January - March 2019: Case Summaries
This page includes the detailed summaries of each individual territorial, river, maritime, or identity claim that has been active during this quarter. For more details on the purpose of this quarterly review and for the summary of events during the quarter, see the Overview page.
ICOW Site Search
This search interface allows you to search through these quarterly reviews for such terms as names of territories, countries, or leaders. (For now, this is limited to ICOW's quarterly reviews of news over territorial, river, maritime, or identity claims, covering events since the beginning of 2019. In the future, we plan to expand this search to include access to summary web pages for each of the more than 1200 claims identified by the ICOW project, which will be created as part of the next external grant that the ICOW project receives.)
Case Summaries: New Claims
No new claims began during this quarter.
Case Summaries: Claim Escalation and Provocations
Claim numbers that end in "xx" indicate claims that have begun since the end of the publicly available data set in question and have not yet been assigned a number; this document will be updated in the future when these numbers have been determined.
Territorial Claims
Western Hemisphere
- (none)
Europe
- Spain/UK over waters off Gibraltar (Territory #206 / Maritime #2xxx): military activity in disputed area
- On 2/5/19 the Spanish patrol vessel Tornado entered the 3-mile waters off Gibraltar, broadcasting the Spanish national anthem on a maritime communications frequency used in the area and interrupting a training exercise involving the British vessel HMS Sabre. The Sabre issued several notices of British sovereignty in the waters, which the Tornado ignored for two hours before returning to international waters. On 2/17/19 the Tornado again entered Gibraltar's claimed waters, approaching three anchored merchant ships to demand that they leave Spanish waters. Gibraltarian authorities ordered the ships to stay in place, sent two Royal Navy vessels to the scene, and protested the incident; the Tornado eventually departed, although its weapons were visibly uncovered and manned during the incident.
- Croatia/Slovenia over land border and Adriatic Sea (Territory #352 / Maritime #2386): military activity in disputed area
- Slovenia protested in late March that a Croatian police boat had crossed 2.5 km into Slovenian waters in Savudrija Bay, claiming that its navigation system had broken down, and only returned to Croatian waters after being challenged by a Slovenian police boat. Croatia rejected the protest, insisting that the Slovenian vessel involved in the incident had intruded into Croatian waters.
- Greece/Turkey over Aegean Sea (Territory #364 / Maritime #2352): non-military provocation
- Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar declared in March that both Cyprus and the Aegean Sea (referring to the areas disputed between Turkey and Cyprus/Greece) "lie within Turkey's territorial waters," prompting a Greek protest. Turkish navy divers participating in a NATO exercise also took a picture holding a Turkish flag under Greek waters near Crete; the picture was initially retweeted by a NATO account, before the retweet was deleted after a Greek protest.
Africa
- Egypt/Sudan over Halaib/Halayeb (Territory #696 / Maritime #2xxx): activity in disputed area
- Egypt issued a call for bids on oil/gas exploration rights in Red Sea waters near Halaib/Halayeb. Sudan summoned the Egyptian ambassador to protest, arguing that the waters in question were Sudanese. Sudan's foreign ministry warned exploration companies against submitting any bids, while inviting Egypt to use peaceful means to end the dispute.
Middle East
- Israel/Lebanon border (Territory #740): activity in disputed area
- Seeking to protect northern Israeli villages from Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, Israel began constructing a concrete wall along the border in January. Lebanon protested that this was a violation of its sovereignty, as part of the wall was being built in territory claimed by Lebanon, and brought the issue to the attention of the UN Security Council in mid-January.
- Israel/Syria over Golan Heights (Territory #744): non-military provocation
- U.S. President Donald Trump issued an executive order recognizing full Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights on 3/25/19. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu praised the move, while Syria condemned it as an attack on its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and vowed to recover the territory through "all available means." Countries ranging from the UK, France, Germany, and Russia to Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey and organizations such as the Arab League and EU opposed the move; UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres warned that that "the status of Golan has not changed."
- Earlier in the quarter, noting an intensifying Israeli campaign for recognition of its sovereignty over the Heights, Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad had warned UN peacekeepers that Syria was not afraid of Israel's supporters, and "will attack Israel if it does not leave the Golan Heights."
Asia and Oceania
- China/Taiwan over Taiwan (Territory #809): military activity in disputed area / non-military provocation
- Chinese President Xi Jinping announced on 1/1/19 that his government desired rapid progress toward reunification with Taiwan, declaring that the two "must and will be" reunited. He indicated that he would prefer to achieve this through a peaceful "one country two systems" approach, but that he would not rule out achieving this by force if peaceful means should fail. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen rejected the idea of any treaty that would undermine Taiwanese sovereignty and democracy.
- U.S. naval vessels traveled through the Taiwan Strait in both February and March; China replied by urging the U.S. to continue to follow the one China policy and properly handle Taiwan-related issues, and the next week sent two fighter jets across the Taiwan Strait into Taiwanese airspace until Taiwanese jets were scrambled to intercept them.
- China/Japan over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Territory #820 / Maritime #2714): military activity in disputed area / non-military provocation
- Chinese patrol vessels entered Japanese waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands at least seven times during this quarter. Japan responded by creating a crisis response headquarters to collect more information about the incidents and monitor the situation.
- In late March, the Japanese education ministry approved textbooks for the 2020-2021 academic year that described the islands as "an inherent part of Japan's territory"; the Chinese government quickly protested.
- Japan/Russia over Kuril Islands/Northern Territories (Territory #828 / Maritime #2744): activity in disputed area / military activity in disputed area
- Two Russian government officials visited the islands on 2/26/19 to attend a ceremony on Shikotan marking the linking of the islands with the Russian island of Sakhalin via fiber optic cable. Japan protested to the Russian Foreign Ministry through diplomatic channels, describing the visit as "unacceptable."
- Russia then held a small military exercise on two of the islands on 3/13/19, with about 500 men practicing defense of Etorofu and Kunashiri against an amphibious assault; Japan protested through diplomatic channels.
- Japan/South Korea over Dokdo/Takeshima (Territory #830 / Maritime #2736): activity in disputed area / non-military provocation
- A South Korean maritime research vessel entered the waters around the islands between 2/15/19-2/18/19. Japan protested this research activity as a violation of its territorial waters.
- The next week, the Japanese government sent a government official (Cabinet Office parliamentary vice minister Hiroshi Ando) to speak at Shimane prefecture's Takeshima Day ceremony on 2/22/19, an annual event that is meant to commemorate and raise awareness of the Japanese claim to the islands. The South Korean government responded by condemning Japan's continuing claim to the islands, urging Japan to stop its provocations over the islands and face up to history.
- In late March, the Japanese education ministry approved textbooks for the 2020-2021 academic year that described the islands as "an inherent part of Japan's territory"; the South Korean government quickly protested.
- On 3/26/19 the Japanese government protested South Korean plans to conduct research in waters near the islands, demanding the cancellation of the plans.
- Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan over Batken-Isfara (Territory #874): fatal armed conflict
- Tajik villagers protested a Kyrgyz road construction project that ran though the ethnic Tajik enclave of Vorukh in Kyrgyzstan's Batken province, including territory claimed by Tajikistan. The Tajik government had previously urged Kyrgyzstan not to build the road until the question of sovereignty of the area had been resolved, and Tajiks worried that the road construction would divert irrigation water needed by Vorukh farmers. Ethnic Tajiks and Kyrgyz hurled rocks at each other as the project got underway in mid-March, before several buildings were set ablaze and the violence escalated to gunfire; members of both communities were wounded and two Tajiks were killed. Border guards intervened to stop the violence, the construction project was halted pending further talks, and the residents of two ethnic Kyrgyz villages (Ak-Sai and Kok-Tash) were evacuated to safer areas until the situation calmed down.
- China/India over Arunachal Pradesh/Southern Tibet (Territory #912): non-military provocation
- Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited India's border state of Arunachal Pradesh on 2/9/19 to inaugurate several development projects. China protested, arguing that it had never recognized Indian activities in "the so-called Arunachal Pradesh" and calling it South Tibet; the Indian government responded that it considered the area to be an inalienable and integral part of India.
- India/Pakistan over Kashmir (Territory #922): fatal armed conflict
- Rebels in Indian-administered Kashmir bombed a paramilitary convoy at Pulwama on 2/14/19, killing at least 40 policemen. India blamed Pakistan for funding the rebels and supporting the attack, and responded by summoning the Pakistani ambassador to protest, withdrawing Pakistan's most favored nation trade status, announcing a campaign to isolate Pakistan diplomatically, warning of a "crushing response," and demanding that Pakistan take credible and visible action against the perpetrators of the attack and similar groups operating from Pakistani territory. Pakistan's foreign ministry denied involvement in the incident and declared that it condemns acts of violence anywhere in the world, while Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan demanded proof of Pakistani involvement and warned that Pakistan would retaliate against any Indian military action. UN Secretary General Guterres called on both sides to take immediate steps to reduce tensions, and offered his services to help broker peace.
- After the bombing, both Indian and Pakistani forces increased the intensity of their routine artillery shelling across the border, killing and wounding several soldiers and civilians over several weeks, and sent additional troops to the area. India launched a 2/26/19 airstrike on a site inside Pakistan that it claimed was used for training by Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), the militant group that carried out the bombing; this was the first time in more than 40 years that warplanes from either side had struck targets across the Line of Control. Pakistan then launched an airstrike in Kashmir on 2/27/19, and each side claimed to have shot down at least one of the other's aircraft; Pakistan captured the pilot of a downed Indian plane that crashed in Pakistani territory. Both sides claimed that they did not want the situation to escalate further and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan called for negotiations; leaders and diplomats from the Australia, China, Germany, Russia, the U.S., and other countries and organizations spoke to one or both sides and urged deescalation. India demanded that deescalation could only happen if its captured pilot was released, which Pakistan did on 3/1/19. The Pakistani government then announced on 3/4/19 that it would begin an immediate crackdown on JeM and other militant groups operating from Pakistani soil, although claiming that this was not in response to India's pressure. Dozens of militants were arrested in the next few days, including several relatives of the alleged planners of the bombing, but Pakistan later reported that the dossier of evidence India had presented showed no evidence of Pakistani ties to the attack.
