a similar likelihood of experiencing conflict at least once, but in one case the conflicts end quickly while in the other case they endure and lead to protracted cycles of violence. The results in Table 3.2 suggest that this is not the case, though, as the same categories are the most conflictual in both halves of the table, and both experience roughly twice as much conflict as the least conflictual categories. These results are statistically significant for all territorial conflict ( $p < .02$ ), although they fail to reach conventional significance levels for fatal conflict ( $p < .25$ ).

These first tables suggest preliminary support for our hypotheses, with territorial conflict generally being more likely in the situations that we expected to be most dangerous (particularly following violent independence). These tables' bivariate analyses were not able to control for the impact of other factors that might plausibly affect conflict behavior, though. Our next analyses will be multivariate, allowing us to add such statistical controls for a more meaningful analysis.

### **Multivariate Analyses**

We begin by considering the impact of colonial legacies on territorial conflict between neighbors. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the results of a logit analysis of territorial conflict that accounts for the control variables discussed earlier. Each observation in these tables represents a

year in the history of two countries, which either share a direct land border or are separated by no more than 400 miles of open sea. Some of these countries share a colonial legacy of the kinds that we have discussed while others do not, offering a basis for comparison. The goal of these tables is to understand the likelihood that a given pair of countries will become involved in armed conflict over territory (Table 3.3) or fatal conflict over territory (Table 3.4), based on the colonial legacy (if any) while controlling for other factors that are widely acknowledged as affecting conflict patterns.

[Tables 3.3 and 3.4 about here]

The results are consistent with the preliminary results from Tables 3.1 and 3.2, and generally support our hypotheses. Hypothesis 3 suggested that territorial conflict should be more likely in pairs of states in which at least one achieved independence through violent means. This is clearly supported in Model II of both Tables 3.3 and 3.4, as all three situations with violent independence -- whether same-colonizer, different-colonizer, or partial colonial legacies -- see significantly more armed conflict over territory.

The two remaining hypotheses about territorial relations between neighbors come from diametrically opposed theoretical perspectives: Hypothesis 4a suggested that territorial conflict should be more likely in pairs of states that had both been colonized by the same colonial power due to the lack of urgency in settling internal borders, while Hypothesis 4b suggested that such borders should be less conflictual because of the sense of postcolonial solidarity. The results offer much stronger support for Hypothesis 4a's expectation of increased conflict than for Hypothesis 4b's more optimistic expectation, as both same-colonizer legacy situations (following either violent or peaceful independence) see significantly increased territorial conflict.

While same-colonizer legacies appear to be dangerous, it turns out that most other types of colonial legacies also increase the risk of armed conflict when compared to the referent category of borders that do not have a colonial legacy. What we have called partial colonial legacies, or those where a former colony shares a border with a state that was never colonized during the modern era, are even more dangerous than same-colonizer legacies, significantly increasing armed conflict in both Tables 3.3 and 3.4 regardless of the process that led to independence. Only different-colonizer legacies see a slight reduction in territorial conflict following peaceful independence, and even this reduction is not statistically significant. For purposes of comparison, current colonial borders (those that feature a current colony on at least one side of the border) are significantly less likely to experience territorial conflict overall, and not significantly different from cases with no colonial legacy to experience fatal territorial conflict.

[Table 3.5 about here]

Another useful way to compare the results of logit analyses is through the analysis of the predicted probabilities of conflict in certain situations according to the model, which reveals the marginal impact of each factor in the model while holding constant the effects of all of the other factors. Table 3.5 presents the predicted probabilities of both forms of territorial conflict for each of the colonial legacy situations that we have discussed. The baseline probabilities of territorial conflict in the absence of colonial legacies are relatively low, with an annual predicted probability of .008 (or roughly one conflict every 125 years) for all territorial conflicts and an even lower probability of .003 (or roughly one every 300 years) for fatal territorial conflict. These low probabilities are not too surprising, as there have been less than 1000 territorial conflicts in the entire interstate system since 1816, and far fewer fatal territorial conflicts. More

instructive are the changes in predicted probabilities in the various colonial legacy categories. The probability of territorial conflict generally at least doubles for each type of colonial legacy that involved violent decolonization, and generally increases by at least half for the other types of colonial legacies.

Overall, these results offer a great deal of insight into the relationship between colonial legacies and territorial conflict. In general, same-colonizer legacies seem to be more dangerous than different-colonizer legacies, suggesting that colonial rulers did not do as good a job of establishing or making borders between their own possessions as they did for the borders between their and other colonizers' possessions. Partial colonial legacies turn out to be surprisingly dangerous as well, suggesting that colonial rulers did not do a very good job of establishing or marking borders with states adjoining their colonies -- or perhaps that those states subsequently took advantage of the colonizers' withdrawal, using the opportunity to press the neighboring former colony for territorial cessions. The method by which states achieved independence also has a systematic impact on later events. Colonies that became independent through violent struggles tend to have a much more conflictual future than those that were granted independence peacefully, experiencing much higher levels of territorial conflict with neighboring states as well as with the former colonizer itself.

The remaining quantitative analyses will follow up on these primary analyses by considering several alternative possibilities. While we are confident that we have identified meaningful global patterns, it is very possible that these analyses have obscured several other patterns in subsets of the world, such as specific regions of the world or in specific colonizers' empires.

## Followup Analyses

One important followup to the global patterns that have been identified above involves the possibility of regional differences. In particular, academics have disagreed over the impact of the legal doctrine of *Uti Possidetis* on territorial conflict in the Americas, as well as that doctrine's enshrinement in the OAU Charter and related African documents. Since the overall effects of *Uti Possidetis* and the OAU remain open to debate, we investigate this question by extending our original models from the earlier tables.

[Table 3.6 about here]

Table 3.6 adds several regional variables to the models that were presented earlier, in order to address this topic as directly as possible. We focus on the two regions that have been argued to have been more peaceful due to these legal doctrines; we have not seen any arguments about any similar legal doctrines that might have influenced other regions' territorial issues in any systematic way. The results indicate that borders in either of these regions have been significantly less likely to experience territorial conflict after independence, even after considering the impact of the other factors in the model (both colonial legacies and the control variables). That is, even considering the types of colonial rule and the ways that each state in these regions achieved independence ( as well as the impact of relative military capabilities, joint democracy, and the length of peace since the last armed conflict between the states), these two regions see a much lower risk of territorial conflict than the rest of the world.

This result suggests that the doctrine of *Uti Possidetis* may have been more effective than some have given it credit for being, and that the OAU Charter and similar statements and documents in Africa may have had a similar effect. The remainder of the model generally produces similar results to Tables 5 and 6, so adding these variables did not fundamentally

change any of the other conclusions of the model, but these two factors have a very strong negative effect on territorial conflict. Even if most of Latin America became independent with the twin risk factors of a same-colonizer legacy and achieving independence from Spain violently, the Western Hemisphere has generally seen much less territorial conflict than would otherwise have been expected. Further research is still needed to be sure, but this is certainly consistent with the optimistic views expressed earlier.

A related question involves the possibility that there may be systematic differences in the ways that different colonizers managed internal borders within their empires. There are too many combinations of pairs of empires to be able to address possible differences between, say, the way that British and French administrators managed their empires' borders with the way the Spanish and Portuguese, British and German, or French and Belgian administrators did so. Focusing on the internal borders of the different empires is much more feasible, though, as can be seen in Table 3.7.

[Table 3.7 about here]

Table 3.7 adds dummy variables for the empires with the greatest number of internal borders that have subsequently become borders between independent nation-states. This includes three overseas empires (the British, French, and Spanish) as well as two land empires (the Russian and Ottoman). The remaining empires generally had fewer internal borders, which would increase the risk of misleading results due to a small number of cases, while offering little potential empirical gain.

Only one of these five empires has a consistent effect that is statistically significant at the conventional .05 level in both models in Table 3.7. The former internal borders between French colonies have experienced much less territorial conflict since decolonization. While France also

had colonies elsewhere in the world, this is certainly consistent with the overall reduction in territorial conflict following decolonization in Africa, as French West Africa has been credited with being a zone of peace or territorial stability (e.g., Kacowicz 1998; Kornprobst 2002). Of the other major overseas empires, neither the British nor the Spanish empires' former internal borders have seen any systematic difference in terms of overall territorial conflict, although the British empire has seen a weak ( $p < .10$ ) increase in fatal conflict while the Spanish empire has seen a somewhat stronger ( $p < .04$ ) decrease in fatal conflict (again consistent with the Latin American result in Table 3.6). The Russian empire has not show any systematic difference in conflict patterns, while the Ottoman empire has seen a decrease in overall conflict ( $p < .02$ ) and a weaker decrease ( $p < .08$ ) in fatal conflict.

Our final followup analysis considers the possibility of differences based on the type of empire. In the tables that we have presented so far, we have grouped overseas empires like European possessions in Latin America and Africa together with land empires like the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. It is certainly possible that there are important differences in the ways that these different types of empires' legacies affect territorial stability after independence. Indeed, many studies of the economic legacies of colonialism leave out the major land empires to focus on overseas empires -- although that decision certainly seems warranted with respect to economic development, where the states that emerged from overseas empires have often performed quite poorly compared to those that emerged from land empires within Europe. Table 3.8 investigates whether there are systematic differences between these types of empires with respect to territorial conflict after independence.

[Table 3.8 about here]

Table 3.8 adds a new variable to our original model of territorial conflict between neighbors, to try to determine whether land empires have had different legacies than overseas empires. The results suggest that there are slight differences, but nothing that fundamentally alters the main conclusions of the study. The new land empire variable is only significant for overall territorial conflict between neighbors in Table 3.8, where it significantly reduces such conflict ( $p < .001$ ), but there is no systematic impact on fatal conflict between neighbors. This suggests that neighbors that were both members of land empires are somewhat less likely to experience territorial conflict overall than neighbors that emerged from overseas empires, but that this difference vanishes when more serious forms of conflict are considered. Furthermore, the results for the other variables in the model remain essentially identical when this variable is included, suggesting that there is little systematic problem with including both land empires and overseas empires in the same model.

**Table 3.1: Colonial Legacies and Likelihood of Territorial Conflict between Neighbors**

*At Least One Territorial Conflict:*

<u>Type of Relationship</u>	Any Conflict		Fatal Conflict	
	None	One or More (%)	None	One or More (%)
Same colonizer legacy:				
Violent independence (N=75):	42	33 (44.0%)	52	23 (30.7%)
Nonviolent (122):	101	21 (17.2)	111	11 (9.0)
Different colonizer legacy:				
Violent independence (131):	103	28 (21.4)	115	16 (12.2)
Nonviolent (68):	54	14 (20.6)	62	6 (8.8)
Partial colonial legacy:				
Violent independence (69):	39	30 (43.5)	51	18 (26.1)
Nonviolent (77):	53	24 (31.2)	66	11 (14.3)
Other (143):	119	24 (16.8)	128	15 (10.5)
Total:	511	174 (25.4)	585	100 (14.6)
	$X^2 = 38.82$ (6 df, $p < .001$ )		$X^2 = 30.24$ (6 df, $p < .001$ )	

**Table 3.2: Colonial Legacies and Numbers of Territorial Conflicts between Neighbors**

<i>Average Number of Territorial Conflicts:</i>		
	Any Conflicts	Fatal Conflict
<u>Type of Relationship</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>
Same colonizer legacy:		
Violent independence (N=75):	2.33 (5.41)	0.72 (1.93)
Nonviolent (122):	0.81 (3.78)	0.39 (2.27)
Different colonizer legacy:		
Violent independence (131):	0.89 (3.94)	0.31 (1.56)
Nonviolent (68):	0.44 (1.07)	0.09 (0.29)
Partial colonial legacy:		
Violent independence (69):	1.81 (4.03)	0.51 (1.21)
Nonviolent (77):	1.03 (2.86)	0.32 (1.26)
Other (143):	0.71 (2.70)	0.25 (0.95)
	F = 2.78 (p<.02) 684 d.f. (6/678)	F = 1.32 (p<.25) 684 d.f. (6/678)

**Table 3.3: Accounting for Territorial Conflict between Neighbors**

Variable	Model I:	Model II:
	Basic type	More detail
<i>Colonial Legacies</i>		
Same-colonizer legacy:	0.61 (0.13)***	
Violent independence		0.71 (0.14)***
Nonviolent independence		0.43 (0.16)***
Different-colonizer legacy:	0.43 (0.14)***	
Violent independence		0.58 (0.14)***
Nonviolent independence		- 0.04 (0.22)
Partial colonial legacy:	0.87 (0.13)***	
Violent independence		1.01 (0.14)***
Nonviolent independence		0.66 (0.16)***
Current colonial border	0.07 (0.16)	0.07 (0.16)
<i>Control Variables</i>		
Capabilities (stronger side)	- 1.30 (0.23)***	- 1.32 (0.23)***
Joint democracy	- 0.22 (0.13)*	- 0.27 (0.13)**
Land border	1.26 (0.10)***	1.24 (0.11)***
Peace years	- 0.36 (0.02)***	- 0.36 (0.02)***
Constant	- 2.29 (0.25)***	- 2.24 (0.26)***
	N=43,582	N=43,582
	X <sup>2</sup> =1270.07	X <sup>2</sup> =1282.67
	(11 df, p<.001)	(14 df, p<.001)

*Notes*

• Each model also includes three splines (not reported here) to assist in correction for temporal dependence, as discussed by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).

\*\*\*p<.01, \*\*p<.05, \*p<.10 (robust standard errors in parentheses)

**Table 3.4: Accounting for Fatal Territorial Conflict between Neighbors**

Variable	Model I:	Model II:
	Basic type	More detail
<i>Colonial Legacies</i>		
Same-colonizer legacy:	0.81 (0.22)***	
Violent independence		0.79 (0.23)***
Nonviolent independence		0.83 (0.25)***
Different-colonizer legacy:	0.45 (0.23)*	
Violent independence		0.69 (0.24)***
Nonviolent independence		- 0.58 (0.49)
Partial colonial legacy:	0.89 (0.22)***	
Violent independence		1.00 (0.259)***
Nonviolent independence		0.73 (0.27)***
Current colonial border	0.03 (0.27)	0.03 (0.27)
<i>Control Variables</i>		
Capabilities (stronger side)	- 1.51 (0.37)***	- 1.48 (0.37)***
Joint democracy	- 0.32 (0.23)	- 0.36 (0.23)
Land border	1.46 (0.18)***	1.46 (0.18)***
Peace years	- 0.28 (0.03)***	- 0.28 (0.03)***
Constant	- 3.55 (0.42)***	- 3.57 (0.43)***
	N=43,582	N=43,582
	X <sup>2</sup> =432.28	X <sup>2</sup> =434.93
	(11 df, p<.001)	(14 df, p<.001)

*Notes*

• Each model also includes three splines (not reported here) to assist in correction for temporal dependence, as discussed by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).