- Cambodia/Thailand over border (Territory #956): action against civilians
- Thai officials approached Cambodian farmers on 2/16/19 and demanded that they stop farming cassava in the disputed territory along the border. The farmers approached Cambodian authorities for assistance, and they worked out a compromise with the Thais: the farmers could wait and harvest the cassava that had already been planted during this growing season, but they would not plant any future crops until the status of the border area was resolved.
- China/Vietnam over Paracel Islands (Territory #946 / Maritime #2810): action against civilians
- Vietnam protested after a Chinese maritime surveillance vessel fired a water cannon and chased a Vietnamese fishing boat near Discovery Reef in the Paracel Islands on 3/6/19. The boat sank after hitting rocks during the chase, and the five fishermen on board clung to the wreckage until they were rescued by another Vietnamese fishing boat. A Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman rejected this account, claiming that a Chinese vessel responded to a distress call and found the sinking boat, whereupon it called for a rescue vessel to save the crew. After investigating the incident, Vietnam demanded that China compensate the fisherman for their lost boat and act to prevent further similar incidents; China responded by reiterating its position that the islands are Chinese, demanded that Vietnamese fishermen stop fishing in the area, and refused to pay compensation for what it considered illegal fishing in Chinese waters.
- Malaysia/Philippines over Sabah (Territory #971): non-military provocation
- The Sabah question has generally been dormant in recent years, but Filipino President Duterte had previously vowed to pursue his country's claim to the territory, and the claim became more overt again during this quarter. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad visited the Philippines on 3/7/19 and claimed that there was no Filipino claim to the territory, but a Filipino government spokesman said later in the day that Mahathir was incorrect and there definitely is an ongoing Filipino claim that dated back to the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos (between 1966-1986). The claim apparently was not discussed during Mahathir's visit.
- France/Vanuatu over Matthew & Hunter Islands (Territory #978 / Maritime #2932): activity in disputed area
- A French warship visited the disputed islands in late January, painting the French flag on a rock and polishing a plaque that had been left there previously to reinforce French sovereignty claims. Vanuatu's foreign minister summoned senior French diplomats to protest, the government of Vanuatu requested talks over the issue, and the New Caledonia separatist movement FLKNS declared that it viewed the islands as part of Vanuatu's heritage. French officials from New Caledonia (the French territory that currently administers the islands) rejected the Vanuatu claims. In mid-March, Vanuatu's political opposition demanded the expulsion of French diplomats from Vanuatu because of the claim; the government rejected this demand and called for the resumption of negotiations over the islands. In mid-March, France invited Vanuatu to send a delegation to Paris for talks over the islands at a mutually agreeable time.
- China/Philippines over Spratly Islands (Territory #984 / Maritime #2802): activity in disputed area
- China opened a "maritime rescue station" in January on Fiery Cross Reef (Kagitingan/Yongshu). A Philippine presidential spokesman initially indicated that his government would not protest, because the rescue station could benefit fishermen from all countries and its presence would not change the Filipino claim to the reef and nearby waters, although Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin later indicated that the government would protest once the Chinese activities could be studied and confirmed.
- The Philippines worked to reinforce its positions on Thitu Island (Pag-asa/Zhongye) in February, repairing an airstrip and expanding barracks and other facilities for troops and fishermen on the island, despite the deployment of as many as 95 Chinese naval, coast guard, and fishing vessels around the island in December. After it became clear that the Philippines would continue with the operations despite the Chinese presence, the number of Chinese vessels was reduced to roughly 40 by late January. Hundreds of Chinese ships swarmed the area in March, though, harassing Filipino fisherman and blocking them from fishing around three sandbars located near Thitu; the Filipino government protested several times.
- U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo assured the Philippines on 3/1/19 that the U.S. was committed to ensuring that the waters of the South China Sea remained open to free international navigation, and restated U.S. commitments under the two countries' Mutual Defense Treaty; any armed attack against Filipino forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the area would trigger the U.S. obligations under that treaty.
- Two former Filipino government officials filed suit against Chinese President Xi Jinping in the International Criminal Court in mid-March, alleging that he had committed crimes against humanity by implementing a plan to control the South China Sea that caused harm to thousands of Filipino fishermen. The Filipino government did not support their filing, arguing that it was undertaking bilateral negotiations over the sea and warning that the ICC would likely dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction (as China had never joined and the Philippines formally withdrew from the court two days after the case was filed).
- Philippines/Taiwan over Spratly Islands (Territory #984 / Maritime #2802): activity in disputed area
- Taiwan responded to reports that the Philippines was reinforcing its positions on Thitu Island (Pag-asa/Zhongye) in February by reiterating its claim to the area and urging that the construction be stopped.
River Claims
Western Hemisphere
- (none)
Europe
- (none)
Africa
- (none)
Middle East
- (none)
Asia and Oceania
- Indian/Pakistani claims over Indus basin waters (River #1924-1926-1928-1930-1932): non-military provocation
- Following a bombing by Kashmiri militants that killed at least 40 policemen, on 2/21/19 India threatened to reduce the flow of water to Pakistan, instead diverting the rivers for the use of Indians in Punjab and Jammu-Kashmir. Indian Infrastructure Minister Nitin Gadkari announced that his country "has decided to stop our share of water which used to flow to Pakistan. We will divert water from Eastern rivers and supply it to our people in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab." The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty gives India control over the eastern Sutlej, Beas and Ravi rivers; and Pakistan control of the western Indus, Jhelum and Chenab; at this time India was using approximately 93-95% of the water it was allotted under the treaty. The threat appeared to mean that India would use dams and other projects to harness the remaining water it was allocated from the Beas and Ravi rivers (the "Eastern rivers" mentioned by Gadkari) rather than interfering with the water that was allocated to Pakistan under the treaty. Recognizing this, Pakistani Minister of Water Resources Khawaja Shumail indicated that Pakistan had "neither concern nor objection" about the Indian plan, which is consistent with the treaty -- although other officials did warn against future attempts to block or divert water that was considered Pakistani under the treaty, and Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi asked the World Bank (guarantor of the treaty) to monitor India's actions.
- China/Myanmar over Irrawaddy River - Myitsone Dam (River #1942): non-military provocation
- China pressured Myanmar to restart work on the Myitsone Dam, which had been suspended by Myanmar in 2011, while thousands of Myanmarese protested against the project and called for it to be ended completely. The controversial dam project was located near the headwaters of the Irrawaddy River in Myanmar, and the initial agreement to build it called for 90% of the generated electricity to be delivered to China and 10% to Myanmar.
Maritime Claims
Western Hemisphere
- (none)
Europe
- Ireland/UK over Dundalk Bay fishing (Maritime #2xxx): action against civilians
- Two fishing boats from Northern Ireland, the Amity and the Boy Joseph, were detained by an Irish fisheries protection vessel on 2/27/19 while fishing for crabs, lobsters, and whelks in Dundalk Bay. The Irish Department of Defense reported that they had been detained for fishing within Ireland's 6-mile claimed territorial waters. The captains of the two boats pleaded guilty in Irish court on 3/1/19, allowing the court to release them and their boats. Nigel Dodds, MP from Belfast North and deputy leader of Northern Ireland's Democratic Unionist Party, demanded an explanation from Ireland; Jim Shannon, another MP from the DUP, argued in the House of Commons that the boats had been illegally seized in "waters that are disputed, waters that belong to this great nation, this British nation." Fishing in the area had only recently become controversial. Since the 1960s, both Ireland and the UK/Northern Ireland had allowed reciprocal access to each other's waters, following an informal understanding known as the Voisinage agreement, but a 2016 decision by Ireland's Supreme Court ruled (in a case brought by Irish fishermen) that this informal agreement did not have sufficient legal standing to allow foreign access to Ireland's natural resources. Irish boats were still allowed to fish in Northern Irish waters, and the Irish government had pledged to pass legislation to formalize the Voisinage agreement in terms that would be acceptable to the Supreme Court, but had not yet done so, as the government lacked sufficient support in the legislature. A spokesman for the UK's Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs warned that the UK "cannot accept the current unequal application of this arrangement indefinitely and continue to explore solutions to reinstate a level playing field as quickly as possible for the benefit of all our fishermen." After the fishermen were released, Ireland's taoiseach (prime minister) Leo Varadkar termed the incident "regrettable" and declared that he had been in contact with the opposition in the legislature and hoped the legislation could be passed quickly, while hoping that the UK would not over-respond to the situation.
Africa
- Mauritania/Senegal over North Atlantic Ocean (Maritime #2xxx): action against civilians
- Mauritania announced in March that it was banning Senegalese fishermen from fishing in Mauritanian waters. This broke the terms of an agreement that had been signed in December 2018 after Mauritania had arrested dozens of Senegalese fishermen and seized their boats. That deal had allowed Senegalese fishermen to catch 50,000 tons of fish each year.