\*\*\*p<.01, \*\*p<.05, \*p<.10 (robust standard errors in parentheses)

**Table 3.5: Marginal Effects**

Predicted Annual Probability of Territorial Conflict,  
with change from baseline prediction:

<u>Condition</u>	<u>Any Conflict</u>	<u>Fatal Conflict</u>
Baseline (no colonial legacy)	.008	.003
Current colonial dyad (colony on one/both sides of border)	.009 (+ .001)	.003 (+ .000)
Different-colonizer legacy:		
Violent decolonization	<b>.015 (+ .006)</b>	<b>.006 (+ .003)</b>
Nonviolent decolonization	.008 (- .000)	.002 (- .001)
Same-colonizer legacy:		
Violent decolonization	<b>.017 (+ .008)</b>	<b>.007 (+ .004)</b>
Nonviolent decolonization	<b>.013 (+ .004)</b>	<b>.007 (+ .004)</b>
Partial colonial legacy:		
Violent decolonization	<b>.022 (+ .014)</b>	<b>.009 (+ .006)</b>
Nonviolent decolonization	<b>.016 (+ .008)</b>	<b>.007 (+ .004)</b>

*Notes*

- Calculated from Model II of Table 3.3 and Model II of Table 3.4 using the MFX command in STATA version 9.2; all other variables held at their mean or modal values for purposes of this calculation.
- Entries in **bold** represent effects that were statistically significant at the .05 level.
- Numbers may not add up exactly due to rounding.

**Table 3.6: Accounting for Territorial Conflict with Regional Differences**

Variable	Model I:	Model II:
	All conflict	Fatal conflict only
<i>Colonial Legacies</i>		
Same-colonizer legacy:		
Violent independence	0.94 (0.15)***	1.40 (0.23)***
Nonviolent independence	0.87 (0.17)***	1.41 (0.26)***
Different-colonizer legacy:		
Violent independence	0.81 (0.15)***	1.12 (0.24)***
Nonviolent independence	0.73 (0.23)***	0.34 (0.49)
Partial colonial legacy:		
Violent independence	1.02 (0.14)***	1.03 (0.24)***
Nonviolent independence	0.85 (0.16)***	0.97 (0.27)***
Current colonial border	0.36 (0.17)**	0.49 (0.28)*
<i>Geographic Region</i>		
Western Hemisphere	- 0.30 (0.11)***	- 1.22 (0.21)***
Africa	- 1.07 (0.14)***	- 1.22 (0.22)***
<i>Control Variables</i>		
Capabilities (stronger side)	- 1.37 (0.22)***	- 1.60 (0.36)***
Joint democracy	- 0.33 (0.13)**	- 0.49 (0.23)**
Land border	1.36 (0.11)***	1.48 (0.19)***
Peace years	- 0.36 (0.02)***	- 0.26 (0.03)***
Constant	- 2.32 (0.25)***	- 3.57 (0.43)***
	N=43,582	N=43,582
	X <sup>2</sup> =1328.63	X <sup>2</sup> =476.98
	(16 df, p<.001)	(16 df, p<.001)

*Notes*

- Each model also includes three splines (not reported here) to assist in correction for temporal dependence, as discussed by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).
- \*\*\*p<.01, \*\*p<.05, \*p<.10 (robust standard errors in parentheses)

**Table 3.7: Accounting for Territorial Conflict with Colonizer Differences**

Variable	Model I:	Model II:
	All conflict	Fatal conflict only
<i>Colonial Legacies</i>		
Same-colonizer legacy:		
Violent independence	1.04 (0.30)***	1.51 (0.42)***
Nonviolent independence	0.40 (0.33)	0.57 (0.52)
Different-colonizer legacy:		
Violent independence	0.59 (0.14)***	0.70 (0.24)***
Nonviolent independence	- 0.03 (0.22)	- 0.57 (0.49)
Partial colonial legacy:		
Violent independence	1.02 (0.15)***	1.02 (0.25)***
Nonviolent independence	0.67 (0.16)***	0.75 (0.27)***
Current colonial border	0.09 (0.16)	0.08 (0.27)
<i>Colonial Power</i>		
United Kingdom	0.40 (0.31)	0.77 (0.47)*
France	- 1.14 (0.36)***	- 1.56 (0.56)***
Spain	- 0.21 (0.29)	- 0.95 (0.44)**
Russian Empire	- 0.48 (0.40)	- 0.51 (0.61)
Ottoman Empire	- 0.96 (0.40)**	- 0.99 (0.54)*
<i>Control Variables</i>		
Capabilities (stronger side)	- 1.40 (0.23)***	- 1.72 (0.35)***
Joint democracy	- 0.31 (0.13)	- 0.46 (0.23)**
Land border	1.31 (0.11)***	1.61 (0.19)***
Peace years	- 0.36 (0.02)***	- 0.27 (0.03)***
Constant	- 2.27 (0.25)***	- 3.57 (0.41)***
	N=43,582	N=43,582
	X <sup>2</sup> =1316.24	X <sup>2</sup> =471.66
	(19 df, p<.001)	(19 df, p<.001)

*Notes*

• Each model also includes three splines (not reported here) to assist in correction for temporal dependence, as discussed by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).

\*\*\*p<.01, \*\*p<.05, \*p<.10 (robust standard errors in parentheses)

**Table 3.8: Colonial Legacies from Land and Overseas Empires and Territorial Conflict between Neighbors**

Variable	Model I:	Model II:
	All conflict	Fatal conflict only
<i>Colonial Legacies</i>		
Same-colonizer legacy:		
Violent independence	0.80 (0.14)***	0.86 (0.24)***
Nonviolent independence	0.51 (0.16)***	0.89 (0.25)***
Different-colonizer legacy:		
Violent independence	0.64 (0.15)***	0.73 (0.24)***
Nonviolent independence	- 0.03 (0.22)	- 0.57 (0.49)
Partial colonial legacy:		
Violent independence	1.00 (0.15)***	1.00 (0.25)***
Nonviolent independence	0.66 (0.16)***	0.73 (0.27)***
Current colonial border	0.07 (0.16)	0.03 (0.27)
<i>Type of Empire</i>		
Land Empire	- 0.67 (0.19)***	- 0.43 (0.27)
<i>Control Variables</i>		
Capabilities (stronger side)	- 1.31 (0.23)***	- 1.46 (0.37)***
Joint democracy	- 0.21 (0.13)	- 0.31 (0.23)
Land border	1.25 (0.11)***	1.47 (0.18)***
Peace years	- 0.36 (0.02)***	- 0.28 (0.03)***
Constant	- 2.27 (0.26)***	- 3.61 (0.43)***
	N=43,582	N=43,582
	X <sup>2</sup> =1304.86	X <sup>2</sup> =438.82
	(15 df, p<.001)	(15 df, p<.001)

*Notes*

- Each model also includes three splines (not reported here) to assist in correction for temporal dependence, as discussed by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).
- \*\*\*p<.01, \*\*p<.05, \*p<.10 (robust standard errors in parentheses)

**CHAPTER 4**  
**TERRITORIAL CONFLICT WITH THE FORMER COLONIZER:**  
**GLOBAL PATTERNS**

We now move from territorial conflict between neighbors to consider the impact of colonial legacies on territorial conflict with the former colonizer. This chapter's quantitative analyses will allow us to evaluate Hypotheses 1 and 2, over the conditions under which former colonies are most likely to engage in territorial conflict against their former colonial rulers.

**Research Design**

For the most part, this chapter follows the same research design as Chapter 3's analysis of colonial legacies and territorial conflict between neighbors. There are several important differences, though, beginning with the set of cases being studied. Whereas the earlier chapter focused on all borders, this chapter has a more focused set of cases: relationships between a former colony and its former colonial or imperial ruler(s). Depending on the table, then, each observation is either a former colonizer-colony relationship, or a single year in this relationship after independence.

It should be noted that some states were ruled as dependencies of several different foreign powers; for the purposes of this chapter, a separate observation is created for each such ruler. For example, a number of German colonies or Ottoman possessions were awarded to new rulers as League of Nations mandated territories after World War I, and some colonies were transferred from one colonial empire to another (such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, which as was noted in the previous chapter was transferred from Ottoman to Hapsburg rule in 1878). For the purposes of

this chapter, it is important to study the former colony's post-independence relationships with each of its former rulers.

A second difference involves the variables that are used to measure colonial legacies. Because we are analyzing former colonizer-colony relationships, every case has such a relationship, so there are no cases with partial or no colonial legacies, and no same- or different-colonizer legacies. Instead, the most important distinction with respect to colonial legacies in this chapter is whether the colony achieved independence through violent or non-violent means, as discussed in Chapter 3.

We also introduce two further dimensions of colonial legacies that might plausibly affect the relationship between a newly independent state and its former colonial ruler; these might be seen as control variables, although they are controlling for very specific parts of the colonial legacy itself rather than for other factors that are believed to be important. The first is whether or not this was the final colonial ruler before the state's independence, and the second indicates whether or not this ruler was governing under a League of Nations or United Nations mandate or trusteeship. These factors are only relevant for colonies that changed hands before independence, whether being transferred from one empire to another or being awarded as a mandate or trusteeship.

### **Quantitative Analyses**

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 examine all former colonizer-colony relationships in the modern interstate system, in a way that is comparable to the first tables in Chapter 3's analysis of international borders. As hypothesized, violent independence processes greatly increase the risk of territorial conflict, both overall and focusing only on fatal conflicts, and this result is

statistically significant at the .01 level. A former colony is more than twice as likely to become involved in at least one armed conflict over territory against its colonial ruler when it achieved independence through violence (19.5%) than when it achieved independence peacefully (7.2%), and more than four times as likely to escalate at least one territorial conflict to the level of fatalities (14.9% versus 3.2%). Colonies that achieved independence violently also average approximately five times as many conflicts, both overall and for fatal conflicts. It is worth comparing these figures to the results from the earlier analyses of territorial conflict between neighbors, though. Even the much more dangerous category of colonies that achieved independence through violent means only experiences about as much territorial conflict as the three middle categories in Chapter 3, far behind the most conflictual situations.

[Tables 4.1 and 4.2 about here]

These first tables have offered preliminary support for our hypotheses, with territorial conflict generally being more likely in the situations that we suggested should be most dangerous (particularly following violent independence). These tables' bivariate analyses were not able to control for the impact of other factors that might plausibly affect conflict behavior, though. Our next set of analyses will be multivariate in nature, allowing us to add such statistical controls for a more meaningful analysis.

### **Multivariate Analyses**

Hypothesis 1 suggested that territorial conflict in former colonizer-colony relationships would be more likely after colonies became independent through violent means, and Hypothesis 2 suggested that territorial conflict would be less likely for such relationships after colonies became independent through peaceful means. These hypotheses are supported by the evidence

reported in Table 4.3, with each effect being statistically significant at the .05 level or better for both all conflict and fatal conflicts.

[Tables 4.3 and 4.4 about here]

As before, we present the marginal impact of the key variables in Table 4.4, to aid in the interpretation of the results. The baseline captures the risk of conflict when none of the other factors in Table 4.3 is present, which is the aftermath of a nonviolent decolonization that did not involve a League of Nations or United Nations mandate/trusteeship and was not the final colonizer before the state achieved independence. The predicted annual risk of territorial conflict in this situation is .005 overall and .003 for fatal conflict, but when the colony achieved its independence through violent means, this risk roughly triples for both forms of conflict.

Overall, these results from these tables offer a great deal of insight into the relationship between colonial legacies and territorial conflict. The method by which states achieved independence has a very strong impact on later events. Colonies that became independent through violent struggles tend to have a much more conflictual future than those that were granted independence peacefully, experiencing much higher levels of territorial conflict with neighboring states as well as with the former colonizer itself. As before, though, we need to run a followup analysis to assess the robustness of these results.

### **Followup Analysis**

Our final followup analysis considers the possibility of differences based on the type of empire. In the tables that we have presented so far, we have grouped overseas empires like European possessions in Latin America and Africa together with land empires like the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. As discussed earlier, it is certainly possible that there are important

differences in the ways that these different types of empires' legacies affect territorial stability after independence, even if we found little evidence of such differences in Chapter 3's analysis of territorial conflict between neighbors. Table 4.5 investigates whether there are systematic differences between these types of empires with respect to territorial conflict after independence.

[Table 4.5 about here]

Table 4.5 adds a new variable to the earlier model to try to determine whether land empires have had different legacies than overseas empires. The results suggest that there is no systematic difference with respect to territorial conflict against the former colonizer. The new land empire variable is not statistically significant for either type of territorial conflict. Furthermore, the results for the other variables remain essentially identical when this variable is included in the model, suggesting that there is little systematic problem with including both land empires and overseas empires in the same model.

**Table 4.1: Colonial Legacies and Likelihood of Territorial Conflict with the Former Colonizer**

*At Least One Territorial Conflict:*

Type of Relationship	Any Conflict		Fatal Conflict	
	None	One or More (%)	None	One or More (%)
Violent independence (N=87):	70	17 (19.5%)	74	13 (14.9%)
Nonviolent independence (125):	116	9 (7.2)	121	4 (3.2%)
Total:	186	26 (12.3)	195	17 (8.0)
	$X^2 = 7.26$ (1 df, $p < .01$ )		$X^2 = 9.59$ (4 df, $p < .01$ )	

**Table 4.2: Colonial Legacies and Numbers of Territorial Conflicts with the Former Colonizer**

<i>Average Number of Territorial Conflicts:</i>		
	Any Conflicts	Fatal Conflict
<u>Type of Relationship</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>
Violent independence (N=87):	0.87 (3.34)	0.29 (1.00)
Nonviolent independence (125):	0.16 (0.66)	0.03 (0.17)
	F = 5.42 (p<.03) 211 d.f. (1/210)	F = 7.83 (p<.01) 211 d.f. (1/210)

**Table 4.3: Accounting for Territorial Conflict with the Former Colonizer**

Condition	Model I:	Model II:
	Any Conflict	Fatal Conflict
<i>Colonial Legacies</i>		
Violent independence	1.13 (0.31)***	1.17 (0.56)**
Last colonizer before indep.	0.29 (0.26)	0.15 (0.42)
League/UN mandate	0.98 (0.55)*	0.79 (1.11)
<i>Control Variables</i>		
Capabilities (colonizer)	- 4.01 (0.60)***	- 4.40 (1.13)***
Joint democracy	0.55 (0.26)**	0.74 (0.42)*
Land border	2.52 (0.27)***	2.88 (0.45)***
Peace years	- 0.32 (0.05)***	- 0.14 (0.07)***
Constant	- 1.53 (0.73)***	- 3.08 (1.22)***
	N=9694	N=9694
	X <sup>2</sup> =302.34	X <sup>2</sup> =99.33
	(10 df, p<.001)	(10 df, p<.001)

*Notes*

• Each model also includes three splines (not reported here) to assist in correction for temporal dependence, as discussed by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).

\*\*\*p<.01, \*\*p<.05, \*p<.10 (robust standard errors in parentheses)

**Table 4.4: Marginal Effects**

Predicted Annual Probability of Territorial Conflict,  
with change from baseline prediction:

<u>Condition</u>	<u>Any Conflict</u>	<u>Fatal Conflict</u>
Baseline (nonviolent decolonization):	.005	.003
Last colonizer before independence:	.006 (+ .001)	.003 (+ .000)
League/UN mandate:	.012 (+ .007)	.006 (+ .003)
Violent decolonization:	<b>.014 (+ .009)</b>	<b>.009 (+ .006)</b>

*Notes*

- Calculated from Table 5.3 using the MFX command in STATA version 9.2; all other variables held at their mean or modal values for purposes of this calculation.
- Entries in **bold** represent effects that were statistically significant at the .05 level.
- Numbers may not add up exactly due to rounding.

**Table 4.5: Colonial Legacies from Land and Overseas Empires and Territorial Conflict with the Former Colonizer**

<u>Condition</u>	Model I:	Model II:
	<u>Any Conflict</u>	<u>Fatal Conflict</u>
<i>Colonial Legacies</i>		
Violent independence	1.20 (0.33)***	1.21 (0.63)*
Last colonizer before indep.	0.44 (0.30)	0.18 (0.46)
League/UN mandate	0.83 (0.57)	0.71 (1.14)
<i>Type of Empire</i>		
Land Empire	- 0.88 (0.55)	- 0.31 (1.06)
<i>Control Variables</i>		
Capabilities (colonizer)	- 4.04 (0.57)***	- 4.44 (1.10)***
Joint democracy	0.42 (0.26)	0.70 (0.40)*
Land border	3.26 (0.52)***	3.12 (0.96)***
Peace years	- 0.32 (0.05)***	- 0.14 (0.07)**
Constant	- 1.61 (0.72)***	- 3.05 (1.18)**
	N=9694	N=9694
	X <sup>2</sup> =293.42	X <sup>2</sup> =101.11
	(11 df, p<.001)	(11 df, p<.001)

*Notes*

• Each model also includes three splines (not reported here) to assist in correction for temporal dependence, as discussed by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).

\*\*\*p<.01, \*\*p<.05, \*p<.10 (robust standard errors in parentheses)

**CHAPTER 5**  
**COLONIAL LEGACIES AND TERRITORIAL CONFLICT**  
**IN THE AMERICAS**

We now supplement the quantitative results in the previous two chapters by looking in greater detail at the general types of colonial legacies that were discussed earlier. In doing so, we draw from the quantitative results as well as brief case studies of relevant cases and other research on related topics. The goal of this section is to integrate the quantitative findings -- which give a useful summary of overall patterns -- with more detailed information about specific cases, to help flesh out the causal mechanisms that are at work and to gain a better understanding of the impact of colonial legacies with respect to territorial conflict. The next five chapters cover the five regions of the world that have had the most extensive experience with colonial rule, in rough chronological order based on when most states in the region decolonized. We begin with the Western Hemisphere in Chapter 5.

**Regional Patterns**

Map 5.1 shows the distribution of colonial rule in the Western Hemisphere in 1780, shortly before most of the region decolonized. Table 5.1 then summarizes the borders in the region from the perspective of our measures of colonial legacies. More than half of the region's borders are accounted for by same-colonizer legacies from two empires: 30 borders between former Spanish colonies (mostly in mainland Central and South America) and 30 between former British colonies (mostly reflecting Caribbean islands). A further 43 borders separate two states from different colonial empires, only one (the United States-Russian border across the

Bering Strait) is a partial colonial legacy (because Russia was never colonized), and no borders in the region have no colonial legacy whatsoever.

[Map 5.1 and Table 5.1 about here]

About one-fourth of the borders in the region experienced at least one territorial conflict (28 of 104, or 26.9%), and half of these experienced at least one fatal conflict (13.5%). The most conflictual borders were those between two former Spanish colonies; more than half of these borders were challenged in at least one armed confrontation (60.0%), and more than one-third experienced at least one fatal conflict (36.7%). Different-colonizer legacies still experienced a fair amount of conflict, as 21.0% experienced at least one conflict and 7.0% had at least one fatal conflict; much of this conflict involved the former Spanish colonies' borders with Brazil and other neighbors from different empires. Relations between the former British colonies have been peaceful, although most of these did not become independent until the later twentieth century -- when the lessons of earlier decolonization experiences around the world had become clear -- and most of these were islands that lacked land borders (which tend to be much more conflictual than sea borders).

### **Territorial Conflict between Neighbors**

This high level of conflict within the former Spanish empire is not surprising, as it is consistent both with the quantitative results from the previous chapter and with our hypotheses. The empire decolonized violently, through armed revolutions in the first decades of the 19th century, and there were numerous problems with the determination and marking of borders under Spanish rule. Despite the good intentions behind the application of *uti possidetis* in Latin America, the doctrine's application appears to have been plagued by several serious problems

(Brownlie 1998: 132-133; Hill 1945: 155; Prescott 1987: 105-106, 199 ff; Ratner 1996: 594, 607-608).

[Map 5.2 about here]

One issue was that the Spanish had employed a wide variety of administrative units, with different borders often delimiting military, political, and religious entities; several different newly independent states could thus claim possession of the same territory based on inheritance from different Spanish entities. The Spanish often changed the borders of their administrative units over time through seemingly arbitrary royal decrees or *cédulas* from Madrid, raising questions about which state's colonial predecessor actually possessed a given territory under Spanish rule. For example, a Spanish royal order in 1803 transferred the islands of San Andrés (shown in Map 4.2) and part of the Mosquito Coast from the Captaincy-General of Guatemala (today's Central America) to the Viceroyalty of Santa Fé (today's Colombia). Both Costa Rica and Nicaragua claimed after independence that this transfer had only referred to military jurisdiction and had not changed political sovereignty (Ireland 1941: 164-165).

[Map 5.3 about here]

Other borders were never clearly marked due to ignorance of local geography, as the entire continent was never completely explored or settled under Spanish rule. For example, the Bolivia-Chile and Bolivia-Paraguay borders were defined only vaguely and incompletely in Spanish documents and maps, allowing each side in these respective territorial claims to argue that its colonial predecessors had explored and administered territory beyond the presumptive border lines that were inherited at independence. This created a situation where both Bolivia and Chile laid claim to the same areas along the Pacific seacoast, leading to a series of incidents in

the area and ultimately to Chile's capture of coastal areas of both Bolivia and Peru in the 1879-1883 War of the Pacific, as seen in Map 4.3 (Fifer 1972; Ireland 1938: 53-95).

Despite these problems with the former Spanish colonial borders, though, the followup analyses at the end of Chapter 3 found a strong negative effect for territorial conflict in Latin America. This apparent contradiction is easily resolved when we consider that the analyses in Chapter 3 and the simple patterns in Table 5.1 are examining slightly different phenomena. While Chapter 3 was primarily concerned with predicting annual conflict -- i.e., the risk of territorial conflict in any given year -- this chapter's table focuses on the likelihood of conflict at any point in time after independence. While the former Spanish colonies were much more likely than other pairs of neighbors to experience conflict or fatal conflict at some point, most of them have been independent now for nearly two centuries. Thus, after settling their borders (perhaps through force), they have experienced peaceful relations for decades (in some cases more than a century), which accounts for the observed peaceful relations found in Chapter 3.

### **Territorial Conflict with the Former Colonizer**

Territorial conflict with the former colonizer has been quite rare in the Americas, perhaps influenced by the great geographic distance between the New World and the colonizers' homelands. Only two of 37 states in the region have become involved in territorial conflict of this form. The United States became involved in several confrontations against Great Britain, although these owed more to the fact that the U.S. shared a border with the British colony of Canada than to the former colonizer-colony relationship. Spain also had several confrontations against Peru related to the Chincha Islands, a rich source of guano.

**Map 5.1: Colonial Latin America**




Source: Keen and Wasserman (1984), *A Short History of Latin America*, p. 124.

**Table 5.1: Colonial Legacies and Borders in the Americas**


<u>Type of Legacy</u>	Territorial Conflict:	
	<u>Any</u>	<u>Fatal</u>
Same-Colonizer Legacy		
UK:	0 / 30 (0.0%)	0 / 30 (0.0%)
Spain:	18 / 30 (60.0%)	11 / 30 (36.7%)
Different-Colonizer Legacy:	9 / 43 (21.0%)	3 / 43 (7.0%)
Partial Colonial Legacy:	1 / 1 (100%)	0 / 1 (0.0%)
No Colonial Legacy:	---	---
Total:	28 / 104 (26.9%)	14 / 104 (13.5%)

Map 5.2: San Andres and Providencia



Source: Calvert (2004), *Border and Territorial Disputes of the World*, p. 500.

### Map 5.3: Borders of Independent Bolivia



Source: Calvert (2004), *Border and Territorial Disputes of the World*, p. 500.

**CHAPTER 6**  
**COLONIAL LEGACIES AND TERRITORIAL CONFLICT**  
**IN EUROPE**

The next regional analysis involves Europe. While this region did not experience traditional overseas colonialism in the same sense that the Western Hemisphere or Africa did, most states in Eastern and Central Europe were once ruled as part of three major land empires: the Hapsburg, Ottoman, and Russian empires. We now examine these states' experiences.

**Regional Patterns**

Table 6.1 shows the colonial legacies behind European borders. Europe did not experience significant colonization by overseas empires, so nearly half of the region's borders (136 of 284) had no colonial legacy on either side and more than one-fourth (88 of 284) were partial legacies in which only one side of the border was once ruled as a dependency. As for the remaining roughly one-fourth of the continent, 21 borders separate states that were once part of the Russian empire, eight separate states from the Ottoman empire,<sup>10</sup> three separate former Hapsburg territories, and two separate former British colonies.

[Table 6.1 about here]

In contrast to the Americas, in Europe the most dangerous situation has not been borders within or between empires, but what we term borders with a partial colonial legacy. Such borders, which separate a former Ottoman or Hapsburg (or other) possession from a state that was never colonized, experienced conflict more than one-third of the time (32 of 88, or 36.4%),

and fatal territorial conflict roughly one-sixth (15 of 88 or 17.1%). Borders within the region's various empires experienced conflict around the overall average seen in Table 3.1, with approximately one-fourth of the borders experiencing at least one territorial conflict, while borders with a different-colonial legacy or no colonial legacy experienced less conflict.

### **Territorial Conflict between Neighbors**

[Map 6.1 about here]

A good illustration of these relationships is the former Yugoslavia, as seen in Map 6.1. Most recently, we have seen nasty fighting between several of the former Yugoslav republics -- Croatia (from the Hapsburg Empire), Serbia (from the Ottoman Empire), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (transferred from the Ottoman Empire to the Hapsburg Empire in 1878). The case of Bosnia is one example of a relationship that might be obscured by our coding decisions, since for the purposes of identifying colonial legacies we have only examined the most recent colonial or imperial ruler. The Croatia-Bosnia conflict is thus considered here to be a same-colonizer legacy, while Serbia-Bosnia is considered a different-colonizer legacy. In each case, though, the former imperial ruler was unable to produce stable borders that ensured peace either between or within the eventual states (see, e.g., Calvert 2004: 390-398).

### **Territorial Conflict with the Former Colonizer**

Europe has seen much more former colonizer-colony conflict than the other regions, perhaps influenced by the proximity of the former rulers to their former possessions. The most dangerous former colonizer-colony relationship anywhere in the world in the past two centuries

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<sup>10</sup> This figure only refers to former Ottoman possessions in Europe; Ottoman territories

has been the relationship between Greece and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey, following Greek independence in 1829. This pair has accounted for 29 territorial conflicts since that time, eight of which produced fatalities. This case certainly fits our earlier discussion of the most dangerous situation, as Greece achieved independence through a violent rebellion against Ottoman rule, and many issues remained unresolved upon independence. Greece and Turkey have subsequently engaged in armed conflict over their land border as well as the status of Cyprus and a number of small Aegean Sea islands, as seen in Map 6.2.

[Map 6.2 about here]

Cyprus is another good example of a state that fits this pattern; it was once ruled by Turkey, although it achieved its formal independence from the United Kingdom decades after the latter acquired it from Turkey; both the transfer from Turkish to British rule (as a result of war) and independence (as a result of an armed revolt) occurred violently. Cyprus has engaged in six armed conflicts over territory with Turkey (three of them fatal) since independence, reflecting a number of issues that were unresolved at independence and have generally remained so. Most prominent, of course, is the status of the northern portion of the island of Cyprus, which is primarily populated by ethnic Turks; there are also maritime issues offshore. The failure to settle the status of both ethnic Greeks and Turks on Cyprus upon independence in 1960 was followed by numerous conflicts, including the Turkish invasion that established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and numerous incidents since the permanent stationing of Turkish troops on the island.

[Map 6.3 about here]

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in the Middle East are covered in a separate section of this analysis.

Another prominent contributor to this category is Poland, which engaged in four territorial conflicts with Russia (one fatal) and three with Germany (one -- World War II -- fatal) after leaving their respective empires to become independent. Polish independence occurred as a result of violence -- World War I -- and was not accompanied by a full resolution of all issues with its neighbors (and former rulers). In particular, Russia did not accept its territorial losses upon the initial creation of Poland, leading to the 1919 Russo-Polish War almost immediately after independence. Germany also sought to revise its eastern border, leading to numerous tensions during the interwar period and culminating in World War II. Map 6.3 illustrates the territorial changes after World War II, with large German territories being transferred to Poland and large Polish territories being transferred to several Soviet republics; it was not until these major changes had been made that Poland's borders were generally accepted on all sides (and even then, pressure for Cold War unity against the perceived Western threat was at least partially responsible for the avoidance of a renewed German claim). Similarly, Russia and Finland experienced a number of territorial problems upon Finnish independence from the Russian empire, leading to three territorial conflicts (two of them full-scale wars), and Russia has as engaged in territorial conflicts with its former possessions of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

Further investigation reveals that territorial conflicts have been much more common in land empires such as the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires, with fully one-third of such cases (17 of 51) being followed by at least one territorial conflict after independence. Just under six percent of former colonies from overseas empires (8 of 138, or 5.8%) engaged in territorial conflict with their former colonial rulers, and most of the cases with relatively high numbers of conflicts came from land rather than overseas empires. One likely reason for this is that former possessions in land empires remain located close to the former ruler after independence, where

they likely have frequent interactions with the former ruler's people and economic interests. In contrast, former colonies in overseas empires may be less likely to have such interactions, as the colonizer's abandonment of its overseas possessions may have left it with little immediate interests that would justify renewed intervention.

**Table 6.1: Colonial Legacies and Borders in Europe**

<u>Type of Legacy</u>	Territorial Conflict:	
	<u>Any</u>	<u>Fatal</u>
Same-Colonizer Legacy		
UK:	0 / 2 (0.0%)	0 / 2 (0.0%)
Hapsburg:	1 / 3 (33.3%)	1 / 3 (33.3%)
Russia:	3 / 21 (14.3%)	3 / 21 (14.3%)
Ottoman:	4 / 8 (50.0%)	4 / 8 (50.0%)
Different-Colonizer Legacy:	4 / 26 (15.4%)	2 / 26 (7.7%)
Partial Colonial Legacy:	32 / 88 (36.4%)	15 / 88 (17.1%)
No Colonial Legacy:	21 / 136 (15.4%)	13 / 136 (9.6%)
Total:	65 / 284 (22.9%)	38 / 284 (13.4%)

Map 6.1: The Former Yugoslavia



Source: United Nations Cartographic Section

<<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/frmyugo.pdf>>

**Map 6.2: Greece and Turkey**



Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2008 World Factbook:  
<<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/gr-map.gif>>

**Map 6.3: Borders of Independent Poland**



Source: Calvert (2004), *Border and Territorial Disputes of the World*, p. 513.