- Kenya/Somalia over Indian Ocean (Maritime #2xxx): activity in disputed area
- After Somalia was said to have made a 2/7/19 presentation to investors in London to auction off exploration rights in disputed water, Kenya summoned its ambassador from Somalia for consultations on 2/16/19 and asked the Somali ambassador to return to his capital for consultations (many sources incorrectly reported this as expelling the Somali ambassador). The Kenyan government labeled the auction "an outrageous and a provocative act of aggression" and labeled anybody involved as "enemies of the State" and "adversaries of the Kenyan people." Somalia responded by denying that it had auctioned any rights in disputed waters (arguing that all the blocks being auctioned were in waters that were clearly Somali regardless of how the ICJ rules), and declaring that it would not do so or take any other unilateral actions before the resolution of their pending dispute at the International Court of Justice.
Middle East
- Cyprus/Turkey over Eastern Mediterranean (Maritime #2698): military activity in disputed area
- Turkish warships accompanied a survey vessel into disputed waters claimed by Cyprus to undertake a seismic survey from 1/26 - 1/29/19; Cyprus protested to the UN on 2/19/19.
- Turkey held a major naval exercise called "Blue Homeland" from 2/27-3/8/19, involving 102 ships in simultaneous drills in the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean, and Black Seas; this was widely seen by observers as a warning to Greece and Cyprus about Turkish maritime interests in the area.
- Israel/Lebanon over Eastern Mediterranean (Maritime #2708): activity in disputed area
- Lebanon protested on 2/5/19 that Israel had licensed a company to exploit oil and gas resources in a 330 sq mi area of disputed waters along the maritime border between the two states. Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri called this "a dangerous matter" and "an infringement of Lebanese sovereignty." Lebanon also warned in a 3/7/19 letter to the UN, EU, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy that Israeli plans for a gas pipeline to Europe must not cross any Lebanese waters.
Asia and Oceania
- China/Japan over East China Sea [non-island] (Maritime #2xxx): activity in disputed area
- Japan protested on 2/6/19 against what appeared to be Chinese test drilling in late January in the East China Sea, in an area where the two states had agreed in 2008 to pursue joint development of natural gas fields (although a formal treaty has not yet been signed and the maritime boundary in the area has not been agreed).
- China/Japan over Okinotorishima (Maritime #2xxx): activity in disputed area
- Japan protested to China after a Chinese research vessel was seen to be operating near Okinotorishima. The Japanese coast guard aircraft that discovered the ship asked it to cease operations, but there was no reply. Note that this case does not qualify as a territorial claim because China does not dispute Japanese sovereignty over Okinotorishima -- it disputes whether the feature is an island (as Japan claims, allowing it to use it as the basis for an EEZ) or a rock (as China claims, which would not allow a Japanese EEZ and would leave the surrounding waters as international).
- India/Sri Lanka over Palk Strait fishing (Maritime #2xxx): action against civilians
- Sri Lanka frequently seized and released Indian fishing boats throughout this quarter, and India seized five Sri Lankan boats that were fishing inside the Indian EEZ. In February the Indian Coast Guard began instructing local fishermen to avoid the area near Sri Lankan waters, where overfishing had depleted fish stocks on the Indian side (creating temptation to cross into Sri Lankan waters), and to fish for tuna in uncontested deep waters elsewhere. The Indian government also began asking fishermen to use GPS devices to ensure that they did not cross into Sri Lankan waters, although the fishermen insisted that the government should provide them with these devices rather than making them pay for the devices themselves.
- Cambodia/Vietnam over Gulf of Thailand (Maritime #2808): activity in disputed area
- It was reported in January that in July 2018, the Vietnamese military had unilaterally installed seven concrete or steel border pillars in an undelimited area of the Gulf of Thailand near the Cambodian island of Koh Ses/Koh Seh. Cambodia had protested and demanded the removal of the pillars. According to a local government official in January 2019, the situation had calmed, and government officials were holding talks over the maritime border in the area -- possibly referring to December 2018 talks in Hanoi between Cambodia's prime minister and Vietnam's president.
- China/Indonesia over Natuna Islands fishing rights (Maritime #2xxx): activity in disputed area
- Seeking to bolster Indonesian sovereignty in waters around the Natuna Islands in the face of increasing violations of the waters by Chinese and Vietnamese fishing boats, Indonesia announced plans to establish fishing grounds in the waters north of the islands, which it termed the North Natuna Sea to distinguish it from the larger South China Sea. The Indonesian government planned to establish a sea port and cold storage facilities on the islands, along with a fuel tanker and satellite and drone technology to assist the operations of Indonesian fishermen in the area.
- Indonesia/Vietnam over Natuna Islands fishing rights (Maritime #2816): activity in disputed area
- Seeking to bolster Indonesian sovereignty in waters around the Natuna Islands in the face of increasing violations of the waters by Chinese and Vietnamese fishing boats, Indonesia announced plans to establish fishing grounds in the waters north of the islands, which it termed the North Natuna Sea to distinguish it from the larger South China Sea. The Indonesian government planned to establish a sea port and cold storage facilities on the islands, along with a fuel tanker and satellite and drone technology to assist the operations of Indonesian fishermen in the area.
- Indonesian patrol boats seized four Vietnamese fishing boats that were operating in Indonesian-claimed waters around the Natuna Islands in late February (2/23 or 2/24/19), and expelled two Vietnamese surveillance ships from the area after they showed "hostile intent" by obstructing the seizure of the four fishing boats.
- Indonesia/Malaysia over fishing (Maritime #2852): action against civilians
- Both countries seized a number of fishing boats from the other country that were allegedly fishing in their territorial waters. The two countries had signed a memorandum of understanding in 2017 calling for the quick release of any seized fishermen, who were likely unaware of the exact location of the international maritime boundary, but recent months had seen the seizure of at least eight Malaysian and nine Indonesian boats that were still being held as of 3/19/19.
- Malaysia/Singapore over airspace and waters (Maritime #2xxx): activity in disputed area
- A Greek-flagged cargo ship collided with an anchored Malaysian Marine Department ship in Singaporean-claimed waters on 2/10/10, leading Singapore to reiterate its demand for all Malaysian vessels to leave the disputed area.
Identity Claims
Western Hemisphere
- (none)
Europe
- Russia/Ukraine over Russians in Eastern Ukraine (Identity #3302): fatal conflict
- There were almost daily incidents of shelling or other cross-border firing throughout this quarter; the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission reports 83,047 ceasefire violations and 1163 explosions due to artillery, mortar, rocket, or tank fire during the quarter, and the Wikipedia daily summary reports at least 32 fatalities (18 Ukrainian military and 14 separatist or pro-separatist forces).
- Albania/Greece over Greeks in Albania (Identity #3322): non-military provocation
- On March 30, Albania's online Government Gazette published a government order calling for the expropriation of Greek-owned houses in the coastal areas around Himara, which would then be converted to tourist usage. The Greek government raised the matter with the European Commission and warned Albania that failing to protect the rights of the Greek minority might lead Greece to block Albania's consideration for EU membership. The order was removed from the online Gazette the next day, without any explanation.
Africa
- (none)
Middle East
- (none)
Asia and Oceania
- Armenia/Azerbaijan claim over Nagorno-Karabakh (Identity #3842): fatal conflict / verbal provocation / military activity in disputed area
- Almost daily accusations of cross-border firing were made throughout this quarter, with at least one Azeri soldier being killed by Armenian shelling in late March.
- Azerbaijan's ambassador to Ukraine declared in an interview with Ukrainian public radio that his country preferred a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but felt that the Armenian government was not making constructive steps toward settlement, and warned that Azerbaijan would use force to restore its territorial integrity if peaceful negotiations failed.
- Azerbaijan held five days of military exercises involving up to 10,000 troops and 500 tanks on 3/11/19, leading Armenia's Foreign Ministry to declare that the exercises "do not contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to peace." While the exercises were underway, Armenia's National Security Council met for the first time in Nagorno-Karabakh, where they described the Azeri exercises as an attempt to pressure Armenia before the next meeting with the Minsk Group mediators, and repeated the recent Armenian demand to include the local government of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) as a party in future talks (both Azerbaijan and the Minsk Group had refused to consider this demand).
Case Summaries: Peaceful Claim Management and Settlement
Claim numbers that end in "xx" indicate claims that have begun since the end of the publicly available data set in question and have not yet been assigned a number; this document will be updated in the future when these numbers have been determined.
Territorial Claims
Western Hemisphere
- Canada/Denmark over Hans Island (Territory #36 / Maritime #2028): bilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- John Robins, a Canadian mining geologist and developer, filed a claim under Canadian law for mineral exploration rights on Hans Island. The Canadian government granted the request on Feb. 4, then notified Denmark the following day, as required under a 2005 agreement that each country must notify the other of any activity involving the island; the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that the two countries had been in contact over the matter. Robins admitted that his main goal was to "stir the pot a bit" and spur efforts to resolve the issue.
- Colombia/Nicaragua over Quita Sueno-Roncador-Serrana (Territory #56 / Maritime #2062): binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- This case remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice during the quarter.
- Guatemala/Belize over Belize (Territory #066): other (preparation for possible adjudication)
- Campaigning intensified as Belizean politicians argued for or against "yes" votes in an April 10 referendum on whether or not the Guatemalan claim to Belize should be taken to the ICJ. The Guatemalan public had previously voted "yes" in 2018. The Belizean opposition People's United Party (PUP) filed a case on 3/16/19 asking the country's Supreme Court for an interim injunction blocking the referendum so the Court could determine the legality of the 2008 agreement that opened the way for the two countries to submit their dispute to the ICJ; a hearing was scheduled for 4/1/19.
- Guyana/Venezuela over Essequibo (Territory #112 / Maritime #2110): binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- This case remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice during the quarter.
- Guyana protested to the UN Security Council in January after a Venezuelan gunboat approached a survey ship that was operating in Guyana's claimed EEZ (but in waters offshore from Guyanese territory claimed by Venezuela) on 12/22/18. ExxonMobil restarted exploration in the area in late February after seeing no further challenge from Venezuelan officials since the original incident.