**CHAPTER 7**  
**COLONIAL LEGACIES AND TERRITORIAL CONFLICT**  
**IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

The next regional analysis focuses on the Middle East, which had a somewhat different colonial history than either the Americas or Europe. Much of the region was once part of the Ottoman Empire, which stretched far beyond the European territories covered in the previous chapter. After the Ottoman Empire was dissolved after World War I, though, many of its former Middle Eastern possessions were granted to European powers as mandated territories under the League of Nations. These territories thus experienced both rule under a major land empire and rule as part of overseas empires.

**Regional Patterns**

The Middle East was heavily influenced by the Ottoman Empire, which ruled over important parts of the region until World War I. After the war, the Ottoman possessions were divided among Britain -- which already had special relationships with a number of other entities along the coast of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea -- and France as mandated territories under the League of Nations, producing the situation shown in Map 7.1. 41 of the 100 borders in the region separate two states that were part of different empires -- typically the Ottoman, British, or French -- while another 19 separate two states that emerged from the same empire and 33 separate one such state from a state that was never colonized. Each of these types of colonial legacies tended to experience a high risk of territorial conflict, with roughly one-third of the borders in the region seeing at least one such conflict (and over one-fourth seeing fatal conflict);

most of the categories experienced a higher risk of conflict than any category in some of the other regions of the world.

[Map 7.1 and Table 7.1 about here]

### **Territorial Conflict between Neighbors**

Perhaps the most obvious cases of territorial conflict in the Middle East are related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which involves much more than simply colonial legacies (and which is beyond the scope of the present project). There are many other cases that have clear connections to the actions of the colonial rulers, though. A good example is the Iraqi territorial claim to Kuwait, which is depicted in Map 7.2.


[Map 7.2 about here]

The main contention behind the Iraqi claim to Kuwait is that Kuwait was an integral part of the Ottoman province of Basra, which became modern Iraq. If this were to be the case, then Kuwait should have stayed under Iraqi rule upon the latter's independence. Kuwait responds that -- while paying tribute to the Ottoman Sultan for a long period of time -- it was never under direct Ottoman rule, and that an 1899 protectorate agreement with Great Britain placed it under British protection in return for control over its foreign affairs. As is well known, the Iraqi claim persisted for decades after Kuwait's 1961 independence from British rule, leading to numerous incidents as well as the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, although it appears that the new Iraqi government that took power after Saddam Hussein was removed has accepted Kuwait's independence and dropped the Iraqi claim. (Calvert 2004: 470-476)

### **Territorial Conflict with the Former Colonizer**

Like most of the other regions beyond Europe, the Middle East has seen relatively little territorial conflict against former colonial rulers, and most of what there has been has involved a land empire. Great Britain has been involved in conflict against one former colony in the region, Iraq, but these four confrontations have involved the defense of another British colony (Kuwait) rather than any specific colonizer-colony problems. The Ottoman Empire has also been involved in several problems with former possessions: one each with Iraq and Egypt, and two with Syria.

**Map 7.1: The Middle East in the Interwar Period**



Source: Cleveland (1994), *A History of the Modern Middle East*, p. 158.

**Table 7.1: Colonial Legacies and Borders in the Middle East**

<u>Type of Legacy</u>	Territorial Conflict:	
	<u>Any</u>	<u>Fatal</u>
Same-Colonizer Legacy		
UK:	7 / 14 (50.0%)	4 / 14 (28.6%)
France:	0 / 1 (0.0%)	0 / 1 (0.0%)
Ottoman:	1 / 4 (25.0%)	1 / 4 (25.0%)
Different-Colonizer Legacy:	12 / 41 (29.3%)	10 / 41 (24.4%)
Partial Colonial Legacy:	11 / 33 (33.3%)	10 / 33 (30.3%)
No Colonial Legacy:	3 / 7 (42.9%)	1 / 7 (14.3%)
Total:	34 / 100 (34.0%)	26 / 100 (26.0%)

Map 7.2: Iraq and Kuwait



Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2008 *World Factbook*.  
<<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/ku-map.gif>>

**CHAPTER 8**  
**COLONIAL LEGACIES AND TERRITORIAL CONFLICT**  
**IN AFRICA**

Much like the Americas, Africa's colonial experience was primarily a matter of rule by overseas empires. The African states generally remained under colonial rule until the decades following World War II, when nearly the entire continent experienced decolonization.

**Regional Patterns**

Map 8.1 depicts the colonial empires ruling over Africa in 1914, and Table 8.1 summarizes the colonial legacies that resulted from these empires. Approximately half of the borders in independent Africa separate two states that emerged from different colonial rulers (78 of 162). Most of the remaining borders separate two states from the same empire, led by 30 from the French empire and 26 from the British. There is little difference in the likelihood of territorial conflict between the most common types of colonial legacies in Africa, with a low of 15.4% of borders between former British colonies experiencing conflict and a high of 26.7% for borders between former French colonies.

[Map 8.1 and Table 8.1 about here]

While the highest risk of conflict seems to come from the former French colonies in Africa, the followup analyses in Chapter 3 suggested that former French colonies (as well as African borders) tended to experience less territorial conflict. As with Latin America, which has already been discussed, this is due largely to differences in what is being measured. While some of the former French colonies experienced territorial conflict soon after independence, these

conflicts tended to end quickly, with little risk of further conflict afterward. The span of conflict-free decades after the borders were resolved helps explain the results from Chapter 3's annual analysis.

### **Territorial Conflict between Neighbors**

[Map 8.2 about here]

Map 8.2 shows the former colony of French West Africa, which ultimately produced a number of independent states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. Several of these states became involved in armed conflict over territory after independence, most notably Mali and Burkina Faso. This conflict related to events during the colonial era, when the French organized and reorganized their West African holdings several times. Mali argued that the disputed Béli River region -- the only source of fresh water in the area -- had always been considered part of the French Sudan, the colonial entity that became Mali at independence. Upper Volta (later Burkina Faso), though, presented a number of historical, geographic, and demographic arguments to counter those of Mali, with both sides presenting French maps that supported their respective claims to the territory; this situation resembles the many problems plaguing Latin America's use of *Uti Possidetis* to establish and maintain borders after independence. The territorial claim lingered for decades, producing armed clashes in 1974, 1975, and most bloodily in 1986, although the matter was ultimately settled with the help of the International Court of Justice. (Calvert 2004: 3-7)

[Map 8.3 about here]


Another prominent African territorial claim with colonial roots involves the Bakassi Peninsula, a territory lying between the former British colony of Nigeria and the former German

colony of Cameroon (handed to French rule as a League of Nations mandated territory after World War I). This territory was the subject of serious armed clashes in the 1980s and 1990s, before finally being resolved by the International Court of Justice in a 2002 decision that was fully implemented in the summer of 2008. Much of each side's argument depended on actions taken during the colonial era, with Cameroon arguing that a 1913 Anglo-German treaty had given Bakassi to the German colony (Nigeria rejected that argument because the treaty had not been ratified before World War I changed the situation on the ground in the region) and both sides referring to numerous treaties between the colonizers and local powers during the colonial era. (Calvert 2004: 7-9; ICJ 2003)

### **Territorial Conflict with the Former Colonizer**

As with the Americas, few African states have engaged in territorial conflicts with their former colonial rulers. Only three of 67 states have engaged in even a single territorial conflict, only one of them fatal. Morocco has engaged in one confrontation against France and three against Spain, both of which once ruled significant parts of Moroccan territory. Particularly for Spain, though, this conflict is more a matter of Spain's continued colonial presence in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (located on mainland Moroccan territory) than a matter of a past colonial relationship. Otherwise, the only other case is Egypt and Sudan, which have had four confrontations related to their disputed border.

# Map 8.1: Colonial Africa in 1914




Source: Collins (1994). *Historical Problems of Imperial Africa*, p. 266.

**Table 8.1: Colonial Legacies and Borders in Africa**


<u>Type of Legacy</u>	Territorial Conflict:	
	<u>Any</u>	<u>Fatal</u>
Same-Colonizer Legacy		
UK:	4 / 26 (15.4%)	1 / 26 (3.9%)
Belgium:	1 / 3 (33.3%)	1 / 3 (33.3%)
France:	8 / 30 (26.7%)	3 / 30 (10.0%)
Different-Colonizer Legacy:	14 / 78 (18.0%)	6 / 78 (7.7%)
Partial Colonial Legacy:	4 / 25 (16.0%)	3 / 25 (12.0%)
No Colonial Legacy:	---	---
Total:	31 / 162 (19.1%)	14 / 162 (8.6%)

Map 8.2: French West Africa



Source: *L'oeuvre de la France en Afrique occidentale* (1936), p. 261.

Map 8.3: The Bakassi Peninsula



Source: United Nations Cartographic Section:  
<http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/ba/Un-bakassi.png>

**CHAPTER 9**  
**COLONIAL LEGACIES AND TERRITORIAL CONFLICT**  
**IN ASIA AND OCEANIA**

The final region to be examined here is Asia and Oceania. Many of the states in this region were ruled as part of European overseas empires. There were several more local empires, though, including the Russian empire and (on a lesser scale) Chinese and Japanese expansionism within the region.

**Regional Patterns**

The final region in our brief discussion of colonial legacies is Asia and Oceania. This region featured a number of colonies, ranging from the British possessions in South Asia (today's India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) to French Indochina (today's Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam), as well as more local empires from neighboring Russia, China, and Japan. Table 9.1 lists the colonial legacies behind Asian borders. A number of these borders included at least one state that was never colonized, but there are also 33 borders between states from the same colonial empires and 30 more between states from different empires. As with Europe, the most dangerous borders appear to be those where at least one side was never colonized.

[Table 9.1 about here]

**Territorial Conflict between Neighbors**

The example of India and Pakistan -- which have experienced 38 territorial conflicts since independence, 24 of them fatal -- stands out as one where the colonizer's actions either

created or worsened a serious territorial problem (shown in Map 9.1) that has currently lasted more than six decades and shows no signs of ending soon. Before leaving their South Asian colonial possessions, the British decided to partition British India into a majority Muslim state and a majority Hindu state. While most of the leaders of the princely states that made up British India chose to join the postcolonial state that best reflected the religion of their populations, the (Hindu) maharajah of Kashmir hesitated to join either new state, leading to demands and then armed revolt by his majority Muslim constituents. Facing this threat, he then announced Kashmir's accession to India, which has been followed by more than six decades of demands and armed rebellion by the majority Muslim population of Kashmir as well as the Pakistani government. It is not clear that different decisions by the British colonial government would have been able to prevent serious conflict throughout the entire former British India, but a strong argument could be made that the British actions as they were leaving the area did little to manage or settle the potential issues that arose almost immediately upon independence. (Anderson 2000: 165-167; Calvert 2004: 184-197)

[Map 9.1 about here]

Turning from overseas empires to land empires, similar results may be seen in a number of cases within the former Russian Empire and Soviet Union. Maybe the most visible example in recent history is the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave with a largely Armenian population located within the borders of Azerbaijan, shown in Map 9.2. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia came under Soviet rule in the tumultuous days after World War I, and in 1920 the leadership of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic passed Nagorno-Karabakh to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in a fraternal gesture. Continued

ethnic conflict and Turkish pressure led Joseph Stalin to designate the enclave an autonomous region and transfer it back to Azerbaijan in 1923.

[Map 9.2 about here]

The Soviet authorities were able to maintain general order in the coming decades, but tensions persisted, and the opening of political expression in the mid-1980s led to the renewal of overt conflict over the territory. Armenia began to demand the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenian rule, and the region's local leadership voted in 1988 in favor of such a transfer. The tensions over the region soon led to a series of strikes and demonstrations, which began to escalate to armed conflict. Soviet forces intervened in 1989 to reestablish order in the region, imposing direct rule for a time in 1989 before handing control back to Azerbaijan in November. Armenia declared Nagorno-Karabakh to be part of the Armenian Republic in December of 1989, though, and fighting and ethnic cleansing soon escalated. The Soviets were unable to maintain order in the region, and the breakup of the Soviet Union was followed by further escalation. Tens of thousands have died and hundreds of thousands have been displaced, while Nagorno-Karabakh remains under Armenian rule and repeated multilateral peace initiatives have failed. While Soviet rule over both Armenia and Azerbaijan was able to prevent the outbreak of full-scale fighting over the enclave for some six decades, the multiple transfers of the territory and changes in its status under Soviet rule failed to resolve the issue and instead set the stage for future conflict. And once the Soviet Union broke up and Armenia and Azerbaijan achieved independence, the issue -- which had already been inflamed in recent years -- quickly exploded into full-scale war. (Anderson 2000: 236-238; Calvert 2004: 249-258)

### **Territorial Conflict with the Former Colonizer**

Finally, only four of 54 former colonies in Asia or Oceania have engaged in territorial conflict against their former colonial rulers. Indonesia and the Netherlands have engaged in seven confrontations, China and Mongolia have one, and the remaining two involve Japan and both Koreas.


[Map 9.3 about here]

A good example of conflict against the former colonizer is the conflict between Japan and South Korea over the islets known in Korean as Dokdo, in Japanese as Takeshima, or in some Western sources as the Liancourt Rocks (pictured in Map 9.3). After Japan established a protectorate over Korea in 1905 following the Russo-Japanese War, it announced the incorporation of the islets into Shimane prefecture. Following Japan's defeat in World War II and South Korea's independence, Koreans believe that the islands were returned to South Korean sovereignty, while Japanese sources deny this; there have been numerous incidents and claims related to the islands over the past six decades (e.g., Calvert 2004: 197-200). This is another classic example of a case where independence occurred violently (with Japan's defeat in World War II) and the former colony became independent without important issues having been resolved to both sides' satisfaction.

**Table 9.1: Colonial Legacies and Borders in Asia**

<u>Type of Legacy</u>	Territorial Conflict:	
	<u>Any</u>	<u>Fatal</u>
Same-Colonizer Legacy		
USA:	0 / 2 (0.0%)	0 / 2 (0.0%)
UK:	4 / 15 (26.7%)	3 / 15 (20.0%)
France:	2 / 6 (33.3%)	1 / 6 (16.7%)
Russia:	1 / 9 (11.1%)	0 / 9 (0.0%)
Japan:	1 / 1 (100%)	1 / 1 (100%)
Different-Colonizer Legacy:	5 / 30 (16.7%)	2 / 30 (6.7%)
Partial Colonial Legacy:	15 / 38 (39.5%)	7 / 38 (18.4%)
No Colonial Legacy:	6 / 9 (66.7%)	4 / 9 (44.4%)
Total:	34 / 110 (30.9%)	18 / 110 (16.4%)

**Map 9.1: Kashmir**




Source: Anderson (1993), *An Atlas of World Political Flashpoints*, p. 100.

**Map 9.2: Nagorno-Karabakh**



Source: Anderson (1993), *An Atlas of World Political Flashpoints*, p. 136.

**Map 9.3: Dokdo/Takeshima**



Source: Anderson (1993), *An Atlas of World Political Flashpoints*, p. 116.

## CHAPTER 10

### CONCLUSIONS

This project has been a preliminary effort to investigate the impact of colonial legacies on territorial claims between independent nation-states. We began by laying out three distinct types of legacies that might be at work, and by presenting a series of hypotheses about the conditions under which each type of legacy should be most likely. These hypotheses were tested through quantitative analyses of territorial conflict over the past two centuries. Overall, these analyses generally offer strong support for most of our hypotheses, suggesting both that colonial legacies can have an important impact, and that our approach in this project has a great deal of potential for understanding these legacies.

#### **Summary of Colonial Legacies**

##### *Colonial Legacy Worsened Territorial Relations with Neighbors*

One type of colonial legacy that we discussed involved situations where the history of colonial rule seems to have worsened territorial relations between states after their independence. Along these lines, we hypothesized that territorial conflict would be most likely in pairs of states that had both been ruled by the same colonizer, as well as in pairs of states in which at least one had achieved independence through violent means. These expectations were generally supported by our quantitative analyses, suggesting that even these simple measures of the colonial legacy are quite successful at predicting conflict behavior after decolonization.

Nearly half of all same-colonizer borders that followed violent independence were challenged in at least one territorial conflict, and nearly one third of such borders experienced at least one fatal conflict over the territory. Furthermore, with three different types of colonial

legacies and several different measures of conflict, in every single case armed conflict was significantly more likely following violent independence on at least one side of the border than when both sides achieved decolonization peacefully.

### *Colonial Legacy Improved Territorial Relations with Neighbors*

The other type of colonial legacy that we discussed involving situations where the history of colonial rule seems to have improved territorial relations between states after their independence. Among these lines, we hypothesized that territorial conflict should be less likely between former colonies of the same colonizer. Furthermore, the mirror image of Hypothesis 3 was the expectation that postcolonial relations between states that achieved independence through peaceful processes should be more stable and peaceful than relations between states that achieved independence violently. The evidence turns out to be mixed. Where a colonial border divided the possessions of two different colonizers and both sides of the border achieved independence through peaceful means, postcolonial relations have generally been marked by somewhat less territorial conflict. The expectation of greater solidarity between former colonies of the same colonial power was not supported at all, though, regardless of how the colonies achieved their independence.

Turning to other research, there is some suggestion that *uti possidetis* and similar doctrines were responsible for the general avoidance of territorial conflict in the Americas and Africa, even if (as noted above) several scholars see the application of these doctrines as having been plagued by numerous flaws. Zacher (2001: 229) argues that the principle of *uti possidetis* “had some impact in promoting greater order” in Latin America, although it was not always respected by every country in the region, and Malanczuk (1997: 162-163) notes that most newly

independent states have accepted this general principle of the inheritance of colonial borders. Domínguez et al. (2003: 21) argue that “Given immense geographic spaces, seemingly insurmountable barriers such as the Andean mountains or the extensive dense tropical forests that filled much of Central and South America, state leaders with limited resources found it cost-effective to honor and rely on *uti possidetis* to address most border issues,” and that while interstate war frequently occurred in postcolonial Central and South America, “*Uti possidetis juris* held successfully over time, with six exceptions, the last of which occurred in 1941.” Kacowicz (1995: 270; see also Kacowicz 1994: 227-228) suggests that -- while there have been a few wars or near-wars in the region -- “the vast majority of border disputes in South America have been resolved peacefully, leading to some cession or exchange of territories. The basis for a peaceful settlement of those disputes was established through the principle of *uti possidetis*, according to which the Latin American countries recognized the colonial borders as their post-independence international frontiers.” The followup analyses from the end of Chapter 3 are consistent with this; territorial conflict turns out to have been significantly less likely in the Western Hemisphere than would otherwise have been expected, and fatal territorial conflict has been less likely between former Spanish colonies.

Turning to Africa, Kacowicz (1995: 271) and Zacher (2001: 229) conclude that African borders -- particularly in West Africa -- have generally been respected, in line with *uti possidetis*. Yet there is evidence that the application of *uti possidetis* in Latin America was plagued with problems, as noted above, and other scholars are skeptical of related efforts in Africa. For example, Prescott (1987: 105) notes that the 1964 OAU declaration was meant to prevent the emergence of territorial disputes in Africa, but concludes that “Unfortunately, it has not succeeded in that intention.” As with Latin America, this project has found evidence suggesting

that such scholars may be right; territorial conflict has been significantly less likely both in Africa and between former French colonies, such as those in West Africa.

Moving beyond armed conflict for the moment, it is worth noting that many of the territorial cases that have been submitted to the International Court of Justice involve shared colonial legacies. A brief glance through the list of contentious ICJ cases identifies nineteen that have involved territorial issues.<sup>11</sup> Of these, nine involved two states that had both been colonies of the same colonizer, most notably pairs of former Spanish colonies in Latin America (like the San Andrés and Providencia case discussed earlier) or former French colonies in West Africa (like the Mali-Burkina Faso case). Another five involved two states that had been ruled by different colonizers or empires, and the remaining five included at least one state that was a colonizer rather than a colony of another state; none of these territorial cases involved a colonizer and one of its former colonies. These numbers suggest an important pattern when considered in context, using the numbers from Chapters 3 and 4 to identify the number of shared borders or colonizer-colony relationships that potentially could have taken a territorial issue to the ICJ. The nine ICJ cases with a same-colonizer legacy come from a set of 189 total borders with such a legacy, so 4.8% of these borders were settled by reference to the court. The five cases with a different-colonizer legacy come from a set of 199 borders, so only 2.5% of borders - - barely half of the probability for same-colonizer legacies -- were submitted to the court; none of the 289 former colonizer-colony relationships has yet been submitted to the ICJ. By no means does this offer definitive proof that a shared legacy of colonial rule by the same power increases states' willingness to settle their territorial issues peacefully through adjudication, but it is

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<sup>11</sup> The list of cases is at <<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3>>. This figure of nineteen territorial cases excludes another nineteen that exclusively involved sovereignty over maritime zones (with no mainland or island territory at stake) or the use of cross-border rivers.

certainly consistent with this suggestion. Future research should do more to investigate the impact of colonial legacies on peaceful conflict management, as well as on armed conflict itself.

#### *Colonial Legacy Worsened Territorial Relations with the Former Colonizer*

We begin by considering cases of territorial issues between a former colonizer and one of its former colonies. We had hypothesized that territorial conflict would be more likely when the colony achieved independence through violent means, but less likely when it achieved independence nonviolently. Both hypotheses were supported by the analyses, suggesting that the relationship between colonizer and colony at the time of independence plays a very important role afterward.

The results in Chapter 4 should help to put these results in perspective, though. Only about one in eight cases (12.3%) experience even a single armed conflict over territory, and even fewer -- only 8.0% experience a single fatal conflict over territory. Even in the most conflictual scenario, those colonies that achieved independence through violence, less than one in five experience even a single armed conflict against the former colonizer after independence, and there is an average of less than one conflict per dyad. So it should be clear that this is not the modal category, and armed conflict against the former colonizer over territory is clearly the exception rather than the rule. With that said, though, there are a number of very conflictual cases in this category, the most prominent have been discussed above.

#### *Colonial Legacy Improved Territorial Relations with the Former Colonizer*

While the territorial conflicts mentioned in the previous section attract more headlines, we must also bear in mind that (as discussed above) relatively few former colonies engage in

territorial conflict with their former colonial rulers. This likely occurs for one of several reasons. On the one hand, the colonizer and its colony may have resolved the status of any potentially disputed territories to each side's satisfaction before independence, as part of the decolonization process. On the other hand, the colonizer may simply have abandoned its remaining territorial interests in the region around its former colony. Having lost its rule over the area despite the advantages of its local administrative and military presence, the colonizer would seem unlikely to maintain a reasonable expectation of reconquering part or all of the territory that had been lost. This is consistent with the evidence from our analyses, which found much lower risk of armed territorial conflict with the former colonizer if decolonization was achieved through peaceful means -- which presumably involves a more gradual process and a more definitive resolution of issues between the colonizer and the colony.

## **Discussion**

These analyses suggest that the common tendency to refer to "colonial legacies" or to the "colonial origins of today's problems" may have a basis in fact. Over the past two centuries, territorial conflict between neighbors has been more likely between former colonies than between other states, particularly when at least one of them achieved statehood through violent processes or when both were dependencies of the same foreign power. Territorial conflict has also been quite likely between former colonizers and their nearby former colonies, at least for colonies that achieved independence violently; nearby colonies that achieved independence through peaceful processes are significantly less likely to become involved in territorial conflict with their former colonial ruler.

Taken together, this evidence suggests that processes and decisions in international relations are influenced by events in the distant past. While international relations scholars have frequently focused on the impact of recent events such as armed conflicts or war, this study's results show that events several centuries ago -- indeed, long before the modern state became independent -- can also have a strong and systematic effect. This is also consistent with a variety of work on other potential influences of colonialism, which has found important connections between colonial histories and political or economic conditions within postcolonial states.

This project has produced some very useful insights into the role of colonial legacies with respect to territorial conflict, but it has not produced definitive answers regarding every aspect of colonial legacies. Many interesting and important questions remain to be addressed in future research. One area for further development is a more detailed examination of individual cases of borders or other claimed territories, which will allow us to gain a much clearer understanding of how these colonial legacies work. Quantitative analyses such as those presented in this project are very useful for identifying important patterns and relationships, but case studies offer a better chance to investigate the specific processes at work in these general patterns.

In conducting these case studies, we plan to focus more on specific events during the colonial era as influences on territorial stability after independence. In the preliminary analyses reported here, we have used broad categories to measure the colonial legacy -- whether two states shared the same or different colonizers, and whether at least one of them achieved independence through violent means. Our theoretical discussion of the different types of colonial legacies suggests that much more may be at work, though, and our brief evaluation of several prominent cases was consistent with this; more detailed case studies will be even more helpful. For example, while violent or nonviolent decolonization processes are useful measures

of the way that colonial rule ended and have very strong effects in this study's preliminary analyses, it may be at least as important to investigate the status of each border when the colonial era ended (such as whether the border had been settled to both sides' satisfaction, mapped clearly and accurately, and marked accurately on the ground). Even violent decolonization processes may not be likely to lead to territorial claims or armed conflict over borders that were accepted and demarcated at independence, and even peaceful decolonization processes may not be enough to prevent future conflict over borders that were still challenged or were unmarked at independence. Borders with a history of conflict or changing possession during the colonial era may be more likely to lead to post-independence challenges, as one or both new states may seek to reverse past losses and regain previously held territory after independence; the same may also be true for colonially imposed borders that separate members of tribal, ethnic, or other identity groups or otherwise seem to set the stage for post-independence conflict. The impact of colonial history after independence may also depend on the length of colonial rule (whereby a longer colonial period means a greater opportunity for the colonizer's actions to affect subsequent events) or on the details of how the colonies were run (e.g., with settlement-oriented colonies being run very differently from colonies that were used primarily for resource extraction). We will investigate these options in our case studies, and to the extent that it is possible, we will use factors such as these to improve our quantitative analyses in followups to this project.

Finally, another important followup will involve more of an emphasis on territorial *claims* and on territorial *conflict management* rather than the armed conflict over territory that has been studied here. While armed conflict over territory is the subject that (rightly) attracts the most attention from both scholars and policymakers, it is only part of the story of territorial claim management -- only around half of all territorial claims experience even a single episode of

armed conflict, and peaceful techniques such as negotiations or mediation are much more common than armed conflict (e.g., Hensel 2001) -- and thus only part of the story of colonial legacies. Most of the effects of colonial legacies in this preliminary study appear to have been dangerous, increasing the risk of armed conflict over territory after independence. Yet it is quite possible that certain types of colonial legacies can have a much more positive effect, either preventing the outbreak of territorial claims in the first place (and thus making armed conflict over territory impossible) or helping to promote the peaceful management of territorial claims. And even colonial legacies that appear to increase armed conflict can still generally be overcome; not all borders in even the most dangerous situations identified by our model led to deadly territorial conflict, so future research would do well to investigate how some otherwise similar borders were managed without the bloodshed that characterizes so many other cases. Our future work in this area will focus much more on the impact of colonial histories on the outbreak, peaceful management, and ending of territorial claims, drawing from my work with the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project's data set on territorial claims (e.g., Hensel 2001; Hensel et al. 2008; Hensel et al. 2009).

## Appendix 1: Territorial Conflicts with a Same-Colonizer Legacy

Colonizer	States	Border	End	Conflicts (Fatal)
USA	Philippines - Palau	Sea	1994	0 (0)
	Palau - Micronesia	Sea	1994	0 (0)
UK	USA - Canada	Land	1867	0 (0)
	USA - Bahamas	Sea	1973	0 (0)
	USA - Jamaica	Sea	1962	0 (0)
	USA - Dominica	Sea	1978	0 (0)
	USA - St. Lucia	Sea	1979	0 (0)
	USA - St. Vin. & Gren.	Sea	1979	0 (0)
	USA - Antigua & Barbuda	Sea	1981	0 (0)
	USA - St. Kitts & Nevis	Sea	1983	0 (0)
	USA - Australia	Sea	1901	0 (0)
	USA - New Zealand	Sea	1907	0 (0)
	Bahamas - Jamaica	Sea	1973	0 (0)
	Trinidad & Tobago - Barbados	Sea	1966	0 (0)
	Trinidad. & Tobago - Grenada	Sea	1974	0 (0)
	Trinidad. & Tobago - St. Lucia	Sea	1979	0 (0)
	Trinidad. & Tobago - St. Vin. & Gren.	Sea	1979	0 (0)
	Trinidad. & Tobago - Guyana	Sea	1966	0 (0)
	Barbados - Dominica	Sea	1978	0 (0)
	Barbados - Grenada	Sea	1974	0 (0)
	Barbados - St. Lucia	Sea	1979	0 (0)
	Barbados - St. Vincent & Grenadines	Sea	1979	0 (0)
	Barbados - Antigua & Barbuda	Sea	1981	0 (0)
	Barbados - Guyana	Sea	1966	0 (0)
	Dominica - Grenada	Sea	1978	0 (0)
	Dominica - St. Lucia	Sea	1979	0 (0)
	Dominica - St. Vincent & Grenadines	Sea	1979	0 (0)
	Dominica - St. Kitts & Nevis	Sea	1983	0 (0)
	Grenada - St. Vincent & Grenadines	Sea	1979	0 (0)
	Grenada - Antigua & Barbuda	Sea	1981	0 (0)
	Grenada - St. Kitts & Nevis	Sea	1983	0 (0)
	Grenada - Guyana	Sea	1974	0 (0)
	St. Lucia - St. Vincent & Grenadines	Sea	1979	0 (0)
	St. Lucia - Antigua & Barbuda	Sea	1981	0 (0)
	St. Lucia - St. Kitts & Nevis	Sea	1983	0 (0)
	St. Lucia - Guyana	Sea	1979	0 (0)
	St. Vincent & Gren. - Antigua & Barb.	Sea	1981	0 (0)
	St. Vincent & Gren. - St. Kitts & Nevis	Sea	1983	0 (0)
	St. Vincent & Gren. - Guyana	Sea	1979	0 (0)
	Antigua & Barb. - St. Kitts & Nevis	Sea	1983	0 (0)
	Malta - Libya	Sea	1964	0 (0)
	Cyprus - Egypt	Sea	1960	0 (0)