Europe
- Kosovo/Serbia over Kosovo (Territory #340.3) and Kosovo/Serbia over Presevo Valley (Territory #340.4): other (peacekeeping) / apparent non-binding mediation - EU (no agreement)
- The UNMIK peacekeeping force continued operations during the quarter (see related documents and publications).
- Numerous U.S., German, and EU officials (including President Trump) met with or sent letters to Serbian and/or Kosovan leaders during the quarter, during which they discussed the Kosovo issue and/or tried to end the 100% tariff that Kosovo had placed on Serbian goods to add pressure for a settlement, but none of these meetings qualified as negotiations between officials of both Serbia and Kosovo. Kosovo's Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj insisted on 1/29/19 that he would only remove the tariffs in exchange for the holding of an international conference that would be able to reach a legally binding settlement recognizing Kosovo's independence with its current borders. Kosovo's negotiating team that would take part in any talks on the matter made an unannounced trip to Brussels on 2/5/19 to meet with EU foreign policy officials, potentially setting the agenda for a new round of talks.
- Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic announced on 2/18/19 that Serbia would only return to the negotiating table if Kosovo removed the tariff, but more important, that demarcation between Albanian and Serbian communities was the official Serbian proposal for a peace settlement. Dacic did not specify where the demarcation line would be, as that would be the subject of negotiation, but this was the first time that this demand for revised borders was made part of an explicit proposal for settlement rather than discussed in vague terms as a possibility. Kosovar Prime Minister Haradinaj indicated that no agreement should be allowed to change the current borders, which were respected by both Kosovo and NATO, and that his government had no intention of having Kosovo follow the same path of division as Bosnia and Republika Srpska.
- Reports emerged on 2/22/19 that Kosovo President Thaci and Serbian President Vucic had been holding secret meetings with European Union officials and had reached a working agreement on a document listing 12 principles for settlement, including the issue of borders as well as the status of churches, cultural monuments, the Trepca mining complex, and others. According to several summaries of the reported agreement, one or more of the (predominantly ethnic Albanian-inhabited) areas of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja would be transferred from Serbia to Kosovo; the predominantly ethnic Serb-inhabited area of Mitrovica would either be ceded to Serbia or become a free city; the Trepca mining complex along the border between the Albanian and Serbian areas of Kosovo would be shared by the two states and an American-Chinese-French consortium; and Serbian churches in Kosovo would be given extraterritorial status, among other terms. Responding to these reports, Thaci indicated on 2/26/19 that he would resign if Serbia were to agree to turn over those ethnically Albanian municipalities but the Kosovo parliament rejected the agreement; Haradinaj replied to the reports on 2/27/19 by indicating that Kosovo did not have any pretensions or claims to Serbian territory (indicating that he did not know the context in which Thaci had spoken the previous day), and declaring that Kosovo would never trade its territory (even the ethnically Serbian-populated north) for Serbian recognition of its independence. Kosovo's parliament voted on 3/7/19 to accept a platform for the negotiations that included demands for recognition of Kosovo's independence, UN membership, and full sovereignty over its territory with no executive powers delegated to an association of Serbian municipalities in the north (which had been called for in the 2013 Brussels Agreement); Serbian President Vucic called an urgent session of the national security council in response.
- Croatia/Slovenia over land border and Adriatic Sea (Territory #352 / Maritime #2386): binding adjudication - ECJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- This case remained under consideration at the European Court of Justice during the quarter.
- Greece/Turkey over Aegean Sea islands (Territory #364 / Maritime #2352): bilateral negotiations (functional agreement)
- Greek Prime Minister Tsipras visited Ankara on 2/5/19 to meet with Turkish President Erdogan. In a joint press conference after the meeting, they indicated that they had discussed their Aegean Sea issues and had agreed to take steps to reduce tensions in the area and institute confidence-building measures. Greek and Turkish officials met in Brussels in mid-February and in Antalya on 3/21/19 to lay out the details of these CBMs: bilateral restraint on airspace violations, measures to avoid dangerous naval maneuvers along the maritime border, efficient and immediate contact between leaders in case of incidents, and cooperation to control the flow of illegal migrants in the sea and along the land border.
Africa
- Kenya/Uganda over Migingo Island (Territory #534): bilateral negotiations (procedural agreement)
- The Migingo claim was discussed when the Ugandan and Kenyan foreign ministers met on 3/26/19 and when Ugandan President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni visited Kenya on 3/27/19 for talks with Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta. The talks produced agreement on an action plan to reduce tension and to establish a border commission to address both the Migingo question and the demarcation of the entire border.
- South Sudan/Uganda over border (Territory #541): bilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- The two governments announced on 2/5/19 that in January they had set up a joint committee for the demarcation of the border, but that its operations were being delayed due to lack of funds. Both sides had made frequent accusations of border violations since South Sudan's 2011 independence, culminating in an October 2018 incident where South Sudanese soldiers crossed six kilometers into Uganda and occupied the village of Ngomoromo before Ugandan soldiers demanded their withdrawal. This new committee had been trained by the African Union's Border Programme and was to investigate the border using advanced equipment as well as maps dating back to the colonial era.
- Mauritius/UK over Chagos Archipelago (Territory #574): non-binding inquiry/conciliation - ICJ (decision not complied with by UK)
- The International Court of Justice, by a 13-1 vote, issued a non-binding advisory opinion that supported the Mauritian claim. The ICJ ruled that the UK had acted unlawfully by detaching the Chagos Islands (including Diego Garcia, now the site of a major US military base) from its colony of Mauritius before independence to create a new colony called the British Indian Ocean Territory, and that it was obligated to end its control of the archipelago "as rapidly as possible." The UK Foreign Office noted that this was only an advisory opinion rather than a legally binding judgment, but said it would look carefully at the details of the ruling. Mauritius indicated that if it were to recover sovereignty over the islands it would not seek to remove the US base from Diego Garcia, but the US judge at the ICJ was the only dissenting vote.
- South Sudan/Sudan over Abyei (Territory #576): other (peacekeeping)
- The UNISFA peacekeeping force continued operations during the quarter (see related documents and publications).
- South Sudan/Sudan over border (Territory #576): bilateral negotiations (functional agreement)
- The two countries' Joint Border Commission met in Khartoum from 2/22-2/24/19 and in Addis Adaba from 3/13-3/16/19 to discuss border issues between them, including demarcation of the 80% of the border that has been agreed and delimitation of the 20% that remains disputed. The commission on 3/17/19 accepted the report of the joint Technical Committee on Demarcation regarding the areas that had already been agreed, and instructed the committee to prepare a comprehensive plan for demarcation of these areas.
- The two countries' defense ministers also agreed in Khartoum on 3/18/19 that they would withdraw their forces from the border to set up a buffer zone and open border crossings in cooperation with the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), and indicated that their governments were determined to resolve the remaining sections of the border with the continued assistance of the African Union High Level Implementation Panel.
- Egypt/Sudan over Halaib/Halayeb (Territory #696 / Maritime #2xxx): bilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- News reports speculated that the territorial question had been discussed when Sudanese officials met with their Egyptian counterparts to seek foreign support for their regime against domestic protestors. These included a 1/27/19 meeting between Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Cairo, as well as a 12/27/18 meeting between Egyptian Foreign Minister Shukri and General Intelligence chief Kamel and their Sudanese counterparts in Khartoum.
Middle East
- Iran/Iraq over Shatt al-Arab and nearby territory (Territory #704): bilateral negotiations (procedural agreement)
- Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visited Iraq on 3/12/19 for three days of talks with Iraqi officials, and the the two governments agreed to return to the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Among other provisions, that agreement had settled territorial and river questions over the Shatt al-Arab river along the border, but it was abrogated by Saddam Hussein in 1980. A joint statement released afterward announced "a road map to resolve bilateral issues such as demarcation of their border, ownership of oil fields and dispute over the Shatt al-Arab," as well as covering issues such as fighting terrorism and encouraging tourism.
- Israel/Lebanon over border (Territory #740): other (peacekeeping) / non-binding mediation - USA (no agreement)
- The UNIFIL (see related documents and publications) and UNTSO (see related documents and publications) peacekeeping forces continued operations during the quarter.
- U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Israel and Lebanon in March. While in Lebanon, he offered U.S. mediation to help with demarcation of the Israel-Lebanon border and settlement of the maritime border issue. Pompeo and the Lebanese officials he met agreed on the need to maintain calm along the border, but Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil warned that Lebanon had the right to defend itself and to resist foreign occupation of its land (which it alleged Israel was doing). Lebanese President Michel Aoun met with UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres at the end of March to ask him to help the process of demarcating the Lebanese-Israeli border, apparently including both the land and maritime portions of the border.
- Israel/Syria over Golan Heights (Territory #744): other (peacekeeping)
- The UNDOF (see related documents and publications) and UNTSO (see related documents and publications) peacekeeping forces continued operations during the quarter.
Asia and Oceania
- Japan/Taiwan over Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Territory #820 / Maritime #2714): bilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- Japanese and Taiwanese officials met from 3/5-3/7/19 and 3/26-3/27 regarding fishing rights around the disputed islands during the upcoming fishing season. A 2013 agreement allowed Taiwanese vessels to fish in portions of Japan's EEZ around the islands, without addressing the question of sovereignty over the islands themselves. These talks ended without a substantive agreement, but the officials agreed to meet again in early-mid April to try to settle the issue before the start of the fishing season.
- Japan/Russia over Kuril Islands/Northern Territories (Territory #828 / Maritime #2744): bilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe vowed in early January to push for a peace treaty with Russia that would settle the island claim as part of a formal settlement to the World War II state of war between Japan and Russia. The two countries' foreign ministers met on 1/14/19 to set the stage for a 1/22/19 summit between Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin. After the summit, Abe indicated that the two leaders had confirmed their determination to reach a solution to the territorial claim -- but Putin declared that there was still much "painstaking work" ahead before a settlement could be reached. Putin warned at the summit that any agreement would have to be supported by the Russian public -- which had seen recent demonstrations by nationalists opposed to any territorial cessions to Japan -- and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on 2/4/19 that peace talks would only possible if Japan recognized the outcome of World War II ("including the full recognition of and respect for Russia’s sovereignty, particularly over those islands"). Lavrov and Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono met for talks on 2/16/19 on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, but made no progress over the issue, with Lavrov making clear that Russia had no timetable for settling the issue quickly. Deputy Foreign Ministers Igor Morgulov and Mori Takeo met in Moscow on 3/5/19 for further talks, with Japan reportedly pushing for a draft agreement that could be signed when Putin visits Japan for the G-20 summit in June. Dmitry Peskov, a spokesman for Putin reported on 3/12/19 that very detailed work was underway for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Russia and Japan, but that Russia's emphasis was on ending the state of war rather than settling sovereignty over the islands,. He warned that the process could take years to complete, and indicated that no detailed information would be released along the way.
- Japan/South Korea over Dokdo/Takeshima (Territory #830 / Maritime #2736): bilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- Leaders held telephone talks on 1/4/19 over an incident in December 2018 where a Japanese airplane allegedly flew dangerously close to a South Korean ship and the South Korean ship allegedly locked its targeting radar on the plane. The two reportedly agreed that working-level consultations of military authorities should be undertaken to narrow their differences over the incident.
- Kazakhstan/Kyrgyzstan over border (Territory #844): other (ratification)
- Kyrgyzstan completed ratification of the 12/25/17 border demarcation treaty, as President Sooronbai Jeenbekov formally signed the law of ratification on 1/18/19.
- Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan over Batken-Isfara (Territory #874): bilateral negotiations (functional agreement)
- Diplomats from both states (including both presidents and both prime ministers) held talks over the clashes following road construction in the disputed territory, and Kyrgyz President Sooronbai Jeenbekov and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon agreed on 3/14/19 to launch a joint investigation into the incident and to push forward with talks to settle the border. The two countries' deputy prime ministers, Jenish Razakov of Kyrgyzstan and Azim Ibrohim of Tajikistan, held several days of talks that culminated in a 3/18/19 agreement to establish 24-hour police patrols along the border and for road construction to continue.
- Tajikistan/Uzbekistan over border (Territory #876): other (demarcation progress)
- Delegations from the two governments held talks in Dushanbe on 1/24/19 over border demarcation, following the completion of border delimitation in a March 2018 treaty.
- India/Pakistan over [Indian-administered] Kashmir (Territory #922) and [Pakistani-administered] Kashmir (Territory #922): other (peacekeeping)
- The UNMOGIP peacekeeping force continued operations during the quarter (see related documents and publications).
- Cambodia/Thailand over border (Territory #956): bilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- The Cambodia-Thailand General Border Committee held its 14th annual meeting on Feb. 13-14, discussing general cooperation along the border. It was reported that inspections had discovered 73 of the original (1919-1920) colonial-era border posts, of which 45 were agreed as part of the modern border, with the remaining 28 yet to be approved; negotiations were continuing to approve these posts and to plan the location of additional posts along the 800km border. There have been numerous reports of disagreements and incidents over certain segments of the border in recent years, both around the Preah Vihear temple and elsewhere.
- Cambodia/Laos over border (Territory #963): bilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- The Cambodian Interior Ministry's annual border report was released on 2/14/19, noting that the situation along the border with Laos was calm and that the two sides had held ten meetings in the past year. The two states' foreign ministers chaired a meeting of the Joint Commission for Bilateral Cooperation on 2/21-2/22 in Vientiane to work on the details of a joint request for more detailed colonial-era maps of the border from France, which had ruled both states as part of French Indochina. This followed a 2018 agreement in response to 2017 border incidents, with the goal of settling the location of 24 unmarked border posts in Preah Vihear and Stung Treng provinces (out of 145 total posts). Cambodian Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn complained on 3/6/19 about the delays created by this request for further French maps, though, arguing that the border could have been settled by that time using other maps and that the more detailed maps being requested had been created in 1902 before the current border had been finalized by the French transfer of Stung Treng to Cambodia.
- Cambodia/Vietnam over border (Territory #964): bilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- The Cambodian Interior Ministry's annual border report was released on 2/14/19. This report noted that the situation along the border with Vietnam was calm, and that the two sides had held 233 meetings in the past year. 84% of the border was reported to have been accepted and demarcated, and negotiations were underway to finalize the remaining 16%. Cambodian Prime Minister Samdech Techo Hun Sen and Vietnamese President Nguyen Phu Trong held talks in Phnom Penh on 2/26/19 where they signed a number of treaties on bilateral cooperation and agreed to accelerate negotiations to finalize the rest of the border.
- Philippines/Vietnam over Spratly Islands (Territory #984 / Maritime #2802): bilateral negotiations (functional agreement)
- Filipino Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana visited Vietnam for three days of talks with Vietnamese Minister of Defense General Ngo Xuan Lich in mid-March. They agreed to refrain from arresting and detaining fisherman from the other country who were caught poaching or fishing across the contested maritime border.
River Claims
Western Hemisphere
- Canada/USA over Columbia River (River #1015): bilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- Canadian and American negotiators met in Washington, DC, on 2/27-2/28/19 for the fifth round of talks since May 2018 over updating or replacing the 1964 Columbia River Treaty. Several provisions in the original treaty were set to expire in 2024, which is also the first time at which either party could end the treaty (with ten years of notice). American negotiators sought to change provisions in the original treaty calling for sharing electricity produced by hydroelectric dams on the river, and to increase the amount of water flowing downstream to salmon habitat in U.S. territory; the talks were also covering issues such as flood control.
- Brazil/Paraguay over Parana River - Itaipu Dam (River #1106): bilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- Brazilian and Paraguayan negotiators began meeting this quarter to update the 1973 treaty that established the dam and its binational electricity regime. Debt payments for construction of the dam under the original treaty are scheduled to end in 2022, so the terms for electricity payments need to be renegotiated by 2023. Negotiations toward this new treaty began after the installation of new Brazilian President Bolsonaro, who met with his Paraguayan counterpart Abdo Benitez (who took power in 2018) at least three times during the quarter. Brazil reportedly seeks a reduction in its payments to Paraguay for its excess share of the electricity produced by the dam, which is shared evenly between the two states, while Paraguay reportedly seeks an increase in these payments as well as the ability to sell its excess electricity to third parties such as Chile and Uruguay.
- Bolivia/Chile over Silala River (River #1124): binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- The dispute remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice. On Feb. 15, Chile filed a written reply to a Bolivian counterclaim that had been filed in 2018, where Bolivia had responded to the initial Chilean case by claiming that the Silala waters were fully Bolivian.
Europe
- Hungary/Slovakia over Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (River #1306): binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- This case remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice during the quarter.
Africa
- (none)
Middle East
- Egypt/Ethiopia/Sudan over Nile River - Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (River #1500): bilateral negotiations (no agreement) / multilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- News reports speculated that the dam question had been discussed when Sudanese officials met with their Egyptian counterparts to seek foreign support for their regime against domestic protestors, and that Sudan had agreed to support Egypt against Ethiopia over the dam. These included a 1/27/19 meeting between Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Cairo, as well as a 12/27/18 meeting between Egyptian Foreign Minister Shukri and General Intelligence chief Kamel and their Sudanese counterparts in Khartoum.
- The leaders of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan held a tripartite summit in Addis Adaba on 2/10/19, which continued talks that had been held since January 2019; afterward the three leaders underscored the urgency of reaching a unified view on the dam, although it does not appear that any substantive agreement was reached.
- Iran/Iraq over Shatt al-Arab (River #1727): bilateral negotiations (procedural agreement)
- Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visited Iraq on 3/12/19 for three days of talks with Iraqi officials, and the the two governments agreed to return to the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Among other provisions, that agreement had settled territorial and river questions over the Shatt al-Arab river along the border, but it was abrogated by Saddam Hussein in 1980. A joint statement released afterward announced "a road map to resolve bilateral issues such as demarcation of their border, ownership of oil fields and dispute over the Shatt al-Arab," as well as covering issues such as fighting terrorism and encouraging tourism.
Asia and Oceania
- Afghanistan/Iran over Helmand River (River #1918): bilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- Negotiations over the river began on 1/6/19, reportedly constituting the 19th round of talks since 2004, as the two sought to reach agreement over water sharing on the river that had been left unsettled by a 1973 treaty.
- India/Pakistan over Chenab River (River #1926): bilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- Pakistani officials inspected two Indian hydroelectric projects on the Chenab River from 1/27-1/31, as allowed under the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. These projects are alleged to violate Pakistani rights to Chenab River waters, which the treaty specifies are to be reserved for Pakistan (along with the waters of the Indus and Jhelum) while the waters of the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej are to be reserved for India; India argues that the hydroelectric projects are in compliance with the treaty. At the conclusion of the visit, the Pakistani delegation invited their Indian counterparts to schedule a corresponding visit to the Pakistani side of the basin in March, although the visit was postponed following the February-March crisis during which over 40 Indian police were killed by a bomber and both India and Pakistan launched airstrikes on the other's territory.
- China/Thailand over Mekong River / Rapids blasting (River #1940: bilateral negotiations (possible substantive agreement / possible claim end)
- Thai Foreign Minister Pramudwinai met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang at Chiang Mai in February to discuss Mekong issues. He reported afterward that China had agreed to stop the blasting of Mekong rapids with explosives to open wider shipping lanes. (The story noted, though, that Pramudwinai had made a similar claim in 2017 but the project had continued.)