Cyprus - Israel	Sea	1960	0 (0)
Ghana - Nigeria	Sea	1960	0 (0)
Cameroon - Nigeria	Land	1961	6 (3)
Uganda - Kenya	Land	1963	2 (0)
Uganda - Tanzania	Land	1962	5 (4)
Kenya - Tanzania	Land	1963	0 (0)
Kenya - Zanzibar	Sea	1963	0 (0)
Kenya - Somalia	Land	1963	3 (1)
Tanzania - Zanzibar	Sea	1963	0 (0)
Tanzania - Somalia	Sea	1961	0 (0)
Tanzania - Zambia	Land	1964	0 (0)
Tanzania - Malawi	Land	1964	0 (0)
Tanzania - Seychelles	Sea	1976	0 (0)
Zanzibar - Somalia	Sea	1963	0 (0)
Somalia - Yemen	Sea	1967	0 (0)
Somalia - Yemen P.R.	Sea	1967	0 (0)
Eritrea - Yemen	Sea	1967	2 (0)
Zambia - Zimbabwe	Land	1965	0 (0)
Zambia - Malawi	Land	1964	0 (0)
Zambia - South Africa	Land	1964	0 (0)
Zambia - Botswana	Land	1966	0 (0)
Zimbabwe - South Africa	Land	1965	0 (0)
Zimbabwe - Botswana	Land	1966	0 (0)
South Africa - Lesotho	Land	1966	0 (0)
South Africa - Botswana	Land	1966	0 (0)
South Africa - Swaziland	Land	1968	0 (0)
Mauritius - Seychelles	Sea	1976	0 (0)
Libya - Egypt	Land	1951	1 (0)
Iraq - Egypt	Land	1932	2 (1)
Iraq - Jordan	Land	1946	1 (0)
Iraq - Kuwait	Land	1961	12 (3)
Iraq - Bahrain	Sea	1971	2 (1)
Iraq - Qatar	Sea	1971	1 (1)
Egypt - Jordan	Land	1946	0 (0)
Egypt - Israel	Land	1948	25 (9)
Jordan - Israel	Land	1948	11 (11)
Kuwait - Bahrain	Sea	1971	0 (0)
Kuwait - Qatar	Sea	1971	0 (0)
Bahrain - Qatar	Sea	1971	1 (0)
Bahrain - UAE	Sea	1971	0 (0)
Qatar - UAE	Land	1971	0 (0)
Afghanistan - Pakistan	Land	1947	8 (3)
India - Pakistan	Land	1947	38 (24)
India - Bangladesh	Land	1947	7 (4)
India - Myanmar	Land	1948	0 (0)
India - Sri Lanka	Sea	1948	0 (0)

	India - Maldives	Sea	1965	0 (0)
	India - Malaysia	Sea	1957	0 (0)
	Pakistan - Myanmar	Land	1948	0 (0)
	Bangladesh - Myanmar	Land	1948	0 (0)
	Malaysia - Singapore	Land	1959	1 (0)
	Malaysia - Brunei	Land	1984	0 (0)
	Vanuatu - Solomon Islands	Sea	1980	0 (0)
	Kiribati - Tuvalu	Sea	1979	0 (0)
	Tuvalu - Fiji	Sea	1978	0 (0)
	Fiji - Tonga	Sea	1970	0 (0)
Belgium	Dem. Rep. Congo - Burundi	Land	1962	0 (0)
	Dem. Rep. Congo - Rwanda	Land	1962	1 (1)
	Burundi - Rwanda	Land	1962	0 (0)
France	Mali - Senegal	Land	1960	0 (0)
	Mali - Mauritania	Land	1960	1 (0)
	Mali - Niger	Land	1960	0 (0)
	Mali - Ivory Coast	Land	1960	0 (0)
	Mali - Guinea	Land	1960	0 (0)
	Mali - Burkina Faso	Land	1960	3 (2)
	Mali - Algeria	Land	1962	0 (0)
	Senegal - Mauritania	Land	1960	2 (1)
	Senegal - Guinea	Land	1960	0 (0)
	Benin - Niger	Land	1960	1 (0)
	Benin - Burkina Faso	Land	1960	0 (0)
	Benin - Togo	Land	1960	0 (0)
	Mauritania - Algeria	Land	1962	0 (0)
	Niger - Burkina Faso	Land	1960	0 (0)
	Niger - Chad	Land	1960	0 (0)
	Niger - Algeria	Land	1962	0 (0)
	Ivory Coast - Guinea	Land	1960	1 (0)
	Ivory Coast - Burkina Faso	Land	1960	0 (0)
	Burkina Faso - Togo	Land	1960	0 (0)
	Gabon - Congo	Land	1960	0 (0)
	CAR - Chad	Land	1960	0 (0)
	CAR - Congo	Land	1960	0 (0)
	Madagascar - Comoros	Sea	1975	0 (0)
	Algeria - Tunisia	Land	1962	0 (0)
	Syria - Lebanon	Land	1946	0 (0)
	Cambodia - Laos	Land	1953	0 (0)
	Cambodia - Vietnam	Land	1954	1 (0)
	Cambodia - S. Vietnam	Land	1954	6 (1)
	Laos - Vietnam	Land	1954	0 (0)
	Laos - S. Vietnam	Land	1954	0 (0)
	Vietnam - S. Vietnam	Land	1954	0 (0)
Spain	Dominican Rep. - Colombia	Sea	1821	0 (0)
	Dominican Rep. - Venezuela	Sea	1821	0 (0)

	Mexico - Guatemala	Land	1821	0 (0)
	Mexico - Honduras	Sea	1821	0 (0)
	Guatemala - Honduras	Land	1821	2 (1)
	Guatemala - El Salvador	Land	1821	1 (1)
	Guatemala - Nicaragua	Sea	1821	0 (0)
	Guatemala - Costa Rica	Sea	1821	0 (0)
	Honduras - El Salvador	Land	1821	2 (1)
	Honduras - Nicaragua	Land	1821	4 (0)
	El Salvador - Nicaragua	Sea	1821	0 (0)
	El Salvador - Costa Rica	Sea	1821	0 (0)
	Nicaragua - Costa Rica	Land	1821	0 (0)
	Nicaragua - Panama	Sea	1821	0 (0)
	Nicaragua - Colombia	Sea	1821	4 (0)
	Costa Rica - Panama	Land	1821	1 (0)
	Costa Rica - Colombia	Sea	1821	0 (0)
	Panama - Colombia	Land	1821	0 (0)
	Colombia - Venezuela	Land	1821	4 (0)
	Colombia - Ecuador	Land	1822	1 (0)
	Colombia - Peru	Land	1824	7 (2)
	Ecuador - Peru	Land	1824	29 (11)
	Peru - Bolivia	Land	1825	3 (1)
	Peru - Chile	Land	1824	5 (1)
	Bolivia - Paraguay	Land	1825	19 (4)
	Bolivia - Chile	Land	1825	7 (1)
	Bolivia - Argentina	Land	1825	1 (0)
	Paraguay - Argentina	Land	1816	1 (1)
	Chile - Argentina	Land	1818	28 (1)
	Argentina - Uruguay	Land	1816	3 (0)
Hapsburg	Czech. Rep. - Slovakia	Land	1918	0 (0)
	Croatia - Bosnia	Land	1918	2 (2)
	Croatia - Slovenia	Land	1918	0 (0)
Russia	Poland - Estonia	Sea	1991	0 (0)
	Poland - Latvia	Land	1991	1 (1)
	Poland - Lithuania	Land	1991	3 (1)
	Poland - Ukraine	Land	1991	0 (0)
	Poland - Belarus	Land	1991	0 (0)
	Poland - Finland	Sea	1918	0 (0)
	Moldova - Ukraine	Land	1991	0 (0)
	Estonia - Latvia	Land	1991	0 (0)
	Estonia - Finland	Sea	1991	0 (0)
	Latvia - Lithuania	Land	1991	0 (0)
	Latvia - Belarus	Land	1991	0 (0)
	Latvia - Finland	Sea	1991	0 (0)
	Lithuania - Belarus	Land	1991	0 (0)
	Lithuania - Finland	Sea	1991	0 (0)
	Ukraine - Belarus	Land	1991	0 (0)

	Ukraine - Georgia	Sea	1991	0 (0)
	Armenia - Georgia	Land	1991	0 (0)
	Armenia - Azerbaijan	Land	1991	7 (3)
	Georgia - Azerbaijan	Land	1991	0 (0)
	Azerbaijan - Turkmenistan	Sea	1991	0 (0)
	Azerbaijan - Kazakhstan	Sea	1991	0 (0)
	Turkmenistan - Uzbekistan	Land	1991	0 (0)
	Turkmenistan - Kazakhstan	Land	1991	0 (0)
	Tajikistan - Kyrgyzstan	Land	1991	0 (0)
	Tajikistan - Uzbekistan	Land	1991	0 (0)
	Kyrgyzstan - Uzbekistan	Land	1991	1 (0)
	Kyrgyzstan - Kazakhstan	Land	1991	0 (0)
	Uzbekistan - Kazakhstan	Land	1991	0 (0)
Ottoman	Albania - Yugoslavia	Land	1913	3 (2)
	Albania - Greece	Land	1913	0 (0)
	Yugoslavia - Greece	Land	1878	0 (0)
	Yugoslavia - Bulgaria	Land	1878	4 (1)
	Yugoslavia - Romania	Land	1878	0 (0)
	Greece - Bulgaria	Land	1878	2 (2)
	Bulgaria - Romania	Land	1878	1 (1)
	Saudi Arabia - Yemen A.R.	Land	1927	3 (1)
	Saudi Arabia - Oman	Land	1927	0 (0)
Japan	N. Korea - S. Korea	Land	1945	13 (5)

*Notes*

\* Denotes cases that opposed each other in at least one fatal conflict over territory. All conflict and fatality data taken from the COW project's Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set, as adapted by the ICOW project.

\* The end of colonial rule refers to the end of the later of the two states' colonial experiences.

\* Excludes former colonizer-colony relationships (see Appendix 4 for those).

## Appendix 2: Territorial Conflicts with a Different-Colonizer Legacy

States (Colonizers)	Border	End	Conflicts (Fatal)
USA (UK) - Haiti (France)	Sea	1804	1 (0)
USA (UK) - Dominican Rep. (Spain)	Sea	1821	0 (0)
USA (UK) - Mexico (Spain)	Land	1821	4 (1)
USA (UK) - Honduras (Spain)	Sea	1821	0 (0)
USA (UK) - Nicaragua (Spain)	Sea	1821	0 (0)
USA (UK) - Costa Rica (Spain)	Sea	1821	0 (0)
USA (UK) - Panama (Spain)	Land	1821	0 (0)
USA (UK) - Colombia (Spain)	Sea	1819	0 (0)
USA (UK) - Venezuela (Spain)	Sea	1821	0 (0)
USA (UK) - Indonesia (Netherlands)	Sea	1949	0 (0)
USA (UK) - PNG (Australia)	Sea	1975	0 (0)
USA (UK) - Samoa (New Zealand)	Sea	1962	0 (0)
Bahamas (UK) - Cuba (USA)	Sea	1973	0 (0)
Bahamas (UK) - Haiti (France)	Sea	1973	0 (0)
Bahamas (UK) - Dominican Rep. (Spain)	Sea	1973	0 (0)
Cuba (USA) - Haiti (France)	Sea	1902	0 (0)
Cuba (USA) - Dominican Rep. (Spain)	Sea	1902	0 (0)
Cuba (USA) - Jamaica (UK)	Sea	1962	0 (0)
Cuba (USA) - Mexico (Spain)	Sea	1902	0 (0)
Cuba (USA) - Belize (UK)	Sea	1981	0 (0)
Cuba (USA) - Honduras (Spain)	Sea	1902	0 (0)
Haiti (France) - Dominican Rep. (Spain)	Land	1821	1 (0)
Haiti (France) - Jamaica (UK)	Sea	1962	0 (0)
Haiti (France) - Colombia (Spain)	Sea	1819	0 (0)
Dominican Rep. (Spain) - Jamaica (UK)	Sea	1962	0 (0)
Dominican Rep. (Spain) - St. Kitts & Nevis (UK)	Sea	1983	0 (0)
Jamaica (UK) - Honduras (Spain)	Sea	1962	0 (0)
Jamaica (UK) - Nicaragua (Spain)	Sea	1962	0 (0)
Jamaica (UK) - Colombia (Spain)	Sea	1962	0 (0)
Trinidad & Tobago (UK) - Venezuela (Spain)	Sea	1962	0 (0)
Trinidad & Tobago (UK) - Suriname (Netherlands)	Sea	1975	0 (0)
Barbados (UK) - Venezuela (Spain)	Sea	1966	0 (0)
Dominica (UK) - Venezuela (Spain)	Sea	1978	0 (0)
Grenada (UK) - Venezuela (Spain)	Sea	1974	0 (0)
St. Lucia (UK) - Venezuela (Spain)	Sea	1979	0 (0)
St. Vincent & Grenadines (UK) - Venezuela (Spain)	Sea	1979	0 (0)
Antigua & Barbuda (UK) - Venezuela (Spain)	Sea	1981	0 (0)
St. Kitts & Nevis (UK) - Venezuela (Spain)	Sea	1983	0 (0)
Mexico (Spain) - Belize (UK)	Land	1981	0 (0)
Belize (UK) - Guatemala (Spain)	Land	1981	5 (0)
Belize (UK) - Honduras (Spain)	Sea	1981	0 (0)
Colombia (Spain) - Brazil (Portugal)	Land	1822	0 (0)