Maritime Claims
Western Hemisphere
- Colombia/Nicaragua over Continental Shelf (Maritime #2064): binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- This case remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice during the quarter.
Europe
- Russia/Ukraine over Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov (Maritime #2362): binding arbitration - PCA (no agreement/case remains ongoing) / non-binding mediation - Germany (no agreement)
- This case remained under consideration at the Permanent Court of Arbitration during the quarter.
- German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on 1/18/19 to discuss the situation in the strait. Attempts to get Russia to release the 24 Ukrainian sailors who were captured on 11/25/18 were unsuccessful. Maas warned that Russia "must permanently ensure freedom of passage" in the Kerch Strait, called on both Russia and Ukraine to contribute to deescalation of their conflicts, and repeated a previous offer for France and Germany to monitor the Kerch Strait area to allow ship movement -- Lavrov said that Russia had agreed to this in December, but that the observers were not yet in place.
Africa
- Ghana/Togo over Gulf of Guinea (Maritime #2xxx): bilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- Negotiators were scheduled to hold a fourth round of talks in mid-February after the first three rounds had proven unsuccessful. Oil/gas exploration in the waters that Ghana claimed had reportedly been stopped since Togolese naval forces increased their operations in the area in December 2018. A Ghanaian government spokesman indicated in early February that if bilateral talk remained unable to settle the matter, his government would consider itself forced to turn to international arbitration.
- Kenya/Somalia over Indian Ocean (Maritime #2xxx): non-binding mediation - Ethiopia (no agreement) / binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- The case remained under review at the International Court of Justice.
- Kenyan officials briefed the UN Security Council and the African Union in late February regarding the apparent Somali decision to auction oil exploration rights in disputed waters, seeking to draw their attention to the situation. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed offered to mediate the dispute after meeting separately in Addis Adaba with Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta on 3/1-3/2/19 and Somali President Mohamed Farmaajo on 3/5/19. He chaired a meeting between Farmaajo and Kenyatta in Nairobi on 3/6/19, during which the leaders did not sign any documents or reach any substantive agreements but reportedly agreed to restore diplomatic relations, work towards peace, and take measures to address the issues that had raised tensions. Reports during this quarter suggested that Kenya was becoming concerned about the likelihood that it would lose the ICJ case after having lost in its preliminary objections over the case, and was seeking to settle the issue out of court before the ICJ could rule. Kenya's Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr Monica Juma, had indicated that Kenya was open to a negotiated settlement of the issue, although the Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Macharia Kamau, described reports of Kenyan diplomatic pressure on Somalia as "pure speculation," and Farmaajo was the subject of intense domestic criticism for meeting with Kenyatta over the issue before the ICJ could rule in the case.
Middle East
- Israel/Lebanon over Eastern Mediterranean (Maritime #2708): non-binding mediation - USA (no agreement)
- U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Israel and Lebanon in March, following a year of mediation efforts by U.S. diplomat David Satterfield (including a meeting with Lebanese leaders in early March). While in Lebanon, he offered U.S. mediation to help with demarcation of the Israel-Lebanon border and settlement of the maritime border issue. Pompeo and the Lebanese officials he met agreed on the need to maintain calm along the border, and Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil declared that Lebanon would make all necessary efforts "to reach an honourable agreement for Lebanon that preserves its rights." Lebanese President Michel Aoun met with UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres at the end of March to ask him to help the process of demarcating the Lebanese-Israeli border, apparently including both the land and maritime portions of the border.
Asia and Oceania
- Malaysia/Singapore over airspace and waters (Maritime #2xxx): bilateral negotiations (functional agreement)
- The foreign ministers of Malaysia and Singapore met on Jan. 8 to discuss the issue, which began in October 2018. Singapore is protesting Malaysia's extension of its maritime claims in the waters around the Malaysian port of Johor Baru into what it considers Singaporean waters, while Malaysia is protesting Singapore's control over nearby airspace under a 1974 treaty. The 1/8/19 meeting ended with an agreement to create a working group to handle the maritime issue, to convene a meeting of transport ministers to handle the airspace issue, and to suspend the most controversial airspace policies for at least one month.
- The first meeting of the Joint Ministerial Committee was postponed after Johor Baru chief minister visited a Malaysian vessel in Singaporean-claimed waters on 1/9/19, but Malaysia's Economic Affairs minister met with Singaporean leaders on 1/14/19 for "a frank and positive discussion on bilateral issues." The two countries' transport ministers met on 1/24/19 for a "heart to heart discussion" of the airspace issue that resulted in proposals to be discussed with their respective governments, as well as an agreement to suspend the controversial measures until March 31 to allow more time for negotiations.
- The joint working group finally held its first meeting in Putrajaya on 1/28/19, which was described afterward as "constructive discussions." Talks continued on an almost daily basis, leading to a 2/14/19 statement by Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah that “The discussions are very positive and we are about to resolve the issues on the port lines.” By early March, the joint working group's talks had advanced enough that they were reportedly planning to submit their recommendations to the two governments later in the month.
- The two foreign ministers met on 3/14/19 and announced afterward that they had agreed to suspend the implementation of their overlapping maritime claims around the port, temporarily returning to the claimed limits before both sides expanded their claims in late 2018. Furthermore, no government vessels would anchor in the disputed area, no new commercial activities would be permitted and existing activities would be suspended, Malaysian and Singaporean vessels would operate in the area in accordance with UNCLOS and other relevant international law, and a joint committee would be set up within a month to ensure that these recommendations are implemented. Once that committee is set up, negotiations for maritime boundary delimitation in the area would begin; if bilateral talks should fail to produce a settlement, the issue would be resolved with the help of a third party settlement procedure.
Identity Claims
Western Hemisphere
- (none)
Europe
- Cyprus/Turkey over Turks in TRNC (Identity #3xxx): other (peacekeeping)
- The UNFICYP peacekeeping force continued operations during the quarter (see related documents and publications).
- Russia/Ukraine over Ukrainians in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Identity #3302): binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- This case remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice during the quarter.
Africa
- (none)
Middle East
- (none)
Asia and Oceania
- Armenia/Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh (Identity #3842): non-binding mediation - OSCE (procedural agreement)
- The OSCE's Minsk Group of mediators coordinated a meeting between Armenian and Azeri ministers in Paris on 1/16/19. The ministers discussed a variety of issues, agreed to meet again in February, and agreed on the need to take concrete measures to prepare their respective populations for peace.
- Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian then met informally at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on 1/22/19, discussing the situation but not making any progress in settling the issue. OSCE Chairperson Miroslav Lajcak planned a visit to both Armenia and Azerbaijan for early-mid March to pursue peaceful settlement in line with the Minsk Group mediation; he visited Azerbaijan on 3/5/19, stressing that the status quo was unacceptable and seeking progress toward settlement.
- Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan suggested in late February that the format of the talks should be expanded by adding the ethnic Armenian government in Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) so that it could represent its own interests rather than relying on Armenia -- this was quickly rejected by Azerbaijan and by Russia (co-chair of the Minsk group), and the OSCE mediators insisted on meeting without preconditions such as this.
- Another meeting was held between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on 3/29/19 in Vienna with representatives of the OSCE Minsk group, which both sides described as constructive, and both leaders recommitted to strengthening the cease-fire in the disputed region and improving mechanisms for direct communication and humanitarian measures.
Case Summaries: Potential Claims
These cases have some elements of a territorial, river, maritime, or identity claim, but do not currently meet the complete ICOW definition. Typical reasons include the lack of explicit government statements (some of these demands were made by private citizens and not supported overtly -- or even disavowed publicly -- by their governments) or the lack of an explicit demand (e.g. governments stating the need for a route to the sea or better water security without stating the territory or river where this was sought). These cases are worth monitoring as potential future claims, should the situation or the demands made by the potential challenger state change, and they also help to illustrate ICOW coding rules regarding what does and does not qualify as codable claims.
Territorial Claims
- Albania/Kosovo over Kosovo?: no explicit contention
- After Albania and Kosovo signed a 12/27/18 agreement to unify border control, setting up joint crossing points and moving toward a common economic space, Serbian officials warned in January of an Albanian attempt to annex Kosovo. Former UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Christian Schwarz-Schilling warned in a 3/2/19 Deutsche Welle editorial that Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama and his government had never fully abandoned the idea of unification with Kosovo, and that it was considered to be a real option if freeing Kosovo from Serbian domination took too long. This does not currently qualify as a territorial claim because there is no evidence that Albanian government officials are explicitly demanding the annexation of Kosovo, but it is worth monitoring in case such demands are eventually made.
- Armenia/Georgia border?: no specific claim
- Armenian President Armen Sarkisian and Georgian President Salome Zourabichvilli met in Yerevan, during which they discussed many issues. Zurabishvili issued a statement afterward noting that they had agreed to pursue the settlement of their border issue: “The time has come for our countries to complete the border delimitation. The delimitation process should not last that long between friends.” There does not appear to be any current disagreement over the location of the border, in Dzhavaketia or elsewhere, that would be codable as an explicit demand to specific territory.
- Bangladesh/Myanmar over St. Martin's Island?: no explicit contention
- The government of Bangladesh protested in February that a number of Myanmarese government web sites showed St. Martin's Island (a Bangladeshi territory) as part of Myanmar. Similar protests had been made in October 2018, leading Myanmar's ambassador to acknowledge that showing the island as belonging to Myanmar was a mistake, and leading to a government note reporting that all such links had been removed from the relevant web sites. The responses in 2018 clearly indicate that there was no explicit Myanmarese claim to the island at that time, but we will continue to monitor this case, as the appearance of further government web sites showing the island as Myanmarese suggests that not everything was fully settled.
- Belarus/Russia over Belarus?: no explicit contention
- Belarusian President Lukashenko met with Russian President Putin at least three times during this quarter for talks that were vaguely described as covering "Belorusian-Russian cooperation." Observers speculated that the talks could involve Russia granting economic advantages to Belarus in exchange for furthering of the ties between the two states under the 1999 "Union State of Russia and Belarus," potentially even going as far as Russian annexation of Belarus. A Russian government spokesman had denied in December that Belarus could become part of a single state with Russia, though, and Lukashenko insisted in January that Belarusian sovereignty is "holy" and Belarus would never become part of Russia. Given these statements, there is no evidence of the type of explicit Russian demand for sovereignty over Belarus that would be needed for this to qualify as a territorial claim.
- Canada/USA over "Northwest Angle"?: no official government actor
- A White House petition was submitted calling for the transfer of this geographical oddity from the U.S. to Canada. The territory, which juts into Lake of the Woods along the border, is only accessible by land from Canada (it can only be accessed from the U.S. by boat), and was originally given to the U.S. due to a mapmaking error while drawing the border after the American Revolution and the War of 1812. This does not qualify as a territorial claim because the petition was started anonymously by a private citizen, and the Canadian government did not explicitly support the petition or demand the territory. The petition was ultimately closed without any action being taken because it did not receive enough signatures to require a government response (it only received 5,554 signatures in the 30-day period of eligibility and would have needed 100,000 to require a response).
- China/Kyrgyzstan over border territory?: no explicit contention
- The Kyrgyz government on 1/9/19 responded to rumors that Kyrgyzstan was too dependent on China and that it would have to cede territory if it should be unable to pay its debts. This response described China as a "reliable partner and kind neighbor." This does not qualify as a territorial claim because these were only rumors, and the Chinese government had shown no sign of making such demands (either now or for a future situation where debts went unpaid); this also does not qualify because it is not clear which territory would be involved.
- Greece/Macedonia "name dispute": no explicit contention
- Macedonia's parliament amended its constitution on 1/11/19 to change the official name of the state to the Republic of North Macedonia, as required by the 2018 Prespa/Prespes Agreement with Greece. Greece then ratified the agreement on 1/25/19, and the new name became official on 2/12/19. That agreement officially ended Greek government concerns that Macedonia sought to annex the Greek province of Macedonia, although large protests in Greece argued that it did not go far enough in assuring this. This did not qualify as a territorial claim because (despite the Greek concerns) Macedonian policymakers did not make explicit claims to Greek territory.
- Iranian claims to parts of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia?: no specific claim
- During a 2/11/19 speech at an event commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated that during “the traitor Qajar dynasty, 205 years ago," large portions of lands in the Caucasus were separated from northern Iran (which he described as "the Mother Land"). This was seen as a nod to Iranian nationalists who sought the return of these lands, although the statement was not explicit enough to indicate that a territorial claim is the official government policy, nor did it specify the exact lands involved.
- Ireland/UK over Ireland?: no official government actor
- A UK Government petition was submitted in January calling for Ireland to be integrated into the UK for the first time since its 1922 independence, as a solution to the Brexit border problem. This does not qualify as a territorial claim because the petition was started anonymously by a private citizen, and the British government has not explicitly supported it or otherwise demanded the territory. If the petition receives 10,000 signatures within six months (by 7/9/19), the British government would be required to respond to it, and if it receives 100,000 signatures during that period it would need to be considered for possible debate in Parliament, but the petition was quickly removed from the site. This does not qualify as a territorial claim because it was posted by a private citizen, and the fact that the government quickly removed the petition indicates that there was no governmental support for even discussing the idea.
- Ireland/UK over Northern Ireland?: no official government actor
- With the future of the economic border between Ireland and Northern Ireland left uncertain due to last-minute negotiations over Brexit, Mary Lou McDonald -- leader of the Sinn Fein party in Northern Ireland -- suggested that a popular vote should be held to consider unifying Northern Ireland with Ireland if a satisfactory solution to the border could not be reached. This does not currently qualify as a territorial claim because the government of Ireland has not supported her or made similar demands for the annexation of Northern Ireland following Brexit; because she is a citizen of Northern Ireland, this could only be considered a separatist demand unless the Irish government begins to make explicit demands.
- Italy vs. Croatia/Slovenia over Trieste/Istria/Dalmatia?: no official government actor
- On 2/11/19 the European Parliament's President Antonio Tajani, a conservative Italian politician, raised fears of Italian territorial claims when speaking at an event commemorating a World War II-era massacre near the border between today's Italy and Slovenia: “Long live Trieste, long live Italian Istria, long live Italian Dalmatia, long live Italian exiles.” The statement was quickly protested by both the Croatian and Slovenian governments, which accused him of "falsifying history" and "historical revisionism." Tajani responded that his statement "was in no way a territorial claim. I was referring to the Istrian and Dalmatian Italian-language exiles, their children and grandchildren, many of whom were present at the ceremony.” He later met Croatian and Slovenian MEPs to apologize and express his "deep regret" over the statements. This does not qualify as a territorial or identity claim because Tajani (despite his European Parliament role) is not authorized to make Italian foreign policy, so even if he did intend to argue that the areas should be Italian or that the ethnic Italian people who had lived there deserved special treatment, he could not make this argument on behalf of the government.
- Israel/Jordan over airspace: other (not over territorial sovereignty)
- Israel officially opened the new Ramon Airport outside Eilat, near the Jordanian border. According to Jordan's state-run al-Mamlaka television, the Jordanian government had protested this airport's location as a violation of Jordanian air sovereignty. This does not qualify as a territorial claim because the Jordanian complaint only involves airspace (for the flight paths to and from the airport), and not sovereignty over the territory where the airport itself is located.
- Kenya/Tanzania over Lake Victoria border?: other (poorly marked rather than disputed border)
- Tanzanian officials arrested fifteen Kenyan fishermen from Remba Island on 1/31/19 for fishing illegally in Lake Victoria. This followed similar incidents in late 2018, as Kenya arrested 16 Tanzanian fisherman in November and Tanzania arrested 26 Kenyans in December. The fishermen claimed that the border in the lake was not well known and should be marked clearly to prevent such incidents in the future. This does not qualify as a territorial claim because there does not appear to be any disagreement between the governments over the location of the border, just a question of marking the border better so local fishermen know exactly where it is.
- Moldova/Transnistria over Varnita?: no official government actor
- Transnistria claimed in January that the village of Varnita should be under its jurisdiction, not Moldova's. This does not qualify as a territorial claim because Transnistria is not a recognized nation-state.
- Syria/Turkey over "security zone"?: no explicit contention
- In late January, the Syrian government protested against Turkey's military presence in northern Syria as a violation of the 1998 Adana Protocol, in which Syria agreed to stop the Kurdish PKK from organizing in Syrian territory and both sides agreed to closer security cooperation; Turkey argued that the 1998 protocol justified the Turkish presence in northern Syria because Syria was not acting effectively against Kurdish groups there. Syria argued that Turkey was "occupying Syrian territory via terrorist organisations linked to it or directly via Turkish military forces." This does not currently qualify as a territorial claim because Turkey does not explicitly claim sovereignty over northern Syria, only justifying its presence there as a way to protect Turkish territory from Kurdish forces and from spillover from the Syrian civil war.
- Western Sahara: no official government actor
- The UN envoy for the Western Sahara dispute held talks in Switzerland in late March 2019. The Western Sahara issue does not qualify as a territorial claim because there is no state challenger. Morocco currently occupies and administers the territory, while Algeria allegedly backs the Polisario movement seeking to liberate the area from Morocco but does not formally claim Western Sahara as Algerian territory.
Maritime Claims
- Argentina/China over fishing?: no official government actor
- An Argentine coast guard cutter, the Mantilla, fired warning shots at the Chinese trawler Hua Xiang 101 for fishing illegally in Argentine waters on 3/2/19. The trawler did not have its Automatic Identification System turned on while fishing one km inside Argentine waters; when approached by the Mantilla it turned off its lights and attempted to flee to international waters, then made aggressive moves toward the Argentine vessel that prompted the warning shots. The Chinese Fisheries Management Bureau refused to reveal the trawler's ownership. Chinese media reports claimed that Argentina had declined to provide the exact coordinates of its maritime zone, leading to incidents such as this where fishermen are not fully certain where Argentine waters begin. This does not seem to qualify as a maritime claim because there is no clear Chinese government involvement.
- China/USA over South China Sea navigation?: no explicit contention
- The U.S. destroyer USS Campbell conducted a Jan. 7 freedom of navigation operation by sailing within 12 miles of the disputed Paracel (Xisha) Island chain, which China controls and both Vietnam and Taiwan claim. China protested this as a violation of Chinese sovereignty, and sent military ships and aircraft to identify the U.S. vessel and warn it to leave Chinese waters. The destroyers USS Spruance and USS Preble conducted another freedom of navigation operation on 2/11/19 by sailing within 12 miles of Mischief Reef, one of the islands/reefs in the Spratly chain that China had been building up and fortifying in recent years; China protested the incident as a series of "tricks" and claimed that its navy had warned off the American vessels. U.S. B-52 bombers flew over the South China Sea on 3/5/19 and 3/14/19 as part of an ongoing campaign to demonstrate freedom of airspace above the islands. Freedom of navigation operations like this, where the U.S. is seeking to ensure that navigation rights are not limited, do not qualify as maritime claims unless there is an explicit disagreement over navigation in specific waters.