Venezuela (Spain) - Guyana (UK)	Land	1966	7 (0)
Venezuela (Spain) - Brazil (Portugal)	Land	1822	0 (0)
Guyana (UK) - Suriname (Netherlands)	Land	1975	2 (0)
Guyana (UK) - Brazil (Portugal)	Land	1966	0 (0)
Suriname (Netherlands) - Brazil (Portugal)	Land	1975	0 (0)
Ecuador (Spain) - Brazil (Portugal)	Land	1822	0 (0)
Peru (Spain) - Brazil (Portugal)	Land	1824	1 (1)
Brazil (Portugal) - Bolivia (Spain)	Land	1825	1 (0)
Brazil (Portugal) - Paraguay (Spain)	Land	1822	6 (1)
Brazil (Portugal) - Argentina (Spain)	Land	1822	1 (0)
Brazil (Portugal) - Uruguay (Spain)	Land	1822	0 (0)
Poland (Russia) - Czechoslovakia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	2 (0)
Poland (Russia) - Czech. Rep. (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Poland (Russia) - Slovakia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Poland (Russia) - Romania (Ottoman)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Czechoslovakia. (Hapsburg) - Romania (Ottoman)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Czechoslovakia (Hapsburg) - Ukraine (Russia)	Land	1991	0 (0)
Slovakia (Hapsburg) - Ukraine (Russia)	Land	1991	0 (0)
Malta (UK) - Albania (Ottoman)	Sea	1964	0 (0)
Malta (UK) - Greece (Ottoman)	Sea	1964	0 (0)
Malta (UK) - Tunisia (France)	Sea	1964	0 (0)
Albania (Ottoman) - Macedonia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Albania (Ottoman) - Croatia (Hapsburg)	Sea	1918	0 (0)
Macedonia (Hapsburg) - Yugo. (Ottoman)	Land	1918	1 (0)
Macedonia (Hapsburg) - Greece (Ottoman)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Macedonia (Hapsburg) - Bulgaria (Ottoman)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Croatia (Hapsburg) - Yugoslavia (Ottoman)	Land	1918	1 (1)
Croatia (Hapsburg) - Greece (Ottoman)	Sea	1918	0 (0)
Yugoslavia (Ottoman) - Bosnia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	1 (1)
Greece (Ottoman) - Cyprus (UK)	Sea	1960	0 (0)
Greece (Ottoman) - Libya (UK)	Sea	1951	0 (0)
Greece (Ottoman) - Egypt (UK)	Sea	1922	0 (0)
Cyprus (UK) - Syria (France)	Sea	1960	0 (0)
Cyprus (UK) - Lebanon (France)	Sea	1960	0 (0)
Bulgaria (Ottoman) - Ukraine (Russia)	Sea	1991	0 (0)
Moldova (Russia) - Romania (Ottoman)	Land	1991	0 (0)
Romania (Ottoman) - Ukraine (Russia)	Land	1991	0 (0)
Cape Verde (Portugal) - Senegal (France)	Sea	1975	0 (0)
Sao Tome (Portugal) - Eq. Guinea (Spain)	Sea	1975	0 (0)
Sao Tome (Portugal) - Cameroon (UK)	Sea	1975	0 (0)
Sao Tome (Portugal) - Nigeria (UK)	Sea	1975	0 (0)
Sao Tome (Portugal) - Gabon (France)	Sea	1975	0 (0)
Guinea-Bissau (Portugal) - Senegal (France)	Land	1974	0 (0)
Guinea-Bissau (Portugal) - Guinea (France)	Land	1974	0 (0)
Eq. Guinea (Spain) - Cameroon (UK)	Land	1968	0 (0)
Eq. Guinea (Spain) - Nigeria (UK)	Sea	1968	0 (0)

Eq. Guinea (Spain) - Gabon (France)	Land	1968	1 (0)
Gambia (UK) - Senegal (France)	Land	1965	0 (0)
Benin (France) - Ghana (UK)	Sea	1960	0 (0)
Benin (France) - Nigeria (UK)	Land	1960	1 (0)
Mauritania (France) - Morocco (Spain)	Land	1960	0 (0)
Niger (France) - Cameroon (UK)	Sea	1961	0 (0)
Niger (France) - Nigeria (UK)	Land	1960	0 (0)
Niger (France) - Libya (UK)	Land	1960	0 (0)
Ivory Coast (France) - Ghana (UK)	Land	1960	0 (0)
Guinea (France) - Sierra Leone (UK)	Land	1961	0 (0)
Burkina Faso (France) - Ghana (UK)	Land	1960	0 (0)
Ghana (UK) - Togo (France)	Land	1960	1 (1)
Togo (France) - Nigeria (UK)	Sea	1960	0 (0)
Cameroon (UK) - Gabon (France)	Land	1961	1 (0)
Cameroon (UK) - CAR (France)	Land	1961	1 (0)
Cameroon (UK) - Chad (France)	Land	1961	0 (0)
Cameroon (UK) - Congo (France)	Land	1961	0 (0)
Nigeria (UK) - Gabon (France)	Sea	1960	0 (0)
Nigeria (UK) - Chad (France)	Sea	1960	2 (1)
Gabon (France) - Angola (Portugal)	Sea	1975	0 (0)
CAR (France) - Dem. Rep. Congo (Belgium)	Land	1960	0 (0)
CAR (France) - Sudan (Egypt)	Land	1960	0 (0)
Chad (France) - Libya (UK)	Land	1960	6 (0)
Chad (France) - Sudan (Egypt)	Land	1960	0 (0)
Congo (France) - Dem. Rep. Congo (Belgium)	Land	1960	0 (0)
Congo (France) - Angola (Portugal)	Land	1975	0 (0)
Dem. Rep. Congo (Belgium) - Uganda (UK)	Land	1962	0 (0)
Dem. Rep. Congo (Belgium) - Tanzania (UK)	Sea	1961	0 (0)
Dem. Rep. Congo (Belgium) - Angola (Portugal)	Land	1975	0 (0)
Dem. Rep. Congo (Belgium) - Zambia (UK)	Land	1964	2 (1)
Dem. Rep. Congo (Belgium) - Sudan (Egypt)	Land	1960	0 (0)
Uganda (UK) - Rwanda (Belgium)	Land	1962	2 (0)
Uganda (UK) - Sudan (Egypt)	Land	1962	1 (0)
Kenya (UK) - Sudan (Egypt)	Land	1963	0 (0)
Tanzania (UK) - Burundi (Belgium)	Land	1962	0 (0)
Tanzania (UK) - Rwanda (Belgium)	Land	1962	0 (0)
Tanzania (UK) - Mozambique (Portugal)	Land	1975	0 (0)
Tanzania (UK) - Comoros (France)	Sea	1975	0 (0)
Somalia (UK) - Djibouti (France)	Land	1977	0 (0)
Somalia (UK) - Yemen A.R. (Ottoman)	Sea	1960	0 (0)
Somalia (UK) - Oman (Ottoman)	Sea	1960	0 (0)
Djibouti (France) - Eritrea (UK)	Land	1977	1 (0)
Djibouti (France) - Saudi Arabia (Ottoman)	Sea	1977	0 (0)
Djibouti (France) - Yemen A.R. (Ottoman)	Sea	1977	0 (0)
Djibouti (France) - Yemen (UK)	Sea	1977	0 (0)
Djibouti (France) - Yemen P.R. (UK)	Sea	1977	0 (0)

Eritrea (UK) - Sudan (Egypt)	Land	1956	0 (0)
Eritrea (UK) - Saudi Arabia (Ottoman)	Sea	1950	0 (0)
Angola (Portugal) - Zambia (UK)	Land	1975	0 (0)
Angola (Portugal) - South Africa (UK)	Land	1975	0 (0)
Angola (Portugal) - Namibia (South Africa)	Land	1990	0 (0)
Mozambique (Portugal) - Zambia (UK)	Land	1975	0 (0)
Mozambique (Portugal) - Zimbabwe (UK)	Land	1975	0 (0)
Mozambique (Portugal) - Malawi (UK)	Land	1975	0 (0)
Mozambique (Portugal) - South Africa (UK)	Land	1975	0 (0)
Mozambique (Portugal) - Swaziland (UK)	Land	1975	0 (0)
Mozambique (Portugal) - Madagascar (France)	Sea	1975	0 (0)
Mozambique (Portugal) - Comoros (France)	Sea	1975	0 (0)
Mozambique (Portugal) - Seychelles (UK)	Sea	1976	0 (0)
Zambia (UK) - Namibia (South Africa)	Land	1990	0 (0)
Namibia (South Africa) - Botswana (UK)	Land	1990	1 (0)
Madagascar (France) - Seychelles (UK)	Sea	1976	0 (0)
Comoros (France) - Seychelles (UK)	Sea	1976	0 (0)
Morocco (Spain) - Algeria (France)	Land	1962	2 (2)
Algeria (France) - Libya (UK)	Land	1962	0 (0)
Tunisia (France) - Libya (UK)	Land	1956	2 (0)
Libya (UK) - Sudan (Egypt)	Land	1956	0 (0)
Sudan (Egypt) - Saudi Arabia (Ottoman)	Sea	1956	0 (0)
Sudan (Egypt) - Yemen A.R. (Ottoman)	Sea	1956	0 (0)
Sudan (Egypt) - Yemen (UK)	Sea	1967	0 (0)
Sudan (Egypt) - Yemen P.R. (UK)	Sea	1967	0 (0)
Iraq (UK) - Syria (France)	Land	1946	2 (2)
Iraq (UK) - Saudi Arabia (Ottoman)	Land	1932	3 (1)
Egypt (UK) - Syria (France)	Sea	1946	0 (0)
Egypt (UK) - Lebanon (France)	Sea	1943	0 (0)
Egypt (UK) - Saudi Arabia (Ottoman)	Sea	1927	0 (0)
Syria (France) - Jordan (UK)	Land	1946	1 (1)
Syria (France) - Israel (UK)	Land	1948	36 (15)
Lebanon (France) - Israel (UK)	Land	1948	1 (1)
Jordan (UK) - Saudi Arabia (Ottoman)	Land	1946	0 (0)
Israel (UK) - Saudi Arabia (Ottoman)	Sea	1948	0 (0)
Saudi Arabia (Ottoman) - Yemen (UK)	Land	1967	2 (1)
Saudi Arabia (Ottoman) - Yemen P.R. (UK)	Land	1967	1 (1)
Saudi Arabia (Ottoman) - Kuwait (UK)	Land	1961	0 (0)
Saudi Arabia (Ottoman) - Bahrain (UK)	Sea	1971	0 (0)
Saudi Arabia (Ottoman) - Qatar (UK)	Land	1971	2 (0)
Saudi Arabia (Ottoman) - UAE (UK)	Land	1971	0 (0)
Yemen A.R. (Ottoman) - Yemen P.R. (UK)	Land	1967	0 (0)
Yemen (UK) - Oman (Ottoman)	Land	1967	0 (0)
Yemen P.R. (UK) - Oman (Ottoman)	Land	1967	0 (0)
Bahrain (UK) - Oman (Ottoman)	Sea	1971	0 (0)
Qatar (UK) - Oman (Ottoman)	Sea	1971	0 (0)

UAE (UK) - Oman (Ottoman)	Land	1971	0 (0)
Oman (Ottoman) - Pakistan (UK)	Sea	1947	0 (0)
Afghanistan (UK) - Turkmenistan (Russia)	Land	1991	0 (0)
Afghanistan (UK) - Tajikistan (Russia)	Land	1991	0 (0)
Afghanistan (UK) - Uzbekistan (Russia)	Land	1991	0 (0)
India (UK) - Indonesia (Netherlands)	Sea	1949	0 (0)
Myanmar (UK) - Laos (France)	Land	1953	0 (0)
Myanmar (UK) - Indonesia (Netherlands)	Sea	1949	0 (0)
Cambodia (France) - Malaysia (UK)	Sea	1957	0 (0)
Vietnam (France) - Malaysia (UK)	Sea	1957	1 (0)
Vietnam (France) - Indonesia (Netherlands)	Sea	1954	1 (0)
S. Vietnam (France) - Malaysia (UK)	Sea	1957	0 (0)
S. Vietnam (France) - Indonesia (Netherlands)	Sea	1954	0 (0)
Malaysia (UK) - Philippines (USA)	Sea	1957	2 (0)
Malaysia (UK) - Indonesia (Netherlands)	Sea	1957	1 (1)
Singapore (UK) - Indonesia (Netherlands)	Sea	1959	0 (0)
Brunei (UK) - Philippines (USA)	Sea	1984	0 (0)
Philippines (USA) - Indonesia (Netherlands)	Sea	1949	0 (0)
Indonesia (Netherlands) - Australia (UK)	Sea	1949	1 (1)
Indonesia (Netherlands) - PNG (Australia)	Land	1975	0 (0)
Indonesia (Netherlands) - Palau (USA)	Sea	1994	0 (0)
Indonesia (Netherlands) - Micronesia (USA)	Sea	1986	0 (0)
PNG (Australia) - Solomon Islands (UK)	Sea	1978	0 (0)
PNG (Australia) - Micronesia (USA)	Sea	1986	0 (0)
Kiribati (UK) - Nauru (Australia)	Sea	1979	0 (0)
Kiribati (UK) - Marshall Islands (USA)	Sea	1986	0 (0)
Tonga (UK) - Samoa (New Zealand)	Sea	1970	0 (0)

#### *Notes*

\* Denotes cases that opposed each other in at least one fatal conflict over territory. All conflict and fatality data taken from the COW project's Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set, as adapted by the ICOW project.

\* The end of colonial rule refers to the end of the later of the two states' colonial experiences.

\* Excludes former colonizer-colony relationships (see Appendix 4 for those).

### Appendix 3: Territorial Conflicts with a Partial Colonial Legacy

States	Border	End	Conflicts (Fatal)
Russia - USA (UK)	Sea	1783	4 (0)
Spain - Mauritania (France)	Sea	1960	0 (0)
Spain - Algeria (France)	Sea	1962	0 (0)
Spain - Tunisia (France)	Sea	1956	0 (0)
Spain - Tunisia (France)	Sea	1956	0 (0)
Portugal - Morocco (Spain)	Sea	1956	0 (0)
Portugal - Morocco (Spain)	Sea	1956	0 (0)
Germany - Poland (Russia)	Land	1918	3 (1)
Germany - Czechoslovakia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	2 (0)
Germany - Czech. Rep. (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Germany - Yugoslavia (Ottoman)	Land	1878	2 (1)
Germany - Estonia (Russia)	Sea	1991	1 (0)
Germany - Latvia (Russia)	Sea	1991	1 (0)
Germany - Lithuania (Russia)	Land	1991	1 (0)
Germany - Finland (Russia)	Sea	1917	0 (0)
W. Germany - Czechoslovakia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
E. Germany - Poland (Russia)	Land	1918	0 (0)
E. Germany - Czechoslovakia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Sweden - Poland (Russia)	Sea	1918	0 (0)
Denmark - Poland (Russia)	Sea	1918	0 (0)
AustriaHungary - Yugoslavia (Ottoman)	Land	1878	2 (0)
AustriaHungary - Greece (Ottoman)	Sea	1829	0 (0)
AustriaHungary - Romania (Ottoman)	Land	1878	1 (0)
Austria - Czechoslovakia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Austria - Czech. Rep. (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Austria - Slovakia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Austria - Yugoslavia (Ottoman)	Land	1878	1 (0)
Austria - Slovenia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Hungary - Czechoslovakia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	3 (1)
Hungary - Slovakia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Hungary - Croatia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Hungary - Yugoslavia (Ottoman)	Land	1878	2 (0)
Hungary - Slovenia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Hungary - Romania (Ottoman)	Land	1878	4 (1)
Hungary - Ukraine (Russia)	Land	1991	0 (0)
Russia - Czechoslovakia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Italy - Malta (UK)	Sea	1964	0 (0)
Italy - Albania (Ottoman)	Sea	1913	3 (0)
Italy - Croatia (Hapsburg)	Sea	1918	0 (0)
Italy - Yugoslavia (Ottoman)	Sea	1878	4 (1)
Italy - Yugoslavia (Ottoman)	Land	1878	4 (1)
Italy - Slovenia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)