- Indonesia/Palau over maritime border?: no explicit contention
- The two countries held their sixth round of talks on maritime border delimitation in Manila, Philippines, from March 20-21. This does not qualify as a claim, though, because these were cooperative negotiations to determine the exact location of the maritime border; there was no evidence of the sort of competing demands that would qualify as a maritime claim.
- Maldives/Sri Lanka over fishing?: no official government actor
- Maldivian security officials seized four Sri Lankan fishing boats with 24 crew members in early March for fishing in Maldivian waters. The Sri Lankan government contacted the Maldivian government to attempt to secure their release. This does not seem to qualify as a maritime claim because there was no clear Sri Lankan government involvement in the incident or support for the fishermen's activities.
Identity Claims
Identity claims have another requirement that can keep some potential claims from qualifying for the data set. Rather than reinvent the wheel by trying to create our own new list of ethnic groups that are shared by two or more countries, we use the groups as identified by the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) and Transborder Ethnic Kin (TEK) data sets, which are the leading data sources for scholars of ethnic conflict. This means that any events involving groups that are not coded by those data sets can not be coded in our data set -- which typically occurs in situations where the group in question has very few members in the potential target state, or where the group members are not politically organized in the target state or do not share loyalty to the group beyond their borders.
- Albanians (TEK #203): Albania/North Macedonia (or Kosovo/North Macedonia): no official government actor
- A new language law came into force in North Macedonia on 1/15/19, making Albanian the country's second official language. There had been a longstanding controversy over the rights of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, although this was primarily a domestic controversy between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians -- it does not currently qualify as an identity claim because neither Albania's nor Kosovo's government has been making explicit demands about the treatment of the ethnic Albanians.
- Armenians (TEK #204): Armenia/Kazakhstan: no official government actor
- News sources reported "ethnic conflict" between Kazakhs and Armenians following a 12/31/18 brawl at a bar in Karaganda, Kazakhstan, during which several ethnic Armenians allegedly killed a Kazakh man. 200 people subsequently rallied outside the police department to demand justice, and social media posts began to target the Armenian community. The EPR data set does not code an Armenian minority in Kazakhstan (which would be needed for an identity claim to be codable), and the Armenian government did not make any demands that might have qualified as a claim; the two governments discussed the issue and both sought to downplay the ethnic angle behind the incident.
- Baloch/Baluchis (TEK #362): Iran/Pakistan: no official government actor
- Balochi militants killed 27 Iranian Revolutionary Guards in a 2/13/19 bombing. Iran reported that the bombers included at least three Pakistanis and blamed Pakistan for the attack, demanding that the Pakistani government stop sheltering and supporting the militants. The two countries' foreign ministers spoke on 2/17/19, and Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan spoke with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in late March; Pakistan denied involvement, declared that it would not allow its soil to be used for any attacks against Iran, and expressed willingness to cooperate with Iran to probe the attack. This situation could qualify as an identity claim if Pakistan were to make explicit demands over Iran's treatment of the Baloch, but there has been no evidence of this so far.
- Bengali/Muslims (TEK #352): Bangladesh/India: no official government actor
- The lower house of India's parliament on 1/8/19 passed the Citizenship Amendment Bill, which would grant residency and citizenship rights to Buddhist, Christian Hindu, Jain, Parsi, and Sikh immigrants from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, but not Muslims. Some supporters of the bill admitted that it was intended to protect the political supremacy of Hindus in India against a rising Muslim threat. This is related to a 2018 revocation of citizenship for up to 4 million (mostly Muslim) immigrants in the Indian state of Assam who could not prove that they had lived in India before a massive wave of Bangladeshis fled the 1971 war in their homeland. The passage of the 2019 bill led to widespread protests in Assam, although it would still need to pass the upper house before it could become law; India's Supreme Court indicated that it could not take up a case over the bill until it passed the upper house and became law. This does not currently qualify as an identity claim because the government of Bangladesh has not yet protested or made any demands over the treatment of Muslims in Assam; in the 2018 case Bangladesh indicated that the 4 million involved were not Bangladeshi citizens and declined to take any codable action on their behalf.
- Bulgarians (TEK #208): Bulgaria/North Macedonia: other (concerns name of group rather than treatment/status)
- Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ekaterina Zaharieva warned on 1/15/19 that Bulgaria would only support North Macedonian entry into NATO and the EU if (among other demands) North Macedonia agreed not to steal Bulgaria's history or to deny the countries' shared history. The Bulgarian government considers Macedonians to be ethnic Bulgarians and the Macedonian language to be a dialect of Bulgarian, and Bulgaria was demanding a treaty that would allow Bulgarian politicians to edit Macedonian history books to reflect this view. This situation doesn't currently qualify as an identity claim because it concerns the name of the group in question, not the treatment of the group (as might be the case if Bulgaria was demanding that the North Macedonian government treat ethnic Bulgarians better).
- Catalans (no TEK number): France/Spain: no official government actor
- 41 French senators protested Spain's ongoing detention and trial of 14 Catalan separatist leaders, calling it "repression" and "a real attack on democratic rights and freedoms," and urging the European Union to get involved "to restore the conditions for dialogue in order to find political solutions to a political problem." The senators insisted that they were not taking the side of Catalan independence, but regardless, the French government disavowed the statement -- so there is no codable French government support for Catalan separatism. It is also worth noting that the EPR data set only includes the Catalan people in Spain, not France.
- Chinese (TEK #500): China/Kyrgyzstan: no official government actor
- Hundreds of demonstrators held 1/7/19 and 1/17/19 rallies in Bishkek to protest what they termed the increasing number of Chinese migrants in Kyrgyzstan, and to demand that undocumented Chinese migrants be sent back to China and Chinese nationals be prevented from achieving Kyrgyz citizenship through marriage. This does not currently qualify as an identity claim because the Kyrgyz government did not take their side (the government responded by pointing out all the positive benefits from its relationship with China) and because the Chinese government did not make any demands over the status of ethnic Chinese in Kyrgyzstan. A Kyrgyz foreign ministry official met with the demonstrators on 1/17 and insisted that all Chinese migrants were in the country legally, while President Sooronbai Jeenbekov warned on 1/11 that "those trying to disrupt Kyrgyz-Chinese partnership" will face legal prosecution.
- Crimean Tatars (no TEK number): Russia/Ukraine: no codable EPR/TEK group
- Ukraine protested against alleged Russian violations of the rights of Tatars in Crimea. This does not qualify as a codable identity claim, though, because the EPR data set does not code Crimean Tatars as being present in Ukraine after Russia annexes Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, the EPR and TEK data sets code Crimean Tatars (present only in Ukraine from 1991-2014 and only in Russia thereafter) as distinct from Tatars (TEK #231), which are coded as present in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan.
- Kazakhs (TEK #218): China/Kazakhstan: no official government actor
- Kazakhstan on 1/9/19 confirmed December reports that China would allow more than 2000 ethnic Kazakhs from Xinjiang to renounce their citizenship and leave the country, and indicated that they would be allowed to apply for Kazakh citizenship or residency. News stories report that the Chinese campaign to "de-radicalize" Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other minorities in Xinjiang was quite controversial in Kazakhstan, but that the government refrained from publicly criticizing China, which would be necessary for this situation to qualify as an identity claim.
- Kirgiz/Kyrgyz (TEK #219): China/Kyrgyzstan: no official government actor
- Hundreds of demonstrators held 1/7/19 and 1/17/19 rallies in Bishkek that, among other things, complained about the treatment of ethnic Kyrgyz in China's campaign to "de-radicalize" Uyghurs, Kyrgyz, and other minorities in Xinjiang. The Kyrgyz foreign ministry did report on 1/9/19 that it had sent representatives on a tour of Xinjiang led by Chinese officials (along with representatives from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) that had toured some of the "reeducation camps" (described in its press release as “vocational education and training centers”) and interviewed some of the camp residents, without making any protest over the conditions they saw there.
- Kurds (TEK #302): Syria/Turkey: no official government actor
- After U.S. President Donald Trump declared that all U.S. forces would be withdrawn from Syria, the Syrian Kurds -- a central element in the Syrian Democratic Forces that had worked with the U.S. against ISIS -- sought support from the Syrian government against a feared Turkish incursion. The Turkish government rejected U.S. requests to focus its incursion solely on remaining ISIS forces in Syria and bypass the Kurds, because it sees the Syrian Kurdish YPG forces as closely tied to the PKK Kurdish forces in Turkey that it considers terrorists. This does not currently qualify as an identity claim, because the Turkish government is not making any explicit demands against the Syrian government -- it is just threatening the Syrian Kurds; a claim could begin if Turkey starts to make such demands in light of the Kurdish attempt to work with the Syrian government.
- Rohingya/Muslim Arakanese (TEK #356): Bangladesh/Myanmar: no codable EPR/TEK group
- There is a great deal of disagreement over the treatment of the Muslim Rohingya in Myanmar, many of whom have fled to Bangladesh in the face of severe repression that some have termed genocide. This currently doesn't qualify as a codable identity claim, though, because the EPR and TEK data sets don't include a relevant group in both states (the group known popularly as Rohingya is coded by EPR and TEK as "Muslim Arakanese", which is coded in Myanmar as TEK #356 along with the group "Indians"; the only other states coded with members of TEK group #356 are India and Mauritius).
- Uighur/Uyghurs (TEK #241): China/Turkey: no codable EPR/TEK group
- On 2/10/19, Turkey demanded that China close the "reeducation camps" where it was detaining large numbers of Uyghurs, calling them "concentration camps" and "a great stain on humanity." This does not qualify as an identity claim, though, because the data set is based on ethnic/identity groups as determined by the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set. The EPR data only lists Uyghurs as present in China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (and no ethnic groups of any type are shared by both Turkey and China).
http://www.paulhensel.org/rev2019q1s.html
First published: 22 May 2019 (Last updated 25 January 2020)
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