Italy - Greece (Ottoman)	Sea	1829	3 (1)
Italy - Algeria (France)	Sea	1962	0 (0)
Italy - Tunisia (France)	Sea	1956	0 (0)
Italy - Libya (UK)	Sea	1951	0 (0)
Two Sicilies - Greece (Ottoman)	Sea	1829	0 (0)
Two Sicilies - Tunisia (France)	Sea	1956	0 (0)
Montenegro - Albania (Ottoman)	Land	1913	0 (0)
Montenegro - Croatia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Montenegro - Yugoslavia (Ottoman)	Land	1878	0 (0)
Montenegro - Bosnia (Hapsburg)	Land	1918	0 (0)
Turkey - Cyprus (UK)	Sea	1960	6 (3)
Russia - Bulgaria (Ottoman)	Sea	1878	2 (0)
Russia - Romania (Ottoman)	Land	1878	3 (0)
Russia - Afghanistan (UK)	Land	1919	1 (0)
Russia - Mongolia (China)	Land	1921	0 (0)
Russia - N. Korea (Japan)	Land	1945	0 (0)
Russia - S. Korea (Japan)	Sea	1945	0 (0)
Sweden - Estonia (Russia)	Sea	1991	0 (0)
Denmark - Estonia (Russia)	Sea	1991	0 (0)
Sweden - Latvia (Russia)	Sea	1991	0 (0)
Denmark - Latvia (Russia)	Sea	1991	0 (0)
Sweden - Lithuania (Russia)	Sea	1991	0 (0)
Denmark - Lithuania (Russia)	Sea	1991	0 (0)
Turkey - Ukraine (Russia)	Sea	1991	0 (0)
Iran - Armenia (Russia)	Land	1991	1 (1)
Turkey - Armenia (Russia)	Land	1991	2 (1)
Turkey - Georgia (Russia)	Land	1991	0 (0)
Iran - Azerbaijan (Russia)	Land	1991	0 (0)
Turkey - Azerbaijan (Russia)	Land	1991	0 (0)
Sweden - Finland (Russia)	Land	1917	0 (0)
Norway - Finland (Russia)	Land	1917	0 (0)
Liberia - Ivory Coast (France)	Land	1960	0 (0)
Liberia - Guinea (France)	Land	1958	0 (0)
Liberia - Sierra Leone (UK)	Land	1961	0 (0)
Ethiopia - Kenya (UK)	Land	1963	0 (0)
Ethiopia - Somalia (UK)	Land	1960	16 (9)
Ethiopia - Djibouti (France)	Land	1977	0 (0)
Ethiopia - Eritrea (UK)	Land	1950	1 (1)
Ethiopia - Sudan (Egypt)	Land	1956	2 (1)
Ethiopia - Saudi Arabia (Ottoman)	Sea	1927	0 (0)
Ethiopia - Yemen A.R. (Ottoman)	Sea	1926	0 (0)
Ethiopia - Yemen (UK)	Sea	1967	0 (0)
Ethiopia - Yemen P.R. (UK)	Sea	1967	0 (0)
Turkey - Tunisia (France)	Land	1956	0 (0)
Turkey - Libya (UK)	Sea	1951	0 (0)
Iran - Iraq (UK)	Land	1932	12 (6)

Iran - Saudi Arabia (Ottoman)	Sea	1927	0 (0)
Iran - Kuwait (UK)	Sea	1961	0 (0)
Iran - Bahrain (UK)	Sea	1971	0 (0)
Iran - Qatar (UK)	Sea	1971	0 (0)
Iran - UAE (UK)	Sea	1971	1 (0)
Iran - Oman (Ottoman)	Sea	1741	0 (0)
Iran - Afghanistan (UK)	Land	1919	0 (0)
Iran - Turkmenistan (Russia)	Land	1991	0 (0)
Iran - Kazakhstan (Russia)	Sea	1991	0 (0)
Iran - Pakistan (UK)	Land	1947	0 (0)
Turkey - Iraq (UK)	Land	1932	1 (1)
Turkey - Egypt (UK)	Land	1922	1 (1)
Turkey - Egypt (UK)	Sea	1922	1 (1)
Turkey - Syria (France)	Land	1946	2 (1)
Turkey - Lebanon (France)	Sea	1943	0 (0)
Turkey - Israel (UK)	Sea	1948	0 (0)
China - Afghanistan (UK)	Land	1919	0 (0)
China - Tajikistan (Russia)	Land	1991	0 (0)
China - Kyrgyzstan (Russia)	Land	1991	0 (0)
China - Kazakhstan (Russia)	Land	1991	0 (0)
China - N. Korea (Japan)	Land	1945	0 (0)
China - S. Korea (Japan)	Sea	1945	2 (2)
China - India (UK)	Land	1947	14 (2)
China - Bhutan (India)	Land	1949	0 (0)
China - Pakistan (UK)	Land	1947	0 (0)
China - Myanmar (UK)	Land	1948	1 (0)
China - Laos (France)	Land	1953	0 (0)
China - Vietnam (France)	Land	1954	12 (3)
China - S. Vietnam (France)	Sea	1954	2 (0)
China - Philippines (USA)	Sea	1946	6 (0)
Taiwan - Philippines (USA)	Sea	1946	2 (0)
Japan - Philippines (USA)	Sea	1946	0 (0)
Nepal - India (UK)	Land	1947	1 (0)
Thailand - India (UK)	Sea	1947	0 (0)
Thailand - Myanmar (UK)	Land	1948	5 (1)
Thailand - Cambodia (France)	Land	1953	10 (3)
Thailand - Laos (France)	Land	1953	5 (2)
Thailand - Vietnam (France)	Sea	1954	0 (0)
Thailand - S. Vietnam (France)	Sea	1954	0 (0)
Thailand - Malaysia (UK)	Land	1957	0 (0)
Thailand - Indonesia (Netherlands)	Sea	1949	0 (0)

#### Appendix 4: Territorial Conflicts between Colonizer and Its Former Colony

State	Colonizer	End	Conflicts (Fatal)
USA	UK	1783	4 (0)
Canada	France	1763	0 (0)
Canada	UK	1867	0 (0)
Bahamas	UK	1973	0 (0)
Cuba	Spain	1898	0 (0)
Cuba	USA	1902	0 (0)
Haiti	France	1804	0 (0)
Dominican Rep.	Spain	1821	0 (0)
Jamaica	UK	1962	0 (0)
Trinidad & Tobago	UK	1962	0 (0)
Barbados	UK	1966	0 (0)
Dominica	UK	1978	0 (0)
Grenada	UK	1974	0 (0)
St. Lucia	UK	1979	0 (0)
St. Vincent & Gren.	UK	1979	0 (0)
Antigua & Barb.	UK	1981	0 (0)
St. Kitts & Nevis	UK	1983	0 (0)
Mexico	Spain	1821	0 (0)
Belize	UK	1981	0 (0)
Guatemala	Spain	1821	0 (0)
Honduras	Spain	1821	0 (0)
El Salvador	Spain	1821	0 (0)
Nicaragua	Spain	1821	0 (0)
Costa Rica	Spain	1821	0 (0)
Panama	Spain	1821	0 (0)
Colombia	Spain	1819	0 (0)
Venezuela	Spain	1821	0 (0)
Guyana	UK	1966	0 (0)
Suriname	Netherlands	1975	0 (0)
Ecuador	Spain	1822	0 (0)
Peru	Spain	1824	2 (1)
Brazil	Portugal	1822	0 (0)
Bolivia	Spain	1825	0 (0)
Paraguay	Spain	1811	0 (0)
Chile	Spain	1818	0 (0)
Argentina	Spain	1816	0 (0)
Uruguay	Spain	1811	0 (0)
Poland	Russia	1918	4 (1)
Poland	Hapsburg	1918	0 (0)
Poland	Germany	1918	3 (1)
Czechoslovakia	Hapsburg	1918	0 (0)
Czech. Rep.	Hapsburg	1918	0 (0)
Slovakia	Hapsburg	1918	0 (0)

Malta	UK	1964	0 (0)
Albania	Ottoman	1913	0 (0)
Macedonia	Ottoman	1912	0 (0)
Macedonia	Hapsburg	1918	0 (0)
Croatia	Hapsburg	1918	0 (0)
Yugoslavia	Ottoman	1878	1 (1)
Bosnia	Ottoman	1878	0 (0)
Bosnia	Hapsburg	1918	0 (0)
Slovenia	Hapsburg	1918	0 (0)
Greece	Ottoman	1829	29 (8)
Cyprus	Ottoman	1878	6 (3)
Cyprus	UK	1960	0 (0)
Bulgaria	Ottoman	1878	4 (2)
Moldova	Russia	1991	0 (0)
Romania	Ottoman	1878	0 (0)
Estonia	Russia	1991	2 (0)
Latvia	Russia	1991	3 (0)
Lithuania	Russia	1991	1 (0)
Ukraine	Russia	1991	0 (0)
Belarus	Russia	1991	0 (0)
Armenia	Ottoman	1878	2 (1)
Armenia	Russia	1991	0 (0)
Georgia	Russia	1991	0 (0)
Azerbaijan	Russia	1991	1 (1)
Finland	Russia	1917	3 (2)
Cape Verde	Portugal	1975	0 (0)
Sao Tome	Portugal	1975	0 (0)
Guinea-Bissau	Portugal	1974	0 (0)
Eq. Guinea	Spain	1968	0 (0)
Gambia	UK	1965	0 (0)
Mali	France	1960	0 (0)
Senegal	France	1960	0 (0)
Benin	France	1960	0 (0)
Mauritania	France	1960	0 (0)
Niger	France	1960	0 (0)
Ivory Coast	France	1960	0 (0)
Guinea	France	1958	0 (0)
Burkina Faso	France	1960	0 (0)
Sierra Leone	UK	1961	0 (0)
Ghana	UK	1957	0 (0)
Togo	Germany	1922	0 (0)
Togo	France	1960	0 (0)
Cameroon	Germany	1919	0 (0)
Cameroon	France	1960	0 (0)
Cameroon	UK	1961	0 (0)
Nigeria	UK	1960	0 (0)

Gabon	France	1960	0 (0)
CAR	France	1960	0 (0)
Chad	France	1960	0 (0)
Congo	France	1960	0 (0)
Dem. Rep. Congo	Belgium	1960	0 (0)
Uganda	UK	1962	0 (0)
Kenya	UK	1963	0 (0)
Tanzania	Germany	1922	0 (0)
Tanzania	UK	1961	0 (0)
Zanzibar	UK	1963	0 (0)
Burundi	Germany	1922	0 (0)
Burundi	Belgium	1962	0 (0)
Rwanda	Germany	1922	0 (0)
Rwanda	Belgium	1962	0 (0)
Somalia	Italy	1950	0 (0)
Somalia	UK	1960	0 (0)
Somalia	Italy	1960	0 (0)
Djibouti	France	1977	0 (0)
Eritrea	Italy	1941	0 (0)
Eritrea	UK	1950	0 (0)
Angola	Portugal	1975	0 (0)
Mozambique	Portugal	1975	0 (0)
Zambia	UK	1964	0 (0)
Zimbabwe	UK	1965	0 (0)
Malawi	UK	1964	0 (0)
South Africa	UK	1910	0 (0)
Namibia	Germany	1920	0 (0)
Namibia	South Africa	1966	0 (0)
Namibia	South Africa	1990	0 (0)
Lesotho	UK	1966	0 (0)
Botswana	UK	1966	0 (0)
Swaziland	UK	1968	0 (0)
Madagascar	France	1960	0 (0)
Comoros	France	1975	0 (0)
Mauritius	UK	1968	0 (0)
Seychelles	UK	1976	0 (0)
Morocco	France	1956	1 (0)
Morocco	Spain	1956	3 (0)
Algeria	France	1962	0 (0)
Tunisia	Ottoman	1591	0 (0)
Tunisia	France	1956	0 (0)
Libya	Ottoman	1911	0 (0)
Libya	Italy	1943	0 (0)
Libya	UK	1951	0 (0)
Sudan	Egypt	1956	4 (1)
Sudan	UK	1956	0 (0)

Iraq	Ottoman	1920	1 (1)
Iraq	UK	1932	4 (1)
Egypt	Ottoman	1831	1 (1)
Egypt	UK	1922	0 (0)
Syria	Ottoman	1920	2 (1)
Syria	France	1946	0 (0)
Lebanon	Ottoman	1920	0 (0)
Lebanon	France	1943	0 (0)
Jordan	Ottoman	1923	0 (0)
Jordan	UK	1946	0 (0)
Israel	Ottoman	1923	0 (0)
Israel	UK	1948	0 (0)
Saudi Arabia	Ottoman	1927	0 (0)
Yemen A.R.	Ottoman	1926	0 (0)
Yemen	Ottoman	1926	0 (0)
Yemen	UK	1967	0 (0)
Yemen P.R.	UK	1967	0 (0)
Kuwait	UK	1961	0 (0)
Bahrain	UK	1971	0 (0)
Qatar	UK	1971	0 (0)
UAE	UK	1971	0 (0)
Oman	Ottoman	1741	0 (0)
Afghanistan	UK	1919	0 (0)
Turkmenistan	Russia	1991	0 (0)
Tajikistan	Russia	1991	0 (0)
Kyrgyzstan	Russia	1991	0 (0)
Uzbekistan	Russia	1991	0 (0)
Kazakhstan	Russia	1991	0 (0)
Mongolia	China	1921	1 (0)
N. Korea	Japan	1945	2 (1)
S. Korea	Japan	1945	3 (0)
India	UK	1947	0 (0)
Bhutan	UK	1947	0 (0)
Bhutan	India	1949	0 (0)
Pakistan	UK	1947	0 (0)
Bangladesh	UK	1947	0 (0)
Myanmar	UK	1948	0 (0)
Sri Lanka	UK	1948	0 (0)
Maldives	UK	1965	0 (0)
Cambodia	France	1953	0 (0)
Laos	France	1953	0 (0)
Vietnam	France	1954	0 (0)
S. Vietnam	France	1954	0 (0)
Malaysia	UK	1957	0 (0)
Singapore	UK	1959	0 (0)
Brunei	UK	1984	0 (0)

Philippines	Spain	1898	0 (0)
Philippines	USA	1946	0 (0)
Indonesia	Netherlands	1949	7 (2)
East Timor	Portugal	1975	0 (0)
East Timor	Indonesia	2002	0 (0)
Australia	UK	1901	0 (0)
PNG	UK	1906	0 (0)
PNG	Germany	1920	0 (0)
PNG	Australia	1975	0 (0)
New Zealand	UK	1907	0 (0)
Vanuatu	France	1980	0 (0)
Vanuatu	UK	1980	0 (0)
Solomon Islands	UK	1978	0 (0)
Kiribati	UK	1979	0 (0)
Tuvalu	UK	1978	0 (0)
Fiji	UK	1970	0 (0)
Tonga	UK	1970	0 (0)
Nauru	Germany	1914	0 (0)
Nauru	Australia	1968	0 (0)
Marshall Islands	Germany	1920	0 (0)
Marshall Islands	Japan	1947	0 (0)
Marshall Islands	USA	1986	0 (0)
Palau	Germany	1920	0 (0)
Palau	Japan	1947	0 (0)
Palau	USA	1994	0 (0)
Micronesia	Germany	1920	0 (0)
Micronesia	Japan	1947	0 (0)
Micronesia	USA	1986	0 (0)
Samoa	Germany	1920	0 (0)
Samoa	New Zealand	1962	0 (0)

*Notes*

\* Denotes cases that opposed each other in at least one fatal conflict over territory. All conflict and fatality data taken from the COW project's Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set, as adapted by the ICOW project.

\* A given state may appear in this table more than once if it was ruled by several different colonial powers.

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